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Freedom from Value Judgments: 
 
Value-Free Social Science and Objectivity in Germany, 1880-1914 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation addresses a central issue in the methodological debates that raged in the German academy 
around the turn of the twentieth century.  The idea of “value-free” social science, or “value-freedom,” was passed 
down to subsequent decades as a way of thinking about the objectivity of knowledge, but because of its name it has 
been widely misunderstood.  Moreover, it has been seen either as a clever invention of the polymath scholar Max 
Weber, or as some form of ideology masquerading as neutrality (or both).  Instead, a contextually sensitive historical 
analysis of the work of five German and Austrian scholars—Carl Menger, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Jellinek, 
Hermann Kantorowicz, and Gustav Radbruch—demonstrates that value-freedom was a complex doctrine with 
widely ramified sources in the intellectual history of economics, sociology, and law. It was accepted on a variety of 
grounds and by individuals of differing personalities, politics, philosophical training, and academic disciplines. 
“Value-free” social science in the work of these men meant anything but the removal of values from 
scholarly consideration.  Instead, its advocates promoted a focus on the subjectivity and the will of the individual, 
goal-directed agent.  Value-freedom took the form of several interrelated distinctions, between theory and practice, 
fact and value, “is” and “ought,” means and ends; but each of these scholars coupled his preferred formulation with 
the shared view that human values are incapable of rational justification.  They insisted on the importance of the 
analytical separation of the positive and normative but recognized a legitimate role for the social sciences in the 
positive discussion of values.  However, the attempt to bridge the subjective world of human values and the 
objective world of social scientific fact foundered for most of them on the inherently subjective choices made by the 
individual scholar, leading them to face the possibility that value-freedom could not provide a successful theory of 
objectivity without reformulation.  The dissertation spans three decades and several disciplines, including the work 
of important jurists whose social scientific credentials have been neglected owing to their disciplinary backgrounds. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Value-Freedom and Objectivity in Max Weber’s Germany 
 
This is a study of a badly named but highly influential concept.  In the course of the 
twentieth century, many European and especially American practitioners of social science who 
were concerned to justify the objectivity of their work began to refer to it as “value-free.”
1 
Although never lacking critics, the term gained popularity among practicing social and natural 
scientists and even among philosophers of science in the two decades after the Second World 
War, and the ostensible idea behind it achieved a kind of commonsense status.
2 Like many terms 
that suddenly enjoy a vogue, the predicate “value-free” was not given a rigorous definition, but 
its meaning seemed readily apparent.  The social or natural sciences would reach the desired 
“objective” status when practicing scientists
3 had suitably excluded their values from their 
analyses and proceeded to deal solely with the facts they were endeavoring to explain. 
  Or so it appeared.  Of course, the complete removal of values from any science, let alone 
from social science, was impossible; anyone claiming to be a practitioner of “value-free” social 
science in this commonsense understanding of the term was mistaken.  For as a wide body of 
philosophical literature has shown in the subsequent decades, it is not possible even for natural 
scientists to set their values aside completely.  At a minimum, those that came to be known as 
                                                 
1 See the essays on particular social science disciplines in Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Science, Vol. 7, The Modern Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), e.g. Dorothy Ross, “Changing Contours of the Social Science Disciplines,” 217-218; James Farr, “Political 
Science,” 316-318; Robert C. Bannister, “Sociology,” 335, 346; Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 429. 
2 On the postwar history of the idea, principally from a philosophy of science perspective, see Heather E. Douglas, 
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 46-65. 
3 Throughout this dissertation, the words “science” and “scientist” are used as translations of the German 
Wissenschaft and Wissenschaftler, to indicate an “organized body of knowledge” and the scholars who produce it, 
rather than according to the common English meaning of “natural science” or “natural scientist.” Science and 
scholarship are treated as synonyms. This usage is purely for purposes of convenience and does not imply any 
identification of the social sciences with the natural sciences.  
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“epistemic” or “cognitive” values, such as “accuracy, consistency, predictive and explanatory 
scope, simplicity and fruitfulness in generating research puzzles…, instrumental efficacy… or 
‘prediction and control,’… [a] high degree of falsifiability,” and many others, were necessary to 
determine what counted as an effective theory.
4 A chorus of critics has argued, often plausibly, 
that even this distinction between epistemic values internal to the sciences on the one hand, and 
personal or social values on the other, is impossible to draw consistently.
5 
The philosopher Hilary Putnam offers an important case in point.  His work contends that 
the concept of a clear-cut dichotomy or dualism (as opposed to a softer “distinction”) between 
the categories of “fact” and “value,” which lies at the heart of the “value-free” science ideal, is 
not justifiable, owing especially to linguistic and epistemic considerations.  The “practices of 
scientific inquiry upon which we rely to decide what is and what is not fact, suppose values.”   
Because an “enormous amount of our descriptive vocabulary” is necessarily “entangled” with 
our values, description and valuation are interdependent rather than separable.  For these reasons 
he criticizes the attempt, which he dates to the early 1930s, of many economists to reject the idea 
that they should explicitly concern themselves with the welfare of society, and to adopt instead a 
“value neutral criterion of optimal economic functioning,” epitomized by Pareto optimality.  
Instead, he is sympathetic to the position of “second phase classical [economic] theory,” like that 
of Amartya Sen, in which ethical concerns and concepts are introduced into the discipline 
                                                 
4 For an overview, see Hugh Lacey, Is Science Value-Free? Values and Scientific Understanding (London: 
Routledge, 1999), chapters 2 and 3; this partial list is quoted from Lacey, 53. An early version of this view is Carl 
Hempel, “Science and Human Values,” in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965); 
various later versions of it are supported by Lacey, Larry Laudan, and others: see the essays by Laudan, Lacey and 
Mauro Dorato in Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, Science, Values, and Objectivity (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2004). 
5 See, for instance, Barry Barnes, “Transcending the Discourse of Social Influences,” in Machamer and Wolters, 
eds., Science, Values, and Objectivity; Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie, eds., Value-Free Science: 
Ideals and Illusions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, 
89ff.  
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without the abandonment of its “rigorous tools.”
6 Such work offers insuperable obstacles to the 
commonsense idea of “value-free” social science by removing the possibility of relying on 
simplistic notions of fact, which are at its core.  More contentiously, others have even claimed 
that the “value-free” ideal not only fails to secure scientific objectivity through the exclusion of 
values but actively stands in the way of a just social order—as the latter is defined by these 
critics.
7 
  In light of these criticisms, it would appear that those who originally formulated the ideal 
as a way of speaking about objectivity had simply introduced an error into the philosophy of 
science, and perhaps a malicious one.  Did they really do so? And who were they? The 
philosophers who have discussed the idea have generally traced its origins back to the ideas of 
other philosophers, and not unreasonably.  In particular, the idea is said to have arisen in the 
work of David Hume, in his distinction between what “Is” and what “Ought” to be and his 
insistence that moral judgments were not matters of fact.
8 And yet, while these distinctions and 
the idea of the “naturalistic fallacy”
9 are indeed at the heart of the ideal, neither Hume nor Kant, 
who is sometimes considered a second philosophical source, used the term “value-free,” nor did 
they aim to describe a canon of social scientific methodology. 
                                                 
6 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 128, 135-37; id., The 
Collapse of the Fact/Value Distinction and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 60-
62, 49-54. 
7 In the German context, the locus classicus is the dispute beginning in 1961 and continuing throughout the 1960s 
between the “critical rationalists” Karl Popper and Hans Albert, and the “critical theorists” Theodor Adorno and 
Jürgen Habermas.  For Habermas’s arguments against “value-free” science and instrumental reason (a major interest 
of the critical theorists generally) see his “Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics,” in Theodor Adorno, ed., 
The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976), 142, 
145, 158-160; 162. 
8 For instance, see Putnam, Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 14-19, esp. 16-17. 
9 This was the interpretation of Hume’s point about the impossibility of generating “Ought” statements on the basis 
of “Is” statements which saw the practice as a logical error. The term is owing to G.E. Moore, who used it in a 
slightly different way. On the general problem and Hume’s contribution in particular, see W.D. Hudson, ed., The 
Is/Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1969).  
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The third source typically cited is the German social scientist Max Weber, who did use 
the terms “wertfrei” and “Wertfreiheit,” from which the equally awkward-sounding English 
“value-free” and “value-freedom” derive, and who was attempting to clarify methodological 
problems in social science.
10 A certain interpretation of Weber’s work, as the paradigm of a 
politically neutral sociology appropriate for technocratic needs, deeply marked the self-
conception of American sociology, and to a lesser extent of other disciplines, in the postwar era 
under the leadership of men like Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, and Reinhard Bendix,
11 and it 
was at least in large part through this quasi-Weberian lens that mid-century social scientists came 
to see their work as striving for value-freedom.
12 It is, however, also well-known by now that 
this received interpretation of Weber has not held up to historical scrutiny,
13 and the reasonable 
doubts about it include the notion that Weber advanced a value-free science of the 
“commonsense” variety, as we shall aim to persuade the reader at the end of this introduction.  
Not for nothing did Weber always use quotation marks in referring to “Wertfreiheit.” Any 
sustained attention to Weber’s original texts would have quickly shown some of the subsequent 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, 174, where he describes Weber as having “introduced the modern 
fact-value distinction”; Dorato, “Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in Science,” in Machamer and Wolters, 
Science, Values, and Objectivity, 56. Much of the literature dealing with value-freedom has taken the form of an 
attempt to put Weber in “dialogue” with later thinkers who did not form part of his intellectual context. See, for 
example, George McCarthy, Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological 
Disputes in German Sociology (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001); Darrow Schechter, The Critique of 
Instrumental Reason from Weber to Habermas (New York: Continuum, 2010); Nasser Behnegar, Leo Strauss, Max 
Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Such approaches are 
perfectly legitimate and show the lasting power and contemporaneity of Weber’s thought, but they also tend to 
introduce ideas common in Weber’s milieu as insights of his own, and cannot claim to present Weber’s thought in a 
context he would have personally recognized. 
11 On the reception of Weber in the United States, see now Lawrence Scaff, Max Weber in America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), chapters 11-13. 
12 This is reflected in the occasional use of the German term wertfrei itself (and, significantly, without quotation 
marks) in important English-language texts marked by the “value-free” ideal in this period. See, for example, Lionel 
Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1935), 90-91; 
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1962), vii. 
13 For a critical view, see Sven Eliaeson, Max Weber’s Methodologies: Interpretation and Critique (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002), Ch.4, although note that Eliaeson strangely identifies “American social thought” with Straussianism: 
151.  
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denunciations of the idea of value-freedom to be directed against a straw-man
14; had Weber 
chosen a more appropriate term for his conception, some (although hardly all) of the subsequent 
confusion and debate about the idea might have been avoided.
15 
  But if attention to the original historical context of the idea could help to demonstrate the 
nuanced position Weber actually held on the proper role of values in scholarship, perhaps it 
could also illuminate the meaning of “value-freedom” more broadly through a historical 
examination of the work of some of his peers and predecessors.  For surely the notion of value-
freedom did not originate with Weber alone.  And we have the example of a distinguished body 
of historical scholarship on the related idea of objectivity in the natural and statistical sciences of 
the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to show how substantial a contribution the 
history of ideas can make in clarifying key concepts still being vigorously debated.
16 This 
dissertation aims to perform a similar service on a modest scale by investigating the intellectual 
origins of, and the forms taken by, the idea of value-freedom in the work of a half dozen of 
Weber’s colleagues and interlocutors, particularly the economist Carl Menger (1840-1921), the 
sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), and the jurists Georg Jellinek (1851-1911), 
Hermann Kantorowicz (1877-1940), and Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949). 
  These thinkers did not themselves define the terms “value-freedom” or “objectivity,” and 
some of them did not even use these terms, but rather only ideas that later fell under the value-
                                                 
14 This holds for those critics who have pointed out that scientists and scholars cannot successfully purge themselves 
of all their value commitments and that valuations are always implicated in the social scientist’s “facts”—a problem 
of which Weber was well aware.  
15 Challenges to the idea of a uniform rationality that have been raised in the twentieth century after Weber’s death 
do have implications for the adequacy of Weber’s arguments and are not resolvable by a more careful study of his 
texts: see the classic collection Rationality, ed. Bryan Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970) and its later companion, 
Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). 
16 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone, 2007); Lorraine Daston, “Objectivity and the 
Escape from Perspective,” Social Studies of Science 22 (1992), 597-618; Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The 
Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Allan Megill, ed., 
Rethinking Objectivity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).  
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freedom rubric.  We should not, consequently, expect complete uniformity in the vocabularies 
they used to discuss these ideas.  Nonetheless, it will help to have working definitions of “value” 
and of “objectivity” that are appropriate to the ways in which they were used in this period.  The 
term value (or values) is very open-ended, but the Oxford English Dictionary designates two 
principal categories of meanings: “[w]orth or quality as measured by a standard of equivalence,” 
such as is often found in assessing the economic value of an object, or “[w]orth based on esteem; 
quality viewed in terms of importance, usefulness, desirability, etc.,” particularly including “[t]he 
principles or moral standards held by a person or social group; the generally accepted or 
personally held judgement of what is valuable and important in life.”
17 The term as used here 
will designate particularly the sense in which a value is a source of normative orientation for 
human agents.  As the subtle Max Weber scholar Guy Oakes has put it, for Weber, as for his 
peers, “[i]n cultural life, values represent positions taken by actors,”
18 and we might add that they 
can consequently be seen as functionally equivalent to ends or goals. A value judgment is an 
assessment on the basis of accord or disaccord with the actor’s source of normative orientation; 
value-freedom is the absence of values defined in this way.
19 
Objectivity too presents a range of meanings, but the recent study by Lorraine Daston and 
Peter Galison helps to define the issues that are relevant here.  Daston and Galison persuasively 
argue that “objectivity is the suppression of some aspect of the self, the countering of 
subjectivity.  Objectivity and subjectivity define each other, like left and right or up and down…. 
                                                 
17 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (with corrections), ed, J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, 20 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001) 19:415:3-417:3 (s.v.”value”). 
18 Guy Oakes, “On the Unity of Max Weber’s Methodology,” review essay, International Journal of Politics, 
Culture and Society 12:2 (1998), 293-306, here 296. 
19 In this dissertation, the term value-freedom is employed without quotation marks, for aesthetic reasons owing to 
its continual use.  What we will find, however, is that these thinkers advocated “value-freedom” in quotation 
marks—that is to say, it is the particular interpretation of the doctrine that does not require, and indeed rejects, the 
absolute elimination of values from scientific knowledge, or what we have described as the commonsense 
understanding of value-freedom.  
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If objectivity was summoned into existence to negate subjectivity, then the emergence of 
objectivity must tally with the emergence of a certain kind of willful self, one perceived as 
endangering scientific knowledge.”
20 This is precisely the sense in which objectivity will appear 
in the discussion below.  For the value-freedom advocates, objectivity is the problem that arises 
when the suppression of certain subjective elements in individual selves is perceived as 
problematic, precisely because of the unavoidability of values in all social phenomena – values 
being conceived by those advocates as the subjective elements.  Such subjective elements seem 
to threaten the reliability and trustworthiness of scientific findings.  One increasingly popular 
means of dealing with this problem in the second half of the nineteenth century was the mode of 
objectivity, or “epistemic virtue,” which Daston and Galison label “mechanical objectivity.”
21 
This was associated with “the insistent drive to repress the willful intervention of the artist-
author [i.e., the subjective self], and to put in its stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, 
move nature to the page through a strict protocol, if not automatically.”
22 Scientists, including 
social scientists, who aimed to secure their work against the intrusion of subjectivity in this way 
advocated what amounted to an ascetic discipline: purging themselves of willfulness, bias, and 
the intervention of arbitrary or personal elements.
23 This set of beliefs and practices will be 
called “ascetic objectivity”
24 in the following chapters, and it will be associated with the 
nineteenth-century positivist scientific ideals that are on display in Daston’s and Galison’s work; 
perhaps surprisingly, however, it also constitutes a manner of looking at objectivity that the 
value-freedom advocates attempted, without great success, to overcome, as we shall see. 
                                                 
20 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 36-37. 
21 Ibid., 18. 
22 Ibid., 121. 
23 Ibid., 373-75. 
24 Daston and Galison remark, appropriately, on the connection to asceticism in the previous passage; the use of this 
term is even more appropriate in the German social sciences in the era between Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber.  
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  For whatever reason, few historians have taken up the task of examining the general 
intellectual context of the idea of value-freedom in a sustained way; at least, historical interest 
has not been on a par with the attention given by the history of science to the idea of objectivity 
more broadly.
25  The principal effort by a historian to examine the idea has been Robert N. 
Proctor’s Value-Free Science?, which ranges across centuries and across both the natural and 
social sciences.  Proctor’s work is highly suggestive, and makes two important and related points 
that this dissertation amply confirms, namely “…that value-neutrality, far from being a timeless 
or self-evident principle, has a distinctive geography: ‘value-freedom’ has meant different things 
to different people at different times,” and that “value-neutrality is not a single notion but rather 
a collection of loosely associated ideals that emerged at different times to serve different social 
functions….”
26 Proctor connects an array of different doctrines ranging from the Greek 
distinction between contemplative and practical life to the so-called “devalorization of being,” in 
which reality ceased to appear to early modern thinkers as being infused with purpose and 
meaning, leading them to locate such purposes and meanings in human beings only.  He then 
treats a wide variety of modern movements and doctrines from classical German sociology to 
logical positivism, emotivism in ethics, and modern positive economics.  Out of these 
movements he draws further distinct doctrines, such as the following, some of which will recur 
in our discussion below.  The naturalistic fallacy principle—that it is impossible to derive an 
                                                 
25 In addition to the literature cited above, American social science has benefited from serious interest in the idea of 
objectivity; see especially the fine work of Thomas Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The 
American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1977) and the essays in Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998); the widely discussed Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity 
Question” and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Mary O. 
Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865-1905 (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 2011 [1975]). 
26 Robert N. Proctor, Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), x, 6. Proctor uses the terms value-freedom and value-neutrality interchangeably; we do not use the 
term value-neutrality here as it has no basis in the German-language discussion, as opposed to later English-
language discussions.  
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“Ought” statement from an “Is” statement—is a logical or even grammatical point that has been 
particularly important to the value-freedom doctrine.  This principle can be used to critique the 
view that what is, or what is natural or actual, is normative or has received the authority and 
blessing of science.  Science can also be seen as a “neutral arbiter” in the social problems that 
have divided modern society, as it cultivates the right mentality for overcoming division and 
gaining consensus.  Proctor also connects the value-freedom doctrine to subjectivism in 
economics specifically.
27 
  Proctor’s book has performed an important service in surveying the ways in which 
different doctrines from different eras and socio-political contexts have combined in what might 
appear to be a unitary idea.  He also endeavors to show that these ideas gained ground because 
they served various social and political functions rather than because they possessed any intrinsic 
intellectual merit; this sociological reductionism offers insight into the ways in which value-
freedom could be embraced for tactical purposes, and fits with a longstanding tradition of 
treating notions of value-freedom or objectivity as part of the process of professionalization 
undergone by the social sciences at the end of the nineteenth century.
28 These insights come at a 
price, however.  First, sociological reductionism is not a very plausible approach to intellectual 
history, as it treats all ideas as operationalized rationales for the attainment of particular socio-
political goals, but has trouble differentiating between effective and ineffective ideas.  Thus, 
Proctor claims that the reasons given by advocates of value-freedom were “not sufficient to 
account for its origins,” and that we must instead consider the adoption of the doctrine as an 
attempt to gain the kind of “prestige won by physicists and chemists in their mastery over 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 6-9.  
28 For the case of German sociology, the best instance of such an approach is Dirk Käsler, Die frühe deutsche 
Soziologie 1909 bis 1934 und ihre Entstehungsmilieu (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984).  
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nature.”
29 But why exactly were physicists and chemists the beneficiaries of prestige for their 
scientific work during the nineteenth century? Could it be that creating conventions and practices 
that delegitimized the intrusion of personal values, beliefs, and ideological convictions had 
something to do with the success and thus the prestige of natural science? However inflected by 
politics in the broadest sense, the assignment of prestige in academic research was not and is not 
simply a random matter of power and hierarchy, and once this is admitted, ideas must be 
considered on their own merits, too. 
  Second, because Proctor treats the notion of value-freedom as an ideological doctrine 
adopted to serve social functions, and surely also because of his admirable wide-lens attempt to 
trace its whole history, he runs into difficulties explaining the ideas of individual thinkers, often 
misrepresenting their intentions as well as their actual stated positions.  For instance, he makes 
very perplexing claims such as that one reason social scientists were in favor of “neutrality” 
(actually, value-freedom) was their “rejection of practical applications” for social science.
30 
While such a rejection might characterize those scholars whom Fritz Ringer famously 
characterized as the “orthodox” German mandarins,
31 with their devotion to humanistic Bildung, 
no advocate of value-freedom would have accepted this claim; indeed, one of the scholars 
Proctor quotes, Ferdinand Tönnies, even made the notions of “pure” and “applied” sociology 
basic components of his theory of the discipline.  The related claim that that “despite their 
protests, many of the greatest advocates of neutrality played an important role in the politics of 
                                                 
29 Proctor, Value-Free Science?, 67. 
30 Ibid., 69. 
31 Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1969).  
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their time,”
32 even if it were true, would be a non-sequitur: the value-freedom principle required 
of its devotees neither neutrality nor abstinence from politics. 
Proctor reduces the debates over value-freedom in the German academy to a “reaction 
against movements outside the universities—socialism, the women’s movement, and racialist 
nationalism…. Neutrality,” he claims, “emerges as a self-conscious ideology of science partly in 
reaction to political challenges to state power—Marxism, feminism, and social Darwinism—but 
also as an outgrowth of fears that practical, and specifically industrial, concerns were about to 
swamp the pursuit of science ‘for its own sake.’”
33 Again, this characterization might perhaps 
describe the opponents of the value-freedom advocates, but could any reader of Weber, Sombart, 
or Tönnies possibly recognize their views in it? We are simply told that such social movements 
explain the success of the value-freedom doctrine.  Statements such as, “The National Liberal 
party enjoyed support in Germany in the early years of Bismarck’s rule (1878-1891)”
34 may 
incline the reader toward skepticism about the trustworthiness of Proctor’s guide to the historical 
context of these debates in imperial Germany.  But even with that qualm put aside, Proctor’s 
statements cannot survive a shave from Occam’s razor.  Even among the value-freedom 
advocates considered in this dissertation, a wide variety of views on politics and social 
organization prevailed, from the conservative liberal Menger, through moderate National 
Liberals like Jellinek (and perhaps Weber) to the left-liberal Kantorowicz and the social- 
democratically inclined Tönnies and Radbruch.  Rather than trying to fit them into a Procrustean 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 70. Proctor makes the further claim, without evidentiary backing, that “The scientist was not to bother 
himself with political affairs. His job was to follow the truth: it was not his place to challenge the politics of his 
patrons.” Ibid., 84. All of the value-freedom advocates we will examine below were involved with political matters 
at some point in their careers. Proctor’s reference to “patrons” is particularly mystifying: German professors were 
state employees, and those who were closest to the state and academic powerbrokers like Friedrich Althoff of the 
Prussian ministry of education were the opponents of the value-freedom advocates. 
33 Ibid., 70. 
34 Ibid., 101.  
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bed of opposition to modernity, it is better to explain their methodological commitments on the 
basis of their methodological arguments. 
Such a practice would have saved Proctor from interpretations that demonstrate an 
unfamiliarity with the writings and views of the value-freedom advocates.  In quoting from a 
passage in Tönnies’ address to the first meeting of the German Sociological Society, which we 
will analyze below, Proctor claims Tönnies believed that scientific sociology “was neutral not in 
the abstract but rather in opposition to certain political ideas.” When Tönnies mentioned that 
sociology in and of itself can be neither in favor of nor against socialism, or the women’s 
movement, or the “mixing of the races,” Proctor inadvertently demonstrates the importance of 
avoiding the naturalistic fallacy by summarizing Tönnies’ position thus: “Neutrality, in other 
words, was proposed in opposition to socialism, the expansion of women’s rights, and the 
mixing of the races.”
35 Not only does this interpretation cleave against the transparent meaning 
of the text, but it is diametrically opposed to the positions on these issues that Tönnies personally 
held, as we shall see. 
  This dissertation makes the assumption that statements on questions of methodology 
should be treated with respect as consciously and rationally held arguments, particularly when 
they are the result of considerations spanning a scholar’s entire career.  Of course, others have 
discussed the value-freedom commitments of turn-of-the-century German social scientists in this 
way as well, although relatively few of them have been historians.  One effort dating to the 
1950s deserves particular mention: the chapter on the origins of “scientific value relativism” in 
Arnold Brecht’s Political Theory.
36 Brecht’s chapter brings together in very brief compass the 
considered views of key supporters of value-freedom among German philosophers and jurists, 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 91-92. 
36 Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), Chapter 6, esp. 207-240.  
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placing emphasis on the distinction between Is and Ought and stating clearly that Weber himself 
would have been the first to acknowledge that he was not the originator of the doctrine.
37 
Probably owing to Brecht’s own training as a jurist in the same milieu as those about whom he 
wrote—he was a younger contemporary of Radbruch’s in L￼beck—his chapter is the only 
discussion of value-freedom that considers the jurists Jellinek, Kantorowicz, Radbruch, and 
Kelsen in the same context as Weber and the neo-Kantian philosophers who are normally 
credited with establishing it.
38 Although pioneering in this way, it provides only the briefest of 
treatments, however. 
  More attention has been paid to the specific dispute over value judgments in political 
economy known as the Werturteilsstreit, which took place in the Verein für Sozialpolitik, 
Germany’s premier social scientific body, in 1909, with further discussions continuing until the 
outbreak of First World War.
39 The principal antagonists in this debate were Max Weber and the 
historical economist Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), with Weber deriving support from his 
contemporary, Werner Sombart, and Schmoller supported by a range of economists old and 
young.  Weber defended the value-freedom position in opposition to Schmoller’s “ethical” 
political economy, and we will outline his stance in this chapter and Schmoller’s in the following 
chapter.  Heino Heinrich Nau has acutely chronicled the course of the dispute in German 
political economy (and its intellectual antecedents), identifying the positions taken even by 
minor figures in the discipline.  Instead of duplicating his research, therefore, this dissertation 
                                                 
37 Ibis., 215. 
38 Ibid., 220-21, 231-238. 
39 See especially Heino Heinrich Nau, “Zwei ￖkonomien: Die Vorgeschichte des Werturteilsstreits in der 
deutschsprachigen ￖkonomik,” in Nau, ed., Der Werturteilsstreit: Die Äusserungen zur Werturteilsdiskussion im 
Ausschuss des Vereins für Sozialpolitik (1913) (Marburg: Metropolis, 1996), 9-64.  Several other brief 
considerations exist in older literature: Christian von Ferber, “Der Werturteilsstreit 1909/1959: Versuch einer 
wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Interpretation,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 11 (1959), 21-
37; Dieter Lindenlaub, Richtungskämpfe im Verein für Sozialpolitik (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1967), 433-443, which is 
surprisingly unreliable in an otherwise fine study; Nereu Feix, Werturteil, Politik und Wirtschaft: Werturteilssreit 
und Wissenschaftstransfer bei Max Weber (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 16-33.  
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aims to supplement it by a carefully analyzing important proponents of the value-freedom 
doctrine – proponents who themselves did not participate directly in the Werturteilsstreit but 
whose contributions should nonetheless not be overlooked. 
 
I.  The Argument 
 
  Despite operating in different disciplines, and despite their widely variant personal and 
intellectual backgrounds, Menger, Tönnies, Jellinek, Kantorowicz, and Radbruch held similar 
attitudes not only about the value-freedom doctrine itself but about social science generally.  
They also faced a common problem as a result of the way in which they conceptualized the 
human world that their disciplines were seeking to explain. 
Broadly speaking, we can identify three major commonalities. First, all five aimed to 
establish that explanations in the social sciences must make reference to the subjective meanings, 
intentions, and values of individual human actors.  They were in this way—much like others in 
the tradition derived from German historicism—opponents of nineteenth-century positivism. 
Positivists like the influential statistical-determinist historian Henry Thomas Buckle tended to 
believe that scientific work could achieve objectivity by ignoring the subjective level of human 
intentions and values and dealing only with predictable aggregate behaviors.  Not even Tönnies, 
among our figures the most sympathetic to positivism, could accept such an orientation.  In a 
way, then, it was ironically essential to the advocates of value-freedom that they insisted on the 
relevance to social scientific work of carefully examining human values, not being free of them.  
And yet, their notion of the proper function of social science separated them from any purely 
historicist perspective because of its emphasis on explanation rather than on interpretive  
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understanding alone.  To emphasize the combination of this focus on both subjective meanings 
and values and on the effort to explain actions in terms of regularities, we will sometimes refer to 
this approach as “interpretive social science.”
40 
Second, they all accepted the view that human values or valuations were subjective in the 
sense of being non-rational and incapable of public demonstration.  Values were a matter of 
contingent individual commitment based on will or emotion and could not be established or 
justified by reasoned argument.  This perspective in turn separated the value-freedom advocates 
from the traditional moral-political sciences such as the German Staatswissenschaften, which 
aimed directly at promoting the public welfare.  
Third, they came to accept what we will designate here as the “value-freedom complex,” 
to refer to the notion, as emphasized by Proctor, that value-freedom was composed of a number 
of potential constituent parts.  Among these parts, the most prominently featured for the social 
scientists considered here were the distinctions between theory and practice, Is and Ought, and 
fact and value, and the conviction that a normative science claiming to determine ultimate values 
was an impossibility, to be replaced by the ideal of a science that determined the means to given 
ends.  Variations among the individual thinkers relate to the importance they assigned to 
particular elements in this value-freedom complex. 
  It is important to the argument here that it was a combination of these three 
commonalities – the need to refer in the social sciences to subjectivity, the recognized 
subjectivity of human values, and the value-freedom complex – which led to acceptance of the 
                                                 
40 That is, interpretation is combined with the scientific emphasis on (largely causal) explanation. Although this 
phrase might lead to confusion with the employment of hermeneutic methods in social science, sometimes known as 
interpretive social science, it is used here in preference to German-language alternatives like “cultural science,” 
(Kulturwissenschaft) “human science,” (Geisteswissenschaft) and “science of man” (Wissenschaft vom Menschen)  
which can be equally confusing because of their very particular meanings in the context of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Germany. The Weberian “science of reality” (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) might be best but is 
simply too vague and awkward in English.  
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idea of “value-free” science.  In particular, without the second commitment, to value 
subjectivism, there was no reason why a separation of Is and Ought or theory and practice would 
necessarily lead to a limitation of social science to a positive rather than a normative function—
one might ever so sharply differentiate between what is and what ought to be and yet believe that 
there was a clear and objective moral law that impelled the social scientist to promote “the 
good.”  Only with the emergence of all three of these common commitments as “live options” 
did value-freedom first become possible in what we think of as the Weberian sense.  Alongside 
it, however, came the inevitable problem of objectivity. 
When connected with value subjectivism, the conviction that social science must take 
genuine notice of individual values, intentionality, and other mental phenomena in its 
explanations raised the problem of justifying scientific findings on several levels.  At the first 
level, the social sciences would be little better than a kind of “glass bead game” or form of 
conceptual play if they did not provide guidance to people in their interactions with the rest of 
the human world.  Recognizing the fact that the scholars’ traditional prerogative of normative 
guidance was threatened by the subjectivity of values, the value-freedom advocates used their 
doctrine to salvage a role for the social sciences in providing policy or legal norms as long as the 
ultimate goals were externally given to the scholar, who could supply the relevant factual 
knowledge to realize these goals most effectively.  Yet factual knowledge, too, was threatened: 
confronted with a mass of subjective mental states and valuations with no internal criteria for 
judging importance or irrelevance, the social scientist had to develop some other sort of 
theoretical criteria for fishing out facts from the world’s never-ending stream.  These criteria 
were subject to the same philosophical scruples, and had to be defended; the impending infinite 
regress posed a problem that could be solved only by means of a form of circular reasoning that  
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closed the chain of justification into a loop, or by a full-stop, “Here I stand” conviction, itself 
ungrounded.  The danger to a coherent notion of objectivity in this process was apparent. 
  Our protagonists thus had a common, or at least closely related, set of arguments and 
problems to address, with variations according to their disciplines.  They also tended to share 
certain values and convictions themselves, above all a preference for the cultured individual (true 
even of the gemeinschaftlich-oriented Tönnies and the social democratic Radbruch) and for 
pluralism combined with relativism and tolerance.  Except for Menger, they had strong 
nominalist tendencies; and even Menger, despite his Aristotelianism, could show signs of it, 
particularly in his rejection of the “real” nature of organic or collective entities.  A perhaps 
surprising commonality is the lack of influence of Nietzsche, often thought to be one of the 
determinative influences on the modern conception of values in a godless world (as it was for all 
of these figures).  But it is equally important to emphasize their divergent intellectual origins, 
politics and even personality attributes, not to mention the discipline-specific problems that they 
faced.  All three of the jurists were shaped by neo-Kantianism, but we show that in each case, 
they came to important conclusions leading in the direction of value-freedom before or without 
neo-Kantian arguments.  Menger, as just observed, was an Aristotelian of sorts, in the Austrian 
philosophical tradition.  Tönnies’ thought was principally shaped by seventeenth-century 
philosophy, above all by that of Thomas Hobbes.  We have seen that the range of their political 
opinions ranged from the center-right to moderate socialism, and in most chapters we give some 
consideration to the ways in which their own biographies shaped the convictions they held about 
as personal a matter as “ultimate” values.   
As to the ways in which their scholarly training played into their commitment to value-
freedom, it is a novel feature of this dissertation that it examines their methodological arguments  
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in light of the content of their professional work, particularly as the latter has a bearing on 
understanding their views of value, values, and normativity.  This emphasis highlights both the 
contingency of the process by which they developed their views on values and value-freedom, 
and also suggests how many different potential avenues there were toward the doctrine.  An 
ancillary consideration raised by this procedure is the question of whether the common concept 
of “value” may be used to unlock similarities between very different problems in different 
disciplines, such as exchange value in economics, the validity of judicial pronouncements, and 
the changing structure of social authority.   
One further particularity of the argument is that the legal sciences deserve to be 
considered here among the social scientific disciplines as part of the soil from which value-
freedom grew.  Often ignored in treatments of social science problems, law has always been an 
obvious source of reflection on the problems of normativity.  It has raised its own characteristic 
concerns while often employing social scientific methods and facing the same array of problems 
as the latter, as our discussion of Jellinek and Kantorowicz in particular will show.  Like the 
“practical science” of economic policy in Menger, or as in the question Weber and Tönnies ask 
about what tasks science can in fact perform when confronting values, law itself must deal with 
normative statements and it must even prescribe—yet the legal practitioner, even when a judge, 
cannot simply assert his or her arbitrary will, but must approach the law and its requirements as 
matters of fact. 
  The five figures considered here played an important role in raising awareness of the 
limits of social science in the face of value questions, and of the need for a recognition that the 
theoretical and the practical are connected but analytically separable.  In some ways, then, their 
achievement was very similar to Weber’s, and often involved the expression of what we now  
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take to be Weberian ideas before Weber enunciated them—sometimes long before.  We may 
credit them with pursuing a non-positivist social science that nevertheless insisted on recognizing 
the difference between research and advocacy.  Still, as we shall see in the individual chapters, 
they largely failed to create solutions to, or often even to recognize, the difficulties created for 
their positions by the objectivity problem.  In the end, all but one of them fell back at least 
implicitly on the ascetic ideal, even after leaving positivism behind, in their attempts to take 
subjectivity into account without threatening the objectivity of their results.  Only Jellinek shared 
with Weber a different kind of solution, which did not fall back upon injunctions to purge 
oneself of all bias. 
  Modern thought is characterized by dualisms like the one involving subjectivity and 
objectivity, and it appears at least to many to be antinomian, involving equally necessary but 
contradictory claims that are impossible to reconcile.  Successfully reconciling subjectivity and 
objectivity at the level of conceptual thought would be a difficult feat indeed, and it may be that 
taking practical measures may be the only option for securing something like objectivity.  It is 
the originality of Jellinek and Weber to set out a process-oriented model of intersubjectivity to 
substitute for the objectivity ideal, in which science does not depend on purging oneself of 
impure motives but instead on the ability of a competitive selection process composed of 
countless individuals presenting their findings to be checked by others.  Intersubjectivity remains 
on one side of the dualism in question, but a process-oriented conception entails that results are 
tested both by others’ reasoning and by those results’ staying power in an external world in 
which, as Weber put it, “the light of the great cultural problems moves on.”
41 If the attention 
devoted to Weber as a theorist of value-freedom is to rest on more than the greater extensiveness 
                                                 
41 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 5
th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1982), 214; The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: Free 
Press, 1949), 112.  
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of his essays than those of the theorists considered here, it must be as the scholar who—perhaps 
along with Jellinek—most readily saw the need for a non-“ascetic” solution to the problem of 
objectivity.  
  Ultimately, the purpose of this dissertation is to resuscitate the work of a number of 
important and intriguing but relatively underappreciated thinkers by treating their concerns and 
arguments within the contexts in which they arose, rather than as responses to recent problems. It 
is hoped that the reader will gain familiarity with the problems considered by these thinkers and 
by their struggles with solutions, as well a recognition of why Weber might indeed be seen as 
standing on their shoulders.  The value-freedom tradition was not a justification of the removal 
of values from social scientific discussion, even if the instability of these figures’ attempts to 
hold both subjectivity and objectivity in balance subsequently led those who were confused by 
the name and attracted by a new positivist current to reconceive their work as really value-free. 
In order to determine the proper place and originality of our five protagonists, we must 
begin with some basic background in the thought of the neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband and 
Heinrich Rickert, and of Max Weber. 
 
II.  A Primer on Southwest German Neo-Kantianism 
 
Neo-Kantianism in its several forms was the dominant philosophical tradition in 
Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century and for much of the beginning of the 
twentieth.
42  The neo-Kantian revival that succeeded the heyday of Hegelianism in many German 
philosophical faculties was, at least initially, focused more on pure logic, natural science, and the 
                                                 
42 The classic survey of German philosophy, Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 1831-1933 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), is not always lucid but remains the best guide to this period.  
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history of philosophy than on the cultural issues that exercised professors in the other 
Geisteswissenschaften or “human sciences.”  But by the 1880s, another “school” of neo-
Kantianism had begun to arise in the southwestern universities of Freiburg, Heidelberg, and 
Strassburg.  Its principal constituents, led by Wilhelm Windelband and, somewhat later, Heinrich 
Rickert, were fascinated by the methodological problems raised by the need to combat the 
contemporary challenge to the German historical tradition from Anglo-French positivist social 
scientists, who sought lawful regularities instead of the hermeneutic understanding of 
historically-situated individuals and collective groups—the latter, too, such as nations, seen as 
having a kind of historically relative individuality.
43 
  Windelband and Rickert were certainly not the first philosophers to address themselves to 
these questions.  They had been preceded by Wilhelm Dilthey, whose Einleitung in die 
Geisteswissenschaften appeared in 1883, a book that H. Stuart Hughes once suggested to be “the 
first thoroughgoing and sophisticated confrontation of history with positivism and natural 
science.”
44 Dilthey had aimed to ground the historicism of German social scientific practice by 
establishing that the natural and human sciences dealt with two ontologically different realms, 
nature and mind (Geist), and that the latter realm could only be understood “from the inside” by 
                                                 
43 Thomas E. Willey, Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860-
1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), 131-32. Klaus Christian Köhnke, The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: 
German Academic Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
an exhaustive but not always philosophically nuanced portrayal, focuses on the period before 1880 and includes 
minimal consideration of the southwest German school. The German historical tradition and the challenge from 
positivism are still best approached through Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, rev. ed. 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983). 
44 H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930, rev. ed. 
(New York: Vintage, 1977), 194.  
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interpretive reconstruction.
45  But his work did not initially provoke a great deal of debate, and it 
was left to Windelband to reopen the issues in the 1890s.
46 
  In his 1894 Rectoral Address at the University of Strasbourg, entitled “Geschichte und 
Naturwissenschaft,” Windelband disputed Dilthey’s claim that the difference between the 
Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften lay in the subject matter proper to each.  The 
“methodological procedure” of psychology, for instance, he reminded his audience, “is 
exclusively the method of the natural sciences.”
47 He suggested instead that any taxonomy of the 
sciences be based on a difference in method, not in the subject of study.
48 But he concurred with 
Dilthey that it would be a grave mistake to restrict scholars to the methods employed by the 
natural sciences alone.  Where it had been tried out, he quipped, this positivist program of 
attempting to establish inductive laws governing all aspects of history and cultural life had 
produced “a few trivial generalities which can be excused only on the basis of a careful analysis 
of their numerous exceptions.”
49 Scholars should recognize that both the natural scientific 
method and the method represented by German historicism had their proper place, determined by 
their success in achieving their respective goals.  Acknowledging the value of the natural 
scientific approach, which aims to “establish, collect, and analyze facts only…for the purpose of 
understanding the general nomological relationship to which these facts are subject,” 
Windelband argued that the Geisteswissenschaften “have a distinctively different purpose: they 
provide a complete and exhaustive description of a single, more or less extensive process which 
                                                 
45 See, most recently, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Wilhelm Dilthey: Eine Einführung (Stuttgart: UTB, 2011); and in 
English, Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978). 
46 Hughes, Consciousness and Society, 190. It was favorably received by the historical economist Gustav Schmoller 
in the same 1883 book review as the latter used to dismiss the methodological work of Carl Menger, igniting the 
Methodenstreit. See Chapter 2 below. 
47 Wilhelm Windelband, “History and Natural Science,” trans. Guy Oakes, History and Theory 19:2 (Feb. 1980), 
174. 
48 Ibid., 174. 
49 Ibid., 181-82.  
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is located within a unique, temporally defined domain of reality.”
50 The first method he termed 
“nomothetic,” the second, “idiographic.”
51 Windelband thus defended the historicist concern 
with individuality from positivist attack by granting that both the nomothetic and idiographic 
methods had different and equally legitimate goals, and that neither could replace the knowledge 
obtained through the other method with its own type of knowledge.
52 
  Clearly more interested in the idiographic than the nomothetic, however, Windelband 
went on to outline an initial analysis of the former method as it was applied in the human 
sciences.  Here he made his most original, if complex, contribution to the methods debate,
53 one 
that is relevant to our purposes here. Windelband argued that we could call something 
knowledge if and only if it stood in relation to a value, a norm which determined that we ought to 
believe it; it was a condition for the possibility of knowledge that one could postulate a “normal 
consciousness” above the level of ordinary consciousness and not susceptible to relativistic 
objections, which set norms for the good, the true, and the beautiful, as if in an absolute way.
54  
For Windelband rejected value objectivism, arguing that value itself “never belongs to objects in 
themselves alone, as a property, but always only in relation to an evaluating consciousness”; 
consequently it was evaluative judgment, rather than values, that must be secured against the 
threat of relativism by this kind of transcendental argument from the possibility of knowledge.
55 
Windelband treated theoretical judgments, which is to say statements about truth or falsity, and 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 174. 
51 Ibid., 175. 
52 The best general account in English of Windelband’s thought overall, and specifically with regard to the ideas 
outlined in the Rectoral Address, is Charles Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), Ch.2, esp. 66-81. 
53 Iggers, German Conception, 148. 
54 See Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 181-182; Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, 76-77; Willey, Back to Kant, 
136-137; on the idea of a “normal consciousness,” see Marion Heinz, “Normalbewusstsein und Wert,” in Marion 
Heinz and Christian Krijnen, eds., Kant im Neukantianismus (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007), 75-90. 
Strictly speaking, to say that these norms were “absolute” is to ontologize them, which Windelband wanted to avoid: 
hence the use of transcendental argument to establish a postulate of normal consciousness rather than a claim to 
some kind of knowledge of supra-physical reality. 
55 Ibid. Windelband quoted in Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 181.  
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evaluative judgments equally as valuational (“axiological”), regarding truth as a value much as 
any other.
56 Thus, against the positivists, Windelband insisted that even theoretical judgments 
about nomothetic laws must make reference to value, even if it was the universal and necessarily 
posited value of general truth.  The unique individuality sought by the idiographic disciplines, 
however, necessarily lacked generality, and in consequence, to establish knowledge in the field 
of “particular realities,” the social scientist must point to some other type of value—no less 
universal, but not the kind inhering in a general apodictic judgment.
57  Since, as Windelband put 
it in another work, “all other values are known to us only in such structures as in their empirical 
appearance belong to the life of man, and relate to what man has elaborated from his experience 
of the surrounding world,” the idiographic method can produce knowledge only when it relates 
the individuality being described to one of these values common to the human experience of 
life.
58  But Windelband did not describe these values beyond calling them “the structures of 
civilized life,” and he implicitly assumed that all human beings share them.  He thereby 
remained set against historicist relativism, positing universal, formal values in judgments of the 
good and the aesthetic as much as in theoretical judgments.
59 The complexities of Windelband’s 
attempt at a transcendental grounding of universally valid values are less important here than his 
use of the term “values,” which he derived from his teacher Hermann Lotze
60: by employing it 
he thus helped to ensure that the concept of values was introduced directly into considerations of 
historical and social scientific methodology. 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 183. 
57 See especially Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, 74-79. 
58 Wilhelm Windelband, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Joseph McCabe (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
1921), 205. 
59 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, 79. 
60 Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 169-181.  
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  Heinrich Rickert, a student and then colleague of Windelband, later clarified a point of 
confusion in his mentor’s argument, even as he developed the main points of the Rectoral 
Address in two books of the 1890s and 1900s.  He agreed with Windelband that the sciences 
should be classified by method, and that the two branches were represented by the nomothetic 
and idiographic approaches.
61 The two methods had entirely different goals and were thus, he 
thought, “in radical logical opposition.”
62 The nomothetic sciences sought out laws or 
generalizations, and the idiographic sought to describe individualities in their full uniqueness.
63  
But Rickert wondered in what way it could be said that the idiographic method really captured 
individualities, as Windelband had claimed.  If we assume, as Rickert did, that reality is a sort of 
continuous flux, an infinitely differentiable “heterogeneous continuum,” which is “irrational” in 
the neo-Kantian sense that any pattern in the world is not inherent but imposed upon it by the 
human mind, then any attempt to employ a scientific method must necessarily be “a process 
involving the simplification of the actual multiplicity of reality itself.”
64 This is just as true of the 
idiographic as of the nomothetic method: both offered a selective, schematized picture of reality 
through the process of concept-formation.  They differed only in the way they simplified, with 
the nomothetic natural sciences producing their kind of order by discerning regularities or 
generalizing, and the idiographic or cultural sciences seeking out in contrast the “particular and 
individual.”
65 But if reality in all its particularity was “irrational,” if it served as the limit to 
                                                 
61 Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft.  English trans., George Reisman, Science and 
History (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), 15. Rickert preferred the terms “natural scientific” and “cultural 
scientific” to “nomothetic” and “idiographic,” but on technical grounds unimportant here. 
62 Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1902). English 
trans., Guy Oakes, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 35. 
63 Rickert, Science and History, 34; 46. 
64 Ibid., 33. All italics in the following quotations are Rickert’s own. See also Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, 
52; Willey, Back to Kant, 145; Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, 94-95; Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert: Concept 
Formation in the Cultural Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 53-56. 
65 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, 98-99.  
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concept formation which by definition must simplify, how could Rickert salvage the claim that 
“individuality is, notwithstanding, preserved in the process” of idiographic conceptualization?
66 
  Rickert drew on and clarified Windelband’s reference to values in his solution.  The 
human sciences must look to culture and cultural values for “a principle for the selection of the 
essential aspects of reality.”
67 It was not the task of the Geisteswissenschaften to relate just any 
human phenomenon to a value or set of values, as Windelband had implied.  Rather, the social 
scientist should use cultural values to determine which individualities were significant.
68 In other 
words, recognizing the impossibility of conceptually describing an “irrational” individuality in 
all its uniqueness, Rickert argued that we should pick out the most significant details of the area 
of history or society under study by the degree to which they reflected certain values.  In his best 
known example, he pointed out that in a discussion of carbon formations, we would lack interest 
in pieces of coal, though they are certainly separate individualities, while diamonds would attract 
our attention because we attach value to them.
69 In the same way, only historical phenomena that 
reflect values are worthy of attention.
70 Rickert claimed that this position did not limit the 
objectivity of the human sciences.
71  For their task was to relate facts to values (wertbeziehen), 
not to evaluate (werten) facts.
72 But this claim of course presumed that there was an objectively 
“given” set of values on which all historians and social scientists could agree as the relevant set 
for their work of value-relation.  Rickert himself thought that there was such a “common core of 
cultural values on which all or at least most civilized men could agree,” as one historian of neo-
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Kantianism puts it.
73 Still, the truly objectively valid values needed to defend Rickert’s system 
against relativism could not be identified by such considerations.  These were not and could not 
be the ordinary values of the empirical world, which could clearly differ across times and 
cultures, but formal, unconditionally valid values to which reference must be made by any 
empirical value claim: again, by transcendental argument, Rickert attempted to demonstrate that 
knowledge (truth) and other values claims must presuppose objective values.
74 
 
III.  Value-Freedom in Max Weber’s Methodology of Social Science 
 
  Weber’s methodological writings owed a great debt to Rickert.
75 Even Fritz Ringer, who 
is at pains to champion Weber’s intellectual independence from his colleague, admits that 
“Weber followed Rickert in the overall framework of his position.”
76 This is hardly to say that 
Weber parroted his neo-Kantian predecessors, or that his conclusions about the role of values in 
scholarship or in education were the same as theirs or those of the “mandarins” who bemoaned 
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the advent of specialization and the decline of the ideal of individual cultivation or Bildung.
77  
But, however he differed from these contemporaries, Weber’s position on the proper place of 
values in both science and teaching was also shaped by the historicist interest in accounting for 
the unique and individual in history, and by the Rickertian ideas of the irrationality of reality and 
the use of value-relation.
78 
In this introduction, we cannot begin to consider the entire range of methodological 
problems taken up by Weber during the years after 1903, let alone position his work on such 
problems in the context of his scholarship as a whole, as we attempt to do in the case of his 
contemporaries in the chapters that follow.  Weber’s methodological work itself has been studied 
to such a degree of intensity, moreover, that it would be superfluous to do so; a number of high-
quality surveys and studies already exist and more definitive work on his methodological views, 
including on the question of value-freedom, must await the publication of the final volumes of 
the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, which contain his writings on method and the associated 
scholarly apparatus.
79 Nonetheless, it is important to understand the basic features of Weber’s 
views on value-freedom in order to situate and assess the work of the figures studied in this 
dissertation, in part simply because Weber’s writings have become the standard treatment of 
topics that, as we will see, were widely shared in his intellectual context.  Here we will 
principally focus on the features of his methodology which show him to be an adherent of what 
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we have designated above as “interpretive social science”; indicate his value subjectivism and its 
threat to the objectivity of social science, alongside his proposed solution to that problem; and 
conclude by outlining his views on what a “value-free” social science can accomplish for human 
beings pursuing their ends, whether these include social policy or the search for normative 
guidance in university studies. 
  A legally trained economist of the historical school, not a philosopher, Weber did bring a 
different perspective from the neo-Kantians’ to bear on questions of methodology through his 
practical work as a scholar.  Where Rickert had been regarded by many as excessively 
formalistic,
80 Weber had done significant empirical work by the time he first explicitly took up 
methodological questions in 1904.  In the 1880s and 1890s before his well-known personal 
crisis, he had written on Roman agrarian history, farm labor problems east of the Elbe, and on 
the stock exchange, among other things.
81 Even his methodological writings were usually 
prompted by specific and concrete needs.  His pivotal 1904 essay “‘Objectivity’ in Social 
Science and Social Policy,” for instance, served as a statement of Weber’s position as the co-
editor (with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffé) of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik, a major social scientific journal.
82  This essay, along with “The Meaning of ‘Value-
Freedom’ in Sociology and Economics” (1913/17), contains Weber’s central writings on the 
value question as well as other considerations on method, and will be the focus of our discussion. 
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  Weber’s main methodological problem was, essentially, finding a way to combine the 
strengths of the German historical tradition of interpretive Geisteswissenschaft with the search 
for generalizations and causal explanations that were the strengths of what Windelband had 
labeled the nomothetic approach.  He was neither historicist nor positivist, and these designations 
are not especially helpful in understanding his thought; instead, he aimed to practice “interpretive 
social science.” That is, he insisted on taking the subjective meanings, intentions and values of 
individual agents as basic data for social scientific explanation, and he certainly did not aim at 
the discovery of any transhistorical laws of human society or economy, but he also intended to 
explain particular historical and cultural formations and even situationally determined patterns of 
individual action.  For Weber, the study of social phenomena past and present could not be 
limited to a mere description of purportedly inexplicable (because free-willed) “personalities” 
and historical individuals, nor could the scholar presume that human beings followed laws as 
precise as those of much marginalist economics.
83 Instead, he drew on his legal training to 
balance the equally necessary consideration of causation and teleology, strict determination, and 
subjective intention through the study of action in particular cases, in the course of attempting to 
find an “adequate” causal explanation.
84 As Fritz Ringer put it, Weber is best characterized as “at 
once a causalist and a sophisticated interpretationist…[who] simultaneously renewed and 
transformed his methodological heritage.”
85 In this interpretation, the core of Weber’s 
contribution to social scientific method was his conception of “singular causal analysis,” a set of 
techniques for determining without the application of rigid “laws” why one particular event or 
action or idea had come about, and not another.  And, indeed, Weber’s introduction of causal 
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analysis into explicitly methodological discussions helped to redress the imbalance caused by 
undue focus on the “unique individual” in the neo-Kantian position.  It was not that practicing 
historians and social scientists in Germany had ignored the issue of causation in treating 
historical events; but the theoretical elaboration of their work had made it seem as though it was 
no part of the scientist’s task to explain the occurrence of change, or the reason why a given 
individuality took the form it did, other than to point to the “irrationality” of reality and human 
freedom.
86  Weber argued that causal explanation was in fact a central part of any attempt to 
interpret such individualities. 
  Throughout the nineteenth century, members of the “Historical School” had in effect 
equated the causal analysis of events with an attempt to show that the world was deterministic 
and that there was no room for free will or action.
87 Weber took a middle course between the two 
supposed alternatives of determinism and freedom by pointing to the possibility of studying and 
describing causal connections in unique and contingent events.  In order to do this, he made use 
of what he called “one-sided approaches” (“‘einseitigen’ Gesichtspunkten,” a phrase that we will 
see was used by Menger as well) and the technique of counterfactual reasoning.  An excellent 
example of a one-sided approach was the economic interpretation of history.  It was not that 
Weber thought that seeking out historical actors’ motives for economic gain or preservation of 
class interests could provide an adequate explanation of an event in most cases, but he would 
employ it “to the extent that it is successful in producing insights into interconnections which 
have been shown to be valuable for the causal explanation of concrete historical events.”
88 One-
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sided approaches could create generalizations or rules that could be applied to historical or social 
reality to determine where the actual course of events diverged from the ideal predicted course.
89 
The precise causes of the actual events would then be more readily apparent, and one could 
reason counterfactually to determine which among the possible causes were necessary or 
sufficient.
90 
  The same approach could be used in understanding past thought processes as well as 
explaining actions.  Weber gives the example of two rival military commanders fighting a 
campaign.  In order to comprehend their decisions, he suggests attributing to each an ideal 
rationality and a perfect knowledge of all factors relevant to the military situation, and observing 
their actual decisions in contrast to this hypothetical situation. “For only then can the 
consequences of the fact that the real commanders neither had the knowledge nor were they free 
from error, and that they were not purely rational thinking machines, be unambiguously 
established.”
91 
This strategy is the basis of what is perhaps Weber’s most famous contribution to social 
scientific method, the “ideal type.” Ideal types were neither hypotheses nor descriptions of 
reality, but guides to the creation of both, formed through the “one-sided accentuation” of 
selected aspects of reality into an analytical mental construct (Gedankenbild) which, in its pure 
form, could be found nowhere in actual human experience.
92 The function of the ideal type is 
“the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to 
describe them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain 
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them causally.”
93 These “one-sided” heuristic devices all relied on the ability to generalize from 
particulars, to point to elements that “historical individuals” had in common, or to model 
behaviors that were reasonably common and predictable.  Such regularities were an essential 
aspect of causal explanation—even explanation of the most unique and fortuitous of 
circumstances—if only because they set the pattern against which divergences could be 
identified.  “Whether a single individual component of a relationship is, in a concrete case, to be 
assigned causal responsibility for an effect, the causal explanation of which is at issue, can in 
doubtful cases be determined only by estimating the effects which we generally expect from it 
and from the other components of the same complex which are relevant to the explanation.”
94 
From this account of selected aspects of Weber’s method, it is clear that he regarded the 
object of social science as a causal explanation of individual events or processes, not as a simple 
description of them in their full “uniqueness.”  The detection of regularities in history, 
furthermore, helped the social scientist to construct a causal explanation, even if there was no 
strict determinism implied by this position.  Here Weber was indeed at odds with his 
predecessors in the historical tradition and the Baden neo-Kantians.  But when we ask what role 
values played, for Weber, in scientific method, his debt to Rickert is obvious.  He acknowledged 
as much himself.
95 
  The sciences, to begin with, are in Weber’s view divided not by subject matter, but by 
differences in method and conceptual tools, much as the neo-Kantians had argued.
96 The natural 
sciences seek to establish the laws that govern the universe, and the cultural or social sciences 
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seek to render an “understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality [umgebende 
Wirklichkeit des Lebens] in which we move.”
97 But reality for Weber, as for Rickert, is infinite 
and “irrational” in itself, and any attempt to describe cultural individualities must operate by 
some principle of selection.
98 He states the problem comprehensively in his essay on 
“‘Objectivity’” in a passage worth quoting at length to show its affinity with Rickert: 
 
[Life presents us with] an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, 
both “within” and “outside” ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished 
even when our attention is focused on a single “object,” for instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we 
seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components of this “individual phenomenon,” [dies 
“Einzelne”] to say nothing of explaining it causally.  All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind 
can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific 
investigation, and that only it is “important” in the sense of being “worthy of being known.”
99 
 
The human sciences therefore focus on the culturally significant aspects of history and society.
100 
But these aspects cannot be determined by the use of natural scientific concepts 
(Gesetzesbegriffen, those aiming at strict laws), even though, as we saw above in considering 
causation, information from the rule-generating sciences may be useful as a preliminary step 
toward understanding individualities.
101 
Instead, the principle by which significance is determined is value-relevance 
(Wertbeziehung).
102 For instance, concrete technical developments like the harmonic fifth in 
Western music, or the development of the cross-arched vault in Gothic architecture, to use two of 
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Weber’s examples, have interest for us owing to “the aesthetic value of the work of art, which 
cannot be established by the empirical disciplines….”
103 As in Rickert’s formulation, the 
investigator selects elements from the infinite manifold of the past that are “either directly value-
relevant or are causally connected with other value-relevant phenomena.”
104 This process is not 
the same as value judgment; no attempt is made to establish a moral or aesthetic or other 
axiological claim, and indeed where such claims are made, the scientific merit of the work 
suffers as a result.
105 Values are not evaluated by science; they merely—but importantly—“give 
purely empirical scientific work its direction.”
106 
  Weber’s most striking departure from Rickert is his refusal to admit that there is any 
“common core” of values that will or ought to direct all scientists’ efforts; his rejection of 
Rickert’s transcendental approach is a function of his value subjectivism, a view he shared with 
the rest of the figures in this dissertation.  Weber observes that there is emphatically a “personal” 
element in choosing the “direction” of any scientific project, and consequently, “all knowledge 
of cultural reality…is always knowledge from particular points of view.”
107 This admission 
immediately raises the specter of subjectivity, not only of values, but pertaining to the validity of 
scholarly work as well.  Here Weber faced the “objectivity” problem we discussed above.  And 
in fact Weber readily admits a certain kind of subjectivity: “There is no absolutely ‘objective’ 
scientific analysis of culture…[or ‘social phenomena’] independent of special and ‘one-sided’ 
viewpoints according to which—expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are 
selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes.”
108 
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But he insists that this subjectivity does not mean that the social sciences generate 
knowledge that is “valid” only for the investigator himself or herself.  Only the degree of interest 
a given person will show for the results is affected by the central role of values, since the values 
in question may or may not attract that person.
109 “In the method of investigation, the guiding 
‘point of view’ is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme 
[begrifflichen Hilfsmittel] which will be used in the investigation,” writes Weber.  “In the mode 
of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as 
much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the 
truth.”
110 This claim is an important one, for it indicates the way in which Weber sought to 
salvage the objectivity and therefore the truth—and the usefulness—of social science even in the 
absence of Rickert’s transcendental argument for objective values.  It did not matter, Weber 
thought, whether all possible investigators would agree on the “right” set of (universal) values to 
which cultural phenomena would be referred.  He dismissed without further comment the idea 
that the act of selecting a particular value reference to direct scientific enquiry was itself a value 
judgment.
111 Any scholar should be able to verify the scientific rigor of a colleague’s argument—
even if that colleague hailed from a vastly different culture—so long as both followed “the 
norms of our thought”: die Normen unseres Denkens. “It has been and remains true that a 
systematically correct scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose, must 
be acknowledged as correct even by a Chinese—or—more precisely stated—it must constantly 
strive to attain this goal…,” whether or not the Chinese scholar has any normative use 
whatsoever for the values involved.
112 Weber, in short, appealed to reason and the uniformity of 
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the scientific intellect to guarantee the results of investigations so closely connected with 
ungroundable values.  
His belief in the possibility of verifying certain social scientific conclusions, regardless 
of the values that motivated their undertaking, led Weber to a limited yet highly positive view of 
the contribution sociology and economics could make to social policy.  This question of the 
connection between Sozialwissenschaft and Sozialpolitik provides the best window onto Weber’s 
views of value-freedom.  His position was simple: scientific endeavor could never, under any 
circumstances, generate or validate particular values.  Although most social scientific disciplines 
had had their origins in an attempt to discover the norms of economic or social life, Weber 
wrote, “it can never be the task of an empirical science [Erfahrungs-wissenschaft] to provide 
binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be 
derived.”
113 For, adopting the Is/Ought distinction, from a purely logical point of view, “the 
validity of a practical imperative as a norm and the truth-value of an empirical proposition are 
absolutely heterogeneous in character.”
114 Facts and values were distinct and not to be mixed.
115  
In this disillusioned epoch, after the turn of the twentieth century, human beings have learned 
that values and ideals cannot be anchored by the growth of knowledge; rather, people adopt them 
on “faith” in the midst of “the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours 
are to us.”
116 
But if science cannot produce values, it can serve as a tool to further values or ends set 
exogenously, whether by an individual will or an election or any other decision mechanism.  
Because of its ability to produce objective knowledge through the acceptable norms of scientific 
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thinking, it can provide, say, a political figure with all the information he needs to decide on a 
means to reach a predetermined goal: which means are available, what their respective 
consequences would be, and even what the logical consequences of his own value commitments 
might be, so as to proof their internal consistency.
117 It cannot, however, tell him which end to 
select. “An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do—but rather what he can do— 
and under certain circumstances—what he wishes to do.”
118 Weber makes clear that this strict 
separation of social scientific inquiry and the determination of political ends does not entail 
neutrality or “moral indifference” on the part of the social scientist.  A particular political or 
social stance may quicken one’s interest in undertaking research on a scientific problem in the 
first place, and there is no reason that social scientists should withhold their own value 
judgments provided that they keep these rigidly separate from their specifically scientific 
pronouncements.
119 
  Weber’s views on the role of values in university education were analogous.  As we have 
seen, science in his view could not generate values; unlike many of his contemporaries, he had 
no confidence that scholarship would advance the sorts of values advocated in the traditional 
conception of Bildung.  He famously argued in the 1918 lecture “Wissenschaft als Beruf” that 
“the world is disenchanted” as a result of the continual advance of learning, and that science 
cannot help answer the question, “What shall we do and how shall we live?”
120 Professors in 
their teaching could well advocate particular values, provided that they strictly separated their 
value judgments from their scientific claims and made certain that their students were not left in 
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any uncertainty on the matter of which was which.
121 But the idea that these values could in any 
sense be gleaned from and established securely by study and the “re-experiencing” of great texts 
was not a live one for Weber.  Universities, he wrote in 1909, “are not institutions for the 
inculcation of absolute or ultimate moral values. They analyze facts, their conditions, laws, and 
interrelations…. They do not and they cannot teach what should happen….”
122 Though the 
universities can offer students an acquaintance with the major Weltanschauungen, “they would 
be going beyond the boundaries of science and scholarship if they were to provide not only 
knowledge and understanding but also beliefs and ‘ideals.’”
123 
 
  This concludes our brief survey of Weber’s views on the subject of values and value-
freedom in the social sciences oriented toward explaining meaningful human action.  Weber’s 
originality as a thinker is beyond question, and yet in what follows we will encounter many of 
the ideas examined here in earlier or independent formulations, a fact that would not have 
dismayed Weber in the least.  He, too, gave indications of interest in value-freedom in an earlier 
period—his 1895 inaugural lecture at Freiburg contains skeptical remarks on the possibility of a 
normative science—although these were not developed.
124 But interest in value-freedom in 
German-language social science had arisen even before that time, when Weber was a student in 
the 1880s.  It was then that an Austrian economist, Carl Menger, made the issue a central part of 
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his open quarrel with German historical economics and its leader, Gustav Schmoller.  We turn 
next to the ideas of these two antagonists.  
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Part I: Economics and Sociology 
 
Chapter 2. 
“Ethical” Political Economy and “Value-Free” Economics in the Era of the Methodenstreit: 
The German Historical School and Carl Menger 
 
Political economy was the very first social scientific discipline to open the door to value-
freedom, and has ever after been its most regular and solicitous host.  Long before the German 
disputes of the early twentieth century gave the value-freedom complex its first careful 
formulations—and its cumbrous and inaccurate name—English and Irish political economists 
had entered many of its elements into their guestbooks and made them fit for polite company.  
Let us, then, briefly look through the windows of these Victorian drawing-rooms before crossing 
the North Sea to Germany and Austria, where the evening’s conversation will become more 
heated. 
In the form of a distinction between the “science” and “art” of political economy, such 
major classical writers on economic methodology as Nassau William Senior (1790-1864), John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and John Elliott Cairnes (1823-1875) called variously for the separation 
of theory and practice, of ends and means, and for acknowledgement of the inability of science to 
pronounce on the rightness or wrongness of political decisions.
1 There was no attempt to 
marginalize normative questions as unimportant or out-of-bounds for the political economist as a 
participant in policymaking, but only a reminder that such activities were practical ones 
                                                 
1 On the versions of the distinction in British economics, with some remarks on Pareto and Weber, T.W. Hutchison, 
‘Positive’ Economics and Policy Objectives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 23-43, remains the best 
historical survey.  More recent work addressing “value-free” economics emphasizes the contributions of 
philosophers and major twentieth-century economists, generally focusing on criticisms of value-freedom rather than 
on its origins: Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
Ch.5; Hilary Putnam and Vivian Walsh, eds., The End of Value-Free Economics (London: Routledge, 2012).  
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inherently dissimilar to that of discovering how the economy functioned.  In an era of intensive 
debates about politics and policy ranging from the extent of parliamentary suffrage to grain 
tariffs during the 1830s and 1840s (which had some parallels to the economic issues and class 
tensions of the German Kaiserreich), normative questions and policymaking were indeed “of 
great interest and difficulty,” as Senior wrote, “but [they] no more form part of the Science of 
Political Economy, in the sense in which we use that term, than Navigation forms part of the 
Science of Astronomy.”
2 The scholar might be directly involved in advocacy as a citizen—and 
the classical economists most certainly were—but not as a scholar.  “The business of a Political 
Economist,” Senior continued, “is neither to recommend nor to dissuade, but to state general 
principles, which it is fatal to neglect, but neither advisable, nor perhaps practicable, to use as the 
sole, or even the principal, guides in the actual conduct of affairs….”
3  
This limitation of the scholar’s role dovetailed with a conception of political economy as 
the study of “means” which could have nothing to say about the ends to which they were 
directed. Senior’s mentor, Archbishop Richard Whately (1787-1863), may well have been the 
first practicing “social scientist” to effect this separate consideration of ends and means; perhaps 
as a defense of the legitimacy of the Anglican tradition of political economy to which he and 
T.R. Malthus belonged from attack by the utilitarian Radicals on the left and various Romantic 
critics mostly on the right, Whately argued that the political economist was to determine “the 
means by which wealth may be preserved or increased. To inquire how far wealth is desirable, is 
to go out of his proper province.”
4 Cairnes, in his influential restatement of the methods of 
                                                 
2 Nassau William Senior, An Outline of the Science of Political Economy (London: Clowes, 1836), 129. 
3 Ibid., 129-30. Senior also elaborated on the need to divide descriptive and normative functions, science and art, in 
a later set of lectures published as Four Introductory Lectures on Political Economy (London: Longman, Brown, 
Green, and Longmans, 1852); see esp. Lecture III. 
4 Whately quoted in A.M.C. Waterman, Political Economy and Christian Theology Since the Enlightenment (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 137. Waterman argues that Whately provided the first real elaboration of the idea 
of “value-free” or positive political economy: 141.  
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classical political economy in 1857, concurred that the discipline “stands apart from all particular 
[socioeconomic] systems, and is, moreover, absolutely neutral as between all.” That is, he said, it 
was neutral in “pronounc[ing] no judgment on the worthiness or desirableness of the ends aimed 
at in such systems,” as opposed to the factual question of the most effective means to those 
ends.
5 One need have no dubious recourse, then, to claims of influence for Comtean positivism 
(via J.S. Mill) to explain classical political economy’s receptivity toward a variant of value-
freedom; the tradition’s own thinkers evolved a version of positive methodology. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the common association between value-freedom and 
professionalization, its nineteenth-century English advocates tended to occupy university chairs 
and professional organizations, even though so much of Victorian intellectual life took place 
outside of formal academic settings.  Whately, Senior, and Cairnes all occupied chairs in 
political economy at Oxford or Trinity College, Dublin at one point or another in their careers.  
Certainly those who brought about the gradual replacement of classical political economy with 
early neoclassical or marginalist economics in England from the 1870s until the 1890s were 
chaired university economists with an interest in making the discipline more rigorous through the 
use of professional standards and mathematical methods.
6  Both William Stanley Jevons (1835-
1882), at Owens College in Manchester and then University College, London, and Alfred 
Marshall (1842-1924), who decisively shaped the influential Cambridge economics program, 
                                                 
5 John Elliott Cairnes, The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1875 
[1857]), 20. For John Stuart Mill, in his important early essay on the methods of political economy, the discipline 
ought to produce results that could be trusted and employed by those of any partisan position: Mill, “On the 
Definition of Political Economy” (1836/1844), in Collected Works, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1963-91), IV, 312. 
6 John Maloney, Marshall, Orthodoxy and the Professionalisation of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985); Alon Kadish and Keith Tribe, eds., The Market for Political Economy: The Advent of Economics in 
British University Culture, 1850-1905 (London: Routledge, 1993).  
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voiced their support for the conception of value-freedom found in the “art/science” distinction in 
the course of promoting the professionalization of economics.
7 
Jevons warned against “the misinterpretation by the public of the relation between 
science and practice” and made the customary reference to the difference between practical 
crafts and scientific theories—the latter might be used to improve the former, but only through 
the deployment of general principles to specific ends.
8 Marshall agreed, writing in 1879 along 
with his wife Mary Paley Marshall that “gradually science becomes able to predict future events 
with increasing confidence and accuracy. But this is all that a science can do; it cannot claim to 
be a guide in life, or to lay down rules for the practical conduct of affairs. That is the task of what 
in old times used to be called an Art.”
9 A few years later in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge he 
elaborated, “Having done its work [economics] retires and leaves to common sense the 
responsibility of the ultimate decision [in policy questions]; not standing in the way of, or 
pushing out any other kind of knowledge, not hampering common sense in the use to which it is 
able to put any other available knowledge, nor in any way hindering; helping where it could help, 
and for the rest keeping silence.… [A]n economist as such cannot say which is the best course to 
pursue, any more than an engineer as such can decide which is the best route for the Panama 
canal. It is true that an economist, like any other citizen, may give his own judgment as to the 
best solution of various practical problems….  But in such cases the counsel bears only the 
authority of the individual who gives it: he does not speak with the voice of his science. And the 
economist has to be specially careful to make this clear; because there is much misunderstanding 
as to the scope of his science, and undue claims to authority on practical matters have often been 
                                                 
7 One could easily add the influential, if transitional, Cambridge professor Henry Sidgwick to Jevons and Marshall 
on this matter. See especially Sidgwick, The Principles of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1883), 12-29. 
8 Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour (London: Macmillan, 1882), 9-10. 
9 Alfred and Mary Paley Marshall, The Economics of Industry, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1881 [1879]), 3.  
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put forward on its behalf.”
10 Owing to this susceptibility, economists and their readers must 
always be reminded that “the Laws of Economics are statements of tendencies in the indicative 
mood, and not ethical precepts in the imperative,” as Marshall put
 it in the preface to his major 
work of 1890.
11 
Much like J.S. Mill—and, indeed, like many proponents of value-freedom—Jevons and 
Marshall were not entirely consistent even at the level of theory, let alone in their practice.  
Jevons’ writings on economic theory themselves, to say nothing of his essays on economic and 
social policy, are scattered with value judgments.  Marshall was as conflicted here as he was 
elsewhere, trying to balance the construction of rigorous economic theory with the innate ‘do-
goodery’ that John Maynard Keynes would later disparage as owing to the former’s Victorian 
earnestness.
12  But a commitment to value-freedom in economics had been presented, and was 
indeed enshrined in the principal English treatise on economic methodology between Cairnes 
and Lionel Robbins—John Neville Keynes’ Scope and Method of Political Economy (1891), 
which demarcated a sphere of the “positive science of political economy” with explicit reference 
to the categorical philosophical distinction between Is and Ought as well as that between science 
and art.
13 
This background in British economics is worth keeping in mind for this and the following 
chapters, on several grounds. First, it is a reminder that value-freedom was not entirely new as a 
                                                 
10 Alfred Marshall, “The Present Position of Economics,” (1885), in Arthur C. Pigou, ed., Memorials of Alfred 
Marshall (London: Macmillan, 1925), 164-65. Marshall made much the same argument in the third edition of his 
famous textbook: Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 9
th (Variorum) ed., 2 Vols. (London: Macmillan, 1961 
[1890]), vol. II: 154. 
11 Marshall, Principles, vol. I: v-vi. 
12 See J.M. Keynes, “In Memoriam: Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924,” in Pigou, ed., Memorials, 1-65; also reprinted in 
J.M. Keynes, Essays in Biography (London: Macmillan, 1972 [1933]), in Collected Writings, vol. X; see Marshall, 
“Social Possibilities of Economic Chivalry,” in Pigou, Memorials, 323-352, for an example. 
13 J.N. Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, 4
th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1917 [1891]), Ch.2, esp. 
46-60. It is worth observing that J.N. Keynes, like his colleague and sometime friend Marshall, was well-read in the 
works of the German historical and “ethical” economists, and was thoroughly fair to them; he cited, for instance, 
Adolph Wagner’s claims about the inseparability of positive and normative judgments in the course of his 
discussion in this chapter.  
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social scientific doctrine,
14 even if the debate about it reached a qualitatively different level of 
intensity, and in some cases sophistication, in the German context.  Second, as sources of insight, 
the classical economists and sometimes Marshall and J.N. Keynes too were available to the 
German participants, although of course some of the most widely read classical economists from 
Adam Smith to Malthus to J.R. McCulloch were anything but proponents of “positive” 
economics kept free of policy judgments.
15 Third, the fact that it was theoretical economists who 
were the most visible and persistent advocates of value-freedom among social scientists in quite 
different countries—including but not limited to Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Germany—raises 
the possibility that there is a particularly strong connection between value-freedom and the 
method, subject matter, or manner of reasoning characteristic of economics.  This suspicion is 
accentuated by the fact that economics both evinced the earliest commitment to value-freedom, 
and probably remains the only social science in which a sizable number of contemporary 
practitioners of different persuasions and specialties still adhere to some version of the doctrine, 
in an era in which it has become unfashionable.  Finally, however, even this brief juxtaposition 
reveals not only continuities and shared assumptions but also differences of emphasis, 
understanding, terminology, and intellectual tradition.  The German-language discussion of 
values and value-freedom we will encounter here and in the following chapters was shaped by a 
heterogeneous set of traditions, including above all historicism and neo-Kantianism, both of 
which were essentially absent from the British economists’ horizon, while in economics 
                                                 
14 Quite aside from the tendency among philosophers to trace it back to David Hume in the form of the Is/Ought 
distinction. 
15 We shall see below, for instance, that Cairnes was an important source for Menger.  
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specifically the notion of a subjective source of value in individuals’ perceptions of their wants 
was characteristically German.
16 
The previous chapter outlined the position on value-freedom and objectivity that Max 
Weber took in the first decade of the twentieth century, and we had occasion to remark that some 
of the concerns he raised dated back not only to his inaugural lecture of 1895 but to the ongoing 
methodological discussion opened by Carl Menger (1840-1921) in the 1880s.  This chapter will 
document the positions taken by Menger and the chief names among the historical economists 
whose views he opposed.  The sharply-worded 1883-1884 controversy between Menger and 
Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), the powerful Berlin representative of the historical approach, 
concerned not only the relative adequacy of historical and “abstract” methods, but also the 
appropriateness of a normative or “ethical” social science. 
Menger emerged in this dispute as the first major German-language economist to 
embrace the “value-free” science ideal in a form recognizably similar to that later taken by 
Weber.  Despite his very different philosophical pedigree, Menger combined the same basic set 
of commitments that led the other figures in this dissertation to adopt the value-freedom ideal.  
First, he accepted and promoted a version of social science—in his case, economics—which 
insisted on the need to take seriously the subjectively experienced intentions, meanings, and 
other mental states of human beings conceived as agents pursuing ends.  This commitment 
differentiated him from nineteenth-century positivist currents which also sought objective 
knowledge of the human world, but at the cost of excluding consideration of subjective aims and 
values by making human conduct automatic or determined, causally or statistically.  
Simultaneously, he tried to ensure that his social science could offer theoretical explanations of 
                                                 
16 This statement must be qualified in the case of historicism with regard to Marshall and J.N. Keynes, though they 
were responding at least as much to the German historical economists themselves as to English and Irish figures like 
T.E. Cliffe Leslie, William Cunningham, and W.J. Ashley (or to the earlier Richard Jones).  
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such subjectively-determined actions without itself falling victim to subjectivity, and did so by 
employing theoretical “selection criteria” in the form of “types.” At the risk of some confusion 
we will designate this two-part commitment as “interpretive social science,” meaning thereby not 
a purely hermeneutic endeavor but a theoretical science aiming at explanation of human actions, 
which nonetheless refuses to exclude consideration of subjective mental states and values.  
Second, Menger took the values and goals of human agents to be subjective in the additional 
sense of non-rational or “arbitrary,” a matter of personal preference or will.  Third, he accepted 
the set of distinctions which made up the value-freedom complex itself, including especially 
those between theory and practice, and Is and Ought.  Coupled with the doctrine of value 
subjectivism, this led Menger to face the problem of securing his social science itself from the 
threat of arbitrariness or bias.  This “objectivity problem,” which he implicitly attempted to push 
back with the tools of a “realist” or essentialist philosophical doctrine, ultimately limited the 
viability of his entire approach just as it threatened those of the other figures who attempted to 
adopt this complex of ideas in one form or another. 
  Although our principal focus is naturally on Menger’s work, it is necessary to begin with 
the “historical school” in German economics.  For it is not quite true that this heterogeneous 
collection of scholars served purely as a model of what to avoid in order to pursue “value-free” 
science.  Just as the value-freedom advocates came to their doctrine from a variety of intellectual 
backgrounds, and emphasized different features of it in their methodological writings, so too the 
historical economists we consider next came to their conviction of an “ethical” political economy 
from different directions, and they sometimes shared more in common with their opponents than 
expected. 
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I.  The German Historical School and “Ethical” Political Economy 
 
As the common antagonist of Carl Menger in the Methodenstreit of the 1880s and of Max 
Weber in the Werturteilsstreit of the years before World War I, Gustav Schmoller may seem a 
likely foil for the advocates of value-freedom, a scholar whose views run exactly counter to the 
idea of a “value-free” social science.  And so he was in one regard, for it is clear that it was to a 
large degree Schmoller’s ideal of a politically active social science, the results of which would 
somehow both remain objective and feed directly and normatively into particular social policies 
of the German state, which made value-freedom into a rallying cry for his opponents, from Max 
Weber and Werner Sombart to now obscure economists such as Julius Wolf and Ludwig Pohle.
17 
Schmoller was, perhaps alongside Adolf Wagner, the most visible and influential of the scholars 
who promoted the notion that political economists should assess the socioeconomic 
developments they studied against the “ideals” of their times, and promote policies to achieve 
more “ethical” outcomes in the economic field as a core part of their scientific work.
18 
Despite this pivotal area of disagreement, however, we must observe that Schmoller’s 
views on the task of economics were not in any simple sense directly antithetical to those of the 
value-freedom advocates, for there were in fact several areas of continuity between Schmoller 
                                                 
17 The same was true of Menger in the earlier dispute, mutatis mutandis: although Menger did not use the 
terminology of value-freedom in the Methodenstreit, nor did he initially see Schmoller as his principal opponent in 
1883, he did take Schmoller to task for confusing theory and practice, as we shall see in the following section. On 
Wolf and Pohle, see Heino Heinrich Nau, “Zwei ￖkonomien: Die Vorgeschichte des Werturteilsstreits in der 
deutschsprachigen ￖkonomik,” in Nau, ed., Der Werturteilsstreit (Marburg: Metropolis, 1996); Rüdiger vom Bruch, 
Wissenschaft, Politik und öffentlichen Meinung (Husum: Matthiesen, 1980), 300-318. 
18 On Schmoller’s place in German social science, his enormous influence on academic appointments and his key 
role in the Verein für Sozialpolitik, see Helge Peukert, “The Schmoller Renaissance,” History of Political Economy 
33:1 (2001), 71-116; Erik Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864-
1894 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003); Birger Priddat, Die andere Ökonomie : eine neue Einschätzung von Gustav 
Schmollers Versuch einer “ethisch-historischen” Nationalökonomie im 19. Jahrhundert (Marburg: Metropolis, 
1995);  Nicholas Balabkins, Not By Theory Alone: The Economics of Gustav von Schmoller and Its Legacy to 
America (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), esp. 48-49; Sven Thomas, Gustav Schmoller und die deutsche 
Sozialpolitik (Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 1995).  For his position on “ethical” political economy, see below.  
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and his critics as well.  Schmoller even evinced (highly limited) support for key components of 
value-freedom in some of his moods, and more importantly he helped to place real, historically 
conditioned economic agents on the horizon for political economy as a theoretical discipline. 
Certainly Weber, too, drank from the powerful current of historicism in nineteenth-century 
Germany which in the realm of economic history found its high-water mark during the imperial 
period in Schmoller’s work, and this chapter will argue that the historicist focus on interpretive 
understanding of individual and cultural meanings was essential to the growth of a non-positivist 
“value-free” social science even in Menger. 
Of course, we cannot simply equate Schmoller’s perspective with that of the “German 
Historical School” of political economy on the one hand, or with that of the Kathedersozialisten 
on the other; some examination of the nineteenth-century roots of German economics is required 
for understanding either Schmoller or his opponents. Thus, this section aims to set the stage for 
the later rise of “value-free” economics in the years of the Methodenstreit by outlining the views 
of Schmoller’s predecessors in historical economics—as well as his own—on economic method, 
“ethical” political economy, and objectivity, concluding with the seemingly opposing position on 
objectivity held by his fellow Kathedersozialist and Verein member, Lujo Brentano.
19 
Schmoller’s own program was of course indebted to prior economic ideas as well as to his 
convictions about contemporary social problems, and consequently we begin with some 
background in earlier nineteenth-century German political economy. The principal reason to take 
note here of such earlier “historical” economists as Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894), Bruno 
                                                 
19 This section is not intended as a portrayal of the overall work of the older historical economists, Schmoller, or 
Brentano, but only of specific ideas relevant to the notion of a historically nuanced science of economics and to 
value-freedom and objectivity.  
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Hildebrand (1812-1886), and Karl Knies (1821-98) is not that they formed a cohesive “school”
20 
of which Schmoller was simply a younger member, but that they rhetorically initiated the 
program of combatting classical political economy’s “abstract theory” by means of historical 
economic studies to which Schmoller and his students would later give more actual substance.  
The notion of a German historical school of economics, which is a commonplace in textbooks on 
the history of the discipline, has been subjected to criticism by a number of scholars, who argue 
that the economists usually grouped under this heading shared very little.  They formed a 
coherent group neither in nationality (historical economics was often practiced beyond the 
boundaries of Germany), nor in a common historical method (in the sense of taking their data 
primarily from the past or in the sense of an idiographic approach which abjured generalization), 
nor even in their direct personal connections or a common set of convictions on such matters as 
economic policy and the role of the state.
21 This argument has been carried too far,
22 ignoring 
some genuine commonalities, but its de-homogenization of the historical economists is a 
valuable service. Instead, therefore, of presenting the work of Roscher, Hildebrand, and Knies as 
a unified body of doctrine, we will simply identify certain features of the thought of these quite 
                                                 
20 David Lindenfeld, “The Myth of the Older Historical School of Economics,” Central European History 26:4 
(1993), 405-416, effectively demolishes the notion that Roscher, Hildebrand and Knies shared a method or agreed 
on the details of their common program of introducing historical considerations into the domain of political 
economy. This argument had been advanced sketchily before, e.g. by Harald Winkel, Die deutsche 
Nationalökonomie im 19. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), 99. 
21 Heath Pearson, “Was There Really a German Historical School of Economics,” History of Political Economy 31:3 
(1999), 547-62; Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics,19-34. 
22 Geoffrey Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History (London: Routledge, 2001), 56n.1, is probably correct that 
Pearson’s (and a fortiori Grimmer-Solem’s still more stringent) criteria for what constitutes a school are so strict 
that it would be difficult to distinguish any ‘schools’ in the history of economics according to them. This is itself a 
largely ‘scholastic’ question, however; no one denies that an unusually large and influential contingent of 
nineteenth-century German economists promoted (either rhetorically or in their actual practice) the replacement or 
extensive supplementation of “abstract theory” with historical data about the economic life of particular nations, 
institutions or groups, as a means of improving the scientific character and level of certainty of economic 
knowledge, or that that many of them self-identified as belonging to a “historical school.” This is true not just of the 
commonly mentioned Roscher, Hildebrand, Knies, and Schmoller, but also of now-forgotten economists of equal 
stature, such as Georg Hanssen in the earlier period, or the less commonly discussed Knapp, Bücher and Held in the 
later period. For a balanced assessment of the adequacy of the “historical school” concept, see Roman Köster, Die 
Wissenschaft der Aussenseiter: die Krise der Nationalökonomie in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 34-35.  
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different men which are relevant to the later debates between Schmoller and his opponents.  Such 
background is further necessary because it was the work of these older figures, and not that of 
Schmoller, which supplied the main object of Menger’s critique in his principal contribution to 
the Methodenstreit, the Untersuchungen (Investigations) of 1883—even as they also 
simultaneously anticipated certain doctrines which would later be important to the advocates of 
value-freedom. 
German political economy in the first half of the nineteenth century was a discipline in 
transition.  In the era in which the older historical economists’ views were formed, political 
economy remained an integral branch of the moral-political sciences known as the 
Staatswissenschaften, or sciences of state, which had grown up in the German universities of the 
eighteenth century as a body of knowledge useful for the moral and political training of state 
officials.
23 The particular sciences known as cameralism and Polizeiwissenschaft had 
traditionally addressed what modern systems of classification would consider economic 
questions, but with a particular perspective, viewing the economy as part of a well-ordered 
domain in which the princely government ensured that its various “populations” were managed 
in their activities according to the needs appropriate to their social estates (Stände) and in 
accordance with the requirements for state power and expansion.
24 The introduction of Adam 
                                                 
23 David Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), is a fine history of these disciplines; on the relevant period see Chapters 3 and 4. 
As Lindenfeld argues, these future officials also received much of their practical training on-the-job, but part of the 
strategy for success and expansion among professors of Staatswissenschaft in the universities from the eighteenth 
century onward was to teach relevant forms of practical reasoning: these disciplines were in no sense intended to be 
purely “theoretical,” aiming simply for “truth” apart from practice. A voluminous older but still useful German work 
which addresses the academic and practical sides of Staatswissenschaft is Heinrich Heffter, Die deutsche 
Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der Ideen und Institutionen (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1950). 
24 Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse, 1750-1840 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 21-22, 29-32. As Tribe points out, German cameralism was not merely a form 
of mercantilism, as Adam Smith charged in 1776: though it shared elements of mercantilism in its focus on domestic 
production over foreign trade, and the maintenance of domestic stores of precious metals, it was also oriented much 
more to achieving measures for the prevention of disorder and the promotion of a particular conception of the 
political order of the country. Cameralism was not just a body of economic doctrine. Ibid., 66, 74-75.  
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Smith’s political economy in the 1790s was associated with (even if it did not by itself “cause”) a 
change in perspective.
25 As the German academy became preoccupied with the rights-bearing, 
decision-making individual and with the sphere of “civil society” during the period of greatest 
excitement about the moral-political side of Kant’s critical philosophy and the French 
Revolution, a new science of Nationalökonomie grew up alongside the older cameralism.
26  
Addressing the economic actions of individuals operating separately from state control, 
professors of the new political economy agreed that their discipline “was concerned with the 
general principles of economic life which governed the manner in which needs arose, were 
satisfied, and in so doing contributed to the progress of popular wealth. Nationalökonomie was 
deliberately juxtaposed to Staatswirtschaft,” or the state management of public properties.
27 
The new political economy did not simply replace the older cameralism, however.  
Through the 1820s, the two coexisted as new chairs of political economy were added without the 
removal of the cameralistic subjects from the curriculum.
28 And a sort of synthesis formed under 
the aegis of the Heidelberg scholar Karl Heinrich Rau, whose multivolume Lehrbuch der 
politischen Ökonomie was far and away the most influential German economics text of the 
middle third of the nineteenth century: first published in 1826, its ninth and posthumous edition 
appeared under the editorship of Adolf Wagner in 1876.
29 Rau was more of a Nationalökonom 
                                                 
25 Strictly speaking, Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) had in fact been translated into German soon after its first 
publication, but did not make a mark on the German discussion until after the second (Garve) translation, in the 
1790s: ibid., 148, 150; Harald Winkel, “Adam Smith und die deutsche Nationalökonomie 1776–1820,” in Studien 
zur Entwicklung der ökonomischen Theorie, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Neue Folge 115:5, ed. Harald 
Scherf (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1986), 81–109. On the reception of Smith in Germany, see also Ian Simpson 
Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 364-67. 
26 Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 55-67. 
27 Tribe, Governing Economy, 174. Despite its later connotations, the name Nationalökonomie, Tribe observes, was 
originally used by Kant-influenced theorists to refer to the study of all the resources of the nation in 
contradistinction to the subset which was administered publicly (Staatswirtschaft), and relied on the new and 
important public/private distinction. Nationalökonomie was thus associated at the outset with the private wealth-
production of civil society, not the national state: 169-70.  
28 Ibid., 182. 
29 Ibid., 183; Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 119.  
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than a cameralist, but his work fit very well under the practical, moral-political umbrella of the 
Staatswissenschaften.  He introduced few innovations himself, but his textbook institutionalized 
within a single work the division between the study of “private economy” and “public 
economy.”
30 The discussion of private economy in Rau’s first volume was primarily based on 
classical ideas from Smith to Say, dealing with the theory of value and price, and of capital and 
wages, and oriented toward the explanation of production, distribution and consumption along 
classical lines.  Its view of the state both in volume 1 and in volume 2, which took up the 
traditional cameralist questions, was broadly in line with the economic liberalism of the classical 
tradition, regarding the task of the state not as providing the sole source of public order but as 
promoting private citizens’ preexisting initiative and enterprise through education and other 
public goods.  (Rau was thus not at all averse to making normative recommendations in his 
capacity as a good Staatswissenschaftler, even if he followed a liberal rather than a traditional 
“etatist” path.) The compromise or synthesis element came largely through Rau’s greater 
orientation to description of existing economic structures within a German context, what Keith 
Tribe describes as a focus on “economic anthropology” or an account of the “practical workings 
of industry and trade,” which tended to supplant the theoretical-analytical drive of Smith and 
Ricardo, on whom Rau otherwise relied.
31 Rau thus provided a quintessential instance of the 
early nineteenth-century German tendency to couple pure theory with the discussion of particular 
                                                 
30 For the following on Rau, see Tribe, Governing Economy, 190-99; Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 120-121, 
137; Erich Streissler, “Carl Menger, der deutsche Nationalökonom,” in Birger Priddat, ed., Wert, Meinung, 
Bedeutung: Die Tradition der subjektiven Wertlehre in der deutschen Nationalökonomie vor Menger (Marburg: 
Metropolis, 1997), 49-52. 
31 Tribe, Governing Economy, 192.  
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institutional and national particularities, and to rely on descriptive thoroughness rather than 
analytical precision.
32   
Two major scholars of the German political-economic sciences have seen the tendency, 
embodied in Rau, to separate the practical and particularistic cameralist tradition from economic 
theory in the Nationalökonomie tradition, with its source in Anglo-French political economy and 
its universalistic orientation, as the source of subsequent analytical divisions of economic 
method in Germany.  Both Wilhelm Hennis and Keith Tribe have argued that the methodological 
division between pure and applied economics—theory and practical policy—originated, in the 
German case, out of this separation, and Tribe has further suggested that the separation is at the 
basis of the divergence of the “universalistic” or exact-theoretical method and the “historical” 
method in the 1840s.
33 We shall have more to say about the separation of theory and practice as 
an element of value-freedom in economics, and about “exact” and historical methods, later in 
this chapter, but for the moment one other unrelated legacy of the early nineteenth century 
deserves emphasis.  We alluded above to the conception of political economy as a study of the 
way in which human needs or wants are satisfied, which was shared by Rau and other professors 
of Nationalökonomie.
34  This seemingly innocuous statement in fact represents a theoretical 
position from which early nineteenth-century German economists derived a theory of economic 
value oriented toward the perceptions of individual consumers.  In contrast to the theory of value 
characteristic of English classical political economy, which focused on factor costs, especially 
                                                 
32 There are, obviously, exceptions: the first volume of Heinrich von Th￼nen’s Der isolirte Staat (1826), for 
instance, is a powerful instance of “pure theory” or economic analysis not reliant on empirical description. Then 
again, Thünen was not a university economist: see Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 135-137. 
33 Wilhelm Hennis, “A Science of Man: Max Weber and the Political Economy of the German Historical School,” in 
Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., Max Weber and his Contemporaries (London: Unwyn 
Hyman, 1987), 25-58, here pp. 34, 51-52; Tribe, Governing Economy, 205. 
34 The German word in question is “Bedürfnisse,” the exact meaning of which is ambiguous as it can signify both 
“needs” and “wants”—a characteristic worth noting in considering the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of 
value.  
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the cost of labor, in determining the value of goods over the long run, from the very early 
nineteenth century German economic thought possessed the makings of a subjective value theory 
in which the value of goods was in some degree conferred by the subjective perceptions of 
individual economic agents aiming to satisfy their needs or wants.
35  In 1807, for instance, the 
economist Gottlieb Hufeland (an expounder of Smith but an opponent of his labor-oriented value 
theory) argued that not only consumption and exchange but even economic growth were driven 
by purely subjective, mental factors—“an absolute dominance of opinions in the realm of goods 
and property”—with which individual economic agents valued the goods and services available 
to them according to their own judgment of their needs and wants.
36 The elements of a subjective 
theory of value had been present in several eighteenth-century writers on political economy such 
as Galiani and Condillac, but would achieve acceptance by the economic mainstream in the 
western European nations only after 1870, and the major exceptions during the nineteenth 
century were the German legatees of Hufeland such as Rau, the important theorist F.B.W. von 
Hermann, and, indeed, both Roscher and Knies.
37 
If we now turn to the work of Wilhelm Roscher, it becomes apparent that his conception 
of political economy is closely related to that of Rau.  Generally agreed to be the founder of the 
                                                 
35 Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 85-86; see the contributions of Erich Streissler, Karl Milford, Jochen 
Schumann, and Birger Priddat in Priddat, ed., Wert, Meinung, Bedeutung. 
36 Quoted in Karl Milford, “Hufeland als Vorläufer von Menger und Hayek,” in Priddat, Wert, Meinung, Bedeutung, 
95; see also Streissler, “Carl Menger, der deutsche Nationalökonom,” 43-44. The key point in Hufeland’s criticism 
of the Smithians was that economists of his day typically tried to explain value and price by referring to their origins 
rather than to conduct, ignoring the need to explain the valuing behavior of individual actors; Hufeland himself 
combined this attention to valuing behavior with the German Smithian objectivists’ attention to the means-ends 
character of goods to arrive at a theory in which goals and purposes were dependent on individual opinions, 
explaining willing exchanges of differing goods. See Milford, “Carl Menger und die Urspr￼nge der ￖsterreichischen 
Schule der Nationalökonomie,” in Reinhard Neck, ed., Die Österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie 
(Frankfurt: Lang, 2008), 25-64, here 37-40. 
37 The historian Erich Streissler has done more than anyone else to revive awareness of this “proto-neoclassical” 
tradition in the theory of value among little-known German theorists, and to point to its importance for 
understanding the later achievement of Carl Menger: see especially Streissler, “Carl Menger, der deutsche 
Nationalökonom,” and “The Influence of German Economics on the Work of Menger and Marshall,” in Bruce J. 
Caldwell, ed., Carl Menger and His Legacy in Economics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990). We will discuss 
Menger’s use and expansion of this tradition of subjective value theory in the following section.  
57 
 
historical approach to economics in Germany owing to the widely read programmatic statement 
in his Grundriss of 1843,
38 Roscher integrated traditional cameralist elements and some degree 
of attention to historical change and relativity into classical Nationalökonomie. The invariably 
repeated barb that Roscher offered merely “historical sauce on a classical dish” is accurate 
inasmuch as he based his texts organizationally on Rau and in substance on the economic theory 
of classical sources from Smith to Rau; Roscher consequently remained closer to the classical 
economists than did Hildebrand or Knies.
39 Despite being trained by some of the most eminent 
of German historians, including Ranke and Gervinus, despite initially offering lectures in history 
himself, and despite his claims to be following in the footsteps of the historical school of 
jurisprudence under Savigny, Roscher’s own scholarship had almost nothing in common with 
their careful source-criticism.
40 In what sense, then, was he a “historical” economist? For our 
purposes, there are two principal senses, both relevant to later debates about the nature of social 
science. 
First and foremost, in expanding on the traditional cameralist aim (also preserved in Rau) 
of descriptive thoroughness and relevance to the situation of officials in the German states, 
Roscher argued that the theory of political economy must be appropriate to the full reality of the 
specific historical forms of economic life which it aimed to explain.  That is to say, the classical 
theory must be broadened to take account of the many “exceptions” to its laws which were 
apparent in the particularities of the contemporary German situation and of other specific 
                                                 
38 Wilhelm Roscher, Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft: Nach geschichtlicher Methode 
(Göttingen: Dieterichschen Buchhandlung, 1843). 
39 Lindenfeld, “Myth,” 406-407. One of the rare Dogmenhistoriker to dissent from this famous critique of Roscher 
(first made by the economist Robert Wilbrandt, an opponent of Weber in the Werturteilsstreit) is Karl Brandt, 
Geschichte der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre, vol. 2 (Freiburg: Haufe, 1993), 54, though he does not really 
provide much evidence against its accuracy. 
40 Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 154-155. The views of Savigny’s historical school of jurisprudence are 
sketched below in Chapter Four, Section I.  
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economic orders throughout history.
41  For Roscher, this task involved introducing a more well-
rounded view of the individual and above all of the nation.  It meant that in explaining individual 
economic actions, political economy must take into account not just the motive of self-interest 
and the surrounding “real” (economic, political, and social) factors affecting action, but “ideal” 
factors as well, especially moral and religious ones.
42  By extension, as Roscher recurrently 
emphasized, the inextricable interconnection of individuals with their social, political and 
cultural surroundings meant that the economist must account for the effects of national culture 
and characteristics on the shaping of the economy.
43  For instance, Roscher sought to 
demonstrate by historical example that contrary to the opinions of the classical economists, there 
was no natural rate of wages set at a minimum subsistence level, and that the appropriateness of 
free trade or protection depended on the cultural “level” of the nation in question.
44 He followed 
certain currents of his day in conceiving of these necessary interconnections in the form of 
organic and biological analogies.  According to him, the Volk or people formed a real whole or 
totality, whose parts (including individuals and collective entities in the economic, political and 
other realms) cohered internally and could be explained only in terms of mutual causality, and 
which indeed could be seen as a multigenerational and living unity.
45 Roscher was fond of 
making the claim that history, and thereby historical economics, was like physiology writ large. 
Second, Roscher sought to introduce a historical element into his understanding of the 
types of regularities in economic life which it was political economy’s task to describe.  If it was 
                                                 
41 Gottfried Eisermann, Die Grundlagen des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie (Stuttgart: Enke, 
1956), 151-52. It is worth noting that Roscher had favorable comments to make about the historical awareness of 
some of the classical economists, preeminently Smith and Malthus, at least in his earlier years—his aim was not to 
overturn classical theory but to put it onto more secure foundations, as he saw it: ibid., 130-31. 
42 Ibid., 155; Winkel, Nationalökonomie, 94. 
43 See the comments on Roscher’s methodology in Milford, “Carl Menger und die Urspr￼nge der ￖsterreichischen 
Schule der Nationalökonomie,” 47-49. 
44 Winkel, Nationalökonomie, 94-95. 
45 Eisermann, Grundlagen, 139-42, 153, which also notes his interest in Hegelianism.  
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mistaken to think that the “laws” of economic life proposed by the classical economists and their 
vulgarizers were in fact universally applicable to economic agents in all societies, perhaps a 
lawful pattern could still be discerned in the development of different societies.  Roscher sought 
partially, then, to substitute diachronic laws for synchronic laws of political economy, and he 
proposed to employ a comparative method to analyze the raw data of different societies’ 
developmental histories in order to discover such laws.
46 The aim was to establish “a sort of 
comparative morphology” of national economic development, as Lindenfeld has put it.
47   
Roscher adopted a simple framework of stages based on the predominant factors of production—
“nature,” labor, and capital—and his use of biological-organic metaphors inclined him toward a 
cyclical view of growth, maturity, and decline.
48 Although he did in fact successfully introduce 
discussion of historical variations into the standard subjects of the cameralist manuals—for 
instance, dealing with the development of agriculture from primitive farming to the end of 
feudalism, and of manufactures and commerce from the medieval town to the decline of guilds 
and the growth of modern banking—he did not come close to undertaking exhaustive historical-
comparative studies for the purpose of building up the concepts of economic theory by induction 
as he implied.
49 If his attempts to discern lawfully recurring stages of development were 
characteristic of his day,
50 and soon regarded as antiquated,
51 the desire to present a plausible 
account of the historical development of different economic systems was a bequest of great use 
to Schmoller and others who followed him. 
                                                 
46 Milford, “Carl Menger und die Urspr￼nge der ￖsterreichischen Schule der Nationalökonomie,” 48-49. For a brief 
summary Roscher’s position, see Winkel, Nationalökonomie, 94-95. 
47 Lindenfeld, “Myth,” 406. 
48 Eisermann, Grundlagen, 154-55. 
49 Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination, 156. 
50 Ibid., noting that “in their Whiggishness and their all-inclusiveness, they were akin to the schemes of Comte in 
France and Spencer in England of the same era.” 
51 Eisermann, Grundlagen, 132-35, calls attention to Roscher’s explicit consideration of divine intent in history and 
the discrepancy between the calls for empirical-historical investigation oriented toward the individual and the 
biological-cum-religious philosophy of history approach oriented toward larger “wholes” on the other.  
60 
 
Hildebrand and Knies produced their own statements calling for the use of historical 
methods in political economy in the decade following the publication of Roscher’s Grundriss, 
and although they differed from Roscher and from each other in their views on the proper task of 
economics, the themes they struck were similar.  The slightly older Hildebrand, who began his 
career as a historian, was both more radical than Roscher—a democratic delegate at the 
Frankfurt Parliament, he was dismissed from his position at Marburg after 1848 and had to teach 
for a time in Switzerland—and found it more to his liking to set up institutes and journals than to 
pursue sustained scholarship.
52 Addressing economic topics already by about 1840, Hildebrand 
came to oppose the classical school in its English and German incarnations because of what he 
saw as its inapplicability to German particularities and the mistaken “one-sidedness” of its 
materialistic, utilitarian psychology, which denied the ethical and religious motives that drove 
socially-embedded human actors.
53  Charging the classical economists with abstraction and 
“cosmopolitanism,” an epithet which he also directed at contemporary socialism in his 1848 
Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft,
54 he called like Roscher for greater attention to 
“reality” as seen concretely in particular histories and national varieties.
55 In Hildebrand’s case, 
this meant the greater use of history and of statistics (then still divided into separate descriptive 
and quantitative forms) in building a less “abstract” economic theory, and he even set up an 
institute for statistical research.
56 But although he himself later produced a historical study of the 
German wool industry, his opposition to classical categories left him with nothing but 
eclecticism and casuist explanations to offer in place of theory.
57 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 160-64; Lindenfeld, “Myth,” 408. 
53 Ibid., 164-65. 
54 Bruno Hildebrand, Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft, vol. 1 (Frankfurt: Rütten, 1848). There 
were no further volumes. 
55 Eisermann, Grundlagen, 169-70. 
56 Lindenfeld, “Myth of the Historical School,” 408. 
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Knies, the most methodologically sophisticated of the three, shared Hildebrand’s 
rejection of the universalism of classical theory, though he was far from denying the validity of 
theory in general or proposing an inductive historical-statistical method analogous to 
Hildebrand’s program.
58 For Knies, the problem with classical political economy, and the 
socialist economics which he saw as its natural extension, lay in the “absolutism” and 
“perpetualism” of the theory; that is to say, the aim to generate laws valid “for all times and for 
all peoples.”
59 In Die politische Oekonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen Methode 
(1853), Knies agreed that economics should formally expand its attention to the full range of 
motives and non-economic influences which shaped economic phenomena in real, particular 
situations.  This emphatically included his predecessors’ call for greater attention to the ways in 
which national culture and state activity conditioned particular economic systems, and he even 
shared Roscher’s holism to a degree, claiming that the economy could be understood as one of 
the mutually-conditioning (wechselseitige) parts of the totality or “living organism” of the Volk 
across multiple generations.
60 But, as Hennis has pointed out, Knies’s work was noteworthy for 
its further elaboration of the idea of economics as a science of the “whole man” which set out 
from an interpretive understanding of individual action: studying neither the internal connections 
of ideas nor the purely physical, material activities of human beings, but rather the ways in which 
individual mental states affect economic actions in historically specific contexts.
61 He was one of 
the first to consider the differences between Naturwissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaft, and Staats- 
or Sozialwissenschaft, and their appropriate domains, in a manner that led beyond vague analogy, 
                                                 
58 Several historians have called attention to the fact that Knies was himself a noted theorist, particularly in his 
influential Geld und Credit (1873): e.g., Lindenfeld, “Myth,” 409-10; Gottfried Eisermann, Max Weber und die 
Nationalökonomie (Marburg: Metropolis, 1993), 26. 
59 Eisermann, Grundlagen, 202-203. 
60 Ibid., 194-96, 201. 
61 Hennis, “A Science of Man,” 43.  
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anticipating the concerns which would soon be associated with Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert—
and Menger.
62 For Knies, the analytical device of self-interested economic man was not useful 
for such situation-specific explanation of human action since it “de-natured” the individual and 
made it impossible to explain what was actually occurring; instead, the intermediary 
Staatswissenschaften, including political economy, must take into account the full range of 
human motives, especially including ethical and religious views but also culturally and racially 
influenced modes of thinking, alongside material differences if it were to explain human actions 
correctly.
63 
  Neither Hildebrand nor Knies, however, was content to rest with idiographic historical 
descriptions of situationally-specific economic phenomena; both continued Roscher’s initial 
effort at discovering developmental laws in the absence of universally binding synchronic laws 
of economics.  Hildebrand put forward a stage theory of types of economic order, ranging from 
the “natural” to the money economy and ending in the economy based on credit.  Although he 
intended his theory to apply to all societies’ linear developmental processes, and to demonstrate 
the existence of lawful regularities—thereby reintroducing a diachronic form of universalism—
he neglected the fact which should have been clear to him as a historian that these “stages” 
clearly overlapped and even recurred under certain circumstances.
64 Like Hildebrand and unlike 
Roscher, in the 1853 edition of his book Knies’s liberal orientation toward moral and political 
progress was reflected in the contention that political economy aimed to discover laws of linear 
development through comparative study.
65 But the second edition of 1883 evinced much more 
skepticism: while retaining the search for “tendencies” and “analogies” between different 
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63 
 
societies’ patterns of economic development, which he saw as an appropriate intermediary 
position between the laws generated by natural science and the complete “freedom” (based on 
human free will) of the Geisteswissenschaften, Knies now rejected the notion that economics 
could yield developmental laws.  The change in the book’s title between editions is thus 
significant: no longer aiming at Political Economy from the Standpoint of Historical Method, 
Knies now proposed Political Economy from the Historical Standpoint, disclaiming any 
particular historical “method” of discovering laws.  Thus, the thrust of his later argument was the 
emphasis on limited and local regularities and the historical relativity of different economic 
“tendencies,” which may, as Menger thought, have led ultimately to an abdication of the search 
for any theory at all.
66 Even if that was going too far, and even though Knies himself continued 
to work in economic theory, his methodological position suggested at most the possibility of 
theories of the “middle range.” 
  The positive methodological contribution of the older historical economists to the later 
doctrine of value-freedom, so far as there was one, clearly lay more in the impetus they gave to 
the ideal of an interpretive and historical social science which must take culture and individual 
human motives into account, than in any substantive treatment of the elements of the value-
freedom complex.  The work of Roscher, Hildebrand and Knies was certainly still carried out 
under the influence (if not entirely within the confines) of the old moral-political sciences, 
oriented toward practical wisdom as much as toward theoretical knowledge, from which vantage 
point the search for a “value-free” science would seem strange at best. 
Some hints of future developments were, certainly, present in these three men alongside their 
desire for a normative “ethical” economics.  No member of the trio held subjectivist views 
regarding human values in general, but all three exhibited relativist tendencies and accepted the 
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relevance of individual subjective perceptions of needs to a determination of economic value.  
Roscher’s worldview was much like Ranke’s, as the principal study of the older historical 
economists makes clear: Roscher’s strong Lutheran piety allowed him, like the great historian, to 
consider each epoch and form of sociopolitical order on its own terms, but simultaneously to see 
it as immediate to God, thereby ensuring a form of unity beneath historical relativity.
67 Knies’s 
historical relativism, and especially Hildebrand’s, which saw in each epoch and in each national 
form the criteria for an endogenous judgment of its economic order, were attenuated by their 
basic liberal convictions of constant progress.
68 Like Roscher, Hildebrand adopted the German 
approach to theory of economic value deriving from Hufeland and, even, it has been claimed, 
anticipated the marginal utility theory.
69 Knies, in demanding the end of the “absolutism of 
theory,” also criticized classical objective theories of value, and emphasized the wide variance in 
needs across individuals, classes, and nationalities, writing that “Value does not depend only on 
the definite quantities of given goods with definite characteristics, but on the relation of these to 
the concrete needs of people.”
70 But none of the three took either of these positions in the 
direction of a general philosophical stance of value subjectivism. 
As for the component elements of value-freedom itself, Roscher in fact accepted a 
version of the distinction between Sein and Sollen, “Is” and “Ought.”  Perhaps, as Tribe has 
suggested, this was owing to the separation of pure and applied political economy in his 
organizational schema, since several historians have remarked on Roscher’s unusual reluctance 
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thought, without much justification: Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Method, trans. R. Aris (New York: Oxford 
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to take partisan stands on policy questions.
71 But he did sometimes do so, and Lindenfeld’s 
argument that this reluctance may have more to do with his quietist religious views and concern 
about the impossibility of knowing God’s plan is quite plausible in light of Roscher’s explicit 
consideration of divine governance in his work.
72 Regardless, Roscher was very clear that he 
believed that political economy was a moral-political science like the other 
Staatswissenschaften—equally “ethical” and “geistig” in its orientation—whose purpose was not 
simply to study the production of wealth but “to judge men, to rule over men.”
73 With this 
conception of science, and in the absence of value subjectivism, the separation of Is and Ought 
could not lead to any conviction that value judgments must be avoided, but only, as in Rau, to 
the need to make the “correct” value judgments. 
Hildebrand and Knies, meanwhile, shared the notion of political economy as a normative, 
“ethical” science, without even continuing Roscher’s separation of Is and Ought.  Hildebrand, 
the most politically active of the three and the only one who would later join the Verein für 
Sozialpolitik, argued in the context of his stage theory that the third stage—the credit economy—
contained within itself the solution to the “social question.” Credit was an economic category 
with inextricably moral connotations connected to character and trust, and if it could be 
apportioned according to both moral and practical considerations, as Hildebrand insisted, 
workers who showed sufficient moral fiber would have access to the credit necessary to start 
their own small enterprises and lift themselves out of poverty.
74 Knies believed that only a 
historical reinterpretation of the classical theory could allow political economy to retain what 
                                                 
71 Lindenfeld, “Myth,” 407; on Roscher’s politics, see Guido Woelky, “Das Politikverstaendnis von Wilhelm 
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Practical Imagination, 191.  
66 
 
was valuable in the classical tradition and simultaneously to conquer the twin threats of socialism 
and the class antagonism introduced by capitalism under the promotion of self-interested action 
alone.  Political economy was necessarily therefore an “ethical” science, one which might very 
well deal with questions of Sollen as well as Sein, and which embraced the historical-relativist 
but not “value-free” notion that the historically conditioned phenomena of economic life called 
forth historically appropriate institutions and policy measures for their proper management.
75 
Such views should not seem unfamiliar to anyone acquainted with the work of Schmoller, who, 
though born only in 1838 and never a student of any of these three men, nonetheless felt an 
affinity with their work and was not reticent in saying so.
76 All four of them formed their views 
in partial opposition to classical political economy, and especially to the vulgarized form 
(“Manchestertum”) that aimed to imbue a normative doctrine of universal harmony based on 
self-interested action with the authority of a universal economic science.
77 That they did not 
advance claims of value-freedom for their own economic work in opposition to this normative 
doctrine is well worth observing—it suggests that one cannot interpret the value-freedom 
doctrine merely as a tactical ideological response, available at all times much like the claim to be 
free of bias, to a dominant mode of normative “discourse.”  Though claims to value-freedom 
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Adam Müller are worthy of investigation, their grounding in the pre-Romantic Staatswissenschaft tradition of moral-
political science is sufficient to explain their opposition, while the above remarks should also indicate that they were 
by no means opposed either to tempered liberal political or economic aims.  
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may of course serve an ideological function, the doctrine itself presumes a preexisting 
commitment to at least some particular set of philosophical beliefs about the subjectivity of 
values, the relations of Is and Ought, fact and value, theory and practice, and the nature of 
science.  Such commitments are themselves historically conditioned and were not all “live 
options” for the historical economists discussed here, who consequently could make no use of 
the doctrine, even should they have wanted to, in opposing vulgarized economic liberalism.  Be 
that as it may, Schmoller both accepted and furthered their notion of an “ethical” political 
economy in opposition both to normative Manchestertum and to forms of socialism based on 
class conflict, while taking the notion of historical economics away from mere “historical 
standpoints” and toward “historical method.” 
  Let us begin with the latter point, namely Schmoller’s views on the methodology of 
historical economics and the interaction of history and theory.  Schmoller accepted the notion of 
political economy as a social science of the “whole man,” to use Hennis’s phrase, and through 
his powerful academic position in German economics he helped to create the right conditions for 
the pursuit of an “interpretive” science of political economy, starting out from the value-oriented, 
subjectively meaningful actions of human agents operating within a social context, which would 
be embraced in different ways by the value-freedom advocates, including Menger as we will see 
below.
78 This is not to say that Schmoller’s social science of the “whole man” can be identified 
with the “interpretive” social science of the value-freedom advocates; they differed, pivotally, on 
the question of the appropriate place for theory, and to some degree on the methodological status 
                                                 
78 The impact of Schmoller’s historical economics in particular is obvious in the case of the historically-nuanced 
Sozialökonomik (social economics) represented by Weber and by Schmoller’s student Sombart. Weber 
acknowledged Schmoller’s impact on this program in his often-cited letter of 23 June 1908: MWG II/5, Briefe 1906-
1908, 594-595; see also Manfred Schön, “Gustav Schmoller and Max Weber,” in Mommsen and Osterhammel, Max 
Weber and his Contemporaries, 59-60. To suggest that Menger’s work can be seen as related to this search for an 
interpretive social science, even if to a lesser degree than Weber, is more controversial, and will be justified below 
in Section II.  
68 
 
of the individual.
79  But despite the fact that Schmoller explicitly used the Comtean rhetoric of 
the passage from a “metaphysical” to a “positive” stage of social scientific enquiry, and although 
he was an admirer of statistical research, like all the German historicists he rejected the 
statistical-determinist positivism of an H.T. Buckle.
80 Schmoller’s version of the “science of 
man” was both hermeneutical and strongly empirical; it rejected “abstraction” and favored 
exhaustive description of the full range of historically contingent human motives and institutions, 
utilizing the results of contemporary psychology; and it rejected universal laws reached through 
“speculation,” while proposing instead inductively grounded regularities which would 
permanently retain their truth value—that is, they would not be historically relativized at some 
future time. 
  Taking these points in turn, we observe that the strong affinities which Schmoller had to 
positivist modes of thought should not distract from the inescapable interpretive element that 
remained in his vision of science.
81  Rather than relying exclusively on analogies to the natural 
sciences, he maintained the philosophical-sociological character of political economy, 
emphasizing that a truly scientific economics must aim at understanding human beings who were 
                                                 
79 Here I strongly disagree with Hennis, who tends to identify the “science of man” with the interpretive social 
science associated most closely with Weber, in a way that makes the notion of “value-free” science irrelevant or at 
least difficult to comprehend (and that, incidentally, explains how Hennis can suggest that Weber derived the notion 
of value-freedom from Knies, which he certainly did not): Hennis, “A Science of Man,” 51-52. 
80 Schmoller frequently invoked Comte in his principal methodological investigation, “Die Volkswirtschaft, die 
Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” (1893), reprinted in Schmoller, Über einige Grundfragen der 
Socialpolitik und der Volkswirthschaftslehre (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1898), 213-314; this long essay went 
through several editions, but we use the 1893 edition here. As for Buckle, he noted in his main survey work that the 
“frequently made effort to reduce [mental causes] to [material causes], as the materialists like Buckle have done… 
or as with the Marxists who believe themselves able to explain all higher cultural life on the basis of economic 
production, will always come to grief.” Schmoller, Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, Erster Teil 
(Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), 107. 
81 Harald Homann, “Gesetz und Wirklichkeit in den Sozialwissenschaften: Vom Methodenstreit zum 
Positivismusstreit,” Dissertation, T￼bingen, 1989, 119-20; 165; Winkel, Nationalökonomie, 87.  
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moral actors shaped not just by habits and institutions but by mental states.
82 The economy and 
other domains of social reality could not be understood solely from the “outside,” but rather by 
taking into account the mutual conditioning of mental states and material conditions, particularly 
the ways in which moral beliefs are embedded in customs and institutions.
83 A non-determinist 
who took human free will as a datum, Schmoller was nonetheless more interested in social 
groups and institutions than in individual agents; he would criticize Menger for ignoring that 
economic phenomena were accessible only to the “collectivistic consideration” of history and 
statistics which gave due weight to institutions.
84 
These views, characteristic of the German historicist tradition, inoculated Schmoller 
against the more behaviorist strains of the mid-century positivism to which he might otherwise 
have succumbed.  Schmoller began his education and did his early work in the 1850s and 1860s 
at the high point of nineteenth-century positivism.  Like many of his peers among the “younger” 
historical economists in the Verein für Sozialpolitik, he attended the seminar of the extremely 
influential Berlin statistician Ernst Engel, who instilled in Schmoller, Brentano, G.F. Knapp and 
others a belief in the necessity of conducting detailed empirical inquiries to gain reliable 
information about social problems as the basis for any possible reform efforts.
85 His educational 
background was in the historical Staatswissenschaften, with little theoretical Nationalökonomie, 
and between this type of training and Engel’s, Schmoller was strongly conditioned to see 
                                                 
82 Schmoller, “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 226; id., “Wechselnde Theorien 
und feststehende Wahrheiten im Gebiete der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften und die heutige deutsche 
Volkswirtschaftslehre,” (1897), reprinted in Über einige Grundfragen, 315-43; here 332-38. 
83 Heino Heinrich Nau, “Gustav Schmoller’s Historico-Ethical Political Economy: Ethics, Politics, and Economics 
in the Younger German Historical School, 1860-1917,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 7:4 
(Winter 2000), 507-531, here 516-17. 
84 Schmoller, “Die Schriften von K. Menger und W. Dilthey zur Methodologie der Staats- und 
Sozialwissenschaften,” in Schmoller, Zur Litteraturgeschichte [sic] der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften (Leipzig: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1888), 275-304; here 287; see also Nau, “Gustav Schmoller’s Historico-Ethical Political 
Economy,” 514-15. 
85 Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, Ch.4, esp. 129-32.  
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empirical studies as the epitome of “good science.”
86 It was Schmoller’s admiration for this no-
nonsense mid-century empiricism that gave him his abiding dislike for general theory or 
“abstraction,” which to his opponents’ bemusement he consistently connected with the idealistic 
metaphysical speculation against which the positivists had turned.
87  His rejection both of 
classical economic theory and of the work done by Carl Menger must be seen in this light.
88 
Against abstract theory, Schmoller ranged the ideal of historical economics as a 
“descriptive science,” as he put it.
89  The task of economics was not to identify single human 
motives or single causes of economic phenomena, but to gather the completest possible survey of 
actually occurring motives and causes, categorize them, and only then to proceed to theory.
90 
When Schmoller remarked on “exact” science in his dispute with Menger, it was to this 
exhaustive empirical research that he referred.
91 If economics now focused on such empirical 
research, Schmoller replied to Menger, “It is in no way a neglect of theory, but rather the 
                                                 
86 Rüdiger vom Bruch, “Gustav Schmoller: Zwischen Nationalökonomie und Geschichtswissenschaft,” in id., 
Gelehrtenpolitik, Sozialwissenschaften und akademische Diskurse in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 230-49, here 242; Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 127-35 on Schmoller 
and his peers. 
87 Nau, Eine “Wissenschaft vom Menschen”, 57-59; Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 124; Schmoller, 
“Methodologie der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften,” 287, 292. 
88 Schmoller suggested in his review of Menger, in an eminently characteristic statement, that abstraction is indeed 
necessary in economics, but it must be abstraction from the full reality of economic life, and not an attempt to 
produce scholastic phantoms (a barb directed at Menger’s Aristotelian realism): Schmoller, “Methodologie der 
Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften,” 283. For Schmoller’s anti-“abstraction,” anti-utilitarian, and anti-universalist 
critiques of the classical economists, see “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 244, 
300; Homann, “Gesetz und Wirklichkeit,” 116. 
89 Winkel has suggested that Schmoller himself drew methodological support from the “cultural science” orientation 
of Windelband and Rickert, presumably because of the identification of this descriptive method with the 
“idiographic” orientation discussed above in Chapter 1: Harald Winkel, “Grundlagen nationalökonomischen 
Denkens um die Jahrhundertwende,” in Gerhard Sprenger, et al., eds. Deutsche Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie um 
1900. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 43 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991), 18-28, here 24. Winkel offers 
no concrete evidence for this contention, and while the ideal of idiography does approach Schmoller’s pure 
“description,” the essential feature which differentiated “cultural science” from the older historicist viewpoint was 
the notion of value-relevance and the associated recognition of the need for theory, which was importantly absent or 
at least undeveloped in Schmoller and constitutes one of the principal differences between him and the value-
freedom advocates, as this chapter will argue. 
90Schmoller, “Methodologie der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften,” 278, 284; id., “Die Volkswirtschaft, die 
Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 223. 
91 Ibid., 280; R￼diger vom Bruch, “Nationalökonomie zwischen Wissenschaft und öffentlicher Meinung im Spiegel 
Gustav Schmollers,” in id., Gelehrtenpolitik, Sozialwissenschaften und akademische Diskurse, 311-31, here 319-20.  
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necessary foundation [Unterbau] for it.”
92 As a progressive science, political economy ought to 
base itself on the latest findings of the neighboring empirical sciences, especially psychology, 
which could aid in the attempt to understand the “whole man” and place the one-sided 
assumption of economic man in the past where it belonged.
93 Generally in the form of 
monographic studies of historical and contemporary themes, the efforts Schmoller envisioned 
were to form the bricks for the wall of a completed theory sometime far in the future.
94 In this 
hypothetical future state, the task of induction would be complete and scientific knowledge 
would take the form of a pure “rationalism” based on deduction from empirically secured 
propositions, while a universal-historical perspective would provide knowledge of comparative 
developmental laws.  Until and unless humanity reached such a state, however, social scientists 
must be alert to the empirical grounding of their inescapably tentative theories.
95 Indeed, it was 
one of Schmoller’s principal disagreements with Roscher and Hildebrand that they strove for 
such a universal-historical perspective too quickly, thereby continuing the classical vice of 
theorizing without enough fundamental research to provide the data necessary for theory 
construction in the first place. 
But although Schmoller may have advanced beyond his predecessors in the carefulness of 
his historical research and in his unwillingness to proclaim a stage theory of development on the 
basis of scanty data and speculation, he fell behind them in his views on the role of theory in 
economics.  As several scholars have observed, Schmoller’s “descriptive” ideal was a highly 
naïve form of empiricism.  Not only was his program of “summarization of historical data” 
essentially interminable—induction by its nature can never be a “completed” process—but he 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 279. 
93 Nau, “Gustav Schmoller’s Historico-Ethical Political Economy,” 515. 
94 Vom Bruch, “Gustav Schmoller: Zwischen Nationalökonomie und Geschichtswissenschaft,” 240-41. 
95 Ibid., 240-41; Schmoller, “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 230.  
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ignored the constitutive role necessarily played by theoretical assumptions in the discernment of 
any historical facts whatsoever.  In practice, of course, he too used elements of preexisting theory 
to order his historical data, but did so eclectically, without system or consistency.
96 The 
denigration of theory kept Schmoller from reaching the insight that because even a science of the 
“whole man” could never hope to take every detail into account, some (theory-based) criterion 
for the selection of historical or social significance must be supplied by the investigating scholar. 
Schmoller’s naïve empiricism thereby had implications not only for his methodology of 
historical economics but also for his views on objectivity, as we shall see, since the introduction 
of subjectivity into scholarly findings was not as he thought merely the result of partisan 
posturing but an unavoidable feature of the process of determining which facts to highlight. 
  We have already observed that regarding the different elements of the value-freedom 
complex proper—the split between Is and Ought, theory and practice, ends and means, and so 
forth—Schmoller stood in sharp contrast to the other figures considered in this dissertation.  
Schmoller believed in a normative, “ethical” science of political economy.  The foregoing 
discussion has shown that Schmoller opposed his empirical “descriptive” political economy to 
economic theory, and the way he did so is relevant to his views on the core value-freedom 
distinction of “theory vs. practice.” The major link between these two connotations of “theory” 
lies in the fact that for Schmoller, general theory was associated with the Manchesterite doctrine 
of social harmony from self-interest, which served as an impediment to the state-initiated social 
reforms that he believed essential.
97 Following Engel, Schmoller believed that the empirical-
                                                 
96 Yuichi Shionoya, “A Methodological Appraisal of Schmoller’s Research Program,” in id., The Soul of the 
German Historical School: Methodological Essays on Schmoller, Weber, and Schumpeter (New York: Springer), 
22; Vom Bruch, “Gustav Schmoller: Zwischen Nationalökonomie und Geschichtswissenschaft,” 243-44; Balabkins, 
Not By Theory Alone, 74. 
97 Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics,  124, 137; Nau, Eine “Wissenschaft vom Menschen,” 55-56; 
Winkel, “Grundlagen nationalökonomischen Denkens,” 22.  
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statistical approach allowed for a closer connection between the social scientist and the social 
problems of the day, and thus bent economics toward direct involvement in the alleviation of 
those problems—toward practice and away from theory.
98 He was quite forthcoming about the 
direct relation between scientific work and the promotion of particular reforms and particular 
social values that he deemed ethical.  In 1870 he called for an “ethical justification [Begründung] 
for political economy,” and years later, in 1897, he wrote with pride that “the study of political 
economy [Geschäftsnationalökonomie, having connotations of the private economy] has once 
more become a moral-political science, in which the aspiration to position itself in the standpoint 
of the common good and the whole development of the nation and humanity now dominates.”
99 
In this effort, “German science has done nothing but attempt to provide the causal grounding and 
strict proof of truth to the immemorial ethical-religious and legal-governmental [rechtlich-
staatlichen] imperative” of reform, he wrote in 1897.
100 Schmoller was thus a strong believer in 
“engaged” scholarship.
101 This belief in the purportedly direct transition between scientific 
results and policy recommendations was common in the Verein für Sozialpolitik,
102 has 
                                                 
98 For instance, in his 1881 statement upon taking up the editorship of the journal later to be known as Schmollers 
Jahrbuch, he wrote that his policy would be to intensify the attention given to current social problems so as to make 
political economy serve as a “light” to practical life: Schmoller, “ￜber Zweck und Ziele des Jahrbuchs,” Jahrbuch 
für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft 5 (1881), 1-18, here 2. See also Abraham Ascher, “Professors as 
Propagandists: The Politics of the Kathedersozialisten,” Journal of Central European Affairs, 23:3 (Oct. 1963),  
282-302, here 284-85. 
99 Schmoller (1870) quoted in Nau, Eine “Wissenschaft vom Menschen,” 59; Schmoller, “Wechselnde Theorien,” 
338, also cited by Winkel, “Grundlagen nationalökonomischen Denkens,” 24, without attribution. 
100 Schmoller, “Wechselnde Theorien,” 343. For more comments on Schmoller’s “ethical” political economy, see 
also Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 137-41; Ascher, “Professors as Propagandists,” 290. Nor was 
Schmoller alone in this view; Adolf Wagner, with whom he sometimes disagreed on matters of method, shared his 
intermingling of moral assertion with economic research: Karl Erich Born, “Wissenschaft und politisches Werturteil 
im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Karl Ulmer, ed., Die Verantwortung der Wissenschaft (Bonn: Bouvier, 
1975), 92-121, here 109. 
101 Born, “Wissenschaft und politisches Werturteil,” 92-93; Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 247-48. 
102 In the unfinished chapter on “Sozialpolitik and the Historical Method” in his landmark History of Economic 
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 804, Schumpeter remarks that in the Verein’s monumental 
series of Schriften on various social problems, many of them “took no end of trouble with their facts, but most of 
them went straight from their impressions of the factual pattern to recommendations, just as would have any 
nonprofessional worker.”  
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remained popular,
103 and helps to explain why Schmoller and his admirers tended and tend to 
assume that economists interested in economic theory must be opposed to social policy. 
It was quite fortunate for Schmoller that the dictates of “ethical” political economy 
seemed so frequently to conform to his notions of what was ethical instead of his opponents’ 
notions.  Schmoller was a moderate conservative, monarchist, and “social imperialist” who 
believed in a strong, highly active state; the latter would reduce class tensions by pursuing 
factory legislation and social insurance, by protecting craft industry through tariffs and 
regulation, and by introducing greater economic egalitarianism, thereby reconciling the lower 
classes to the monarchy and the social order.
104 He was obviously aware that a plethora of 
conflicting opinions on social policy was available even among his closer colleagues, from the 
nationalizations favored by the conservative state-socialist Adolf Wagner to the “social liberal” 
trade unionism of Brentano, and it has been suggested by Yuichi Shionoya that the phrase 
“ethical political economy” signified merely the inclusion of ethical motives into economic 
analysis as necessary features of the “whole man”—as facts to be explained.
105  This would in 
turn imply that Schmoller’s economics made no normative claims, owing to the historical 
relativity of ethical beliefs.  While Shionoya’s “rational reconstruction” of Schmoller may make 
him more palatable to those concerned about value-freedom, it does not really describe what he 
                                                 
103 Attempts to revive the notion of a morally-inflected economics have had much to do with the revival of interest 
in Schmoller; as Vom Bruch pointed out around the time of the Schmoller sesquicentennial, much less interest had 
been shown in Schmoller’s scientific or methodological program than in his activity as a Kathedersozialist: Vom 
Bruch, “Nationalökonomie zwischen Wissenschaft und öffentlicher Meinung,” 312, n.5. Although this may not be 
as true today, even more recent work on Schmoller starts off from the assertion that economics should be assessed 
on the basis of its policy relevance in addressing social problems: Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 14 
and passim; Peter Koslowski, ed., The Theory of Ethical Economy in the Historical School: Wilhelm Roscher, 
Lorenz von Stein, Gustav Schmoller, Wilhelm Dilthey and Contemporary Theory (New York: Springer, 1995), the 
essays in which are very uneven. Some exceptions are Shionoya, “A Methodological Appraisal,” and Hodgson, How 
Economics Forgot History, although the latter interesting work is derivative in its discussion of the German 
historical school. 
104 Ascher, “Professors as Propagandists,” 290. 
105 Shionoya, “A Methodological Appraisal,” 7, 22ff.  
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thought, and a close reading of Schmoller’s methodological remarks on the subject indicates how 
he continued to justify claiming the mantle of science for particular “ethical” opinions.
106 
It is indeed true that Schmoller expressed not only the historical relativity of ethical and 
other values, but even made comments suggesting that individual opinions on matters of values 
were merely statements of personal Weltanschauungen, representing only partial and one-sided 
viewpoints—a value-subjectivist position.
107 And in the matter of distinguishing practice from 
theory, he was at least aware that there was a risk of social science degenerating into partisan 
“agitation” when no separation of the two spheres was allowed.
108 But the way in which he 
attempted to defang his incipient value subjectivism and its potential effects on the idea of a 
normative science was to appeal to teleology.  He argued that it was unavoidably necessary, at 
least heuristically, to posit some kind of telos for society as a whole in order to understand any 
given “part” of the social totality, and that in the absence of any sort of “completed” body of 
knowledge about causal relations in economy and society drawn from empirical studies, the 
scholar must supply it based on his own perspective.
109 Lest, however, his position be confused 
with the Weberian ideal type based on the idea of value-relevance, we must add that Schmoller 
immediately introduced an important caveat to the implication that scholars’ teleological 
                                                 
106 Although Shionoya’s case is plausible, the 1975 attempt made by Born, “Wissenschaft und politisches 
Werturteil,” 111-13, to portray Schmoller as a partisan of Weberian value-freedom is utterly mystifying. 
107 Schmoller, “ￜber Zweck und Ziele,” 5-6, 8; “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 
237-40, 245. 
108 Ibid., 2; Gerhard Ritzel, “Schmoller Versus Menger: Eine Analyse des Methodenstreits im Hinblick auf den 
Historismus in der Nationalökonomie,” Inaugural Dissertation, Basel, 1950 (see esp. 41, 48) points to Schmoller’s 
career-long inconsistency in the matter of accepting or denying a sphere of “science” apart from “practice,” and 
rightly suggests that though in his actions and sometimes in his thought he clearly showed himself to be against the 
notion of “pure science” (see, for instance, “ￜber Zweck und Ziele,” 2-5), ultimately it is not possible to clear up 
theoretically what was simply a discrepancy in his thought. It was likely conditioned by his attempt to distinguish 
himself and his allies from those with whom he disagreed, who were consequently labeled and dismissed. 
109 Schmoller, “ￜber Zweck und Ziele,” 5-6; “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 
237-38; see also Born, “Wissenschaft und politisches Werturteil,” 111, and Shionoya, “A Methodological 
Appraisal,” 7, 23, which argues that Schmoller treated such teleological judgments in Kantian fashion “as if” society 
really were a holistic unity or organism aiming at the realization of the ethics of justice through an evolutionary 
process.  
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assumptions were purely subjective by arguing that they were already converging on the 
objective “truth” through the process of cultural evolution.
110  “But,” he wrote, qualifying his 
seeming value-subjectivism, “a synthesis which comprehends a people, a time, a human life as a 
whole, which emanates from rich experience, in which consummate expertise [vollendete 
Sachkenntnis] is joined with artistic intuition, can approach so closely to real knowledge that it 
coincides with it for our purposes. As in all human sciences, so too in economics such a 
procedure is indispensable and justified.”
111 
  Schmoller clung to the idea that scholarship could be normative but still salvage its 
objectivity through a less one-sided “teleology”: since the different partisan standpoints, 
generally representing particular material and “ideal” interests such as wealth, class position, 
freedom or justice, were in fact merely parts of a totality, a truly non-partisan standpoint would 
be able to reconcile them in the interest of a higher common good.
112 The scholar was, then, 
much like the Prussian bureaucrats Schmoller so admired, writing and lecturing not in his own 
interest, but in the “common” interest as a member of a sort of Hegelian “general estate.”
113 It 
was Schmoller’s conceit that the scholar kept his professional and scientific rigor so long as he 
did not “agitate,” but there was no reason not to present normative assessments with the authority 
of science.
114  “Like the chorus in the tragedy of the ancients, it [science] should not itself act, 
                                                 
110 Nau, “Gustav Schmoller’s Historico-Ethical Political Economy,” 517-18. 
111 Schmoller, “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 240. 
112 Schmoller, “ￜber Zweck und Ziele,” 8; “Wechselnde Theorien,” 338-40. (The terminology of material and 
“ideal” interests is Weber’s, not Schmoller’s, but is used for convenience.) 
113 To be clear: so far as I am aware, Schmoller did not directly draw this analogy between the notion of the non-
partisan scholar and the bureaucracy as “general estate”—that is, in the language of the old corporate system of 
estates used by Hegel in his political philosophy, an “estate” of altruistic officials representing the common 
interest—but because of his strong orientation toward the Prussian bureaucracy both in his political connections and 
in his historical scholarship, it is a natural way of conceiving how he thought. 
114 The opposition to “agitation” was most obvious in the Verein, where Schmoller long mediated between two 
major factions, the liberals under Brentano and Knapp, who also preferred to conceive of the Verein as more of a 
professional scientific body, and the conservative state-socialists like Wagner and Schönberg, who, as Grimmer-
Solem puts it, expressed a desire for “direct propagandizing of general principles”; especially after a strong 
disagreement and close vote over Bismarck’s new parliamentary strategy and introduction of protectionism in 1879,  
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but rather, separated from the stage, accompany the actors’ actions with its considerations, 
measure them against the standard of the highest ideals of the time.”
115 These ideals, he 
explicitly made clear, were no longer the (formerly) worthy goals of personal and political 
freedom but rather now involved social reform and increased attention to corporate groups and 
associations of various kinds under the aegis of the state, since improving the condition of 
workers was said to be in accord with the “great ideals” and revitalized “ethical” powers of the 
new era.
116 Thus in vacillating as he did between the open embrace of the old ideal of a moral-
political science and the newer positivist ideal of objectivity based on “ascetic” denial of the 
scholar’s tendencies toward bias, Schmoller settled on the notion of objectivity as “non-
partisanship.”
117 The German professor benefitted from the scholarly independence which 
allowed him to be free of interests and to devote himself to “nonpartisan” ideals such as justice, 
and so long as he retained the virtues of his training in “strict, selfless” empirical research on 
particular problems, his work would be of the highest professional caliber.
118 Conflicting theories 
could be judged, in effect, on the degree to which scholars were able to surmount partisan 
interests and approach the ideal of ascetic objectivity: on whether they took more or less of the 
total available scientific knowledge into consideration to limit partiality, and on whether they 
rose from the level of particular interests to the “highest general interests,” in which “passion, 
class interest, egotism and position-seeking” were left behind for an “honest conception of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Schmoller attempted to gain maximum consensus for proposals appealing to “a broad, multi-partisan audience” and 
to avoid attempts to “agitate” in order to paper over the differences between these factions. He thereby aimed to 
protect the existence of the Verein as a unified body. See Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 189-91; 
Manfred Schön, “Gustav Schmoller and Max Weber,” 65. Nonetheless, in a way quite characteristic of Schmoller, 
while efforts were made after 1879 to avoid the “propagandistic treatment” of topics, the Verein remained focused 
on economic policy and that the tendency toward normative judgments of its writings did not really change: see 
Franz Boese, Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1939), 45. 
115 Schmoller, “ￜber Zweck und Ziele,” 9. 
116 Ibid.; “Welchselnde Theorien,” 342. 
117 Vom Bruch, “Nationalökonomie zwischen Wissenschaft und öffentlicher Meinung,” 328. 
118 Schmoller, “Welchselnde Theorien,” 342; “ￜber Zweck und Ziele,” 7.  
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common good.”
119 This was a notion of objectivity that ignored the theory-dependency of facts 
and that still allowed the scholar to make normative claims as a scholar,
120 the very opposite of 
the way in which value-freedom advocates would conceive the notion. 
  Lujo Brentano, Schmoller’s friend and frequent ally—if also the leader of the liberals in 
the Verein and sometime opponent of Schmoller in various contexts—shared his contemporary’s 
ascetic ideal but offered a different perspective which served as a sort of transition to that of the 
value-freedom advocates.  In 1896, Brentano published an essay explicitly contesting some of 
Schmoller’s formulations of the notion of a practically-oriented and normative political 
economy, although not mentioning Schmoller by name.
121  Beginning with the glaringly apparent 
fact that economists’ opinions exhibited persistent differences, and that political economy 
diverged from the natural sciences in its lack of consensus, Brentano acknowledged the 
difficulties raised by the fact that the economist was inherently “situated” in the midst of the 
social and economic issues he had to explain.  That is, the scholar, as a human being, was 
involved in associations and identifications arising from national, class, and family relations, 
individual interests and traditions, which differed widely from person to person and which could 
introduce room for error and disagreement.
122 
Nonetheless, according to Brentano, the lack of consensus among economists was not 
really owing to these basic human differences, but instead to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the difference between Is and Ought, theory and practice.  As he put it, in all other disciplines, 
                                                 
119 Ibid., 340. 
120 Schmoller, “Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode,” 246; 307-309; “Wechselnde 
Theorien,” 321-23, 335-36. 
121 Lujo Brentano, “Die Meinungsverschiedenheiten unter den Volkswirtschaftslehrern,” Cosmopolis 2:4 (April 
1896), 241-60. The essay was later republished with a few introductory remarks as Brentano’s contribution to the 
Werturteilsstreit, as “ￜber Werturteile in der Volkswirtschaftslehre,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 
33 (1911), 695-714. Brentano’s introductory comments are noteworthy for their attempt to insinuate that the 
Werturteilsstreit added little to the ideas he had already been raised in his essay; in fact, his own position was closer 
to Schmoller’s than to the much more sophisticated standpoint represented by Weber. 
122 Ibid., 241-44.  
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scholars “limit themselves to the interpretation of that which is. They state those facts which fall 
in their area of knowledge; they present the way these facts have arisen and why they have arisen 
in such a manner.  That is, they see their task solely in the determination of factualities and in the 
presentation of causal interconnections which bind the facts. It crosses none of their minds to 
want to teach how things should be.  Just for this reason, however, their discipline is real science. 
If they taught more, then their discipline would no longer be science but techne or art. For all 
science concerns itself with knowing, not with doing.”
123 
To keep pure science separate from practice, Brentano suggested that it must, 
grammatically speaking, stay within the indicative mode.  Social science might, first, offer the 
political decision-maker information about what was, and how and why it was so, and thereby on 
the origins of contemporary problems, while also using the past as a source of natural 
experiments with various policies under various conditions.  Second, it could teach what is, 
without coloring by party, interest, or wishes, presenting reality conditioned as it is by the whole 
gamut of possible social, political, and technical factors, as well as outlining the consequences 
that would follow should any particular policy goal be reached.  Third, it could give advice on 
the way the future is likely to be, based not on hopes and wishes but on the likelihood of 
development according to past and present conditions.
124 Pure science might very well have 
practical applications, as did the natural sciences, but such applications were no task for 
theorists, and those doing the “applying” must also take variable, situational detail into 
account.
125 
Scholars’ inability to withstand the sophisms of “agitators,” whether Manchesterite or 
socialist, who attempted to merge their personal views on how things should be with discussion 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 245. 
124 Ibid., 254-55. 
125 Ibid., 254.  
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of how they are, was at fault for the lack of consensus, and Brentano included Schmoller among 
those who were to blame.  Schmoller’s claim that social scientists should take a position on 
social problems by assessing them (and actions taken to relieve them) on the basis of “the highest 
ideals of the time,” could never provide a stable criterion for judgment.  Perhaps if such ideals 
were really undisputed, they might provide such a criterion, but they were disputed—and in 
practice Schmoller’s stance resulted in a “conscious deviation” from the ideal of strict science, 
an increase in the practice of seeking out evidence to support preexisting opinions, and a 
tendency to conflate the positive arguments of scholarly opponents with their moral convictions 
as if the two were identical.
126 The metaphor of the Greek tragic chorus as used by Schmoller, 
said Brentano, was in fact helpful for making the faults of his position visible, for the ancient 
chorus had simply represented the perspective of public opinion, and in the modern age public 
opinion was shaped by the interests of those in different social positions, and shifted rapidly as 
those interests shifted.
127 Appeals to such a tribunal hardly left the scholar with a certain criterion 
for judgment. 
Despite his introduction of two of the elements of the value-freedom complex into the 
discussion, however, Brentano’s own solution to the problem of objectivity was not deeply 
considered.  To replace Schmoller’s notion of social science as a Greek chorus, Brentano 
suggested an equally philhellenic metaphor: the scholar should be like the wise Tiresias advising 
Creon in Antigone, by being willing to tell the truth regardless of whether it accorded with his 
own desires or those of political leaders.  The challenge, for Brentano, was “not just to the 
understanding of the researcher, but also to his character”: the economist must suppress all 
feelings and interests—both the self-interested ones and those motivated by his practical or 
                                                 
126 Ibid., 246-48. 
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policy orientation—which can lead him astray from objective research, from the search for 
“holy” truth.
128 Where Schmoller showed in some of his writings at least an incipient recognition 
of the need to address values and ideals in order to point to significant features in history or 
contemporary society—in his case, a criterion signaling how the many parts of the evolving 
social “totality” fit together into its ultimate goal or telos—Brentano adopted the simple 
positivist vision best be thought of as value-freedom without Weber’s quotation marks.  That is, 
he really aimed at the minimization or, ideally, total elimination of value commitments by the 
scholar, hoping that this ascetic practice would allow him to see the unvarnished truth without 
fear or favor.  The objective scholar simply approached his subject matter in a 
“presuppositionless” state of mind and reproduced what he found, and the test of this objectivity 
was whether the results of the investigation were free of contamination by the scholar’s own 
material interests.
129  Brentano had a modest example of such work ready to hand: in his own 
research on workers’ associations and the conditions of the working class, “I did not come to 
[my] doctrine by setting out from a belief, from an individual Weltanschauung. It corresponds 
neither with the traditions and personal relationships out of which I came, nor the scientific 
viewpoint in which I was educated.” His conclusions could hardly be seen as representing a 
worldview, he asserted, and even if they could, “it is not the starting point but the result of my 
scientific research.”
130 Since the writings Brentano mentioned here were in fact quite openly 
normative and filled with policy recommendations regarding trade unions, it is hard to see his 
position on the theory/practice distinction and the objectivity of economics as anything but 
contradictory, even within the confines of a single essay. 
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  Thus, in summary, we have within the tradition of German historical economics and 
Sozialpolitik scattered pieces of the later value-freedom synthesis coupled with a continued 
desire for a normative economics that would provide direct and unmediated guidance to the 
policymaker.  The historical economists considered here envisioned political economy as an 
interpretive social science—one that placed its emphasis on the ways in which individual action 
was influenced by a multitude of motivations, many of them functions of powerful national, 
social, and cultural influences, and yet without at all displacing the importance of individual 
willed action in a determinist manner.  Although there were limited tendencies within German 
historical economics toward the separation of fact and value and toward value subjectivism, it is 
more accurate to say that the discipline was oriented toward the goal of the older moral-political 
sciences: discovering the conditions for wise governance of the economy and for human 
flourishing, conditions which may have been relative to time and place but about which more or 
less objectively valid claims could supposedly be made within the proper temporal and spatial 
bounds.  Insofar as a new perspective on the appropriate place of values in social scientific 
analysis made itself felt in the younger figures such as Schmoller and Brentano, it was the 
nineteenth-century positivist attitude of nonpartisan scholarly asceticism, which was intended to 
ensure professional objectivity, and which rested quite uneasily amidst their other commitments. 
  Major difficulties that would confront the value-freedom advocates were simply not 
addressed by these earlier thinkers.  If history and contemporary human actions and institutions 
were inherently value-laden, and if values could not be proven to be objectively valid, how was 
the scholar to make choices about what to emphasize and what to pass over in explaining 
economic life? Brentano had simply ignored this problem, and while Schmoller hinted at an 
awareness of it, his rejection of economic theory in favor of an ideal of never-ending empirical  
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description of all aspects of human life relevant to economic activities by its nature discouraged 
the insight that some form of criterion was necessary for selecting which parts of reality to 
emphasize.  Schmoller’s opponent in the Methodenstreit, Carl Menger, would insist not only on 
the separation of theory and practice but on the necessity of such a theoretical criterion, opening 
the gate for the younger advocate of value-freedom Max Weber to continue on his “theory”-
oriented path which we traced in the previous chapter, while advancing a more sophisticated 
notion of objectivity in the succeeding decades. 
 
II.  Carl Menger and the Beginnings of “Value-Free” Economic Theory 
 
Menger still awaits his biographer, and relatively little is known about his personal views 
and values.  One of three sons of a Galician lawyer, all of whom became well known in Vienna, 
including the liberal politician Max Menger and the socialist-leaning law professor Anton 
Menger,
131 Carl (1840-1921) began reading the works of the classical economists in his father’s 
library already in his youth.
132 He studied law at the universities of Vienna and Prague between 
1859 and 1863, and worked as a journalist at numerous newspapers at Lemberg (Lviv, Ukraine) 
and Vienna while serving as a trainee lawyer.  He received his doctorate in law at Cracow in 
1867.
133 Before his academic appointment, his journalistic activities involved work as a writer 
and then editor on six different newspapers between 1863 and 1866, and his time as a financial 
reporter has been noted since Friedrich von Wieser’s reminiscence of Menger as having exerted 
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133 Ibid.  
84 
 
an influence on his economic views and as probably having introduced a certain level of 
commitment to realism about the workings of the business world in his economics.
134 
Kiichiro Yagi has documented Menger’s journalistic appointments, all of which were at 
liberal newspapers, including the Wiener Tagblatt which he founded and edited during the 
eventful years of 1865-1866.
135 It was in 1867 that he first began to study economic theory 
intensively while working at a civil service position, leading to the publication of his first book, 
Die Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre or Principles of Economics in 1871.
136  Shortly 
thereafter habilitated in the legal and staatswissenschaftlichen faculty at the University of 
Vienna, he had to serve as a Privatdozent for only a year before being made associate professor 
in 1873, and received his chair in political economy there in 1879.
137 Menger would remain at 
Vienna for the rest of his life, although he published only one more major book, Untersuchungen 
über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere (1883), 
or Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences.
138  By his mid-50s, although dignified 
by various honorary degrees, memberships in international academies, and honorary designation 
as privy councilor (Hofrat), and despite being one of the university’s most popular lecturers, 
Menger withdrew somewhat from university life, preferring to continue extensive research on 
economics and methodology which he never published and to spend time fishing.  He retired 
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officially in 1903.
139  A comment he made in a letter to Georg Jellinek in 1894 seems to capture 
the spirit of his later years: “I’m working a lot…[but] without the enthusiasm of earlier years.”
140 
Personally, Menger was rather retiring, preferring the posture of an observer and not 
evincing much interest in socializing—despite obviously possessing certain social skills given 
his teaching success and an important appointment at the imperial court.
141 Unusually, he never 
married the woman with whom he lived, though they raised a son, Karl, who would later become 
a mathematician and head of an important discussion circle in interwar Vienna.  Though a 
nominal Catholic, he appears not to have been a religious man.  More is known about Menger’s 
politics; he could perhaps most readily be described as a right-leaning liberal.  The court 
appointment which he held in 1876 was as tutor to Crown Prince Rudolf, who more than a 
decade later would dash the hopes of Austrian liberals for a change of course by shooting himself 
at the Mayerling hunting lodge.  Menger was regarded by the officials monitoring the prince’s 
education as “loyal” and, though a liberal, not a German nationalist, which would at this juncture 
have been a particular threat to Austro-Hungarian cosmopolitanism.
142 In the series of lectures 
which he gave Rudolf on economics, Menger treated economic policy, a topic into which he did 
not enter in his published writings except in matters of monetary policy.  According to Erich 
Streissler, a distinguished historian of Austrian economics who edited and published Rudolf’s 
notes on Menger’s lectures, they are “probably one of the most extreme statements of laissez-
faire ever put to paper in the academic literature of economics.”
143 Menger encouraged Rudolf to 
see the state’s role in the economy as more restricted than the monarchy normally considered it, 
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limiting its actions ideally to the prevention of negative externalities, rejecting redistributive 
agendas, and promoting instead the free pursuit of individual interests in the private market as a 
sounder strategy for economic growth.
144 Streissler’s interpretation relies, however, on reading 
notes taken by Menger’s royal pupil rather than his own published views, and is predicated on 
the assumption that Menger’s later statements of concern over the “social question,” support for 
legislation regulating working hours and factory conditions, and rejection of the “Manchesterite” 
label were merely defensive.  A more balanced viewpoint has been presented by a number of 
other scholars who conclude uniformly that Menger was a liberal but not an advocate of laissez-
faire, allowing for pragmatic use of state policy to remedy social problems in some cases.
145 
Aside from his status as the founder of the Austrian tradition in economics which 
embraced Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser among Menger’s close colleagues 
during his own day and subsequently such influential libertarian economists as Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich Hayek, Menger was best known for his role as a methodologist.  Although 
he felt compelled to apologize for his methodological studies and to suggest that the “positive 
research talent has often enough created a science or changed it in epoch-making fashion without 
developed methodology” whereas “[m]ethodology without talent has never done this,”
146 
Menger nonetheless believed that economics in his era required such studies if it were to avoid 
taking a mistaken path.  As for their importance in philosophical knowledge, he even proclaimed 
at the end of the 1880s that “[t]he foundation of a methodology of the social sciences is the most 
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important epistemological task of our time.”
147 This remark followed on a decade of controversy 
in German-language economics, which had begun with the criticisms of the historical economists 
that Menger made in the Untersuchungen and Schmoller’s subsequent hostile, and personal, 
review of this book, to which Menger responded with an even more hostile polemic—this 
exchange constituting the famous Methodenstreit. 
The headline issue in the Methodenstreit was of course the relative importance and 
proper place of the historical and the “abstract” or theoretical methods in economics, but 
Schmoller and Menger also overtly disagreed about the separation of theory and practice and 
about the legitimacy of a normative social science.
148  The latter issues, in other words, did not 
arise for the first time in Central European economics during the value judgment dispute of the 
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where Menger is entirely ignored and the doctrine is said to arise from the work of Hume and Weber (p.66); Herbert 
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early twentieth century, nor even in the mid-1890s.
149  Indeed the two sets of issues were at least 
partially connected in the Methodenstreit. As we have seen, Schmoller believed that historical 
and statistical studies of economic and social problems directly generated the normative 
conclusions he preferred, while “abstract” economic theory would invariably generate opposing 
normative conclusions.  Menger in turn argued that Schmoller and his predecessors had confused 
several analytically separable tasks and made clear that, in and of themselves, neither historical 
nor theoretical methods would require particular policies in the absence of externally set policy 
goals. 
The fact that the problems of “practice” and normative social science were discussed is 
perhaps what has led to the occasional interpretation of this methodological controversy as a 
political controversy.  It is therefore important to observe that the dispute between Schmoller and 
Menger over both “theory and history” and “theory and practice” was not a dispute about politics 
or policy.  In the course of his scholarly history of the group of economists around Schmoller, 
Erik Grimmer-Solem has claimed that the Methodenstreit was “a debate about the admissibility 
of social reform and other activist economic policy” and not primarily a methodological 
argument, and he provides a salutary reminder that methodology can sometimes be used for 
political purposes.
150 However, in suggesting that the “only thing that could justify” Menger’s 
critical references to a large number of German economists “was not method but a common 
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involvement in social reform,”
151 he reduces Menger’s decades of work in the theory of social 
science to a covert political gesture.  If indeed Menger’s opposition was to the Schmoller 
school’s social reform policies rather than to the claims for a historical method in economic 
theory by economists from Roscher onward, it would have been rather strange for Menger to 
devote so much of his academic life to the complex methodological inquiries we will examine 
below rather than to open arguments about economic policy.  Moreover, though he was certainly 
more of a liberal than a Kathedersozialist, Menger never offered explicit opposition to social 
reform anywhere in his published work
152 and even made occasional comments supporting it, 
such as the remark to Rudolf in favor of factory legislation that “the state is nonetheless obliged 
to intervene in their [factory owners’] economic activities in such cases [of overworking labor] 
and rather to prevent additional profits from accruing to those factory owners, if this is in the 
greater, general interest of the state” or to protect children by “intervening strongly” on their 
behalf when overworked.
153 Menger of course counted among his colleagues and allies several 
Austrian economists who shared both his methodological position on economic theory and also 
Schmollerite politics, such as Wieser and Eugen Philippovich.  The former wrote of Menger 
praising his lack of “party-interest” in his scientific work and his avoidance of (political) 
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passions, an assessment which carries some weight owing to Wieser’s conservative welfare-
statist politics.
154 
In order to support the notion that Menger undertook his extensive methodological 
investigations out of political differences over social reform with the conservative Schmoller, 
who was in fact rarely mentioned in the Untersuchungen, Grimmer-Solem emphasizes the fact 
that Menger did not address the economic role of the state in the Grundsätze, but he neglects to 
mention that the work was intended as the first part of a series of books on the entire discipline 
of economics, including state policy.
155 He argues that Menger was a devotee of the French 
Revolutionary era conservative writers Edmund Burke and Friedrich Carl von Savigny because 
Menger recognized explanatory value in their descriptions of unintended “organic” 
developments, but he does not mention that Menger went on to criticize these same thinkers in 
the same passages for their “one-sidedness and shortcomings,” especially in assuming that 
whatever has come to be must be defended or that “the wisdom in organically created social 
structures is a priori and without proof higher than human wisdom, i.e. higher than the judgment 
of the present.”
156 This was Menger the tutor to the liberal crown prince, who wrote that after his 
death “I lost a serious interest in life. He could have become a great ruler…”—not an organicist 
opponent of the Enlightenment and liberalism.
157 Again, none of this is to argue that Menger was 
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157 Quoted in Yagi, Austrian and German Economic Thought, 29. In identifying Menger with the organicists (Rise of 
Historical Economics, 255-57), Grimmer-Solem rightly points out that Menger was skeptical of what can be called 
the “rationalistic” perspective within the Enlightenment which saw consciously designed legislative changes as 
being the solution to social problems, but this hardly is an indication of opposition to the kind of Scottish 
Enlightenment thought that Menger found appealing (granting that he misinterpreted Adam Smith as belonging too  
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a “Sozialpolitiker” or that he and Schmoller agreed on the best way to deal with poverty, but only 
that the political differences were not nearly as interesting to the pure theorist in Vienna as they 
were to the academic politician in Berlin. 
It is in fact even mistaken to present Menger as an opponent of historical-statistical 
economics tout simple, rather than as an opponent of the idea that economics can only be 
historical.  The passages in which he pointed out the virtues of historical awareness in the 
Untersuchungen are too numerous to bother cataloguing,
158 and he even called, unprovoked, for 
greater historical research in its appropriate place.
159 But what was the proper task of historical 
method according to Menger, and what exactly did he offer in its place when he advanced his 
own theory? What elements of the value-freedom complex did he accept and on what grounds? 
As a subjectivist, in a manner specified below, how did he hope to secure the scientific 
objectivity of economics? Although this section will address most of the issues involved in the 
Methodenstreit in the course of considering these questions, it should not be seen as an account 
or assessment of this well-known dispute.
160 The guiding thread is instead Menger’s creation of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
simply to the former category). Alongside excessive historicism, organicist theories are, after all, one of the main 
targets of opposition from a methodological perspective in Menger’s Untersuchungen.  
158 Menger clearly stated that it was “the poorly cloaked contempt for and basic negation of all other orientations of 
research” that was the real problem, not the usefulness of the historical approach for its particular tasks: 
Untersuchungen, xix; Investigations, 31. 
159 See, for instance, Menger’s long, methodologically-oriented review of Schönberg’s Handbuch der politischen 
Oekonomie in “Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie,” where he suggests that Schönberg use more source-
criticism-based historical research (106), and praises the statistician Wilhelm Lexis’s non-theoretical account of 
business activity (113). 
160 Other assessments of varying quality are available: Ritzel, “Schmoller Versus Menger”; Samuel Bostaph, “The 
Methodological Debate Between Carl Menger and the German Historicists,” Atlantic Economic Journal 6:3 (Sept., 
1978), 3-16, which remains the standard interpretation of the philosophical positions of the two sides; Gary 
Anderson, Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison, “Methodenstreit: The Economics of Competing Interests,” 
European Journal of Political Economy 8 (1992), 401-418, which interprets the debate as shaped  by a concern over 
the ability for new ideas to penetrate a “market for ideas” with high barriers to entry; J￼rgen Backhaus and Reginald 
Hansen, “Methodenstreit in der Nationalökonomie,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (2000), 307-336, 
which is highly sympathetic to Schmoller and makes claims which cannot be sustained, such as that Schmoller was 
really an “outsider” not accepted in the Verein f￼r Sozialpolitik, and that his opponents in the Methodenstreit and 
Werturteilsstreit criticized him for his value-relativism: 313; and recently Marek Louzek, “The Battle of Methods in 
Economics: The Classical Methodenstreit—Menger vs. Schmoller,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 
70:2 (2011), which unfortunately manages to be simultaneously derivative, superficial, and unreliable.  
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theory-driven, “value-free” economics which took subjective mental states and values, and 
actions based upon them, as its core data.  We begin with Menger’s conception of the tasks of 
economics and then proceed to his ideas on value-freedom and an assessment of the problem of 
objective knowledge in his thought. 
a)  Menger’s “Interpretive Social Science” of Economics 
Since Menger has long been viewed as the principal opponent of German historical 
economics, and, with W. Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras, as one of the initiators of the 
“Marginal Revolution” that marked the birth of scientistic neoclassical economics, it may 
initially seem unusual to suggest that Menger’s work has anything whatsoever in common with 
interpretive social science.
161 After all, historicism has always been closely associated with 
hermeneutic methods, while neoclassicism has been notorious for its adoption of analogies and 
modes of thinking from mechanics and thermodynamics, and for its reduction of the 
economizing individual to a black box with a utility function to maximize.
162 But in fact Menger 
was not as far from the older historical economists nor as close to Jevons and Walras as this now 
outdated portrayal would seem to suggest.  Much of the best work on Menger over the years has 
helped to lay to rest many misconceptions about his relation to nineteenth-century German 
economics and to Walrasian neoclassicism.
163 This holds equally for the particulars of his 
                                                 
161 He has appeared as such in prominent textbooks on the history of economics, such as Eric Roll, A History of 
Economic Thought, 5
th ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), 352-57; Robert Lekachman, A History of Economic 
Ideas (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), Ch.10. Even Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1954), 918, who was aware of the Austrian peculiarities and sensitive to the need for a broader social 
science, suggested the view of Menger (and Jevons) as incomplete Walrasians. More recent textbooks, e.g. Roger 
Backhouse, The Ordinary Business of Life: A History of Economics from the Ancient World to the Twenty-First 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 173-177, more commonly recognize the differences between 
Menger on the one hand and Walras and Jevons on the other by considering his contributions separately as part of a 
distinct Austrian tradition within the larger German economic tradition. 
162 The classic, if somewhat exaggerated, critical history of neoclassical economics’ “physics envy” is Philip 
Mirowski, More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
163 Streissler, “The Influence of German Economics on the Work of Menger and Marshall,” and William Jaff￩, 
“Menger, Jevons and Walras De-Homogenized,” Economic Inquiry 14 (Dec. 1976) initiated these  
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economics, especially in value theory, and for his methodology.  Re-locating Menger’s work in 
its original intellectual context allows us to appreciate its commonalities with the emerging 
German “interpretive social science” tradition of non-determinist, meaningful-action-oriented 
scholarship on economic life, which this chapter argues is a key prerequisite for the mature 
“value-free” science ideal.  Because there were also significant differences between Menger and 
the Germans, lying mainly in the former’s Aristotelian realism and the latter’s historicism and 
neo-Kantianism, these commonalities are best appreciated through a contrast with the mode of 
economic analysis represented by Menger’s contemporary, Walras. 
The French father of general equilibrium economics aimed, like Menger, at a unified 
explanation of all prices in a competitive exchange economy, in which explaining factor prices
164 
constituted merely one part of the task, and in which marginal analysis played an important role 
in assessing price formation.
165  Walras’ version of marginal utility, the notion of rareté, a 
measure of the intensity of the individual consumer’s last want satisfied under conditions of 
scarcity, served as the criterion by which individual market actors would allocate their resources 
                                                                                                                                                             
reconceptualizations, respectively. It has long been recognized that Menger, and the Austrian tradition he initiated, 
differed from neoclassicism in their rejection of mathematics in economic analysis, although this was in no way 
unusual in the discipline until the 1930s. 
164 That is, the prices of the factors of production, traditionally rendered as the services of land, labor, and capital, 
ignoring for the time being entrepreneurial ability. In the British classical approach from Malthus and Ricardo 
through Mill, questions of distribution to these factors in the form of rent, wages, and interest (the price of using 
them) had formed the center of attention, and the analysis of supply and demand in both agricultural and 
manufactured products was bound up with the scarcity of usable agricultural land (raising rents with growth) and the 
equilibrating tendencies of the Malthusian law of population (leveling wages with growth). Economic analysis in 
this form necessarily concentrated on aggregate supply and demand and on the question of long-term growth (or 
lack thereof, as residual profits, capital formation, and investment were purported to decline with rising rents), rather 
than on individual consumption decisions or acts of exchange, and marginal analysis was employed only in the case 
of differential rents.  For Walras and Menger in their different ways, the prices of factors of production could best be 
assessed by viewing them as goods like any others within the same exchange framework, although a full-fledged 
marginal theory of distribution awaited proper elaboration in the 1890s with John Bates Clark and others. 
165 The inevitably highly simplified survey of Walras’ economics and its assumptions made in the following three 
paragraphs derives from Donald Walker, Walras’s Market Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
esp. 21-23; Donald Walker, Walrasian Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 63-84, 102-108, 
128-139, 162-166;  Donald Walker, ed., William Jaffé’s Essays on Walras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 87-88, 291-305; Mary S. Morgan, “Economics,” in Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds., The Cambridge 
History of Science, Vol. 7, The Modern Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 275-305; 
Roger Backhouse, Ordinary Business of Life, 170-72.  
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and thus explained the relationship between individual utility and demand.  Like various other 
marginal utility theorists throughout the nineteenth century, Walras recognized both that 
marginal utility diminished with increasing quantities of a good, and that the economic agent 
would be able to maximize utility if he or she allocated all available resources such that the ratio 
of the marginal utility of each good to its price was equal across all goods consumed.
166 This 
approach allowed Walras to provide a strict logical rationale for the empirical observation that 
curves constructed to represent demand schedules for a good at different prices were downward-
sloping, as his predecessor Cournot had argued. It also allowed him, like Jevons, to introduce 
greater precision into the language of economics through the differential calculus, which could 
be used not only in the analysis of utility maximization—in which marginal utility could be 
defined rigorously as the first derivative of total utility with respect to quantity—but 
subsequently for any use of the marginal principle, whether in the assessment of revenue and 
costs on the supply side, in the marginal productivity theory of distribution, or elsewhere.  
Unlike both Menger and Jevons, Walras placed much less emphasis on using marginal 
utility analysis to explain demand and price formation in cases of bilateral exchange,
167 nor was 
he especially interested in the process of offering prices in negotiations between parties as in 
Menger’s bartering examples.  Instead, his economic agents were price takers: in any given 
product or factor market they were simply faced with market prices, declared as if by an 
auctioneer; corresponding to the declared price, each individual or firm would demand a set 
                                                 
166 These propositions are, of course, known as the “law” of diminishing marginal utility and the equimarginal 
principle, sometimes known as Gossen’s First and Second Laws after yet another mid-nineteenth-century German 
theoretician, the initially ignored Heinrich Gossen. The latter principle holds because if the ratios were not exactly 
equal, the consumer could gain a welfare advantage by reallocating resources to the good whose marginal utility 
divided by price was higher than that of alternative goods. 
167 Both of the former concentrated on such exchanges rather than on perfectly competitive markets with an 
indefinite number of sellers, although it should be noted that neither completed a full presentation of their price 
theory, as their main works (Jevons’ Theory of Political Economy and Menger’s Grundsätze) were regarded as 
introductory.  
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quantity of the good in accordance with marginal utility or marginal cost considerations.  But, 
pivotally, not a single transaction would occur, even if it was welfare-improving, except at the 
market clearing price—at the point of equilibrium.  And the truly characteristic feature of 
Walras’ economics, with which he was preoccupied long before his use of marginal utility, and 
which provided him with much greater recognition in the twentieth century than it did during his 
lifetime, was his attempt to explain multi-market or general equilibrium.  Here again following 
Cournot, Walras rightly pointed out that individual product markets could not really be totally 
isolated from one another but were necessarily interconnected and influenced each other in ways 
that could not be accounted for by partial-equilibrium analysis.  Attempting to discover the 
market-clearing prices and quantities for a momentary cross-section of the entire economy as an 
integrated whole was, obviously, an impossible task, but Walras argued that under certain 
specified assumptions, it was possible to show that the number of equations modeling the 
different product and factor markets were equal to the number of unknowns (prices and 
quantities). Such an outcome would, he believed, demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium 
position for the economy to which it would ineluctably return if prices in any part of it 
temporarily deviated.  At a slightly lower level of formality, he tried to provide a “quasi-
dynamic”
168 explanation for the process of equilibration: the economy itself could be said to 
approach such an equilibrium position by the process of tâtonnement: starting from an arbitrary 
auctioneer’s price, competitive markets would “grope” their way to the equilibrium state through 
the logic of maximization under scarcity.  
  Our interest here is not so much in the details of Walras’ achievement, which can only be 
sketched rather grossly, but in the set of assumptions it necessarily made about human action and 
the appropriate methods for the social science of economics, and in the alternative position 
                                                 
168 Walker, ed., Jaffé’s Essays on Walras, 131.  
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adopted by Menger.  In order to attain the high level of precision and sophistication he reached in 
explaining how markets could generate a stable, optimum equilibrium state—a precision 
surpassed only the better part of a century later by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu in the 
1950s
169—Walras had to discuss a very stylized economy indeed.
170  The individual economic 
agent described by his mathematics was equipped with complete knowledge of every part of the 
economy: every market, every other agent’s wants (or preferences, in the preferred modern 
language), and exactly what would happen throughout the system at any set of prices and 
quantities.  The agent was completely rational and incapable of making errors of information or 
judgment, and always selected the best means to every end; his sole motive was to maximize a 
quantity of some implicitly substantial units of satisfaction; the quantities of satisfaction and the 
goods consumed were not discrete (or “lumpy”) but completely divisible in order to make the 
use of calculus rather than simple linear equations possible.  The ends which the agent pursued in 
the course of maximizing his satisfaction were determined for him at the outset and unalterable, 
not subject to deliberation.  In fact, even describing the individual as an agent is mistaken, for he 
did not ever make a choice of any sort: when confronted with the stimulus of a given price, 
action (or inaction) was instantaneous in accordance with the utility function describing the 
individual’s preferences at that price. The environment in which these automata existed was 
composed of such a large (indeed, technically, it ought to have been infinite) number of buyers 
and sellers of identical commodities that no one person or firm could exert market power of any 
sort; the prices they all faced were announced to them by some external mechanism (the 
                                                 
169 Who advanced beyond Walras’ method of counting equations and unknowns (minus the numeraire, the good in 
terms of which others were measured or, generally, money), which did not offer a rigorous proof and which allowed 
the possibility of negative roots, physically impossible given that the solutions were intended to represent real prices 
and quantities, alongside other problems On modern general equilibrium theory, see Bruna Ingrao and Giorgio 
Israel, The Invisible Hand: Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). 
170 It was not, thereby, a fictional or hypothetical model in his view, but an abstraction directly from reality and 
related to it as a fairly good approximation in Walras’ opinion: Walker, Walrasian Economics, 66.  
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auctioneer); time and space did not exist in any substantive sense, since market-clearing was 
instantaneous and frictionless at the correct set of prices, and consequently there was no period 
of production, no uncertainty about future states, no transaction costs. Equilibrium was a static 
state, to be compared with alternate static states, and naturally technological change, growth, and 
other such dynamic factors had no endogenous place in a system of comparative statics. 
  Menger’s approach to economics hardly dispensed with simplifying assumptions, nor 
could it.  Nonetheless, his view of the economic agent, and the processes of interaction and 
competition between agents that made up the economy, was strikingly different and considerably 
closer to what would become the “interpretive social science” approach in Germany.  The 
individual in Menger’s economics was not characterized by perfect knowledge, complete 
rationality and complete freedom of action, inerrancy, or a utilitarian (let alone hedonist) set of 
motives.
171  As he would later put it, “it may be admitted ever so unreservedly that people are 
governed in economic things neither exclusively by a single definite propensity, in our case by 
their egoism, nor are uninfluenced by error, ignorance, and external compulsion.”
172 The 
Grundsätze was filled with remarks on the existence of error and the lack of information, and the 
way in which economic agents worked to minimize but never to eliminate such influences on 
their conduct.  For instance, he wrote, “If…men were always correctly and completely informed, 
as a result of previous experience, about the concrete needs they will have, and about the 
intensity with which these needs will be experienced during the time period for which they plan, 
                                                 
171 Several scholars have discussed these characteristic features of the Austrian approach to economics in the form 
initially given it by Menger; although my treatment of these characteristic themes in Menger is based on the original 
texts, I have also found particularly useful: Sandye Gloria-Palermo, The Evolution of Austrian Economics: From 
Menger to Lachmann (London: Routledge, 1999), 18-36; A.M. Endres, Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory: The 
Founding Austrian Version (London: Routledge, 1997), 9-40, 60-84, 108-125; Allen Oakley, The Foundations of 
Austrian Economics from Menger to Mises (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1997), 56-70. Eugen Maria Schulak and Herbert 
Unterköfler, Die Wiener Schule der Nationalökonomie: Eine Geschichte ihrer Ideen, Vertreter und Institutionen 
(Weitra: Bibliothek der Provinz, 2010), is recent but unfortunately superficial, particularly on Menger: 48-52. 
172 Menger, Untersuchungen, 46; Investigations, 64.  
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they could never be in doubt about the quantities of goods necessary for the satisfaction of their 
needs… But experience tells us that we are often more or less in doubt whether needs will be felt 
in the future at all,” or if so, in what intensity.
173 The level of rationality in the determination of 
the appropriate types and stocks of goods to meet needs and wants varied with the level of 
civilization, as Menger suggested on several occasions, and it was certainly possible for agents to 
be mistaken, even about the assessment of “the relative degrees of importance of different 
satisfactions and of successive acts of satisfaction” of their own needs and wants.
174 Human 
beings strove for knowledge to reduce such errors, and to reach exactitude where possible, but he 
suggested that in reality they were generally content with what would later be known as 
“satisficing” behavior.  In assessing the means (in the form of the appropriate goods) towards 
their ends, instead of the “ideal result” of a “complete enumeration” and “exact determination” 
of these goods, “In practical life…far from pursuing this ideal, men customarily do not even 
attempt to obtain results as fully exact as it is possible in the existing state of the arts of 
measuring and taking inventory, but are satisfied with just the degree of exactness that is 
necessary for practical purposes.”
175 
Further differentiating him from Walras, Menger did not regard the use of calculus as a 
step forward in economic analysis precisely because it could not hope to take the subjective 
meanings of individual actions into account as part of the process of scientific explanation in 
economics.  Menger’s important letter to Walras of February 1884 has often been cited as 
evidence of his Aristotelian realism or essentialism on the basis of the comment that “[w]e 
                                                 
173 Menger, Grundsätze, 36; Principles, 81. 
174 Ibid., 4, 25, 28-29, 32-33, 250-51; Principles, 53, 70, 74, 78-79, 257; quotation: Grundsätze, 121; Principles, 
147. 
175 Ibid., 46; Principles, 90 (businesspeople might well strive for a higher degree of exactness here, he observed). 
Menger frequently made comparable statements about adequacy for practical purposes: see, e.g., Grundsätze, 39; 
Principles, 84.  
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investigate however not only the relationships of quantities but also the ESSENCE of economic 
phenomena.”
176  But what has been neglected is the decisive way in which Menger embraced 
interpretive social science.  Describing his “analytic-compositive” method, which we will 
discuss briefly at the end of the following section, he emphasized that mathematics could help 
greatly in measuring quantities but never in determining the basic elements out of which 
lawfulness arises in the social world.  Clarifying with the example of price theory, he observed 
that the phenomenon of exchange could not be explained without going back “to the needs and 
wants (Bedürfnisse) of human beings, the meaning which the satisfaction of these wants has for 
the latter, to the quantities of individual goods which are found in the possession of individual 
economizing subjects, to the subjective meaning (to the subjective value) which concrete 
quantities of goods have for the individual economizing subject, etc.,” none of which were 
accessible to mathematics.
177 
The absence of calculus in Menger meant, incidentally, that he was not burdened by the 
impulse to posit a single substance (utility or its equivalent) for the agent to maximize, nor by the 
need to model goods as infinitely divisible.
178  Instead, the economizing individual in Menger’s 
Grundsätze pursued the goal of satisfying his discrete wants as best he was able; he made 
conscious choices about which course of action to take, and took those actions which in light of 
his information and understanding seemed likeliest to satisfy the largest number of wants as 
                                                 
176 William Jaffé, ed., Correspondence of Léon Walras and Related Papers, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing, 1965), Letter 602 (from Carl Menger), 3. 
177 Ibid., 4. In notes made in his “author’s copy” of the Grundsätze during the 1870s, Menger had cited a certain 
Eduard Pfeiffer’s book on state revenues as an impetus for the reflection that mathematical certainty was not 
available in the case of human beings because of their status as “living organisms” bringing “partly incalculable” 
actions along with them. Menger’s “author’s copy” has been located at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo since the 
1920s and his marginal comments were published in mimeograph by Emil Kauder in 1961 as Carl Mengers Zusätze 
zu ‘Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre’ (Tokyo: Library of Hitotsubashi University, 1961): here, p. 17. 
178 In the Grundsätze, the quantities are always of “lumpy,” indivisible goods such as horses.  
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completely as possible.
179 Such an approach also encouraged Menger to advance an ordinal 
approach to “utility”—in which individuals chose among different goods to satisfy different 
wants without any implication that there was a common unit of measure shared between them to 
make cardinal comparisons possible.
180 Menger’s marginalism was on display in explaining how 
economizing individuals facing scarce goods and wants of different degrees would allocate their 
resources.  But it was not the mathematically defined marginalism of Walras.  In the 
determination of prices, for example, different marginal values set on a unit of goods by two 
traders would indeed set the bounds between which a price might be agreed upon, but the price 
itself was not determinate and the real price ultimately agreed would depend upon such factors as 
the bargainers’ “various individualities and upon their greater or smaller knowledge of business 
life and, in each case, of the situation of the other bargainer.”
181 In short, individual economic 
agents were not walking demand schedules but agents: they were active and purposive, not 
passive calculating machines automatically responding to stimuli, and their actions were not 
foregone conclusions.  Essentially for our argument, then, their subjective mental states, 
intentions and contingent decision-making, even in conditions where a high degree of rationality 
was presumed as a baseline, were at the center of economics. “[M]an, with his wants and his 
                                                 
179 Menger, Grundsätze, 51-52; Principles, 94-95; see also Menger’s account of the traits necessary for defining a 
good as the foundation for his considering the satisfaction of needs as the basic activity of economic agents, rather 
than the maximization of a quantity of utility: Grundsätze, 3; Principles, 52. 
180 See Pierre Livet, “Cardinality or Ordinality in Menger’s Framework,” in Gilles Campagnolo, ed., Carl Menger: 
Neu eroertert unter Einzbeziehung nachgelassener Texte/Discussed on the Basis of New Findings (Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 2008), which provides a persuasive answer to the question of whether Menger held an “ordinalist” view: a 
qualified yes.  This was incidentally more in line with subsequent developments in economics which have generally 
left utility behind in favor of indifference curves.  For the qualification, see Grundsätze, Ch.3, Section 2.A, which 
presents Menger’s famous numeric table of goods showing the effects of diminishing marginal utility; although 
Menger frames the discussion in such a way that it is unnecessary to assume one can compare the different goods in 
terms of a common measure (as opposed to merely ranking them based on the agent’s revealed preference), he 
nevertheless vaguely suggests such a comparison. 
181 Menger, Grundsätze, 177; Principles, 195; see also the discussion of price at the end of Book I, Ch.5 of the 
Untersuchungen/Investigations.  
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command of the means to satisfy them, is himself the point at which human economic life both 
begins and ends.”
182 
At the level of the market, moreover, Menger’s notion of competition was a far cry from 
Walras’ equilibrium analysis.  There was no auctioneer offering a market price to be taken or 
left, and Menger’s economizing individuals and firms did not make their decisions within a static 
state of perfect competition, but rather as part of a process of competition.  His analysis of prices 
is staged as a set of “duels” between bargaining parties which allow a step-by-step 
approximation to an agreeable price, beginning with a monopoly situation and introducing larger 
numbers of parties without ever reaching the state of perfect competition.  Transactions did not 
need to “wait” for a market-clearing price, and still less for multimarket equilibrium, for 
movement to occur.
183 
Although the major purpose of the Grundsätze was precisely to delineate the setting of 
values and prices through exchange in markets of varying degrees of competitiveness, Menger 
did not ignore other aspects of the economy seemingly more distant from exchange.
184  Indeed, 
like Walras, he shared the aim of presenting a unified theory of value and prices which would 
bring not just exchange but production and income distribution under a single perspective and 
dispense with the rather ad hoc explanations characteristic of pre-marginalist economics.
185 He 
approached integrating production with consumer decisions and exchange by arguing that goods 
should be seen as belonging to different “orders.”
186 Those goods which were directly suited to 
personal consumption (say, a loaf of bread) he labeled goods of the first order, while those which 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 69; Principles, 108. 
183 Ibid., Ch. V; see Gloria-Palermo, Evolution of Austrian Economics, 27-33, and Endres, Neoclassical 
Microeconomic Theory, Ch.7, for good summaries. 
184 On the ways in which issues of information, rationality, time and uncertainty played in to production decisions, 
see especially Oakley, 62-70, 85-86. 
185 Menger, Grundsätze, x; Principles, 49. 
186 For Menger’s ongoing discussions of first-order, second-order, X-order goods, see ibid., 7-10, 67-68, 123ff.; 
Principles, 55-58, 107, 149ff.  
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were necessary to produce first order goods (say, flour, yeast, and an oven) belonged to the 
second order, while in turn they required goods of still higher orders (e.g., harvested grain, pig 
iron), and so forth.
187  The values of production goods and services, including returns to land, 
labor, and capital, could be imputed to them on the basis of their subsequent contributions, in 
complementary combination, to those first-order goods which were directly valued by 
consumers.
188 
While the first and only volume of the Grundsätze did not cover the theory behind 
production or income distribution in great detail, it is possible to see how Menger’s approach 
would differ from that of Walrasian neoclassicism. Most importantly, business firms too were 
characterized by the absence of perfect knowledge and rationality, and by the possibility of error, 
as they attempted to provide the right quantity of goods at the right times to maximize profits. 
Business decisions and production itself took place in time rather than instantaneously, which 
meant that there were unavoidable risks in trying to match current decisions about inputs, output 
and planning to future demand and costs when change could easily alter the market situation in 
either the short or the long run.
189 They also took place in space, leading to transportation 
costs.
190 Regardless of the differences between branches of production, “and even though the 
progress of civilization tends to diminish the uncertainty involved, it is certain that an 
appreciable degree of uncertainty regarding the quantity and quality of a product finally to be 
                                                 
187 Ibid., 8-10; Principles, 56-57. 
188 Ibid., 126; Principles, 152. 
189 Ibid., 22-24, 43-45; Principles, 68-70, 87-89; see also Endres, Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory, 167-71, on 
the challenges of entrepreneurial decisions over employing capital under these conditions, and a useful contrast with 
Böhm-Bawerk’s views showing Menger’s greater subjectivism in capital theory. Note also that the emphasis on time 
and dynamics in the Austrian economic tradition may be related to the use, following Menger, of a cause-effect 
orientation in economics rather than a functionalist orientation—that is, one which aimed to address the question of 
how the parts within a static system interacted, as Walras did.  See Gloria-Palermo, Evolution of Austrian 
Economics, 29. 
190 Ibid., 170; Principles, 189.  Menger even reminded his readers here of the operation of the much-neglected but 
important category of transaction costs in the case of almost any exchange.  
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obtained [through production] will always be present,” to a greater or lesser degree.
191 The 
problem of insufficient information which faced all economizing individuals was exacerbated 
here by the special circumstances of planning production within business firms, which called 
forth whole new professional classes for gathering and updating accounts and statistical data and 
for business reporting, all of which is nonetheless “subject to severe fluctuations” in quality as it 
too can only be gathered in real time and on occasion.
192 The planning activities of producer 
firms under such conditions appeared throughout the sections on higher-order goods in the 
Grundsätze as an activity of individuals, and consequently the figure of the entrepreneur as 
decision-maker took on a pivotal role as the agent responsible for dealing with these problems of 
time, uncertainty and error.  The entrepreneur was no cipher, no mechanism for instantaneous 
equilibration as in Walras; instead, he or she was said by Menger to serve several functions 
under these non-ideal conditions: obtaining information; having responsibility for economic 
calculation, or the handling of the computations necessary for production to take place in an 
efficient way; “the act of will by which goods… are assigned to a particular production process”; 
and supervision or management of the process.
193 Firms, like individuals, faced a market 
                                                 
191 Ibid., 24; Principles, 70. 
192 Ibid., 48-51; Principles, 91-94.  As Streissler once put it, “Mengerian man thus knows little about the present, 
though, interesting[ly] enough, he is constantly trying to increase his knowledge, creating social institutions to 
gather information, empowering growing droves of middlemen to act on his behalf. Still less than about the present 
does he know about the future. Again and again Menger stresses the time dimension of goods and the amount of 
uncertainty this entails”: “To What Extent Was the Austrian School Marginalist?” in R.D.C. Black, A.W. Coats, and 
C.D.W. Goodwin, eds., The Marginal Revolution in Economics: Interpretation and Evaluation (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke, 1973), 160-75, here 167. On the active, decision-making role of Menger’s entrepreneur in coordination of 
information within the vertically disintegrated production process of moving from higher-order goods down the 
value chain to consumer goods in time, see Robert H￩bert’s and Albert Link’s misleadingly titled history of ideas 
about entrepreneurship, A History of Entrepreneurship (London: Routledge, 2009), 42-44. 
193 Ibid., 137; Principles, 160. N.B.: Menger’s emphasis.  
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“process” rather than a static state, and real individuals facing real and incompletely cognized 
conditions were the only forces tending toward equilibrium.
194 
  Although Menger was an economist rather than a sociologist, he provided a further 
indication of the potential usefulness of this interpretive social scientific approach to the 
explanation of social institutions through his theory of what would later be called “spontaneous 
order”: regular social phenomena introduced by unintended actions.  Most famously in his theory 
of money, he traced the logic by which the difficulty of finding just the right bartering partner for 
mutually advantageous trade led, through the same features of human economizing activity 
described in his theory of exchange, to the growth of one particular marketable commodity as the 
currency in which all others were traded—without any need to posit intentional creation of 
money through legislative fiat.
195 But he suggested the same kind of analysis could be applied to 
the growth of new settlements, the state, law, language and morals, as well.
196 Detailed 
examination of this feature of Menger’s work is unnecessary as it is tangential to the current 
discussion. Instead, it need only be observed that even though a central feature of Menger’s 
spontaneous order explanations lay in the unintended consequences of individual actions, the 
actions themselves came about in the same sort of way as the economizing actions of decision-
making individuals oriented toward subjectively set goals and possessing limited knowledge.
197  
Large-scale and complex social phenomena could be explained on the basis of individuals’ 
meaningful actions even when there was no direct intention to create them.  Although it awaited 
                                                 
194 Erich Streissler, “To What Extent Was the Austrian School Marginalist?” 172-174; see the essays in Israel 
Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics (London: 
Routledge, 1991). 
195 See Grundsätze/Principles, Ch. VIII; Untersuchungen, 172-178; Investigations, 152-155; Gerald P. O’Driscoll, 
“Money: Menger’s Evolutionary Theory,” History of Political Economy 18:4 (1986), 601-616. Obviously Menger 
was not the first to create a theory of spontaneous order, which was a topic of interest to Adam Ferguson and other 
Scottish Enlightenment figures. 
196 Menger, Untersuchungen, 178-181; Investigations, 156-157; Appendix VIII contains a more detailed study of the 
law example. 
197 The explanation in the passages cited above uses the language of “individual interests.”  
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Joseph Schumpeter to coin the term “methodological individualism,” this method was already 
present in Menger, for whom there was no need to posit real “organic” unities or social forces, 
and who took a dim view of hypostatizing the results of such actions as the “fiction” of collective 
entities.
198 
In short, in his approach to understanding both individuals and the major social or 
institutional formations characteristic of his chosen social scientific domain, the competitive 
market economy, Menger treated the subject matter of social science as inevitably made up of 
individual, subjectively meaningful actions and valuations.  The analysis of economic and social 
phenomena was in turn essentially a matter of explaining the effects of such meaningful 
individual actions, intended or unintended.  The contrast with Walras, and with nineteenth-
century positivist and statistical-determinist attitudes, is quite clear.  Walras aimed at a scientific 
economics not only in making the discipline amenable to mathematical methods,
199 but by 
assuming that human actions could be studied without attention to questions of subjective 
meanings.  True, Walras’ theory of value was subjective in that he derived value from the 
comparison of amounts of utility under scarcity, but despite his pride in the discovery of 
marginal analysis, the theory of value was always of relatively minor importance to his scientific 
work, the presentation of the theory of general equilibrium.
200 Certainly, as we saw above, 
removing intentionality and subjectivity in decision-making in favor of what amounted to a 
mechanical stimulus-response model allowed him to draw much more rigorous conclusions, 
which could compel acknowledgement from anyone who accepted his premises—a much more 
difficult proposition for those who took subjective meanings into account.  Menger rejected 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Untersuchungen, 86, 235-236; Investigations, 93, 194-196. 
199 In economic theory. Others, including Jevons, began the process of employing quantitative methods in the area of 
what would later become known as econometrics. 
200 Jaff￩, “Menger, Jevons, and Walras,” 515.  
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stimulus-response readings of human behavior, and despite the fact that his educational 
formation took place in the 1860s, he rejected positivism more broadly, particularly in the form 
of “idle play with external analogies between the phenomena of the economy and those of 
nature.”
201  The path which we designated above as positivist—which sought to approach 
scientific status through the assumption that subjective mental states and values need be of no 
concern of the social scientist—was no more appealing to Menger than to the other advocates of 
value-freedom. 
But of course Menger’s economics bore no resemblance to a cognitive-relativist type of 
hermeneutic understanding in its treatment of socioeconomic life, either.  He intended his work 
to provide a more satisfactory scientific foundation on which practical businesspeople could 
build in understanding the economic activities in which they took part.
202 We will critically 
address the details of Menger’s implicit position on objective knowledge below, but it remains to 
argue that his theory of social science shared the other main feature of the “interpretive social 
science” tradition, as defined here: recognition of the need for a theory-based criterion for 
selecting out significant features of the complex world of human beliefs, values, and actions in 
order to allow for causal explanation.  If the comparison with Walrasian economics helped to 
distinguish Menger from the positivist version of objective social science, the clarification of his 
views on economic theory will help to differentiate his version of interpretive social science from 
                                                 
201 Menger, Grundsätze, vii; Principles, 47. We will see presently how he rejected methodological monism and the 
view that natural scientific methods were the appropriate methods for the sciences which studied human beings as 
well, two characteristic positivist doctrines. Menger appreciated the work of Comte, to whom he often referred, and 
whose broad picture of the stages of human intellectual development toward positive thought he accepted: for 
instance, in a letter to Georg Jellinek of 6 December, 1904, Menger denounced “mystical theories of state law” and 
wrote that “What we really need is a scientifically secured foundation for the ethical sciences, whose general 
doctrines are unfortunately still found at the level of the metaphysical stage of development”: Nachlass Georg 
Jellinek, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NL 1136/17.   But he also recognized his distance from Comte, noting in his 
author’s copy of the Grundsätze that “Comte is against my method”: Kauder, ed., Carl Mengers Zusätze, 18. An 
explicit rejection of “positivism” in his 1889 essay on the classification of the sciences used the term in a merely 
polemical usage to refer to the mindless gathering of historical evidence: e.g., “Grundz￼ge,” 200; “Systematic 
Classification,” 15. 
202 Menger, Grundsätze, v-vi; Principles, 45-46.  
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the Schmollerite historical school on the other side.  The difference lay, first, in the “source” of 
theory, and second, in the question of how theory was useful in gaining knowledge of the 
economy.  For Menger, theory itself could never originate out of a mere mass of descriptions of 
“real” economic life coupled with the hope that it would someday be possible to induce 
regularities from them; and it was only “one-sided” theory which could provide useable 
knowledge.  Like Weber later, Menger would identify the major task of theory with the 
establishment of types and relations of types. 
  Fortunately, Menger’s methodological writings are very clear about the division of labor 
within the discipline of economics, and indeed within the sciences as a whole, allowing us to 
identify the role he allotted to theoretical research with ease.  We will first describe Menger’s 
taxonomy of the sciences and then demonstrate the importance of its divisions by showing how 
they contribute to his particular vision of theory-based interpretive social science.  His taxonomy 
starts out from the observation that it is possible to divide the disciplines along two different 
lines: either they can be considered with respect to the substantive area of their focus, or they can 
be considered with respect to the methods they employ.
203  That is, the sciences may be divided 
according to an ontological difference between their objects—in which case the main division 
becomes that of the natural and the human sciences—or they may be divided by their cognitive 
interest in either the general or the particular.  Menger was thus one of the first methodologists to 
call attention to this distinction, and, unlike the Baden neo-Kantians but like Dilthey, who 
explored similar matters in the same year (1883), Menger saw the more basic of the two 
possibilities as the ontological one.
204  Menger did not view it as appropriate to carry over natural 
                                                 
203 Menger, “Grundzüge,” 189; “Systematic Classification,” 4. 
204 Ibid. Oakley, Foundations of Austrian Economics, 53-54 and Ch.3 passim, places much emphasis on the fact that 
Menger’s basic commitment was to an ontological distinction between human and natural phenomena, suggesting 
that this was at the root of his subjectivism, but that he failed to accept its consequences for the ultimate  
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scientific methods to the human domain for explanatory purposes, even as he demonstrated great 
respect for the achievements of natural science and frequently used examples from those 
sciences.
205 As he wrote already in the 1871 preface to his Grundsätze, “every method of 
investigation acquires its own specific character from the nature of the field of knowledge to 
which it is applied.  It would be improper, accordingly, to attempt a natural-scientific orientation 
of our science.”
206 Methods in economics, as in any science having to do with human beings, 
must accept and recognize the inherent differences between human subjects and natural objects 
as explananda.  As we have seen, this meant in practice that reference to human consciousness 
could not be avoided. 
  The point of departure from the historicists became apparent in the next stage of the 
taxonomy, however, since for Menger, it is necessary to differentiate the sciences according to 
method as well, within the bounds of the distinction between human and natural phenomena.  
The human world, like its counterpart, was an intricate entity; Menger referred to the 
“complexity” and “vastness” of the “full empirical reality” of the world itself and of its 
phenomena.
207 However, it was not simple a welter of contingent happenings; it was not the 
extensively and intensively “infinite” manifold of “irrational” reality, unknowable in-itself, of 
the southwest German neo-Kantians.
208 Both the human and the natural world could be known 
directly, as we shall see below in section b), and they could be known in two ways: with 
reference to their concrete and particular features or with reference to their general features.    
                                                                                                                                                             
unpredictability of human actions, thus rendering his theory of science a failure. Oakley relies for his interpretation 
of Menger’s ontological views on the foundational research by Barry Smith, summarized in Smith, Austrian 
Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Chicago: Open Court, 1994), Ch.10. We return to these issues in the 
following section. 
205 E.g., Menger, Untersuchungen, 38-39, n.18; Investigations, 59-60, n.18. For a discussion of Menger’s criticisms 
of the confusion of the human sciences with the natural sciences and the assumption that the former may be treated 
like the latter, see Nau, “Wissenschaft vom Menschen,” 125-126. 
206 Menger, Grundsätze, vii; Principles, 47. 
207 E.g., Menger, Untersuchungen, 34, 253n.140; Investigations, 56, 209n.140. 
208 See above, Chapter I.  
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This represented a distinction between methods, the individualizing and the generalizing, which 
could in principle be deployed in any science.
209  The distinction formed the basis for Menger’s 
contention that economics had as its divisions: history and statistics, seeking the particular in all 
the richness of and complexity of its diachronic and synchronic manifestations; economic 
morphology, seeking the general structural forms taken by economic phenomena, much as 
biological morphology studied the general structures of living things; and economic theory 
proper, seeking the regular and recurrent relations between general structural forms—in short, 
laws.
210 The two generalizing branches, economic morphology and economic theory, could each 
be found in two basic varieties, which Menger named the realistic-empirical and the exact.  We 
will shortly have more to say about these varieties, but the basic difference between them was 
that the latter aimed to identify the truly universal and necessary recurring forms and relations 
between recurring forms, while the former offered an approximation to the exact approach, 
especially in cases where phenomena were extremely complex.
211 The purpose of theoretical 
knowledge of either kind was the same: to extrapolate from observed regularities to unobserved 
regularities, thereby allowing some varying degree of explanatory power and prediction which 
could be used for practical purposes, or as Menger put it, “understanding of the real world, 
knowledge of it extending beyond immediate experience, and control of it.”
212 
  This schema makes Menger’s objections to the procedure of the historical school readily 
apparent.  The historical approach to the human world was the classical form of the 
individualizing method; Schmoller’s program of descriptive studies aimed at considering all 
                                                 
209 The basic taxonomy is presented in Menger, Untersuchungen/Investigations Book I, Ch.1 passim; “Zur Kritik der 
politischen Oekonomie,” 115-116; “Grundz￼ge,” 189-90; “Systematic Classification,” 4. 
210 This discussion of Menger’s division of the sciences relies on the terminology first used in his 1889 article, the 
“Grundz￼ge,” instead of that presented in the 1883 Untersuchungen. There are no substantive differences between 
the two except that in the earlier text, Menger had simply divided the task of “theory” between what he later called 
morphology and theory proper. 
211 Menger, Untersuchungen, 51-53; Investigations, 68-69. 
212 Ibid., 33; Investigations, 55.  
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potentially relevant influences on the particular form of economic activity or institution under 
discussion.
213 Insofar as it sought laws of the economy, these were supposed to emerge from this 
gathering of exhaustively described economic institutions by a process of induction.  However, 
because the historical method for Menger was defined by its exhaustive individualizing, by its 
nature it could never yield any sort of theory without ceasing to be historical.  History was the 
polar opposite of exact theory; it “has the task of making us understand all sides of certain 
phenomena,” while “exact theories have the task of making us understand only certain sides of 
all phenomena in their way.”
214 Menger’s point was that even if a historical economist looked up 
from writing historical monographs on specialized topics long enough to reflect on their 
implications for theory—even realistic-empirical theory—in so doing he would be abstracting 
from reality to some determinable degree and therefore cease “doing history.”
215 Even realistic-
empirical theory could not reproduce the “full empirical reality” which the historian sought, 
making the idea of a universal theoretical social science which could cover all aspects of a 
phenomenon a “phantom.”
216 The historian even marginally interested in the development of 
theory would consequently be compelled to acknowledge the legitimacy of pursuing theory that 
abstracted to some extent from reality—that is, to acknowledge the equal legitimacy of Menger’s 
own scholarly activity alongside historical studies.
217 What, then, was the source of theory? We 
                                                 
213 Menger identifies this (in his view deeply mistaken) aim to achieve a single, complete, all-rounded descriptive 
science at various points, before and after Schmoller’s 1883 review of the Untersuchungen in which he embraced 
the descriptive ideal: Untersuchungen, ix; Investigations, 25; “Grundz￼ge,” 192-193; “Systematic Classification,” 7. 
214 Menger, Untersuchungen, 68; Investigations, 79. 
215 Ibid., 68-69, 111-114; Investigations, 79-80, 109-111. 
216 Ibid., 34-36, 66; Investigations, 56-57; 78. 
217 The traditional view of the Methodenstreit, that it was based on a contest between inductive and deductive 
methods, or Bostaph’s view that it was based on epistemological differences, are not wrong so much as incomplete; 
this reading allows for the further difference that the point which exercised Menger was the wrongheadedness of 
claiming to base theory on complete descriptions covering all aspects of individual cases with no selection criterion; 
even an enumerative induction procedure could not accomplish this. For a recent interpretation of Menger’s view 
which treats this set of issues as an argument against theory derived from induction, see Milford, “Carl Menger und 
die Ursprünge der Österreichischen Schule der Nationalökonomie,” 56-58.  
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will return to Menger’s answer in section b), but we can now see why the source could not be 
induction from the results of a purely individualizing historical description. 
  Because Menger did not share the neo-Kantian view of reality as an “irrational” and 
infinite manifold which could only be approached in its individual features through 
conceptualization (abstraction), he did not explicitly quarrel with the historical economists’ 
claims for the possibility of complete description of particulars.  He did not make the claim that 
our knowledge of purely historical facts or particulars must be theory-determined—for example, 
that it was not possible to collect instances of theory-free “economic” or other kinds of 
particulars at all, because some kind of theory was necessary to identify any given phenomenon 
as economic in the first place.
218  However, he clearly thought it rather unlikely that the historical 
economists could pursue even their historical task itself without at least implicitly relying on the 
results of theory.
219 And some of his limited remarks on the subject of historical methodology 
indicated an awareness that even in history, focused on the concrete as it was, some criterion was 
necessary for separating the important from the unimportant phenomena available to the 
historian as raw data.  “Which phenomena of human life is it the task of the historical sciences to 
lift out of the vastness [of empirical reality] and to present?” he asked, and supplied two possible 
answers in two separate footnotes.  Either, as he continued in this context, the historical sciences 
had the task of presenting any concrete individual phenomenon belonging to their domain “only 
insofar as it is per se significant for the collective image of human life. Only in this way can they 
satisfy their particular task universally.”
220 Or, as he suggested in another place, the historical 
and statistical sciences must focus instead on that material which distinguishes itself as 
                                                 
218 Nau, Eine “Wissenschaft vom Menschen,” 115, suggests that Menger did make this claim, but I do not read him 
as quite reaching this argument, regardless of its appropriateness to his overall position. 
219 E.g., Menger, Untersuchungen, 18, 89; Investigations, 45, 94. 
220 Menger, Untersuchungen, 253 n.140; Investigations, 209 n.140.  
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significant by virtue of signaling “the movement of society” or historical change, which would 
appear to make history a more theoretical discipline, whether or not the notion of historical 
“laws” was accepted.
221 These suggestions implying that even historical knowledge of the 
economy was under a purely logical obligation to make reference to some sort of theoretical 
criterion were not systematically developed or justified with arguments, and his notion of an 
individualizing historical science thus did not lead him in the direction of any analogue to the 
later idea of value-relevance for explaining individual historical formations.  But if Menger’s 
interest in the methodology of historical scholarship was limited, in the area of economic 
knowledge in which he was interested—the generalizing branch—he did identify and develop a 
selection criterion. 
Because any sort of knowledge that renounced the exhaustive-description ideal (any sort 
of non-historical, theoretical knowledge of the economy) would by definition have to abstract 
from reality, this raised the need for some criterion of selection as the basis for deciding how to 
abstract.
222  Menger’s answer followed from his distinction between individualizing and 
generalizing sciences.  Although particular phenomena might possess many attributes which 
could be abstracted from them and separately considered, only some of these attributes were 
general forms which could be discerned in multiple cases.  As Menger observed near the 
beginning of his Untersuchungen, “[i]n spite of the great variety of concrete phenomena, we are 
able, even with cursory observation, to perceive that not every single phenomenon exhibits a 
particular empirical form differing from that of all the others. Experience teaches us, rather, that 
definite phenomena are repeated, now with greater exactitude, now with lesser, and recur in the 
                                                 
221 Ibid., 8-9 n.7; Investigations, 39 n.7.  For yet another briefly stated conception of the proper task of scientific 
history, emphasizing source criticism, see Untersuchungen, 8 n.6; Investigations, 38 n.6.  
222 See Karl Milford, “Menger’s Methodology,” in Bruce Caldwell, ed., Carl Menger and His Legacy in Economics 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 220.  
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variation of things.”
223 These repeating forms could be identified and labeled as “types” by the 
morphological branch of economic inquiry so that they could thereafter be readily located 
wherever, and in whatever sequence, they were found within a given slice of reality.  
Regularities in the sequence of types formed the subject matter of theory proper; put in other 
words, these general forms of relations between general morphological forms constituted laws.  
As examples from the realm of economics, Menger gave “the phenomena of purchase, of money, 
of supply and demand, of price, of capital, of rate of interest” as types and such relationships as 
“the regular drop in price of a commodity as a result of an increase in currency, the lowering of 
the rate of interest as a result of considerable accumulation of capital, etc.” as typical relations or 
laws.
224 The type thus served as the selection criterion for anyone with a cognitive interest in 
explaining or predicting causal sequences—the purposes specific to theoretical science.
225 
Not all general forms were created equal.  Menger suggested that some were universal, 
while others held across a limited domain in space or time.
226  One had to acknowledge simply 
based on the nature of human thinking, he stated, that “whatever was observed in even only one 
case must always put in an appearance again under exactly the same actual conditions; or, what 
is in essence the same thing, that strictly typical phenomena of a definite kind must always, and 
indeed in consideration of our laws of thinking, simply of necessity, be followed by strictly 
typical phenomena of just as definite and different a type.”
227 Thus, when dealing with types 
which were truly universal and contained no admixture of the particular at all, causal 
relationships in particular sequences could be determined with absolute certainty; these were 
                                                 
223 Menger, Untersuchungen, 4; Investigations, 36, on which most of this paragraph draws. 
224 Ibid.; see also 12-13; Investigations, 42, for a few other examples. 
225 Ibid., 34, 253 n.140; Investigations, 56; 209 n.140, commenting on the theoretical as well as the historical 
sciences’ need to pick out universal elements from complex reality. 
226 Nau, Eine “Wissenschaft vom Menschen,” 127-137, provides a good survey of Menger’s ideas on the two kinds 
of types. 
227 Ibid., 40; Investigations, 60.  
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exact laws.
228 Realistic empirical types and laws did not at all possess such certainty, yet they 
were also closer to the real world.  Real types presented the “basic forms of real phenomena, 
within the typical image of which, however, a more or less broad scope is given for 
particularities (also for the development of the phenomena!),” while empirical laws represented a 
form of “theoretical knowledge… [of] the actual regularities (though they are by no means 
guaranteed to be without exception) in the succession and coexistence of real phenomena.”
229 
They were thus differentiated both by their level of abstraction from reality and by their level of 
certainty.  The former did not change, while the latter could.
230 Neither had a special set of 
phenomena to which it alone was appropriate; both types could be sought and identified in all 
phenomena,
231 and naturally many phenomena exemplified multiple types and stood in multiple 
lawful relationships.  Because exact laws represented fully certain knowledge of their respective 
“corners” of reality within all phenomena, when coupled with the laws produced by all other 
exact theories, in other sciences, the sum total of exact theory would provide certain knowledge 
of all of reality—with one exception.
232 Until and unless this state in the development of the 
sciences was reached, the possibility of which Menger regarded as an open question, realistic-
empirical laws would provide necessary supplements, and only the combination of the two 
approaches “can procure for us the deepest theoretical understanding of the phenomena 
considered here which is attainable in our age.”
233  Even in the absence of the complete certainty 
guaranteed by a full complement of developed exact sciences, realistic-empirical methods could 
                                                 
228 See also Milford, “Carl Menger und die Ursprünge der Österreichischen Schule,” 56-57; critique of Menger’s 
reasoning in Oakley, Foundations of Austrian Economics, 81. We will return, critically, to Menger’s justification of 
the idea of exact types and laws in our discussion of objectivity in the following section. For now, it is important 
only to note that for Menger, theory proceeded by discerning and using types. 
229 Menger, Untersuchungen, 36; Investigations, 57. 
230 E.g., ibid., 106-114; Investigations, 106-111. 
231 Ibid., 26, 51-53; Investigations, 51; 68-69. 
232 Ibid., 44, 64-65; Investigations, 62-63, 77-78. 
233 Ibid., 154-155; Investigations, 140.  
115 
 
still provide the social scientist with criteria for discovering repeating forms that would allow 
some degree of explanation, prediction and control, something historical description could never 
achieve.
234 Both were on display in Menger’s economics, as we examined it above; his 
willingness to take realistic-empirical theory seriously should not be underrated, since it is 
embodied in his own work. 
The caveat above, “with one exception,” was necessary, however.  For while strictly 
lawful, certain, and predictable knowledge could be had of many phenomena, provided one 
could gain access to all of the relevant exact types and typical laws, and while this was as true of 
the realm of human life as of nature, Menger did not want to argue that the human world was 
completely determined in the manner of the natural world.
235  He accepted the doctrine of 
“freedom of the human will” (“we have, of course, no intention of denying this as a practical 
category”),
236 and he realized that a critic might contest the possibility of laws of economics 
because of the free will of economizing human subjects.  Still, granting human subjects the 
ability to alter their behavior, he wanted to argue that there remained important uniformities in 
economic actions. “Although reference to freedom of the human will may well be legitimate as 
an objection to the complete conformity to law of economic activity,” he wrote, “it can never 
have force as a denial of the conformity to law of phenomena that condition the outcome of the 
economic activity of men and are entirely independent of human will. It is, however, precisely 
the latter sort of phenomena which are the objects of study in our science.”
237 Thus, although the 
data of economic science consist of actions taken freely by human beings on the basis of their 
                                                 
234 Ibid., 38; Investigations, 59; Menger was quite adamant in reminding the reader that realistic-empirical theory 
was not to be confused with historical economics merely because of its lesser certainty: ibid., 26-28; Investigations, 
51-52. 
235 For the equal applicability to human phenomena, see ibid., 26; Investigations, 50-51. 
236 Ibid., 259-260; Investigations, 214; see also Kauder, ed., Carl Mengers Zusätze, 21ff. for his support for free will 
and rejection of T.H. Buckle, the quintessential deterministic positivist writer. 
237 Menger, Grundsätze, ix; Principles, 48-49.  
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subjectively determined intentions—for instance, two individuals trading corn for horses 
according to their particular wants—some certain and objective knowledge can be gained from 
these data by identifying the typical features which arise out of them—for instance, diminishing 
marginal utility and the range of values within which trades will occur. 
  We may conclude, therefore, that Menger’s aim as a social scientist was ultimately the 
complete and certain explanation not of the entire human world but of any given situation, where 
subjectively determined human purposes and contingent individual life histories and needs 
remained the essential “given” factor.
238 He pursued the development of exact theory in 
particular because he believed that if it were developed not only in economics but in all the other 
sciences bearing on human life, it might be possible to achieve such certainty: not by 
exhaustively describing every feature of reality, but precisely by deploying one-sided viewpoints 
in order to yield understanding of the types and typical laws involved, and then by combining 
each one-sided viewpoint with the others.
239 But even if exact laws must abstract from some of 
the realistic assumptions which characterized Menger’s economics, such as incomplete 
rationality and information, they could not render the purposes of free-willed human beings 
endogenous; the latter were not capable of objective determination by theory.  This was a major 
reason why Menger could never view the task of economics as establishing a general equilibrium 
model of the entire economy along Walrasian lines; such a total system would require the 
elimination of subjective individual decisions as we saw above.  An economics which took 
subjectivity seriously could not make the assumption of “stable preferences,” in the modern 
locution—preferences, or really, “wants,” could change at any time,
240 and it was the task of 
                                                 
238 Menger, Untersuchungen, 264; Investigations, 217-218. 
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240 See his acceptance of this contention from Knies, in Kauder, ed., Carl Mengers Zusätze, 42.   
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economic analysis to address their effects in given instances.
241 Erich Streissler once suggested 
that this sort of subjectivism in Menger “meant that he eschewed deriving concrete results. He 
was content to show all the manifold dimensions of causation in the economic field. In his view 
the final outcome of all these forces at work could not be fully described.” While this was true of 
Menger’s analysis of the economy as a whole, and has obvious bearing on the adequacy of 
Menger’s hopes for the predictive capacity of the sum-total of all exact sciences, Streissler’s 
final judgment that as a result “he ended in doubt” is not accurate.
242  He ended instead with a 
tool for analyzing given situations: a tool very useful for interpretive social science, and one 
quite similar to that used in Weber’s work, with its attempt to explain particular social and 
economic formations generated by a combination of human subjective intentions and material 
conditions on the basis of theoretical types.
243 
  Of course, recognition of free will and acknowledgement of the importance of subjective 
decision-making are not at all equivalent to value subjectivism, the doctrine that there are no 
objective or rationally decidable grounds for preferring one set of values or goals to another.  
One could easily posit both free will and an objective moral law with morally deliberating agents 
whose mental states and intentionality must be taken into account by social scientific 
explanation. But Menger did make the shift from taking human subjectivity seriously to value 
subjectivism, and thence to value-freedom. 
 
                                                 
241 See especially Oakley, Foundations of Austrian Economics, 60; I concur with his interpretation of Menger’s 
occasional locutions implying more biologically-based “objective” wants and needs: they are not in fact objectively 
given by nature but are rather a function of the individual’s contingent total history, including previous subjective 
decisions as well as biology. In other words, they can only appear objective once they are taken as “givens” in a 
particular situation, not in any absolute sense. For more on the subjectivity of wants in the context of value, see 
immediately below. 
242 Erich Streissler, “To What Extent Was the Austrian School Marginalist?” 174-175. 
243 Compare Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 5
th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1982), 45-46, on the 
confusion of lawfulness with determinedness in assessing human action.  
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b)  Value, Value-Freedom and the Problem of Objective Knowledge 
 
Like the other figures considered in this dissertation, Menger came to regard human 
valuations as having no rationally grounded basis which would serve as compelling one value 
choice over another, and we must begin by showing that he held this view more or less 
consistently.  The only variety of the phenomenon “value” which Menger explicitly discussed in 
his writings was, not surprisingly, economic value, and it is his views on this subject which 
provide the basis for concluding that he was a value subjectivist. 
In the theory of economic value, the terms of discussion for the nineteenth century had 
been set by the various “objectivist” stances of classical political economy in Britain, against 
which a number of German economists would react before Menger adopted their views.  In 
explaining exchange value, despite their differences, the classical economists had broadly 
preferred to argue that the proper (“real” or “natural”) measure of a good’s value was objectively 
embodied in the good in the form of the various costs which were incurred to produce it—
whether these were analyzed as ultimately reducible to the amount of labor necessary (the labor 
theory of value) or whether they separately included the costs of ground rent or capital (a cost-of-
production theory).
244 While a good must be useful for exchange to occur, its utility or value-in-
use was not the determining factor. 
Although the paradoxes and difficulties caused by the labor theory of value in particular 
troubled British political economy in the first part of the nineteenth century, German academic 
economists took an entirely different path.  In a series of important papers, Streissler 
demonstrated that a longstanding tradition of subjective value theory preexisted Menger in 
Germany, and that economists in this tradition had in fact already evolved all of the elements 
                                                 
244 Amidst a sea of literature on the topic, see Spiegel, Growth of Economic Thought, 248-50, 320-22.  
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associated with the later Austrian theory of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser, including 
diminishing marginal utility, the equimarginal principle, and the idea of opportunity cost.
245 
While the evidence that marginalism was not “new” in 1871 is important, the only issue relevant 
here is the subjectivist tradition.  Beginning as early as 1807 with Gottlieb Hufeland’s Neue 
Grundlegung der Staatswirthschaftskunst, mainstream textbook writers had argued that goods 
“are only goods by virtue of the mind-picture which one man or several men make themselves of 
them” and that “Value [is] a relationship between all goods in human consciousness…[it is] 
predominantly of a subjective nature.”
246 Even before Ricardo, in Hufeland’s case, and 
subsequently in opposition to the Ricardian labor theory version of objective value theory, which 
it became “standard German practice” to attack, these subjectivist writers aimed to replace the 
“cost-of-production theory of value by a price theory mainly geared towards demand.”
247 
Demand was conceived in terms of utility or value-in-use (treated synonymously), and trade 
could generate as much value, subjectively conceived, as production.
248 Subjectivism meant in 
this context: that value depended entirely on the mental assessment of personal wants and needs 
when an agent was confronted with any social fact or situation, a subjective judgment as to 
whether it constituted a good (or service) and if so how to measure it against others, and much 
historical variety in valuation even in the case of such apparently “objective” needs as food and 
shelter.
249 These positions were very well known to Menger, which explains his attempt to 
associate himself with the German tradition in economics at the end of the preface to the 
                                                 
245 Erich Streissler, “Die Wurzeln der ‘ￖsterreichischen Schule’ der Nationalökonomie in der detuschen 
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246 Streissler, “Influence of German Economics,” 42-43, quoting Hufeland and Albert Schäffle respectively. 
247 Ibid., 41, 47. 
248 Ibid.,  43, 47. 
249 Milford, “Carl Menger und die Urspr￼nge der ￖsterreichischen Schule,” 26-27.  
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Grundsätze, and why he could see himself as sharing with such figures as Roscher and Knies a 
common subjectivist stance against the British classical economists.
250  
Nonetheless, the continuity between the economists of this tradition and Menger can be 
exaggerated.  While they accepted the idea that valuation was subjective in the sense of requiring 
reference to human perceptions of wants or needs, instead of being a function of external things 
(quantities of labor or long-run costs), these earlier figures did not suggest that value was 
subjective in the sense of being founded on no more than an “arbitrary” individual decision or 
preference.  After Hufeland, most of the economists in this German tradition coupled their 
subjective theories of value with a methodological collectivism that saw individuals as parts of a  
national or cultural whole.
251 Their interest lay not in an assessment of “market allocation on the 
basis of individual valuations” but in the relationship of the economic phenomena of the market 
on the one hand and those governed by the quasi-cameralist, order-providing state on the other; 
and above all, they presented economic valuation within a moral context purporting to objective 
validity rather than as a function of arbitrary individual preferences.
252 
As for Menger himself, he shared their subjectivism
253 but took it farther by promoting a 
focus on the individual over the collective as the locus of meaningful action, as we saw above, 
                                                 
250 Grundsätze, x; Principles, 49; for further documentation of Streissler’s claim for Menger’s continuity with this 
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Nationalökonomie: K.H. Rau, F.B.W. von Hermann, B. Hildebrand, G.W.F. Hegel und A. Wagner,” in Priddat, 
Wert, Meinung, Bedeutung,  249-250. 
253 Wieser suggested on the basis of long personal acquaintance that Menger’s activity as a journalist reporting on 
economic conditions had sensitized him to the importance of the subjective perceptions of the usefulness of goods in  
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and by rejecting the tie between economic value and any moral order.
254  Like the German 
tradition, he defined value in terms of human wants as “the importance that individual goods or 
quantities of goods attain for us because we are conscious of being dependent on command of 
them for the satisfaction of our wants.”
255 He then repeatedly stated that value was attributed by 
human beings to objects on the basis of the objects’ relation to subjectively perceived wants, 
rather than inhering in the objects themselves or in the labor that went into producing them.
256 In 
a passage worth quoting at length for the clarity with which it reveals his value subjectivism, 
Menger wrote: 
 
“Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. It is a 
judgment economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their 
lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men. It is, therefore, also quite 
erroneous to call a good that has value to economizing individuals a ‘value,’ or for economists to speak of ‘values’ 
as of independent real things, and to objectify value in this way. For the entities that exist objectively are always 
only particular things or quantities of things, and their value is something fundamentally different from the things 
themselves…. Objectification of the value of goods, which is entirely subjective in nature, has nevertheless 
contributed very greatly to confusion about the basic principles of our science.”
257 
 
Such a view was obviously at odds with the labor theory of value, which Menger 
explicitly rejected on several occasions, noting also the obvious facts that highly valued objects 
                                                                                                                                                             
fulfilling personal wants or needs, and to the way in which the value of additional units of a good diminished with 
increasing quantities: Wieser, “Karl Menger,” 89. Perhaps this was the case, although there is no textual evidence 
for it. 
254 Israel Kirzner, “Introduction,” in Kirzner, ed., Classics in Austrian Economics, Vol. 1 (London: Pickering, 1995), 
xv, rightly stresses that Menger went much farther in his subjectivism than the economists in the tradition recalled 
by Streissler: from a subjective theory of value to a subjectivist economic theory more broadly. 
255 Menger, Grundsätze, 78; Principles, 115. “…[M]an,” he wrote, “with his needs and his command of the means to 
satisfy them, is himself the point at which human economic life both begins and ends.” Ibid., 69; Principles, 108. 
256 E.g., ibid., 81, 87, 107, 119; Principles, 116, 122, 139, 145. 
257 Ibid., 86; Principles, 120-121.  
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might well be attained with no labor at all, while immense amounts of labor might be deployed 
in producing others which would attain no value at all in the absence of scarcity.
258 
  But value not only did not inhere in labor or any other “objective” cost for goods; at its 
base, it was subjective in the sense of being arbitrarily chosen by different individuals.  Different 
individuals might easily assess the same good as being highly worthwhile or utterly worthless, he 
wrote; “Goods always have ‘value’ to certain economizing individuals and this value is also 
determined only by these individuals.”
259 Such assessments were, in the last analysis, arbitrary 
matters, although once the valuation had been ascertained by an individual, it could function as a 
set and determinate data point. “Our wants, at any rate in part, at least as concerns their origin, 
depend upon our wills or on our habits. Once the wants have come into existence, however, there 
is no further arbitrary element in the value goods have for us….”
260 Such a view was not capable 
of being unified with a theory of value that saw it as one part of an objective moral order, and 
Menger certainly did not advocate the latter.  There was no supra-individual “species” of goods 
useful to all human beings as such, a notion that was part of the older economists’ moral order; 
this kind of value, he noted in response to Hildebrand, “has no real existence…. For value arises 
only in the individual and for him only with respect to concrete quantities of a good.”
261 And he 
at least implied the out-datedness of ethical or religious conceptions of economic phenomena by 
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suggesting that these were characteristic of ancient and medieval approaches to economics rather 
than that of “present-day science.”
262 
  It must be acknowledged that there are passages in the Grundsätze which provide the 
possibility of a less subjectivist reading, and it has certainly been suggested that Menger was not 
entirely consistent in his commitment to subjectivism.
263  For instance, he notes the existence of 
a class of goods – what he calls “imaginary goods” – that  cannot satisfy needs even though 
agents believe that they can (such as primitive medicines), and he notes that through stupidity, 
ignorance or error, agents may act to pursue short-term pleasure rather than long-term welfare.
264 
Here Menger seems concerned not to outline real “objective” needs so much as to question 
whether goods or actions which people choose to pursue will in fact satisfy such needs once the 
latter are (subjectively) determined.  It may readily be acknowledged that he devoted interest and 
attention to the necessity of certain real material needs for the biological continuance of life.
265 
Even in this case, however, he later suggested that the very continuation of life could not be 
assumed to be a universally valued goal. 
  These considerations raise the question of whether Menger’s value subjectivism extended 
beyond the limited domain of the economy.  Was it only the valuation of goods which was 
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affected, or did he think that human values more generally were equally subjective? Menger did 
not address such questions directly.  In the Untersuchungen, he matter-of-factly embraced 
historical relativism, noting the obvious “relativity of social institutions and normative laws”: 
regulations and laws, customs, institutions, and so forth were appropriate to their respective 
times and places, and might easily vary accordingly.
266  Economic policy proposals and opinions 
make claim merely to “local” truth, as it were.
267 But such views were not necessarily 
subjectivist, and unlike Weber, Jellinek, or Radbruch, for instance, Menger gave no indication of 
moving from historical relativism to an antinomian view of unavoidable value-conflict.  Still, 
two considerations make it likely on balance that he held to some form of value subjectivism 
beyond the sphere of economic goods.  First, he hardly limited his consideration of the activity of 
valuation to material commodities or business services; if economics for Menger was not yet the 
“science of choice,” it nonetheless explicitly included many goals, relationships, and intangibles 
among the objects of economizing agents,
268 and like material goods these possessed no intrinsic 
value but received their value in the same way as the others, based on subjective considerations 
at the margin. Secondly, for Menger, the sciences could not pronounce upon values or ends, a 
position that was really only explicable on the assumption of value subjectivism, the topic to 
which we next turn.
269 
To recapitulate: we have established above that the starting point of economic analysis 
for Menger must be the decisions of individual economic actors, which are the outcomes of their 
wants and their beliefs about how to satisfy these wants through goods.  These wants and beliefs 
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were subjective in the sense that they required reference to the mental states of individuals rather 
than to purely external behaviors or attributes of goods.  We have now shown that Menger 
believed that human valuation of the objects or ends of action is subjective in the additional 
sense of being “rationally ungrounded.” Consequently, the task of economic science was to start 
from the inherently subjective judgments of value made by economic agents, whose 
“correctness” could not be assessed or made the subject of knowledge, and to analyze their 
outcomes when translated into actions, in a way that would yield knowledge of some degree of 
certainty, depending on the exactness of the types and laws used in the attempt at explanation.  
When his value subjectivism was added to it, Menger’s view of theoretical economics as we 
discussed it above in section a) thus helped lead him to the principal manifestations of his 
commitment to value-freedom: the separation of theory and practice, and the rejection of the idea 
of a normative science through the limitation of scientific analysis to consideration of means 
instead of ends. 
From his earliest work at the beginning of the 1870s, there were indications that Menger 
was committed not only to the idea of an economics which does not explain freely selected 
human ends themselves, but to the idea that science cannot justify ends.  Menger expressed 
skepticism about the idea of a normative “moral” science already in the Grundsätze, even if such 
skepticism was not yet a developed doctrine or a central preoccupation.  As he wrote in a long 
footnote to his discussion of returns to land, labor, and capital in the analysis of value in higher 
order goods, “Among the strangest questions ever made the subject of scientific debate is 
whether rent and interest are justified from an ethical point of view or whether they are 
‘immoral.’ Among other things, our science has the task of exploring why and under what 
conditions the services of land and of capital display economic character, attain value, and can be  
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exchanged for quantities of other economic goods (prices). But it seems to me that the question 
of the legal or moral character of these facts is beyond the sphere of our science.”
270 The “facts” 
were all that economics pronounced upon; one could not dispute the real existence of rent and 
interest, nor of the fact that they might sometimes provide a higher return to an owner of land or 
capital during a given period than the wages a worker might receive for labor in the same period.  
Menger did not claim that such facts were inevitable or unchangeable, only that without “a 
complete transformation of our social relations,” those who felt they were immoral would 
nonetheless have to acknowledge their reality under the present order.
271 
As he began to consider methodological questions in a more intensive manner in the early 
1870s after the publication of the Grundsätze, Menger’s notes on his reading interspersed into 
the special “author’s copy” of that work indicate familiarity with, and acceptance of, some earlier 
economists’ views on the relevant limitations of political economy.
272  He seems to have been 
particularly persuaded by the formulations of J.E. Cairnes and Pellegrino Rossi, an Italian 
economist who succeeded to J.-B. Say’s chair in Paris before being assassinated in Rome in 
1848.  In notes on the “object [and] boundaries of science,” Menger cited pages of the Italian’s 
Cours d’économie politique, which carried the remark that “La science, quel qu’en soit l’object, 
n’est que la possession de la v￩rit￩…. La conaissance d’un certain ordre de v￩rit￩s, tel est l’objet, 
le but particulier d’une science; le moyen, c’est la recherch￩ de ces v￩rit￩s à l’aide de la 
méthode. La science n’est pas chargée de faire quelque chose.”
273 He interpreted the preliminary 
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discourse in Say’s Traité as being “against [the] ethical standpoint” in its view of the task of 
economics.
274 More directly, Menger wrote approvingly following his reading of Cairnes’ Essays 
in Political Economy, “[t]hat political economy is a wholly neutral science, neither socialist-of-
the-chair nor free-trader, nor communistic,” and he copied out Cairnes’ statement that “Whatever 
takes the form of a plan aiming at definite practical ends… is no science.”
275 
The first published comments in which Menger directly addressed the purported 
normativity of social science came in the Untersuchungen a decade later.  Here, treating “the so-
called ethical orientation of political economy” to which he suggested a majority of historical 
economists in Germany adhered, Menger argued “that we cannot rationally speak of an ethical 
orientation of theoretical economics either in respect to the exact orientation of theoretical 
research or to the empirical-realistic orientation.”
276 In part this was so simply for definitional 
reasons: an exact economic theory could not consider non-economic motives and remain exact, 
since its entire purpose was to consider “single sides of the real world” in isolation from others, 
while realistic-empirical theory already considered ethical impulses in human beings alongside 
the other regularities in their conduct from its more probabilistic perspective.
277  Nothing was 
gained thereby from referring to an “ethical” science, if the latter meant a positive (non-
                                                                                                                                                             
Science is not tasked with doing anything else.” Quotation, with italics added, from Pellegrino Rossi, Cours 
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277 Ibid., 288-290; Investigations, 235-36. Emphasis in original.  
128 
 
normative) form of economic theory which took ethical motives into account.  Nor did it make 
sense to refer to the practical science of economic policy
278 as an “ethical science.” Here, too, 
while any policy advice must account for the fact that human actions are shaped by ethical codes, 
customs, and laws, unless such actions were explicitly subordinated to ethical considerations 
alone, the label of an “ethical” science would be inappropriate, and in the latter case would in 
fact constitute an instance of ethical writings about the economy, not economics at all.  Perhaps, 
Menger speculated rather unkindly, the introduction of this inaccurate label had its origins in the 
desire of some scholars to bring loftier sentiments and topics into their works on such a 
supposedly base subject as economics, which would bring them greater prestige.
279 
More importantly for our purposes, Menger explicitly rejected not only the inaccurate 
label of “ethical science” but the idea of a normative science itself as outdated and wrong. 
“The desire for an ethical orientation of our science is in part a residue of a philosophy that 
comes from antiquity,” he wrote, “and, in a different sense, of medieval-ascetic philosophy. In 
good part, however, it is a lamentable crutch for scientific insufficiency, just as in its day the 
ethical orientation of historical writing was.”
280 Those who claimed to practice it saw their task 
as being one of judging which goods are “true” goods, and what prices, incomes, and so forth 
were to be considered as “morally objectionable” by economics itself.  “In this, however, as 
scarcely needs to be noted, there is no ethical orientation of economic research, but a moral 
judgment on single phenomena of national economy. This judgment in no way can touch the 
results of theoretical research in the field of national economy. Any ever so ‘untrue’ or ‘immoral’ 
good is subject to the economic laws of value, of price, etc., and is thus from the economic 
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standpoint a ‘good’ whose value, price, etc. must be interpreted theoretically just as well as the 
value or price of goods serving the highest purposes.” Even if economics dispensed with 
considering purportedly “immoral” goods or phenomena, some other science would have to 
consider them, since they would continue to exist as facts requiring explanation—and in fact, of 
course, no other science could be better suited to explain them than economics.
281 
Menger’s views cannot be dismissed as polemical attacks on the historical economists or 
the advocates of social reform.  In addition to the fact that they applied equally to theorists who 
adopted the “ethical” label—such as Adolf Wagner, who would in fact support Menger in the 
Methodenstreit with regard to the inadequacy of historical method alone
282—Menger clearly 
extended the criticism to those who saw economics as directly entailing either socialism or 
laissez-faire.  Despite his own economic liberalism and personal preference for a free market, he 
took from Cairnes the conclusion “[t]hat the principle of Laissez faire has no scientific basis… 
[and] (is only a practical principle to which there are many exceptions),” which may have been 
the reason why he also disagreed with Cairnes on attributing “the spirit of the positive 
philosophy” to the liberal economists Turgot and Ricardo.
283 In his notes in the 1870s, he linked 
doctrinaire laissez-faire (in the person of Frédéric Bastiat) and socialism as equally unscientific: 
“Bastiat on the one hand and the socialists on the other do not want to represent or explain 
things, respectively, as they are; rather, they chase after practical purposes and the first [i.e. 
Bastiat] wants to justify the facts (that is no scientific problem).  The latter present them as 
glaring injustices; hence their falsification of the facts, to say nothing of their laws! Bastiat wants 
to fuse together the fundamentally different views [Anschauungen] of ‘fact’ and ‘law,’ ‘that 
                                                 
281 Ibid., 289, n. 158; Investigations, 236, n. 158. 
282 Grimmer-Solem, Rise of Historical Economics, 277-278. 
283 Kauder, ed., Carl Mengers Zusätze, 6; 5.  
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which is’ and ‘that which should be.’ That is a false method (socialists of the chair and free 
traders in Germany!).”
284 
Claims to “moral” science or to the direct support for particular moral-political doctrines 
were thus baseless in Menger’s view, and involved several related confusions.  The most 
important of these confusions were those between Is and Ought (“‘that which is’ and ‘that which 
should be’”) and, above all, between theory and practice.  Here too the difference between 
Menger and Schmoller was not that Menger rejected the importance of questions of practice in 
economics, any more than he rejected the use of history, or empiricism.  It was, rather, that he 
objected to the historical economists’ tendency to mix practical questions together with theory 
and to refuse to differentiate them from it.  Menger was sensitized to such problems in the case 
of the theory/practice distinction already in the early 1870s.  The few methodological remarks in 
the preface to the Grundsätze contained a warning against mistaking the subject matter 
appropriate to economic theory: it was not rules for practical activity but the conditions under 
which such activity will take place in providing for human wants.
285  He took note of what he 
described as Rossi’s strictures “against ethical admixtures” and “commingling politics with pure 
economics,” as well as the Italian’s clear distinction between “Econ. pol. rationelle (pure) et. Ec. 
pol. appliqu￩e.”
286 A quotation he copied out in full from Rossi sheds light on his subsequent 
concerns over the historical economists’ confusion of history with theory, and theory with 
practice, in the attempt to consider all questions as part of one single scholarly activity: “Nous ne 
                                                 
284 Ibid., 9. To which he added the ultimate insult: “Bastiat is a lawyer.” 
285 Menger, Grundsätze, ix; Principles, 48. 
286 Kauder, ed., Carl Mengers Zusätze, 4; 7; 5. In another passage within the pages Menger read, though one he did 
not quote directly, Rossi stated that political economy, morals, and politics “se touchent, mais ne se confondent 
pas,” Cours d’économie politique, 16 (that is, these fields abut but are not to be confused with each other).  
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croyons pas que ce soit un moyen d’apporter la lumi￨re que de supprimer l’analyse et de faire de 
toutes les sciences morales et politiques un pêle-m￪le [etc.].”
287 
In the 1880s, this “p￪le-m￪le” formed the central complaint Menger made about 
economics under the hegemony of the historical-ethical school: the latter called for a “universal 
science of the economy” which would “reject separation [of the various areas of economics] in 
presentation [Darstellung], although such a separation would in no way destroy the inner 
coherence of each. They even stigmatize this separation as a step backward, as ‘an unnatural 
dismemberment of an intrinsically coherent material.’”
288 In fact, it was the mixing together of 
several quite separate scientific activities that was regressive.  “Just as great an error concerning 
the nature of theoretical economics and its position in the sphere of social sciences [as that of 
confusing theory with history] is perpetrated by those who confuse it with economic policy, who 
confuse the science of the general nature and connection of economic phenomena with the 
science of the maxims for the practical direction and advancement of economy,” Menger wrote. 
Much like Nassau Senior and Cairnes among the English economists, he suggested that this was 
analogous to identifying chemistry with chemical technology, or physiology and anatomy with 
therapy and surgery: a confusion so basic that it was difficult to understand its persistence.
289 
Probably it was a function of the undeveloped state of economics as a science: “Theoretical 
knowledge has everywhere developed only gradually from practical judgments and with the 
growing need for a deeper scientific substantiation of practice. Theoretical knowledge in the field 
of economy has also taken this course of development. It, too, had originally only the character 
                                                 
287 Ibid., 5. 
288 Menger, “Grundz￼ge,” 192-193; “Systematic Classification,” 7. See further his insistence that it was this 
confusion, which explicitly included that between theory and practice, that set Menger apart from the historical-
ethical school, and not “the use of history and statistics as foundational ancillary sciences”: “Grundz￼ge,” 193; 
“Systematic Classification,” 8. 
289 Menger, Untersuchungen, 19; Investigations, 46.  
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of an occasional motivating of practical maxims, and by nature there still adhere to it traces of 
this origin and of its previous subordination to economic policy.”
290 The other more developed 
(natural) sciences, too, had followed this path and turned from it in their growing maturity, as 
economics still needed to do.
291 The only impediment to economics’ achievement of maturity as 
a science was in fact the historical-ethical school’s “error” in “regarding the union of economic 
theory and applied economics, rather than their separation, as progress and even as a 
methodological postulate. Actually, our efforts should be directed towards furthering the separate 
treatment of the theoretical and the practical, since this is of the greatest importance for the 
development of our science.”
292 
What, then, would a properly disentangled view of theory and practice involve? For 
Menger, it certainly did not involve the rejection of practical concerns as matters for scientific 
consideration, and there was no suggestion that science was a matter of pure theory.  “I would 
especially like to hold that all the sciences, whether they be theoretical or practical, exhibit the 
same status—the latter no less than the former,” he insisted against Schmoller in his 1884 
polemic.
293 The notion of a practical science was a perfectly legitimate one; indeed, it formed the 
final division of Menger’s taxonomy of the sciences in addition to the individualizing and 
generalizing sciences we have examined.
294 The practical sciences were no mere “cookbooks” or 
collections of “recipes,” as some of the historical economists he opposed had suggested—simply 
heaps of advice on specific topics.
295 Nor were they theoretical sciences manquées, simply 
                                                 
290 Ibid., 20; Investigations, 46-47. See also Anhang (Appendix) III generally. 
291 Menger, “Grundz￼ge,” 194; “Systematic Classification,” 9. 
292 Ibid., 194/9; see also Untersuchungen, 21, 94-95; Investigations, 47, 98-99, on the mistake of believing that there 
could be a single universal “method” to accomplish both tasks and the need for a “strict separation.” 
293 Menger, Die Irrthümer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie (Vienna: Hölder, 1884), 56. As has 
often been remarked, this polemic has little substantive content and adds nothing to the Untersuchungen. 
294 E.g., Untersuchungen, 7-10; Investigations, 38-40; “Grundz￼ge,” 199-200; “Systematic Classification,” 14. 
295 Menger, “Grundz￼ge,” 202; “Systematic Classification,” 17.   
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waiting for greater rigor.
296 Instead, the task of the practical division of economic science was to 
“research and present the principles of purposeful action [zum zweckmässigen Handeln], for 
purposeful intervention in events [Erscheinungen: also, ‘phenomena’]” as the specific conditions 
of the case required.
297 Or, as he had put it in the Untersuchungen, “The practical economic 
sciences finally are supposed to instruct us on the basic principles according to which the 
economic designs of people (according to conditions) can be most suitably fulfilled,” and 
included the divisions of economic policy for collective national purposes, and of the science of 
finance and the science of private economy for individual actors (but including governments in 
the former category).
298 In order to fulfill this role, the practical sciences necessarily depended on 
the guidance of the theoretical sciences in identifying the factual constraints that would be faced 
in the pursuit of particular purposes, to the extent that Menger could write that the theoretical 
branch “forms the basis of practical sciences.”
299 He observed that practical sub-disciplines 
within economics, like other practical sciences, did not depend just on economic theory, but on 
the results of multiple theoretical disciplines; however, it was clear that economic theory 
provided the main foundation.
300 
  Menger was not a Kantian, and it has been suggested that the distinction between Is and 
Ought, far from being at the center of his commitment to value-freedom, was rejected by him.
301 
Nonetheless, Menger did draw the distinction between Is and Ought, positive and normative, and 
he connected it with his distinction between theory and practice.  Near the beginning of the 
                                                 
296 Menger, Irrthümer, Eleventh Letter passim. 
297 Ibid., 57. The word “zweckmässig” used in both cases here connotes not just purposive action but action directed 
appropriately towards fulfilling purposes. 
298 Menger, Untersuchungen, 255-256; Investigations, 210-11. 
299 Ibid., 26, 257; Investigations, 51, 212; Irrthümer, 58. 
300 Ibid., 256-257 n.143; Investigations, 211 n.143. 
301 Nau, “Zwei ￖkonomien,” 24. At four paragraphs, this is the longest discussion of Menger’s views on value-
freedom in the literature. However, Nau’s equation of value-freedom with a positivistic perspective and claim that 
Menger rejected the distinction between Sein and Sollen vitiate the discussion in this important survey.  
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Untersuchungen, he identified the difference between the practical sciences and their historical 
and theoretical counterparts as one of positive and normative claims.  The “nature” of practical 
sciences “is essentially different” from the other two branches in that “sciences of this type do 
not make us aware of phenomena, either from the historical point of view or from the theoretical; 
they do not at all teach us what is. Their task is rather to determine the basic principles by which, 
according to the diversity of conditions, efforts of a definite kind can be most suitably pursued. 
They teach us what should be, according to the conditions, for definite human aims to be 
achieved.”
302 He also credited Roscher with drawing the Is/Ought distinction (although in a way 
that does not proceed to contrast practice with theory along Menger’s lines), and called attention 
to the mistakes that can arise in separating theory and practice when a single term, such as “law,” 
contains both normative and positive uses that become confused in scholars’ presentations.
303 
H.H. Nau’s interpretation, that Menger rejected the distinction between Is and Ought, is based 
upon a specific comment Menger made in response to the position represented by Brentano, 
which we analyzed above.
304  Menger was concerned by the historical economists’ treatment of 
the practical sciences as mere catalogues of predetermined, abstract prescriptions that failed to 
take individual nations’ circumstances into account.  The argument he represented as the reason 
for their rejection of the practical sciences was that “[i]t is the task of science to be concerned 
solely with the Is and not with the Ought.  Science has to teach us what was, what is, and how it 
                                                 
302 Menger, Untersuchungen, 7; Investigations, 38. 
303 Ibid., 96; Investigations, 99. 
304 Brentano had not yet published the essay we discussed above at the time of Menger’s writing in 1889, but his 
general position was known to Menger on the basis of his 1889 inaugural lecture at Leipzig, which Menger cites. 
Strictly speaking, Menger does not name any particular historical economist in this passage, leaving the attribution 
vague. However, he considers Brentano’s views at some length in the following sections, and none of the other 
historical economists had—to my knowledge—adopted the Is/Ought distinction as a means of rejecting 
“Manchesterite” prescriptions for the economy.  
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has come to be, but not what ought to be.”
305 That is, in his description of this view, the 
appropriate task of economics in general was to offer “a mere description of what was and what 
is, i.e. by ‘economic history and especially a record of the outcome of the attempts that have 
hitherto been made to improve economic conditions.’”
306 This was Brentano’s position, 
employing the distinction between Is and Ought to rule out the traditional, theory-based laissez-
faire prescriptions, while suggesting that a neutral historical description of what was done in the 
past could yield the obvious conclusions for proper social policy today, thereby unsubtly 
smuggling an Ought back in.  Menger responded that the practical sciences had a separate 
function and separate cognitive goals from the historical and theoretical sciences, and that they 
could never rely entirely on past experience to serve their function.
307 Clearly, this was not a 
rejection of the validity of the distinction between Is and Ought, but only a dismissal of the idea 
that discussion of past experience would suffice for providing practical guidance in the ever-
changing present.
308  Indeed, Menger clarified his statement in a footnote, which contains the 
most concise treatment of his position on value-freedom in all of his methodological work: 
In view of what has been said above, it is hardly necessary to observe that the applied sciences do not force upon us 
any absolute Ought, but that they only teach us the way in which certain generally determined ends can be attained 
in the light of our judgment at a particular time and insofar as we want to attain them at all. The applied sciences do 
not contain…a command to pursue any aims in particular. They merely show us how we have to act (or, if one will, 
how we ought to act!), on the basis of our judgment at a particular time, if we want to attain a given end; whereas it 
is the historical, the morphological, and the theoretical sciences that provide us with knowledge of the past and the 
present and of the nature of phenomena and their interrelations. 
 
                                                 
305 Menger, “Grundz￼ge,” 206; “Systematic Classification,” 20. Note that the original English translation wrongly 
replaces “Is” and “Ought” (Sein and Sollen) with “fact” and “value,” terms which Menger does not use here. 
306 Ibid., 207; “Systematic Classification,” 21. 
307 Ibid., 207; “Systematic Classification,” 21-22. 
308 Ibid., 208; “Systematic Classification,” 22.  
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It was this set of tasks, he concluded, which were entailed by the statement that the practical 
sciences “do not teach an Is but an Ought.”
309 
We have thus arrived via the theory/practice and Is/Ought distinctions at the limits, for 
Menger, of what social science can achieve in considering human values and actions based upon 
them.  Menger did not provide as comprehensive an account of the possible areas of non-
normative scientific analysis of values as Weber and others later would; he did not, for instance, 
point out that social scientists could well assess the internal consistency of particular value 
systems or the coherence of programs of action built upon them.  His focus was instead on the 
quintessential economic task of determining the most appropriate means to given ends.  This 
could and must be done situationally,
310 for although he implied that a given goal generally had 
one most “suitable” (or most “economical”) road to its attainment, this could not be prescribed 
concretely in advance by the practical sciences, and of course the usual impediments of error, 
volition and other influences must be acknowledged as operative to some degree in concrete 
situations.
311 It is important to observe, however, that his commitment to the theory/practice and 
Is/Ought distinctions alone could not deliver Menger to this position supportive of “value-free” 
social science, addressing values from the perspective of “instrumental” or means-ends 
rationality.  By themselves, either could have been merely a procedural injunction not to mix two 
legitimate tasks, and coupled with a purportedly objective ethical theory would not have required 
Menger to reject the idea of a normative science.  The hidden premise was and must have been 
his value subjectivism: although he did not make it explicit in his arguments about the 
appropriate tasks of the practical sciences, only the subjectivist premise can explain why 
practical goals and other “Oughts” must be treated as givens.   
                                                 
309 Ibid., 206 n.1; “Systematic Classification,” 36, n. 16. Note that the emphasis is Menger’s. 
310 Ibid., 216 n.1; “Systematic Classification,” 38 n.27. 
311 Menger, Untersuchungen, 264; Investigations, 217-18.  
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Let us recapitulate once more.  We have shown that according to Menger, social science 
recognized the necessity of taking human values and goals, seen as rationally groundless and 
“arbitrarily” willed, as basic data for analysis alongside the external reality of actions, events, 
and institutions.  To gain objective knowledge while still taking these data into account, these 
non-rational, “arbitrary” elements were to be treated as prerequisites or givens for subsequent 
analysis.  Within the theoretical sciences, these elements served as the parameters of any 
empirical complex of actions or institutions to be explained by theory; and within the practical 
sciences they served as the “ends” for which the practical sciences were to provide guidance 
about the proper “means”—through the use of the full range of relevant findings of the 
theoretical sciences—for the concrete situation being analyzed.  While Menger had thereby 
explained how the practical sciences can legitimately avoid “contamination” by subjectivity, 
provided that they can rely on objective guidance from the theoretical sciences, it remains to be 
seen how he could guarantee the latter sciences’ objectivity.  Explanations of empirical reality 
by the theoretical sciences were only as objective as the theory itself, after all, and consequently 
the attempt to limit the subjective element to setting the parameters of the explanandum 
presupposed that such subjective elements had not entered into the origin of the theory or 
explanans.  We return therefore to the question of how theory arose for Menger (which we saw 
could not be inductive), and how he vouched for its objectivity.  Without such a guarantee, his 
“value-free” science commitment would remain at the level of a disambiguation of scientific 
tasks (into theory and practice) rather than a full theory of scientific knowledge. 
This was the form in which Menger faced the objectivity problem confronted by all the value-
freedom advocates in their attempt to domesticate human subjectivity for the house of science.   
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The following pages conclude our examination of Menger with a critical treatment of the ways in 
which his response could be formulated and defended. 
Menger did not use the word “objectivity” or its cognates to address this issue, but he did 
offer a justification of the certainty of theoretical economics, and by extension social science 
generally.  As we saw in the previous section, Menger suggested that theory avoided 
arbitrariness in considering the complex world by focusing on the recurrent forms in which 
phenomena appeared—quite definitely including subjective phenomena like the valuation of 
goods.  One could select features deemed important by virtue of the use of types, which would 
call attention to these recurrent general features or forms.  The claim to non-arbitrariness, and to 
certainty in the case of exact types, here obviously lay in the justification of the criterion by 
which such features were selected out of reality by the social scientist, and thus could be 
formulated as the question: what ensured the objectivity, or in Menger’s terms the certainty, of 
types? 
Menger had several possible options, and because he nowhere positively states his choice 
among these options we must eliminate two of them to focus on his answer.  First, his types 
could make their claim to certainty on the basis of a priori necessity.  A later Austrian economist 
strongly influenced by Menger and Weber, Ludwig von Mises, would become famous (or 
notorious) for taking this path: Mises’ science of human action, or “praxeology,” which he 
identified with economic theory, took as its starting point axiomatic claims about human action 
that were said to be the transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge of any action.  
The propositions of economic theory followed deductively, and consequently with certainty, 
from these necessary axioms, with no necessary reference to experience of the empirical  
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world.
312  Menger could have taken his exact types as axiomatic and necessary for the possibility 
of economic action, and thus justified the objectivity of economic theory deriving from them 
through deduction.
313  But Menger emphatically rejected a priorism—the “mistakes of aprioristic 
social philosophy,” as he referred to it, or the “aprioristic speculation in the sciences that have 
the real world for their object” from which we have rightly been “liberated” by the historicists.
314 
Even Menger’s exact theory relied on experience—on empiricism—and was not therefore a 
priori.
315 Besides, the a priori strategy in this form (in which a priori truths are purely analytic, 
or mere tautologous definitions) faced the more or less insuperable difficulty of bridging the 
necessary and certain thought-world of axiomatic deductions and the real world of experience, a 
problem that rendered Mises’ theory of action more or less a curiosity.
316 If they were not a 
priori, Menger could have regarded his types simply as heuristic devices designed to allow the 
scholar to determine the course of actual divergences from an ideal or model, as Weber’s types 
were, and not as a form of knowledge at all.  But no one has interpreted Menger as taking this 
approach either, and for good reason, as there is no textual basis for it. 
                                                 
312 The extensive and often inadequate literature on Mises is not directly relevant to this discussion; for 
consideration of Mises’ a priorism in partial connection with Menger’s, see Oakley, Foundations of Austrian 
Economics, 188-190, although note that Oakley advances a quasi-Aristotelian reading of Mises to supplement this 
broadly neo-Kantian reading. 
313 This appears to be Schmoller’s interpretation of Menger’s approach: Schmoller, “Methodologie der Staats- und 
Sozialwissenschaften,” 280. 
314 Menger, “Grundz￼ge,” 188, 206; “Systematic Classification,” 2, 21. See also Menger, Untersuchungen, 6-7 n.4; 
Investigations, 37n.4. 
315 Menger, “Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie,” 126n.4. See Menger’s clarification here of his terms 
“empirical” and “exact,” and insistence that these designations did not signify that the latter was unempirical, and 
that they differed in their “goals of knowledge” and not their “paths of knowledge,” both relying on experience for 
the latter. Bostaph, “Methodological Debate,” 12, is quite correct that Menger was not an apriorist. 
316 Barry Smith (“Aristotle, Menger, Mises,” 275-77, Austrian Philosophy, 305ff.) and Allen Oakley (Foundations 
of Austrian Economics, 42) have seen Menger as an apriorist who rejects the equation of the a priori with the 
analytic, holding open the possibility of a synthetic a priori along Aristotelian lines and thereby bridging thought 
and experience. They acknowledge that Menger saw the origins of exact types as empirical, even if they could be 
known through only one experience (rather than through induction). But I confess that I cannot see how this is 
reconcilable with the claim that Menger was an apriorist: one experience is still experience, and a priori truths are 
logically prior to experience. Uskali Mäki, “Universals and the Methodenstreit,” 490, would appear to agree.  
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Instead, Menger suggested that types and typical relations constituted real knowledge of 
the world gained empirically but not inductively
317: he refers to types of both kinds as 
“knowledge of empirical forms,” and his discussion of them is predicated on the assumption that 
human beings could know them in an immediate and commonsense way.
318  As Max Alter and 
others have noted, this apparently baseless assertion can be interpreted more “charitably” when 
we recognize that unlike so many other modern thinkers, Menger was a philosophical realist.
319 
That is, Menger regarded essences as really inhering in things rather than as being mere “names” 
or designations supplied by conceptual thought (as posited by philosophical nominalism); in this 
case, the essence of a particular economic phenomenon such as the rate of interest could simply 
be “read off” of any particular experience of it, since all instances of the phenomenon must 
exemplify its essential form. On this line of thinking, types were not arbitrary concepts deployed 
by the social scientist for understanding reality, because they were not concepts at all: they were 
the real essences inhering in things.  As Menger wrote, “Theoretical economics has the task of 
investigating the general nature and the general connection of economic phenomena, not of 
analyzing economic concepts and of drawing the logical conclusions resulting from this analysis. 
                                                 
317 For a very early instance of this viewpoint, dating to 1867, see the marginal note Menger made in K.H. Rau’s 
Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, published in mimeograph as: Menger, Carl Mengers Erster Entwurf zu 
seinem Hauptwerk ‘Grundsätze’: Geschrieben als Anmerkungen zu den ‘Grundsätzen der Volkswirthschaftslehre’ 
von Karl Heinrich Rau (Tokyo: Library of Hitotsubashi University, 1963), 16. 
318 Menger, Untersuchungen, 5; Investigations, 36, and passim. 
319 Alter, Carl Menger, 92. Menger did not discuss his basic philosophical stance, but it has been the subject of much 
research. The reasons for thinking that Menger was a realist owe to his apparent Aristotelianism, as documented by 
numerous scholars: Kauder, “Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School,” Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie 17:4 (1958), 411-425, esp. 414-15; Smith, “Aristotle, Menger, Mises,” 265-279; Alter, Carl 
Menger, 93-95, 112-121;  Campagnolo’s investigation of Menger’s reading of Aristotle based on archival evidence 
concentrates on economics rather than on the methodological or epistemological questions relevant here, in part 
because Menger’s copies of the relevant works of Aristotle are missing: Campagnolo, Criticisms of Classical 
Political Economy, 236-47,  250-53.  
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The phenomena, or certain aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the concepts, are the 
object of theoretical research in the field of economy.”
320 
There was not necessarily anything mystical about the idea: Menger’s realism was not of 
the Platonic kind that posited an eternal world of forms, but an immanent realism: essences were 
instantiated in real things, and only in real things, in the Aristotelian manner of a form given to 
matter.
321 Uskali Mäki has presented a persuasive, textually supported case for viewing Menger’s 
theory of exact types as a realist theory of universals, i.e., essential properties inhering in 
particulars and only in particulars, without any independent existence.  For instance, in the case 
of homo economicus: when taken as a universal, this type could not exist outside of real human 
individuals, but within them it was also one really existing “aspect” among many.  It could be 
thought of separately, through abstraction, but could never in fact appear in an isolated, pure 
form, and the thought of it was an instance of the universal rather than an imposed mental 
construct.
322 The realistic type in Menger’s writings could not be seen as strict universals owing 
to their particular elements, and Mäki suggests that they were instead generic instances of 
particulars.
323 The contrast with Weberian types is then apparent, as the latter are 1) not real; 2) 
conceptually imposed upon, rather than perceived in, reality; and 3) and designed instrumentally 
to show divergences between an ideal and a real particular, instead of constituting knowledge 
themselves.
324 Menger’s types did constitute such knowledge, and so, if the realist doctrine was 
                                                 
320 Menger, Untersuchungen, 6-7 n.4; Investigations, 37n.4, where he also specifically disputes the historical 
economists’ accusation that theorists play with arbitrarily determined concepts. 
321 Mäki, “Universals and the Methodenstreit,” 485. 
322 Ibid., 485-486. 
323 Mäki’s example will clarify this statement: “Think of money. This particular penny and the cheque book in my 
pocket now belong to the category of money. They are particular instances of money; they are money tokens. Coins 
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may be called generic instances of money.” These real types “embody both the general features of money and some 
of its more specific manifestations (though the individual or unique features of money particulars have been put 
aside.” Ibid., 479-480. 
324 Ibid., 483.  
142 
 
true, Menger would seem to have avoided the potential criticism that his selection criterion was 
arbitrary. 
However, quite apart from objections to realism from a nominalist perspective, such as 
how one really existing thing (the universal) could exist in multiple instances, there was nothing 
in realism itself to indicate that one could have incorrigible knowledge of essential properties 
like universals.
325 That is, even if there were in fact real essences which human beings could 
know, we could very well be mistaken in perceiving one, and the investigator’s preferences and 
biases might well interfere in the process of gaining such knowledge.  The way Menger 
attempted to head off this objection was to argue that exact theory “seeks to ascertain the 
simplest elements of everything real, elements which must be thought of as strictly typical just 
because they are the simplest.”
326 Thus, we would know that we have reached knowledge of 
actual universals—properties which are “strictly typical” with no admixture of the particular to 
them—when we have traced all phenomena to the simplest elements of which they are 
composed.  This analytic-compositive method, as it is sometimes called,
327 was the method 
Menger aimed to employ throughout his work; he wrote in the Grundsätze that “[w]e have 
endeavored to reduce the complex phenomena of human economic activity to the simplest 
elements that can still be subjected to accurate observation, to apply to these elements the 
measure corresponding to their nature, and constantly adhering to this measure, to investigate the 
manner in which the more complex economic phenomena evolve from their elements according 
to definite principles.”
328 
                                                 
325 As pointed out by Smith, “Aristotle, Menger, Mises,” 276-277. Realism as a doctrine makes no claims about the 
possibility of infallibility or incorrigibility in perceptions of universals, only about their potential intelligibility. 
326 Menger, Untersuchungen, 40; Investigations, 60. 
327 E.g., Alter, Carl Menger, 91. 
328 Menger, Grundsätze, vii; Principles, 46-47; see also Untersuchungen, 40-43, 77-78, 115; Investigations, 60-62, 
86, 112.  
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In Menger’s work, this took the form of methodological individualism, and proved a very 
fruitful method in examining markets and institutions arising from unplanned human actions.  
But, fruitful or not, it hardly answered the challenge.  First of all, it made no mention of realistic-
empirical types, which were certainly not strictly typical; the assumption that they represented 
generic forms of particulars may help clarify their difference from exact types but obviously 
bears no guarantee of objectivity with it.  This was a serious flaw, as these types allowed Menger 
to deal with many of the unavoidable complications introduced by subjectivity, uncertainty, time, 
error, and the other complications he rightly acknowledged as being important for social science 
to address.  His methodological work simply contains no defense of the ability of scholars to 
discover such types objectively, and any use of realistic-empirical theory (in explanation or in 
practical guidance) is thereby subject to charges of subjectivity or bias.  The exact approach itself 
employed the standard neoclassical idealized assumptions about full (relevant) information and 
self-interest in the case of economic man,
329 and if the realistic-empirical type was merely to be 
seen as a pragmatic stopgap with no objective grounding, Menger would need at least to have 
demonstrated some connection between his exact types and the “imperfect” elements of 
empirical reality for his “simplest elements” argument to salvage the realistic commitments of 
his economics. Precisely this connection was, however, never made.
330 
Second, even for exact types, the regress argument still threatens: precisely how do we 
know we have reached the “simplest elements”? Is the self-interested economizing individual 
really the simplest element to which conduct can be reduced or does the universal lie somewhere 
deeper? And how would we assess an alternative answer? We cannot test our exact theories 
based on such types against social reality because the latter is too complicated, involving the 
                                                 
329 Mäki, “Universals and the Methodenstreit,” 480. 
330 On this issue, see Jack Birner, “A Roundabout Solution to a Fundamental Problem in Menger’s Methodology and 
Beyond,” in Caldwell, ed., Carl Menger and His Legacy in Economics, 241-61, here 250-252.  
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interplay of countless other types and typical relations which are not yet known and perhaps 
never will be.
331 In the meantime, before all of the other exact sciences are developed to 
perfection, it will not be possible to test any one exact theory in any way, and we are left only 
with subjective conviction that we have truly discovered the universal properties or laws in 
question.  Multiple interpretations of the same events would prove possible.
332 Moreover, it is 
not even clear that Menger is correct in thinking that the “simplest elements,” even if discovered, 
would necessarily be “strictly typical” or universal in the first place.  Max Alter’s equation of the 
theory of knowledge in Aristotelian realism with Romantic-era hermeneutics, and the attempt to 
view Menger’s method as one of purely intuitive Verstehen, is not persuasive, but his argument 
that Menger failed to give sufficient reasons why his procedure amounted to more than 
introspection, operationally speaking at least, is acute.
333 
Finally, Menger’s attempt to finesse the problem of lawful knowledge of free-willed 
human agents—by locating the effects of willed action only at the level of the parameters for the 
explanation of a particular case—is not successful.  For the willfulness of human beings posed a 
challenge not only to scientific determination of ultimate ends, but also had an impact on their 
decisions about means in a way that rendered their activities fundamentally unpredictable and 
made the attempt to equate teleological connections (ends/means analysis) with causal 
connections invalid.
334  Menger attempted to defuse this objection by acknowledging that real 
                                                 
331 Menger, Untersuchungen, 54; Investigations, 69-70. 
332 See Oakley, Foundations of Austrian Economics, 81, for a critique of Menger’s claim to have discerned that 
“strictly typical” phenomena, once observed, must always occur under exactly the same conditions on any future 
occasion (e.g., strictly typical A and B are always followed by strictly typical C, once observed); Menger’s logic 
ignores that without omniscient perception of conditions, unobserved phenomenon Z might also be required for the 
causal connection, or that the same result C might be the result of X and Y unrelated to A and B. 
333 Alter, “What Do We Know About Menger?” in Caldwell, ed., Carl Menger and His Legacy in Economics, 313-
348, here 331-32; Alter, Carl Menger, 23-65, 97-99. 
334 Menger’s lifelong struggle with the relations between these two modes of thinking was reflected already in his 
attempts to conceive teleological connections as depending on causal connections in the 1860s and 1870s: see Carl 
Mengers Zusätze, 46; Carl Mengers Erster Entwurf, 5; he later decided in favor of the independence of teleology:  
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agents make errors, do not always act rationally to attain the best satisfaction of their needs, and 
can be creative in their responses, and then suggesting that to fault exact theory for not taking 
these deviations into account was analogous to faulting the exact natural sciences for ignoring 
the real impurity of what they modeled as “pure gold, pure hydrogen and oxygen,” and so 
forth.
335 But this was not an appropriate analogy, as Oakley has pointed out, since in the natural 
examples the “impurities” were still the result of determinate physical laws, even if they were 
difficult to measure, while in the social sciences, the assumption of free will broke with causal 
determination on principle and not just at the level of practical measurement.
336 Human 
subjectivity prevented not just the prediction of particular empirically given cases, but the 
construction of a completely certain exact theory in the first place. 
With exact theory thus vitiated, and with realistic-empirical theory ungrounded as to its 
objectivity, Menger was left without a successful solution to the objectivity problem.  His 
attempt to take subjective values into account while preserving the objectivity of social scientific 
knowledge was a major attempt to mediate between the historicist and positivist scientific 
traditions, and he was perhaps the first German-language economist to couple the doctrines of 
value subjectivism and value-freedom together in rejecting the idea of a normative science.  But 
he could not explain how the positive science with which he was left could generate results with 
universal validity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kiichiro Yagi, “Carl Menger and Historicism in Economics,” in Yagi, Austrian and German Economic Thought, 51-
52. 
335 Menger, Untersuchungen, 76-77, 259-61; Investigations, 85-86, 214-15. 
336 Oakley, Foundations of Austrian Economics, 71.  
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Chapter 3. 
Ferdinand Tönnies on the Subjectivity of Values and “Value-Free” Science 
 
On the morning of October 20th, 1910, Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) gave the opening 
lecture at the first meeting of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie—the German 
Sociological Society.  The delegates had informally assembled the evening before to hear a talk 
by another member of the DGS executive board, Georg Simmel, but Tönnies, as president of the 
new organization, had agreed to provide an official, programmatic statement to start the first 
session.  He fully intended to strike an irenic tone. The gathering included academics from many 
fields—economists, statisticians, historians, jurists, theologians, philosophers, anthropologists, 
and health specialists—and inevitably they had differing ideas about the nature of the new 
discipline of sociology.
1 Tönnies attempted to do justice to this diversity of views, and with one 
exception he avoided excluding particular approaches.  The exception, however, was telling: the 
Society was not to accept investigations intended to further a normative or political agenda.  
Whatever previous scholars may have done, “We leave all programs of the future, all social and 
political tasks, out of play,” remarked Tönnies. “Not because we despise them, but rather in 
consistency with scientific thought, because we note the difficulties of basing such ideas 
scientifically and for the time being consider them unconquerable; and because we also expect 
from those who have other opinions on this, for instance those representing ‘scientific socialism,’ 
that they will accept our setting the domain of sociology outside such controversial matters 
[Streitfragen] and demarcating it from them, in order to limit ourselves to the much more easily 
resolvable task of the objective knowledge of facts.” Perfect objectivity was doubtless 
                                                 
1 For a list of the 27 attendees, see Dirk Käsler, Die frühe deutsche Soziologie, 1909-1934, und ihre 
Entstehungsmilieus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984), 603.  
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unattainable, he added, but this did not invalidate the effort to be more objective rather than less. 
And at any rate, it was no business of the scholar to argue for one social policy rather than 
another: “As sociologists, we want to be concerned only with what is, not with what according to 
any particular viewpoint, on any particular grounds, should be.”
2 
  Here Tönnies stood foursquare with his brilliant and quarrelsome younger contemporary, 
Max Weber. It has long been conventional wisdom that the DGS was founded as a result of the 
so-called Werturteilsstreit or value judgment controversy sparked by Weber.  In his 
disappointment with the tendentiously political scholarship furthered by the Verein für 
Sozialpolitik, argued his widow and biographer Marianne in 1926, Weber had agreed with a 
number of his contemporaries on the desirability of founding a new organization which would 
further the purely scientific study of modern social problems without adding an “ethical-political 
emphasis.”
3 This interpretation has been challenged as misrepresenting the importance both of 
Weber and of the specific issue of freedom from value judgments; Otthein Rammstedt has 
pointed out that the DGS was founded before the official outbreak of the Werturteilsstreit later in 
1909, that its initial bylaws contained no mention of the postulate of value-freedom, which was 
added some months later without debate, and that other social scientists who were less engaged 
by the principle of value-free science were instrumental in its founding.
4 Whether or not this is 
                                                 
2 Ferdinand Tönnies, “Wege und Ziele der Soziologie,” in SSK II, 130. Problematically translated in Christopher 
Adair-Toteff, ed., Sociological Beginnings: The First Conference of the German Society for Sociology (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2005), 62. Here as elsewhere in this chapter, I will cite the German original followed by 
any existing English translation. Because the translations are of quite variable quality (in the present case, for 
instance, the translator twice confuses “Ansicht” with “Absicht”), I will alter them in accordance with the original 
where necessary, and will do so without further notice. In ambivalent cases, or to ensure clarity, German words will 
be provided, in square brackets.  
3 Marianne Weber, Max Weber: A Biography, trans. Harry Zohn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, [1926] 1988), 
420. 
4 Otthein Rammstedt, “Die Frage der Wertfreiheit und die Gr￼ndung der Deutschen Gesellschaft f￼r Soziologie,” in 
Lars Clausen and Carsten Schlüter, eds., Hundert Jahre “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.” Ferdinand Tönnies in 
der internationalen Diskussion (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1991), 549-560.  
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so, here it is enough to point out that Tönnies, at least, shared Weber’s commitment to the DGS 
as a forum for value-free science. 
  He did so not out of mere conciliation or compromise, but out of conviction, and he 
repeatedly entered the lists on behalf of the principle.  In 1914, for instance, he wrote to the DGS 
committee to oppose the inclusion of eugenics or the study of “racial hygiene” among the topics 
to be considered by the sociobiological subsection being organized by Alfred Grotjahn, stating in 
no uncertain terms that according to the Society’s principles, “Only theoretical-objective 
researches into facts, causes and effects may be considered, with the exclusion of value 
judgments and ideas about breeding [Züchtungsgedanken].”
5 And many years later, as the DGS 
was undergoing its “Gleichschaltung” at the hands of the Nazis, Tönnies referred once more to 
his duty to uphold the principles established in that first meeting: “I affiliated myself in the year 
1910 with the precept of the exclusion of value judgments from our science enunciated 
especially by Messrs. Max Weber and Werner Sombart—with the explicit interpretation that 
without deciding the question of whether practical theories are scientifically possible in this area, 
especially as ethics and politics, we would in any case exclude these from the realm of our 
activity. I have considered myself duty-bound to conduct myself according to this guideline….”
6 
  Tönnies is today better known as a sociologist than is one of the men he mentions as 
instrumental in establishing the principle of value-freedom—Werner Sombart—but he has drawn 
less interest and attention than Weber or Simmel among those regarded as founding members of 
the profession in Germany.  For the most part, he is known as the author of Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft (1887), a book more often mentioned than read, and for the distinction between pre-
modern “community” and modern market “society” contained in its title.  Sociologists may be 
                                                 
5 Tönnies to DGS Vorstand, circular letter of 3 March 1914. GStA PK, Berlin. VI. HA, NL Sombart, Nr. 18b. 
6 Tönnies, “Erklärung,” 27 December 1933. Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek, Kiel: Cb. 54, NL Tönnies B 
30.9.  
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aware of Tönnies’ extensive empirical and statistical studies, especially on criminology and 
prisons, and of his role in supporting such studies in their early stages.  But the small wave of 
Tönnies scholarship that began in the early 1970s and lasted for the following quarter century 
failed to make this so-called “Nestor” of German sociology into the object of an international 
cottage industry like that which has grown up around his peers.
7 There has been notably little 
work done on Tönnies in English during the past fifty years: one book, a few book chapters and 
articles, as well as translations of two of Tönnies’ own books and two volumes of selections 
from his work make up the entire corpus for the non-German reader.
8 Naturally the German-
language study of Tönnies has advanced much further, with several volumes of conference 
papers and three monographs produced during the 1980s and 1990s, while slow progress has 
been made on a Tönnies Gesamtausgabe since 1998, and a mediocre biography was published in 
2005.  Far and away the most attention, even in the more recent scholarship, has been devoted to 
the origins of his theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.  Relatively little has been written 
about Tönnies’ theory of science or methodology, apart from brief observations about the 
similarities between Tönnies’ and Weber’s use of heuristic models or ideal types.  And no one 
has explained why Tönnies stood with Weber and Sombart in the value judgment dispute. 
  Indeed, the few scholars to comment on Tönnies’ views on value-freedom have generally 
attempted to argue that he opposed it as a doctrine.  Sibylle Tönnies, a descendent and professor 
                                                 
7 For a short account of the reception of Tönnies following his death in 1936, see Lars Clausen, “The European 
Revival of Tönnies,” in Cornelius Bickel and Lars Clausen, Tönnies in Toronto (Kiel: Institut für Soziologie, 1998), 
1-16. Though documenting the institutions in Kiel that have supported research on Tönnies, this paper 
unintentionally shows the relatively limited range of interest in his work. 
8 For English-language secondary literature, see Werner Cahnman, ed., Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation 
(Leiden: Brill, 1973); Arthur Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement: Three Sociologists of Imperial Germany (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, [1973] 1987), Part II; Harry Liebersohn, Fate and Utopia in German Sociology, 1879-
1923 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), Ch.2; Klaus Heberle, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies in USA: Recent Analyses by 
American Scholars, Ferdinand Tönnies Arbeitsstelle Materialien Vol. 7 (Hamburg: Rolf Fechner Verlag, 1989); and 
Christopher Adair-Toteff, “Ferdinand Tönnies: Utopian Visionary,” Sociological Theory 13:1 (1995), 58-65. The 
last two titles are uneven at best.  
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at Hamburg, writing in 1980 under the influence of the so-called “positivist dispute” between 
members of the Frankfurt School and the followers of Karl Popper, emphasized Tönnies’ 
commitment to rational natural law and his vigorously social-democratic political views in an 
attempt to clear him from the (apparently) nefarious charge of being a positivist.  Equating the 
acceptance of the criterion of value-freedom with “positivism,” and equating positivism with 
“functionalism” and “conservatism,” she claimed that his rejection of the romantic conservatives 
of the early historical school of law, and their organic theories of society, within his scientific 
work combined with his well-documented extra-academic support of workers’ movements 
throughout his life to suggest that any statements he made about the exclusion of value 
judgments were mere window dressing. Tönnies was no “positivist”; he was a “partisan.”
9 But 
her claim about Tönnies’ commitment to natural law mistakes the particular role he accorded it, 
which did not involve the belief that natural law generated a real science of norms,
10 and her 
ahistorical treatment of “positivism” in no way proved that his rejection of certain early 
nineteenth-century theories could be seen as evidence for his being a supporter of partisan or 
“committed” science. 
  A much more substantive case was made by another descendent of Tönnies, Klaus 
Heberle, equally worried about salvaging Tönnies from the reputation of falling into “the 
nihilistic-relativistic trap of positivism.”
11 Heberle argued that his grandfather’s views differed 
from Weber’s in that they did not originate in reflections on the logical or epistemological 
problem of deriving knowledge of what “ought to be” from knowledge of what “is,” and that 
“Tönnies did not base his position on the proposition that ‘facts’ and ‘values’ are 
                                                 
9 Sibylle Tönnies, “Gemeinschaft oder Gesellschaft: Ein Werturteil?”, in Lars Clausen and Franz Urban Pappi, eds., 
Ankunft bei Tönnies (Kiel: Mühlau, 1981), 172-181, esp. 180. 
10 See below, Section III a). 
11 Klaus Heberle, “‘Science as a Vocation’ Revisited,” in Heberle, Tönnies in USA, 51-62, quotation on 51.  
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epistemologically absolutely heterogeneous.”
12 This is true: the Is/Ought distinction so important 
to southwest-German neo-Kantianism did not loom large in Tönnies’ convictions and was not his 
prime motive in accepting value-freedom.
13  Heberle justly points instead to Tönnies’ injunction 
that the social scientist learn to recognize the difference between what “is,” and what he “wants”: 
a psychological rather than epistemological question.  And Heberle then draws from this second 
distinction the claim that it allows Tönnies to continue to maintain the possibility of a “critical” 
or “prescriptive” science, and that accurate, objective description of “what is” will of itself lead 
to “objective prescriptions for action.”  Tönnies’ call to refrain from describing what ought to be, 
which we noted above in his 1910 lecture, is thus seen as a temporary injunction that exists only 
for practical reasons—rather than for lasting philosophical reasons—and may eventually be 
discarded in favor of a prescriptive science.
14 There is occasional evidence in Tönnies’ actual 
scholarly practice that would support this interpretation.  And there are comments, such as the 
one from 1933 cited above, that remain open-ended as to the possibility of a scientific, normative 
ethics sometime in the distant future.
15  However, Tönnies was quite clear that no such 
possibility hovered on the horizon during his own day.   
This chapter will contend, in fact, that a balanced view of Tönnies’ writings over the 
course of his career makes it difficult to hold that he envisioned the prospect of a “critical social 
science” as opposed to the application of scientific results in the solution of social problems, and 
that on the contrary his fundamental commitment to the subjectivity of values would have made 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 60. 
13 In this, Tönnies was not alone among advocates of value-freedom: see below, Ch. 4, on Hermann Kantorowicz. 
14 Heberle., 60-62. 
15 In particular, see Ferdinand Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” in Raymund Schmidt, ed., Die Philosophie der 
Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen (Leipzig: Meiner, 1922), 226, in which Tönnies retrospectively distanced himself 
to some degree from the Weberian position and observed that he wanted to leave open the possibility of a future 
science of politics or ethics (presumably, from the context, a normative “science”). Although he suggested here in 
1922 that his opening lecture was intended to represent the views of others in the DGS, his essays and letters 
between the 1880s and World War I are littered with similar statements, as we will see in Section III.  
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a truly prescriptive “science” impossible in any case.  His position did indeed differ from 
Weber’s, but it was not just temporary prudential considerations that led the two to ally with 
each other.  As we will see, Tönnies’ attachment to some form of the ideal of value-free science 
lasted throughout his life.  
  What follows fills part of the gap in scholarship on Tönnies’ theory of science by 
examining the sources and the nature of his views on values and value-freedom in scholarship, 
between his earliest writings and the First World War.  Therefore it examines his substantive 
sociology only insofar as is necessary to this end.  Pursuing our assumption that attitudes toward 
values and objectivity were conditioned by the life events and views on historical development 
of the “founders” of value-freedom, as well as by technical argumentation, we will explore in 
turn Tönnies’ activities both as a person and as a scholar, his account of modernity and its effects 
on values and norms, and those of his writings that have a direct bearing on methodological 
questions.  This approach will allow us to understand why he took the stance he did on values in 
scholarship, and to assess what exactly value-freedom meant to him. 
 
I.  From Oldenswort to Kiel: Tönnies’ Life, Intellectual Development, and Career 
From 1855 to 1914 
 
Tönnies was born in 1855 in Oldenswort, a farming town on the Eiderstedt peninsula that 
juts out from the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein into the North Sea.  It was and remains flat 
and windy cattle country, dotted with marshes and copses, villages and windmills running south 
to Hamburg and north past the islands of Pellworm and Sylt to Denmark. Tönnies’ father was a 
prosperous cattle farmer and church elder.  The family had Dutch and Frisian roots and had been  
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successful landowners in the region since the eighteenth century.  The farm on which Tönnies 
grew up, known as the Riep-Hof and purchased by the family in 1824, encompassed sixty 
hectares of good grazing and arable land, a few small gardens, and a sprawling straw-roofed 
farmhouse.
16 
  It has been a commonplace among Tönnies scholars to observe that his upbringing and 
his family’s rootedness in the world of Eiderstedt farm and village—centered on the rhythms of 
agriculture and local markets and church life—decisively marked his later portrayal of 
Gemeinschaft (community) in his major work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.  That Tönnies 
had personal experience of traditional rural life and community, and that he loved his 
“homeland” in Eiderstedt and in Husum, where the family later moved, is unquestioned.  During 
a very difficult period in the late 1890s, Tönnies wrote to his friend, the Danish philosopher 
Harald Høffding, that he had considered emigrating to England or America, but was dissuaded 
by his fierce devotion to the west coast of Schleswig, “my dearest [engsten] homeland.”
17 He 
often wrote to another close friend and fellow Schleswiger, the philosopher and historian of 
education Friedrich Paulsen, of his love of the dunes and marshes and of the wind outside on fall 
evenings, and observed in this context that anything “genuine” must be “lived” to be 
understood.
18 Such a view unquestionably found its way into his lively ideal-typical portrait of 
community life. 
                                                 
16 Uwe Carstens, Ferdinand Tönnies, Friese und Weltbürger: Eine Biografie (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 
2005), 17, 29, 319 n.2. The only recent study of Tönnies, this biography breaks little new ground, relying so 
extensively on previous sources that it occasionally adopts wholesale and without citation several passages from the 
1971 work of E.G. Jacoby—compare, for instance, Carstens, 79 to Jacoby, 14).  But wherever I was able to check it 
against Tönnies’ letters or archival materials, it proved to be accurate, and it can serve as a useful reference for 
Tönnies’ life, though not his thought, and as a rich source of visual and photographic materials from the Tönnies 
Arbeitsstelle. 
17 Tönnies to Høffding, 6 July 1897, in Ferdinand Tönnies and Harald Høffding, Briefwechsel, ed. Cornelius Bickel 
and Rolf Fechner (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989), 55. (“Engste” has the connotation of intimacy or closeness.) 
18 “…hineinleben muss man sich, wie in alles Echte, um die Sprache der Winde und Wellen zu verstehen.” Tönnies 
to Paulsen, 23 November 1885, in Ferdinand Tönnies and Friedrich Paulsen, Briefwechsel, 1876-1908, ed. Olaf  
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Perhaps in defense of Tönnies against the Nazi-era “blood-and-soil” interpretation of the 
notion of community, post-war scholars have emphasized that, even at an early age, he seems to 
have been marked more by cosmopolitan tendencies than by nostalgia or local patriotism.
19  
Whether or not this is true,
20 it is well to observe that Eiderstedt community life was not as 
parochial as it first appears in retrospect.  Tönnies’ biographer and the head of the Tönnies-
Arbeitstelle in Kiel, Uwe Carstens, observes that the North Sea coast farmers were an 
enterprising group, active far beyond the boundaries of their land.  Whether because their Dutch 
and Frisian family backgrounds provided them with international contacts, a history of family 
geographic and social mobility, and direct involvement with trade and merchant activity, or 
because they needed to participate in the complex and large-scale dike and drainage projects 
needed to empty the marshes and reclaim land from the sea, the Eiderstedt yeomanry tended to 
have wider horizons than many farmers.  Their prosperity, moreover, left them much time for 
politics, sociability, and the development of their cultural tastes, and they maintained close 
contacts with the towns and cities of northern Germany, Holland, Denmark, and England through 
their younger sons, who usually went into business or professional careers.
21  This pattern 
certainly applied to Tönnies’ own family, as his father was actively involved not only in local 
community life, but spent much of his time trading in the Hamburg grain markets and shifted his 
business from ranching to banking when Tönnies was still a child; in addition, Tönnies’ older 
                                                                                                                                                             
Klose, Eduard Georg Jacoby, and Irma Fischer (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1961), 221; see also, e.g., 30 September 1905, 
392. 
19 See, e.g., Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement, 42; Carstens, 8; E.G. Jacoby, Die moderne Gesellschaft im 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Denken von Ferdinand Tönnies (Stuttgart: Enke, 1971), 116-17. 
20 Mitzman’s argument that Tönnies seemed positively disposed towards the new German Reich after 1870 does not 
necessarily show that Tönnies’ loyalties were to entities larger than the local community; in fact, it may be that his 
positive view of the Reich stemmed from his feelings as a member of the German minority in pre-1864 Schleswig, 
which was under Danish rule. We know that Tönnies and his friends disliked their obligatory Danish language and 
culture classes in school, and Tönnies’ close friend, the poet Theodor Storm, was vigorously anti-Prussian but 
supported leaving the Danish monarchy. 
21 Carstens, 18.  
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brother was a “man about town” in London, where he was a commercial representative for a 
German firm.
22  So Tönnies’ social background was not that of a “backwoodsman” or 
agriculturalist, but was instead firmly in the world of the German commercial middle classes: a 
circumstance he shared with other “founders” of sociology in the Kaiserreich, however much he 
may have come to dislike trade and traders.
23 
  It is not surprising, then, that whatever attitudes Tönnies may have had about rootedness 
in community, he soon found himself engaging in activity more characteristic of what Mack 
Walker has called the “movers and shakers”—the professionals, the men of learning and 
commerce, the “disturbers” of traditional patterns of community life.
24 Tönnies had a foot in 
each camp of this group: if his family relied on the commodity exchanges and international 
business transactions for its wealth, he himself was, above all, interested in learning.  It was 
unquestioned that Tönnies should attend the local humanistic Gymnasium; he later recalled that 
his family moved from Oldenswort to the market town of Husum in 1865 in order to further the 
children’s education.
25  His parents clearly placed great faith in his academic abilities: having 
observed the Tönnies family on his first visit, Paulsen later suggested that Ferdinand was clearly 
“the pride and the hope of his parents,” as a gifted student, and when he finished his university 
                                                 
22 Friedrich Paulsen noted in his autobiography that by the time he visited the Tönnies family in the early 1880s, the 
father had long since given up being a farmer to focus on stock market transactions; see Paulsen, An Autobiography, 
ed. and trans. Theodor Lorenz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 288. On Tönnies’ brother Gert, see 
Carstens, 74. 
23 On Tönnies as “backwoodsman,” see Jose Harris, “General Introduction,” in Tönnies, Community and [Civil] 
Society, ed. Jose Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xi, an account that is admittedly more 
balanced than this isolated comment suggests. This recent translation unnecessarily adds the word “civil” to the title; 
it will be cited below as Community and Society. On sociologists’ social circumstances, see Käsler, Die frühe 
deutsche Soziologie, 332ff., and Käsler, “Das Besitzb￼rgertum als zentrales Entstehungsmilieu der fr￼he deutschen 
Soziologie,” in Lars Clausen, et al., eds. Tönnies Heute (Kiel: Mühlau, 1985), 115-131. 
24 Mack Walker, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871 (Cornell University 
Press, 1971). 
25 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 199.  The move was probably also occasioned by his father’s business arrangements 
at this politically unstable juncture in the history of Schleswig-Holstein.  
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studies later on, his father agreed to provide financial support for years of private study.
26 He was 
diligent in his schoolwork, and recalled in a short autobiographical account written in 1923 the 
“deep impression” made on him in his school years by the rector of the Husum Gymnasium, a 
philosophical man who introduced his students to the classics of German literature and ancient 
Greek philosophy and who, perhaps more importantly, inculcated in them (or at least in Tönnies) 
an emphasis on philosophical dualism.
27 
  Another teacher, who doubled as the school’s librarian, led him to an early reading of 
Schleiermacher and of a book about Fichte and the “atheism controversy,” and Tönnies’ eager 
appropriation of these central figures of the classical period of German idealism reflected his 
early struggle with the problem of religious belief.
28 Coming from a long line of Lutheran pastors 
on his mother’s side, Tönnies by his own account had nevertheless settled into unbelief by his 
teens, accepting eagerly Fichte’s view of God as “the moral world order [die sittliche 
Weltordnung].”  His views shifted back and forth owing to two friendships with older, 
philosophically-minded Christian students, and when an uncle gave him a copy of D.F. Strauss’s 
Life of Jesus, he was temporarily afraid to read it.  But at some point during his university days 
the matter became decided, and he took up Strauss’s position against the less radical liberal 
theologians.
29 He retained a positive sense of the social role of religious belief as a foundation of 
communal solidarity, but he claimed that there no longer was any such thing as a “Christian 
community,”
30 and that any true expression of the religious spirit would now have to take form 
(if at all) in a new philosophical community.  The traditional Catholic and Lutheran sacraments 
                                                 
26 Paulsen, Autobiography, 289; Tönnies to Paulsen, 26 November 1877, in T/P Briefwechsel, 5. 
27 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 199-200. 
28 Carstens, 30-32. 
29 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 201-203. Having initially attended classes in the theological faculty as well as the 
philosophical faculty at Jena (he noted laconically at this time that “F￼r Theologie war ich negativ stark interessiert” 
[202]), he soon abandoned them. See also Carstens, 51. 
30 Tönnies to Paulsen, 16 April 1881, T/P Briefwechsel, 124.  
157 
 
and “ ‘God’s word’ ” met his “scorn,” as he later wrote to his fianc￩e in 1893, and he thought 
that only by eliminating all remains of the “burden” of Christian “myths, legends, [and] dogmas” 
would the actual historical contribution of Christianity to western culture appear in the proper 
light.
31 Tönnies’ lifelong commitment to philosophical materialism and opposition to 
institutional churches led him to become a founding member of the German branch of the 
rationalist and anticlerical Ethical Culture Society. 
  A reckoning with traditional religion was a rite of passage for late nineteenth-century 
German students; so too was the practice of moving about from university to university.  Tönnies 
began his post-secondary studies with an attempt to enroll at the newly re-founded German 
university in Strassburg in the summer semester of 1872.  He later recalled this choice as being 
motivated by his “high German consciousness,” but it was at least as likely that he was buoyed 
by a desire to study philology there with Friedrich Max Müller, to whom he had been 
recommended by his fellow Husum resident and mentor, the poet and novelist Theodor Storm.
32 
The plan did not pan out; concerned about the sanitary conditions in Strassburg, he quickly left 
for Jena, where he joined his cousin in the “Arminia” Burschenschaft, one of the more liberal 
student fraternities, and spent a year primarily in philological and philosophical study.  He 
enrolled for the winter and summer semesters of 1874 at Leipzig and Bonn, respectively, and, 
having suffered a head injury while drunkenly cavorting, elected to perform his required military 
service in 1875, abbreviated as it was by medical leaves.  The rest of Tönnies’ studies brought 
                                                 
31 Letter to Marie Sieck, quoted in Carstens, 135; Tönnies to Paulsen, 29 October 1900, T/P Briefwechsel, 347. 
Liebersohn provides no evidence for his claim that Tönnies played down his “struggle to break free of Christianity” 
in his memoirs or that the process was more complicated than Tönnies indicated; see Liebersohn, 38. 
32 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 202; see letter of Storm to M￼ller, 17 April 1872, pp. 359-60 in Tönnies-Storm 
Briefwechsel, edited by Heinrich Meyer, in Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht 32:8 (December 1940), 355-380.  
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him to Berlin in the winter of 1875-76, to Kiel the following summer, back to Berlin, and finally 
to Tübingen, where he received his doctoral degree in classical philology in 1877.
33 
  We know much about Tönnies’ intellectual influences from the beginning of his 
university studies until 1887, when he published Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, in large part 
because he was himself always forthcoming about them.  In fact, he was so free with his 
acknowledgements that we can make mention only of the major figures in Tönnies’ intellectual 
development, and of those directly relevant to understanding his views on science, values, and 
the process of European modernization.
34  
There were two great personal influences on the early Tönnies: Theodor Storm and 
Friedrich Paulsen.  The former powerfully shaped Tönnies’ worldview and ideological leanings 
during his student days, helping to produce or at least to develop in Tönnies the sense of 
pessimism and the premonitions of the decline of western culture which were to mark him 
throughout his life.
35 But Tönnies did not stay for very long in the world of literary culture and 
philology that Storm opened for him.  His interest in the history of philosophy led him from 
Kuno Fischer’s lectures at Jena to the Berlin philosophy seminar of Paulsen, nine years his elder 
and a new Privatdozent, in 1875.  Along with a third Schleswiger, Kuno Francke (later a 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 202-207; Carstens, 46-71. 
34 Many scholars have now studied the intellectual origins of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft specifically, which is 
not our task here; see in particular Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement, which is based almost entirely (but very 
thoroughly) on the correspondence with Paulsen; Niall Bond, “Sociology and Ideology in Ferdinand Tönnies’ 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,” Inaugural Dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität (Freiburg im Breisgau, undated 
[1994]), which limits itself more to the background to Tönnies’ classic text than to the text itself; Manfred Walther, 
“Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft bei Tönnies und in der Sozialphilosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts…,” in Clausen and 
Schlüter, Hundert Jahre “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,” 83-106;  and the most formidable study of the 
philosophical aspects of Tönnies’ thought, Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz, Tiefsinn und Scharfsinn: Ferdinand Tönnies’ 
Begriffliche Konstitution der Sozialwelt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995). 
35 The closeness of their relationship (but little else relevant here) is clearly demonstrated in the Tönnies-Storm 
Briefwechsel, few of Tönnies’ letters to Storm having been preserved; Tönnies published several short studies of his 
mentor following the latter’s death in 1888, which he then collected in 1917 in the short monograph Theodor Storm: 
Gedenkblätter, reprinted in TG 10, 1916-1918 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 363-425. Niall Bond argues that the 
relationship with Storm was definitive for Tönnies’ worldview and (to my mind implausibly) that it outbalanced that 
with Paulsen: Bond, “Sociology and Ideology,” Ch.3.  
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professor at Harvard), Tönnies and Paulsen made a habit of letting their discussions of Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason continue long after the seminar meetings had ended, and they both later 
recalled their conversations as quickly branching out into social and political discussion over 
beers at the Café Suisse.
36 “Paulsen’s influence on me was significant from the beginning,” 
reflected Tönnies fifteen years after Paulsen’s death. “[H]is point of view on the history of 
philosophy, his natural scientific and historical knowledge, but still more his personality 
(pervaded with pure appreciation for truth and social conscience) left deep and fruitful workings 
in me.”
37 Their correspondence, which began in 1876 and lasted until Paulsen’s death in 1908, 
records an intensive intellectual exchange, especially in its first decade. 
  It was certainly the first of the three areas of Paulsen’s influence named by Tönnies that 
had the greatest immediate effect on his career.  Paulsen strongly suggested working on the 
history of pre-Kantian Enlightenment and proto-Enlightenment philosophy, and specifically on 
the thought of Thomas Hobbes.
38 Wanting to pursue his growing interest in modern philosophy 
and social thought, and suffering from continuing headaches as a result of his head injury two 
years before, Tönnies retired to Husum for concentrated study of Hobbes’ Latin and English 
works as a foundation for further development.  It would become his entry into the world of 
academic scholarship.
39  Following a trip to England in 1878 in which he uncovered several 
neglected Hobbes manuscripts and many unknown letters, Tönnies began a series of publications 
on Hobbes that would span his career and radically alter the accepted picture of the philosopher 
of Malmesbury as an empiricist follower of Bacon. Along with Spinoza, to whom Tönnies turned 
                                                 
36 Paulsen, Autobiography, 203; Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 206-207. 
37 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 206; see also Tönnies’ remarks to Paulsen himself on how much the latter had 
influenced his thinking: letter of 22 October 1887, T/P Briefwechsel, 238. 
38 Bernard Willms, “Monstrum oder Mutterschoss? Bemerkungen zum Stellenwert der Hobbes-Forschung im Werk 
von Ferdinand Tönnies,” in Clausen and Schl￼ter, eds., Hundert Jahre “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,” 395, 
argues that Paulsen’s suggestion inoculated Tönnies against the (for Willms) “wrong track” (verrannten) tendency 
of philosophical research in his day toward neo-Kantianism. 
39 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 207.  
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next, in the late 1870s and early 1880s, Hobbes had a profound effect on Tönnies’ own 
thought.
40 
  Tönnies read voraciously and eclectically during these years.  At the same time as he was 
learning to understand Kant under Paulsen’s guidance in 1875—without, it is true, being marked 
by the growing neo-Kantian revival of the critical philosophy—Tönnies absorbed the still 
popular Schopenhauer, whose theory of the will would combine with the elements of 
voluntarism in Hobbes and Spinoza to make a biologically-inflected “will” a central category for 
Tönnies’ social theory.
41  And more remarkably, Tönnies was almost certainly the first important 
thinker to appropriate the work of Friedrich Nietzsche.  Already in the summer of 1872 in Jena, 
Tönnies took note of Nietzsche’s recently published first book, The Birth of Tragedy, in the 
window of a bookstore, reading it later that year at home in Husum “with pleasure, indeed nearly 
with the feeling of a revelation.”
42 Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations, especially those on D.F. 
Strauss and the “Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” profoundly affected Tönnies, who 
continued to read each of Nietzsche’s books upon publication, with an enthusiasm that continued 
through the 1870s but then diminished with what he saw as the increasingly anti-social 
aristocratic tone of the late writings.
43 
  But Tönnies also found himself fascinated by the more concrete problems of the social 
and political world.  His interest in “the social question,” furthered by both Storm and Paulsen, 
was honed in the Berlin statistical seminar of Adolf Wagner, where Tönnies’ desire to study 
“population- and moral-statistics” first developed in 1878-79.  Over the next decade, he would 
                                                 
40 See below, Section III a), for more on Hobbes’ impact. 
41 Cornelius Bickel, Ferdinand Tönnies: Soziologie als skeptische Aufklärung zwischen Historismus und 
Rationalismus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991), 280ff. 
42 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 203. 
43 Ibid., 204-205; on the evolution of Tönnies’ views of Nietzsche from great enthusiasm to suspicion, see, e.g., 
letters of 9 November 1880, 30 October 1881, 29 October 1900 in T/P Briefwechsel, 98; 143; 348.  
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engage with major texts in several different traditions relevant to political and social thought.  
The juristic sciences were perhaps his greatest passion in the 1880s; from the natural law 
tradition of the early Enlightenment, profoundly shaped by his reading of Hobbes as well as 
Pufendorf and Christian Wolff, he moved to assimilate the criticisms of Savigny and the 
“historical school of law” of the early nineteenth century, and drew deeply on more recent work 
by the legal scholars Henry Maine, Otto von Gierke, and Rudolf von Jhering.  In political 
economy, he began with Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Wilhelm Roscher in 1877, and he 
continued the following year with the major figures of socialist political economy in Germany at 
that time, including Karl Rodbertus, and, although without much understanding at first, the first 
volume of Marx’s Capital.  His study included the main works of mid-nineteenth-century 
sociology and anthropology: Comte, Spencer, and Albert Schäffle, among others.  Finally, 
Tönnies followed Paulsen in absorbing some of the natural scientific literature of his own day, 
from Darwin through James Clerk Maxwell.
44 
  What did Tönnies draw from this wide reading? For our purposes, several themes are 
worth noting which will bear on our analysis below.  First, in his philosophical training, Tönnies 
was marked—more than any other major German social thinker of his day—by his reception of 
pre-Kantian philosophy, and particularly by that of the seventeenth century.  His commitment to 
materialism and determinism was fed by these sources, especially Hobbes and to some extent 
Spinoza, as well as by nineteenth-century natural science; and the place of “will,” of the 
“atomistic” individual, and of natural law in his own social science reflected these seventeenth-
century sources more than any others.  This philosophical focus also differentiated him sharply 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 207-213. The exact details of what Tönnies read and when during this period are known, but not especially 
important here. The Tönnies-Paulsen Briefwechsel provides a thorough supplement to Tönnies’ autobiographical 
reflections, and is quite accurately reconstructed in Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement.  
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from many of the other figures instrumental in the growth of the fact-value distinction, because 
unlike them he was not profoundly affected by the heritage of Kant and by neo-Kantianism.  
Second, his understanding of political economy and the concept of economic value 
derived solely from the classical economists and the labor theory of value, as mediated through 
the German historicism represented by Roscher, and through Marx’s later works.  Tönnies either 
was unfamiliar with, did not understand, or did not accept the results of the “marginal 
revolution” in placing emphasis on the demand side of the equation and on the subjective 
valuation of the consumer.
45 His continuing commitment to the idea that economic value could 
be objectively measured and that capitalism involved the extraction of “surplus value” from 
industrial workers meant that, like Sombart but unlike Weber, Schumpeter, or other figures 
considered in the previous chapter, Tönnies could not have been influenced in considering 
valuation subjective by a reading of marginalist economics or of the incipient subjectivism of 
earlier German economists in the tradition of Rau.  
Third, he was familiar with both major competing traditions in the conceptualization of 
the sciences of state and society of his day: like nearly all Germans, he had drunk deep at the 
well of the nineteenth-century historical schools with their broadly hermeneutic methods and 
their underlying tendency to relativism, while, unlike many of his peers, he retained throughout 
his life an exceptionally detailed knowledge of the Anglo-French currents of empiricist and 
“positivist” social science oriented toward generalization, lawfulness, and the study of historical 
causality.   
                                                 
45 While Tönnies must have been aware of the Methodenstreit in economics because of his ties to Berlin political 
economy, especially through a close relation to Adolf Wagner, he did not necessarily read the work of Carl Menger 
or his students, let alone that of Jevons, Walras, or Alfred Marshall. There is no mention of any of these economists 
in Tönnies’ correspondence with Paulsen, and he did not make even a vague reference to the marginalist approach 
until the 1912 edition of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (see “Postscript, 1911,” in Harris, ed., Community and 
Society, 90), a note which does not demonstrate any engagement with marginalist arguments. The first 
acknowledgement of a subjective approach to economic value in Tönnies appears, to my knowledge, in his 1921 
study of Marx: Leben und Lehre.  
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Finally, his social-political interests and reading in the socialist literature inoculated him 
against the assumption of inevitable historical progress underlying some of the western European 
Enlightenment and nineteenth-century liberal traditions, while his own skepticism regarding the 
future of western civilization kept him from embracing the equally dogmatic claims of the 
Second International Marxists and of social democrats to whom he otherwise stood close in his 
politics. 
  In the next two sections, we will consider how Tönnies, drawing on his wide reading, 
built a vision of the development of modern life that revealed the inherent subjectivity of values 
and shaped his view of value-free science.  But first we turn to examine his academic career and 
his political views, since his personal circumstances surely must have been relevant to his 
adoption of value-freedom, however difficult it would be to demonstrate such a claim. 
His intensive study of so many different currents of thought led Tönnies to produce a 
wide-ranging and powerful book, published, too soon for his taste, in 1887.  Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft, which is still synonymous with his name for most readers, was far from an 
immediate success.  Although it received generally positive reviews, it sold at most a few 
hundred copies in its first two years, and the initial print run of 750 copies did not sell out for a 
quarter-century.
46 Disappointed, Tönnies moved from working on theoretical sociology to what 
was then known as “moral statistics,” and particularly to work on the sociology of criminality 
and prison populations.  He had been teaching philosophy as a Privatdozent at the University of 
Kiel since 1881, where an early draft of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft had been turned down as 
his Habilitationschrift, although a series of substantial articles on Hobbes was accepted in its 
place.  Tönnies hated teaching at Kiel; he thought his colleagues were beneath him, and he felt 
little obligation to his students, sometimes announcing a course for the following semester and 
                                                 
46 Tönnies to Paulsen, 29 December 1889, T/P Briefwechsel, 273; “Selbstdarstellung,” 216.  
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then deciding not to give it after all.
47 And yet, he would be associated with the university for 
over fifty years. 
  After 1887, Tönnies concentrated both his teaching and his own studies on the social 
sciences, with an occasional book, article, or course offering on a topic in early modern 
philosophy.  He had hoped to receive a professorship on the strength of his first book, but his 
colleagues were understandably concerned about his demonstrated lack of interest in teaching in 
the 1880s, and so he first received a titular professorship in 1891.  The master of the Prussian 
educational bureaucracy, Friedrich Althoff, offered Tönnies an Extraordinarius professorship in 
1893 on the condition that he resign from his prominent place in the recently founded Ethical 
Culture Society, but Tönnies, never one to compromise his ideals, refused.  He would not be 
promoted to Extraordinarius until 1908.
48 His sociological publications in the 1890s 
concentrated on criminology and on the growth of international sociological literature, which he 
diligently and extensively reviewed for various journals. In addition to writing on cultural 
questions of various sorts for the journal of the Ethical Culture Society, Tönnies produced a 
major study of Hobbes’ life and work in 1896 and a polemic against the growing Nietzsche cult 
in 1897, while simultaneously writing a series of articles chronicling the tempestuous 
dockworkers’ strike in Hamburg during the winter of 1896-97. 
  Around the turn of the century, Tönnies occupied himself with writing prize-essays in 
order to supplement his teaching income.  He won the Welby Prize, established by an English 
aristocrat, with an article on philosophical terminology that was translated in the journal Mind, 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Tönnies to Paulsen, 27 March 1881 and 25 April 1885, in T/P Briefwechsel, 119; 214. Tönnies preferred 
to think of himself as an independent philosopher whose “Alleinfliegen” put him in the company of Hobbes, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, and others (“Selbstdarstellung,” 216). The more grounded Paulsen came to the 
conclusion that Tönnies thought Kiel “so far beneath his dignity that he rejected every opportunity which offered 
itself for lecturing. He regarded it as low to adapt oneself to the needs of the students, and any special preparation 
for a lecture he scorned as theatrical humbug.” Paulsen, Autobiography, 330. 
48 Carstens, 129, 192-93.  
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and devoted much time and hundreds of pages to combating the social Darwinist Wilhelm 
Schallmayer, who had been selected over Tönnies in a Krupp-financed essay competition on the 
application of natural selection to domestic politics in 1900.  Tönnies joined Weber, Sombart, 
and many others in traveling to the United States in 1904 for the Exhibition in St. Louis.  Here he 
gave a paper which marked a shift back to an interest in “pure” or theoretical sociology, which 
Tönnies would continue to elaborate in papers and books throughout the rest of his life.  In 1908, 
at the time of the death of Althoff and of his friend Paulsen, he received a professorship at Kiel 
in “wirtschaftliche Staatswissenschaften,” an expression he despised.  The following year 
brought the founding of the DGS, of which Tönnies assumed the presidency, and which he 
served throughout its two pre-war conferences as well as upon its revival in the 1920s.  Made a 
full professor in 1913, Tönnies retired from teaching three years later, but continued to publish 
actively and take part in conferences until shortly before his death in 1936.
49 
  In 1932, as a protest against the growing power of the Nazis, Tönnies joined the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD).  He had insisted throughout his life that he was not a social democrat: 
whatever the “‘well- but lightly educated’”(“‘Viel- aber Leichtgebildeten’”) might think 
following his endorsement of the Hamburg dockworkers’ cause, “I have never been [a social 
democrat], neither openly nor in secret—because my way of thinking differed considerably on a 
few matters, and because I was greatly reluctant [weil ich grosse Scheu davor hatte] to lose 
myself in practical politics.” That said, Tönnies also condemned the other parties and the 
government for their treatment of the SPD.
50 This retrospective description from 1923 accorded 
well with the views he had earlier expressed.
51 
                                                 
49 Tönnies, “Selbstdarstellung,” 219-225, provides the basic data. 
50 Ibid., 220. 
51 Tönnies to Høffding, 6 July, 1897, T/H Briefwechsel, 55.  
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Unwilling to join a party or to accept Marxist orthodoxy, Tönnies preferred the stance of 
the independent scholar, but the direction of his sympathies was not in doubt.  From the first, his 
exchanges with Paulsen indicated his deep dissatisfaction with modern liberalism, a growing 
antipathy to the state (in contrast to Paulsen, who began with Lassallean state-socialist views), 
and the general conviction that “the Social Democrats are, as almost always, right.”
52 Tönnies 
was able to join with his peers in the Verein f￼r Sozialpolitik in the hope of a “new course” in the 
politics of the early 1890s, which would allow for the broad stream of German liberalism to 
accept a raft of state-imposed social reforms designed to improve conditions and security for 
industrial workers.  But he positioned himself to the left not only of the monarchist state-
socialists like Schmoller and Wagner, but also of Lujo Brentano’s commitment to free trade and 
non-political trade unions and of Max Weber’s tendencies toward “social imperialism”; he was 
not only a thoroughgoing advocate of parliamentarization, but went all the way with Marx in 
believing that the state was essentially an apparatus designed to meet the needs of the 
“bourgeois” classes “for the regulation of social antagonisms.”
53 His political convictions were 
on most open display in his study (for the Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung) of the conditions 
underlying the Hamburg strike, in which he simply took the side of the striking workers.  Instead 
of arguing in this case that social science must itself be ethically inflected, however, Tönnies 
attempted to stay within the mantle of value-freedom by proclaiming that science was truly 
impartial (unbefangen) when it saw that the “truth” lay with the workers, and that it was instead 
“corrupted” public opinion that was “partisan”; he used the opportunity to express concerns that 
                                                 
52 Tönnies to Paulsen, 29 September 1878, T/P Briefwechsel, 47. 
53 On Tönnies’ politics, see especially Bickel, Ferdinand Tönnies, 215-235; quotation on 218.  
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in the era of Baron von Stumm, scientific knowledge was threatened by the impediments to 
academic freedom set up by “capital.”
54 
Tönnies was convinced that state employees, including professors, need not be 
“hindered… from supporting a party [in matters] outside of their official conduct; on the 
contrary, insofar as we are dealing with ‘intellectuals,’ this is highly desirable.”
55 Like many 
other advocates of value-freedom in practice, he certainly crossed the border between official 
and unofficial conduct with some frequency in making value judgments, perhaps unconsciously, 
but he did not do so in the name of a moral “science.”  As in the case of other sympathizers with 
socialism such as Sombart and Gustav Radbruch, the claim of value-freedom may well have 
attracted Tönnies at least in part as a means of defending his work against the hostility generated 
by his political views among the conservative establishment in the universities and the 
ministerial bureaucracy. 
  Let us now turn to Tönnies’ historically-inflected account of the nature of values and 
sources of normative authority in traditional and modern forms of social organization, after 
which we will consider the specific nature and the importance of the value subjectivism he 
reveals for his theoretical reflections on value-freedom. 
 
II.  Values and Normativity in “Community” and in “Society” 
 
Throughout his later career, Tönnies claimed that his image of two fundamental forms of 
social organization, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, was a contrast of pure types and not an 
account of historical progression.  But from the first, readers saw a historical account, even a 
                                                 
54 Quoted in ibid., 248. 
55 Tönnies to Paulsen, 18 April 1899, T/P Briefwechsel, 341-42.  
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philosophy of history, embedded in the dichotomy, and through many of his own comments in 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft Tönnies made it easy to accept this interpretation despite his 
protests.  Moreover, he very much endorsed the legitimacy of attempts to account for historical 
development through the use of sociological theory, an attempt he labeled “applied,” as opposed 
to “pure,” sociology.
56  His interest in the historical development of the West was deep and 
abiding, reflected in his very first publication, on classical antiquity, and in his very last: the 
sweeping but unfinished Geist der Neuzeit, part of which appeared in 1935 just before Tönnies’ 
death, and which he had worked on sporadically for three decades.  So it is not surprising that 
Tönnies’ writings yield an interpretation of history that attempts particularly to make sense of the 
nature of modernity by contrasting it with antecedent forms of European social organization and 
culture.  This section explores the ways in which his interpretation of Western history sheds light 
on his views on the nature of individual and social values, on the sources of normativity, and on 
the nature of science. 
Inevitably, we must look first to Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft for an understanding of 
Tönnies’ account of modernity.  It is not immediately obvious that we are entitled to do so; if the 
dichotomy in the title is truly one of ideal types and really existing social relations always 
embody a mix of the two, then perhaps it is illegitimate to consider the book as telling a story of 
transition from one form of life to another.  But Tönnies’ own intentions were ambivalent.  In 
1882, having finished the early and highly schematic draft of G&G, and immersed in the 
literature of legal philosophy and speculative anthropology, Tönnies wrote to Paulsen that he was 
                                                 
56 On Tönnies’ differentiation between pure and applied (and empirical-statistical) sociology, see especially E.G. 
Jacoby, “Three Aspects of the Sociology of Tönnies,” in Cahnman, Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation, 70-102. 
Werner Cahnman rightly observes that Tönnies’ commitment to “value-free” social science in practice was clearest 
in his “pure” sociology, and that he was much less careful to exclude value judgments in his applied or empirical 
sociology—in this, Tönnies was not altogether different from Max Weber, as the famous passages on the effects of 
modern capitalism toward the end of Weber’s Protestant Ethic suggest: see Cahnman, “Introduction,” in ibid., 17; 
and id., “Max Weber and the Methodological Controversy in the Social Sciences,” reprinted in Cahnman, Weber & 
Tönnies: Comparative Sociology in Historical Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), 30.   
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considering “building up [a] philosophy of history out of the elements of my concepts 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft,” although he sometimes worried that they were too trivial and 
widely understood for it to achieve originality.
57 And on the work’s appearance five years later, 
he clearly offered a portrait of the two concepts as representing epochs or historical stages each 
associated with its own particular forms of normativity.
58 Despite cautioning that care must be 
used in applying his “schematic” concepts, he wrote to Høffding that he thought himself 
authorized through the evidence of history and experience to see them as representing reasonably 
well the actual course of events.
59 Not only Paulsen, but other initial readers such as Høffding, 
Schmoller, Gierke, and Durkheim, interpreted the book this way, and a seminal 1955 centenary 
essay on Tönnies made a strong case for seeing the book as reflecting nineteenth-century 
philosophy of history.
60 Without prejudging the issue of whether “community” and “society” can 
be used as pure types, we shall pursue a similar interpretation by recognizing that the book 
indicates Tönnies’ view of existing historical tendencies, not descriptions meant to claim 
complete validity at any given time. 
Tönnies’ overall philosophy of history was cyclical, or at least consisted of two great 
cycles. Gemeinschaft was most closely associated for Tönnies with pre-Roman antiquity and 
with the high middle ages, while classical antiquity and the modern world since about 1500 
displayed a predominant tendency toward Gesellschaft.
61  He expressed certainty, too, and from 
an early age, that the present culture of the West, which he variously identified as Christian, 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 26 January 1882, 147. 
58 Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Abhandlung des Communismus und des Socialismus als empirischer 
Culturformen (Leipzig: Fues, 1887), 289 [hereafter G&G]; Community and Society, 257 [hereafter C&S]. 
59 Tönnies to Høffding, 14/19 October, 1888, T/H Briefwechsel, 41. 
60 See, e.g., 12 September 1887, 12 February 1888, T/P Briefwechsel; Durkheim’s review of G&G is translated in 
Cahnman, ed., Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation, 240-47; Ren￩ König, “Ferdinand Tönnies,” in Soziologie in 
Deutschland: Begründer, Verfechter, Verächter. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1987. The original version of König’s essay 
was in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. 7 (1955), 348-420. 
61 Tönnies argues for this parallel in many places. See, e.g., “Herbert Spencers soziologisches Werk,” (1889), in SSK 
I, 75-104; 100.  
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Germanic, and European, was in a steady state of decline.  Even if it took another five hundred 
years, modern European culture would follow the Gesellschaft-like path of the Hellenistic-
Roman culture before being swept away.
62 He did not venture specific predictions as to the 
nature of the coming culture, but he thought that it would again include more Gemeinschaft-like 
elements, possibly those envisioned by socialism.
63 Nevertheless, these cycles were not entirely 
self-contained, but embodied some kinds of continuity, which might conceivably allow a process 
of gradual betterment as favorable elements of each type of social organization were retained. 
Always mindful of the passing of the Roman world and its legacy to the successor civilization of 
“German” Europe, as he wrote to Høffding in 1899, he thought it was our task to “order our 
house” and “bequeath the culture which will come after us as well-maintained a legacy as 
possible.”
64 Human history, like the material world, was without meaning in itself, but that fact 
should not hinder the possibility of “reason” (Vernunft) becoming “free” in the minds of men 
through culture.
65 And without question it was “reason” and science that struck Tönnies as the 
principal “legacy” which modernity, like Roman antiquity before it, might offer to a future 
civilization once the wheel had turned again. 
How most appropriately can we characterize the two types of social organization which 
made up this gradually blending cyclical process, and thereby also the medieval and modern 
worlds respectively? Tönnies’ best known works are full of detail, which sometimes threatens to 
overwhelm through its sheer variety and (it must be said) disorganization, but I will argue here 
that the thread of continuity lies in Tönnies’ assessment of the sources of normative guidance for 
                                                 
62 Tönnies expressed this view as early as his 10 March 1881 letter to Paulsen, T/P Briefwechsel, 115; and wrote as 
much to Høffding eighteen years later: 29 June 1899, T/H Briefwechsel, 68. 
63 Tönnies, “Das Wesen der Soziologie” (1907), SSK I, 350-68, 367; translation as “The Nature of Sociology,” in On 
Sociology: Pure, Applied, and Empirical, ed. Werner Cahnman and Rudolf Heberle (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1971), 106. 
64 Tönnies to Høffding, 29 June 1899, T/H Briefwechsel, 68. 
65 Tönnies to Paulsen, 29 September 1878, T/P Briefwechsel, 47.  
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the individual acting person and the type of “means-ends” orientation dominant in a given 
society.  Put another way:  Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft formations can be differentiated 
according to the types of values they promote and the way in which they promote them, and 
according to the way in which people pursue these values in their own actions.  A picture thus 
emerges of the attitudes toward values prevalent in the modern world, in contrast to those of the 
medieval world.  Nevertheless, I will also argue, there is as well an underlying continuity across 
both forms of social organization in that regardless of how it may appear to the social actors 
themselves, the ultimate basis of values and norms is in the wills of individual human animals. 
That is to say, values for Tönnies are in the last analysis subjective. 
a)  Forms of Normativity in Gemeinschaft 
“The natural, underlying, and—for us—lost  constitution of civilization is communistic 
[communistisch], while the contemporary and developing [werdende] constitution is socialistic 
[socialistisch],” wrote Tönnies in the preface to the first edition of G&G, using the terms 
“communism” and “socialism” in order to be provocative but with the broad meaning of 
“community-like” and “society-like.”
66 And, indeed, he would always hold that Gemeinschaft 
was more “natural” than Gesellschaft, and that it alone was “real” while Gesellschaft included an 
element of fictiveness.
67 The easiest way of understanding what Tönnies meant by these 
characterizations is to recall his commitment to nineteenth-century natural science, not to 
romantic nostalgia. Gemeinschaft was most “real” and most “natural” because it embodied first 
and foremost the social relations that developed out of pure biological and kinship relations, and 
                                                 
66 Tönnies, 1887 Preface, G&G xxviii; C&S, 13. 
67 See, e.g., “Zur Einleitung in die Soziologie” (1899), in SSK I, 65-74; 67; partially translated as  “A Prelude to 
Sociology,” in  On Sociology, 77; also, Tönnies to Høffding, 14/19 Oct 1888, T/H Briefwechsel, 35.  
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the effects of stable and close physical proximity to other human animals claiming descent from 
a common ancestor.
68 
Tönnies discussed these most basic relations—between mother and child, between 
siblings, between husband and wife, and what he saw as the slightly less intimate relations 
between father and children, between friends, and between neighbors—in detail in the first book 
of G&G.  For our purposes it is most important to note that in Tönnies’ thinking, the most basic 
sources of normativity in Gemeinschaft lay with the authority of parents and elders, living and 
dead, mortal and divine (for Tönnies, gods were obviously substitute lords or parental figures), 
individual or corporate—and sanctioned by long usage and a common past.  In the short book on 
custom or mores, Die Sitte, which Tönnies wrote in 1909 for Martin Buber’s series on social 
phenomena, he noted that the validity of customary rules in any Gemeinschaft  
 
is based on the general judgment that “we must and we want to act as our forefathers have acted; we must and we 
want to follow their example and their precedents.” This reasoning can and does quite easily lead to the further 
thought, “for that is useful and wholesome for us” and “since our elders knew what is right, their wisdom is superior 
to ours,” and “the way they have done things has been tried out and proven as immemorial usage, as the way in 
which tradition has maintained itself.” Thus understood, acquiescence to custom and fostering of custom are only 
special cases of obedience and imitation through which the young and disciples follow their parents and masters and 
learn from them.
69 
 
Paternalistic Gemeinschaft may be, but that does not mean that it ought to be seen as 
oppressive to its members, Tönnies claimed.  Like all social relationships, he held, those of 
Gemeinschaft are positively willed or affirmed by its members, and that includes relationships 
                                                 
68 See Tönnies, G&G, Book I, Sections 1-6.  
69 Tönnies, Die Sitte (Frankfurt: Rütten & Loening, 1909) 17-18; Custom, translated (unreliably) by A. Farrell 
Borenstein (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), 43. On gods as substitute lords, see Die Sitte, 23-24; Custom, 51.  
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that stratify authority.
70 Tönnies famously associated Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft with two 
different types of human “will,” which he called Wesenwille (natural will), and willkürliche Wille 
or Kürwille (arbitrary or rational will).
71 Wesenwille, which supports Gemeinschaft, grows out of 
the individual’s orientation to pleasure or liking (Gefallen), is strengthened through habituation 
(Gewohnheit) in which that which is repeated becomes “agreeable” and ultimately indispensable 
simply because it is repeated, and through shared memory (Gedächtnis) can conjure up a 
knowledge and love for the habitual common to several persons or a whole community.
72 
If individual wills are shaped by these common experiences and expectations, they may 
come to comprise a “general will” (allgemeine Wille) or a “will of the people” (Volkswille).
73 
This will of the people is portrayed by Tönnies in Die Sitte in a Burkean fashion as an agreement 
between the dead, the living, and those to be born, in the service of preserving a sort of “‘natural 
law’—that is, …a tacit understanding about what has to be.”  Established perhaps by the gods, 
and certainly by ancestors to whom is due the “natural” fear, reverence, and honor also felt by 
the child for the parent or by the weak for the strong, this natural law is nonetheless actively 
reaffirmed in all performance and activity by the people who live in a Gemeinschaft.
74 The 
source of normative guidance, of the values by which people are to direct their lives, is seen to be 
                                                 
70 One of the chief claims of Tönnies’ sociology is that social relationships are affirmative. This is, for all intents and 
purposes, simply a matter of definition: Tönnies does not deny the presence of conflicts between people, but he does 
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71 In the 1887 edition of G&G, Tönnies used the phrase “willk￼rliche Wille,” meaning a will capable of making free, 
arbitrary choices; in the 1912 edition he replaced this phrase with his own coinage, Kürwille. Coming from the old 
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72 Tönnies, G&G, 106-112; C&S, 101-106. 
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tradition, in whatever guise it takes.  But we might say that the source of the “legitimacy” of that 
tradition lies in the continued active willing of the individuals who make up the community.   
Thus, in the case of political authority, Tönnies says, the enhanced honor and freedom of 
action appertaining to the ruler is granted by the “general will” of the community within the 
limits set by a corresponding duty to serve the community.  The origin of the right or law (Recht) 
that establishes authority is in the will; it is not objectively “given”: “The influence of will (die 
Willenssphäre), and so the will of the community, is a mass of determinate force, power or right; 
and right is both the embodiment of will in the form of ability or permission to act, and will as 
obligation or duty.”
75 Inequalities in power which arise by the very nature of political authority 
must be kept within limits, or the community will collapse, for if any group has too much or too 
little power, the function of community (creating unity out of diverse elements) will not be 
fulfilled.  In this situation, what has united the individual wills no longer obtains, and the 
consequence of communal dissolution makes it obvious that for Tönnies the actual power of 
traditional authorities to provide normative guidance depends on the perception of legitimacy 
accorded to those authorities by the individual subjects.  For when a functional community is 
dissipated through the perception of illegitimate use of power, the individual will begin to guide 
his actions according to his own moral compass, provided by nature and “inherited powers and 
drives.” “The less people who come into contact with one another are linked together in the same 
community, the more they are ranged against one another as free subjects of their own desires 
and powers. This freedom will be all the greater the less they feel themselves to be dependent on 
some predetermined guiding power, specifically stemming from the will of some community.”
76 
                                                 
75 Tönnies, G&G, 22; C&S, 32. 
76 Ibid. On political authority, see also G&G 261-62; C&S 233-34.  
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In Gemeinschaft, then, guiding values derive from tradition, from the authority of gods 
and elders, from customary practices seen as natural laws.  Individuals recognize and affirm 
these seemingly “external” normative demands on their actions, and they act accordingly, 
without being aware that the norms they follow maintain their force only through the aggregate 
assenting wills of themselves and their peers. 
This description applies, of course, not only to tribal communities such as those in 
Tönnies’ favored armchair anthropological literature, but to the medieval German towns and 
cities in which he saw the full flowering of Gemeinschaft.  The principal role of communal 
institutions, whether they were economic, religious, or political and civic authorities, was to 
provide embodiments and visible enforcers of the norms and values which kept communities 
from falling apart into competing classes, interest groups, or egoistic individuals.  The 
Gemeinschaft-like towns of medieval Germany governed economic life very carefully, with the 
town councils, the guilds, and the church combining forces to maintain prices and quality 
standards for goods, and to warn against the risks of corruption through trade and commerce.  
Exchange was no matter for “enterprising individuals” but even in a small community of 
households was more analogous to a sharing of food at a common table, according to mutually 
agreed-upon standards rather than contractual relations.
77 The higher activities of the towns (that 
is, those that transcend the arrangements necessary for survival), meanwhile, involved those 
forms of art and handicraft designed to keep civic culture and a sense of one’s own duties 
constantly in mind, “in short, to bring lofty and eternal values closer to the senses.” Indeed, 
religious institutions and the arts had the central role in town life, since in the absence of kinship 
ties that encompass the entire population, they were the primary means of inculcating and 
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maintaining virtue.
78 The life of the mind was governed above all by the church, and like other 
communal powers, the norms governing intellectual endeavors were based on commonly 
affirmed authority: in science and philosophy, the preeminent position of Aristotle was unshaken 
for centuries.
79 
  Under these conditions, the individual pursued his ends in an almost reflexive manner.  
The proper action in a given context was clearly set out by the inherited norms and the 
institutions embodying them.  And indeed the very “will” of the individual—Wesenwille in 
Gemeinschaft—was naturally disposed to the carrying out of actions in an immediate, non-
instrumental way, Tönnies claimed.  Actions were, generally, to be taken for their own sake 
rather than out of calculation of possible outcomes.
80 
b)  The Transition to Modernity  
In Tönnies’ account, as we have seen, in a certain implicit way the normative force of 
values even in community depends ultimately on the wills of biological individuals.  They do not 
consciously see it this way, preferring to point to the authority of God, of custom, of “the 
Philosopher,” and so forth, which they regard as objective and normatively binding powers.  And 
indeed, their beliefs grant legitimacy to tradition.  But there is nothing inevitable about the top-
down social values maintained by traditional societies; their perceived validity is in fact fragile.  
For individuals are moved by Kürwille as well as by Wesenwille, and since it is at base the 
predominant type of will that determines the nature of a given society,
81 Gemeinschaft can 
become Gesellschaft.  Modern society may not be a perfect instance of Gesellschaft; like all 
existing social forms, it is mixed, and Tönnies believed that Germany in his own day was barely 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 42-43; C&S, 49. 
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80 Tönnies, “Zur Einleitung in die Soziologie,” 70. 
81 Tönnies, G&G 183; C&S, 165.  
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removed from “medieval barbarism,” as he wrote to Paulsen—but he added that Gesellschaft 
would be much more visible and indeed dominant by the late twentieth century.
82 It is clear that 
Gesellschaft was, for Tönnies, more or less identical with the condition of modernity in the 
process of unfolding, and that in modern life values and norms depended much more openly on 
the wills and desires of individuals. 
Gesellschaft did not have the same sort of rootedness in natural, biological conditions as 
its more basic pair, making it for Tönnies less “real.” It was more “abstract” in two main ways: 
first, in that it tended to replace natural or intimate relations with purely formal ones, and second, 
in that it was itself a kind of tendency or “latent reality,” a potentiality rather than an actuality in 
the Aristotelian sense.
83 This potentiality could be seen as developing out of Gemeinschaft 
formations, and Tönnies sometimes equated it with a process leading to the decline or 
destruction of Gemeinschaft.
84 No problem exercised incipient German sociology more than the 
question of how the modern world evolved from pre-modern conditions, and Tönnies very much 
took part in the attempts to explain this process using his basic categories. 
Like Max Weber, Tönnies envisioned a process of “rationalization,” and even more like 
Werner Sombart, he saw the growth of “rational” modes of thought and action as a generally 
conscious overcoming of traditional ways.  At the end of his life, he remarked on his 
interpretation of modernization, “I always did see in the entire historical development since the 
middle ages the gradual setting free of rationalism and its increasing dominance as inherently 
necessary processes, and especially as processes of the human mind as will.”
85 This striving for 
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83 Ibid., 60-62; C&S, 64-65. Tönnies here seems to relinquish his nominalist tendencies for a notion of a developing 
“essence” (Wesen) of society. His use of the word Wesen is sometimes realist in tendency. Niall Bond has argued 
that Tönnies’ fundamental approach to concepts is essentialist, an argument which is certainly mistaken in light of 
Tönnies’ view of concepts as “names,” whatever his periodic backsliding in practice. See Bond, 7, 101. 
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rationality often expressed itself quite explicitly in a rejection of the ways of Gemeinschaft, in a 
“struggle against custom [Gewohnheit] and the formation of custom,” and he claimed “that in 
reality the reasonable and free man will always guard himself against acting out of custom, and 
will rather always renew the investigation of the relationship between end and means.”
86 The 
picture of the evolution of society that Tönnies gave in his various writings was more 
complicated than this, but it is nevertheless striking to note how much weight he lent to the 
conscious actions of individuals and to the growth of instrumental or “means-ends” rationality. 
It was not a matter of an occasional remark in a letter.  At least as Tönnies conceived it 
during his pre-war writings, his view of modernization could be found most concisely stated in a 
1913 essay he published in the first number of the Kiel Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv.
87 Here he 
noted that a proper understanding of the transition from the middle ages to the modern age 
required noting how the individualism that characterized Gesellschaft grew up “within,” “out 
of,” and “alongside” Gemeinschaft.  In some ways, modernity was a direct outgrowth of the 
middle ages—a continuation of the pattern of expanding cities and commerce and gradual 
improvement in manners and quality of life—but in other ways it represented a revolutionary 
change and was directly opposed to the main currents of medievalism.
88 As we saw above, risks 
to Gemeinschaft can arise from “within” traditional society through the growing power of a ruler 
or class of rulers, and this was in fact what Tönnies saw in the early modern period.  In the 
economic realm, for instance, it began with manorial lords taking an interest in the managing and 
productivity of their estates; in the political realm, with the prince increasingly seeking absolute 
sovereignty; in the moral-religious sphere, with the clergy increasingly inclined by their 
                                                 
86 Tönnies to Høffding, 14/19 October 1888, T/H Briefwechsel, 36. (Original emphasis, covering the entire passage, 
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87 Tönnies, “Individuum und Welt in der Neuzeit,” reprinted in Fortschritt und Soziale Entwicklung (Karlsruhe: 
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rootlessness and lack of family to be individualists and to seek power through a monopoly over 
interpretation of society’s guiding religious values.
89 
But there were also revolutionary tendencies “out of” Gemeinschaft that rejected the 
traditional social order rather than trying to gain a preponderance of power within it, which were 
motivated by attempts to free the individual from his traditional bonds.  Here Tönnies seems to 
have been thinking of conscious efforts made by groups of individuals to strengthen economic 
individualism by weakening traditional agricultural and craft restrictions; to further political 
individualism through revolutionary struggles for rights and freedoms; and to acquire moral-
spiritual freedom through rejection of church authority.
90 Finally, developing “alongside” 
Gemeinschaft, there was the merchant and trader, always an outsider and “stranger” moving 
between places and communities and trying to open up communication over wide distances 
(Tönnies put the Swiss, the Quakers, and especially the Jews in this context); while in political 
life, he pointed to the growth of organized international groups, including such strange 
bedfellows as the “republic of letters” and the industrial proletariat. In the moral-spiritual arena, 
of course, there was the growth of science.
91 
The account in this 1913 essay is too sketchy to be persuasive even on its own terms, but 
it shows the role Tönnies saw for the effects of Kürwille in the transition to modernity.  Naturally 
enough, for someone as highly influenced by Marx as Tönnies was, pointing to the actions of 
individuals and changes in attitudes as driving forces in modernization was not sufficient. He 
devoted a study to tracing the effects of technology on society and social change.
92 And he stated 
in no uncertain terms that trade, particularly international trade, was the single most important 
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factor in bringing about Gesellschaft.
93 But it is worth noting that Tönnies remarked in the long 
and informative letter he sent to Høffding in 1888 explaining his views, that he was in historical 
viewpoint more than anything a follower of St. Simon and Comte, and that if Marx served as a 
useful correction to the one-sidedness of Comte’s focus on intellectual development as the motor 
of history, Marx himself ought to have acknowledged the force of ideas. “I suspect however that 
that keen-witted man [i.e., Marx], if he had taken the occasion to go more deeply into the causal 
consideration of the historical process, would not in any way have disavowed the great 
complexity within which the different factors act upon one another, nor would he have neglected 
to appreciate the relative meaning of the intellectual moments [i.e., of intellectual factors].”
94 
And in his “Selbstdarstellung,” Tönnies noted that the development of capitalism could be seen 
as being as much a consequence of modern attitudes as a cause.
95 
c)  Forms of Normativity in Gesellschaft 
Tönnies’ remarks on the transition to modern society have made clear how central he 
thought the individual striving for freedom from pre-modern restrictions in fact was.  Personally, 
he was an opponent of economic individualism, the most “pure” expression of Gesellschaft, but 
he was in no doubt about its social-scientific importance or about its role in bringing about those 
elements of modern life that met his approval outside of (and often enough within) the confines 
of his scholarly writing.  In order to complete our understanding of Tönnies’ views on the nature 
of values as revealed by his picture of historical development, we turn next to the sources and 
forms of normativity in modern society. 
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  The section on Gesellschaft in G&G focuses intently on one particular facet of 
modernity: the market economy.  If the characteristic feature of Gemeinschaft, out of which all 
its structures originated, was family life and kinship, then the prime exemplar of Gesellschaft, as 
Tönnies later recalled his intentions, was “the…business life, as it is identified in the most basic 
way through the economic fact of exchange and the corresponding legal fact of contract.”
96 And 
therefore, not surprisingly, if the source of guiding values in traditional societies expressed 
paternal authority of one kind or another, the source in Gesellschaft also reflected its 
paradigmatic social expression.  That is, the values of modern man, ideal-typically and 
increasingly in reality, were those of free individuals participating in purely formal arrangements 
with others, without intimacy and in the pursuit of their own interests.  Although the institutions 
of Gesellschaft ramified out from such market relations to embrace all other areas of social life, 
the market economy remained its lodestar.
97 
  In economic life, the only true commandment, according to Tönnies, was “do or die.”  He 
observed that once markets had suppressed the authority of traditional institutions that ordered 
production and exchange, such as the guilds and the church, there was only one choice: to strive 
against one’s competitors or to go under, something that was never envisioned even in cases of 
conflict in Gemeinschaft.
98 He saw market competition through the lens of the Hobbesian state 
of nature, portraying trade as if it were a virtual war and a zero-sum game; and he regarded any 
remaining moral rules as mere pragmatic conventions without any inner meaning to social actors, 
intended to keep citizens from killing one another if it suited their purposes.
99 Self-interest was 
raised to a virtue, and other moral virtues fell increasingly into desuetude.  Meanwhile the 
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standard of value for goods became just as dependent upon self-interest as the standard for 
conduct.  In a Marxist vein, Tönnies pointed to a shift in the nature of production from the skilled 
craftsmanship of traditional societies to the quintessential modern form of production of 
commodities.  Instead of being crafted with care for one’s own or the community’s consumption, 
Tönnies asserted, commodities were produced as cheaply and extensively as possible with the 
sole purpose of “speculation” on the market that would further the pecuniary self-interest of the 
manufacturer.
100  Easily convertible into money, which was by definition a mere “means” to 
further exchanges without inherent value, these commodities themselves came to partake 
increasingly of the characteristics of money and thereby lost any innate qualities or value in 
themselves.
101 
  As mentioned above, Tönnies thought that the legal contract corresponded in form to the 
economic exchange.  Indeed, contracts were part and parcel of exchange, as trading now took 
place between individuals suspicious of one another and out for their own gain who required 
some third party—the law as enforced by social authority—to replace the customary rules 
regulating economic life in Gemeinschaft.  Drawing on Sir Henry Maine’s famous notion of a 
shift in legal thought from “status” to “contract,” Tönnies described the replacement of the 
customary law based on the immemorial authority of tradition with the concept of a formal 
compact between two interested parties, whose validity—and normative heft—was determined 
only by its success in allowing free economic exchange to occur. Legal rules increasingly came 
to rest on a presumption that individuals were members of groups by voluntary association more 
than by birth, that such members could therefore determine the rules of their conduct, and that 
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the role of social authorities was to be neutral enforcers of competing claims according to the 
formal adherence to agreed-upon rules of procedure.
102  The law of property, too, reflected a shift 
in the nature of property from possession (“Besitz”) to wealth (“Vermögen,” also having 
connotations of “means” or “power”), paralleling the shift from goods-for-consumption to 
commodities.
103 Again, Tönnies did not regard this portrait of legal change as purely schematic 
or ideal typical; he noted that it took place in both Roman antiquity and in the modern world in 
the revival of the Roman law and the spread of modern forms of natural law.  These strong 
influences on modern legal systems promoted the growth of commerce and of individual 
freedom and formally equal justice, in both guises tending to erode customary law.
104 
  Just as Hobbes had noted the need for a supreme state authority to enforce contracts, so 
Tönnies saw the modern state as having the source of its legitimacy not in the sanction of 
tradition but in its efficacy in furthering the interests of commerce.  The state thus represented 
the values and enforced the norms preferred by those people who acted as “merchants,” whether 
literally working in commerce or simply (in an allusion to Adam Smith) reflecting the attitudes 
of the instrumentally rational pursuit of personal gain.  Tönnies wavered between two ways of 
portraying the state: first, he depicted it in the way favored by the liberal tradition, as the result of 
an agreement between citizens to ensure not only peace and order but their rights and property, 
and subject to the requirements of natural law in its dealings with citizens.
105 Second, he 
employed, and seemed to prefer, the vision of the state favored by Marx, as the executive 
committee of the bourgeoisie. On this account, the state should be seen as being run by, and 
                                                 
102 Ibid., 54-55, 261-63; C&S, 59; 234-35; see also G&G 213/C&S 192 on the influence of Maine. 
103 Ibid., 208; C&S, 188. 
104 Ibid., 242-44; C&S, 218-19. 
105 Tönnies, “Zur Einleitung in die Soziologie,” 68-69; “Prelude to Sociology,” 79; G&G 264-66; C&S, 236-37.  
184 
 
having interests identical to those of, the capitalist “class.”
106 In this account, since the state itself 
possesses a monopoly in the use of force, it can make itself the interpreter of the natural law and  
thereby, “the state’s exposition of what the law is, amounts for [its] subjects to a declaration of 
what the law shall be….”
107 A form of normative authority is thus preserved above the naturally 
occurring whims and wishes of individual citizens, but this authority is also run by and in the 
interests of a “class” seen to overlap with those citizens—preserving a sense of its being an 
“absolute” authority only over the increasingly extensive and non-participating proletarian class. 
  In the spiritual and intellectual sphere, the standards of Gesellschaft are set increasingly 
by the two forces of science and public opinion, which together crowd out religion. For now, let 
us note that Wissenschaft could easily be seen as yet another factor contributing to the emphasis 
on the freely choosing individual in modern society as against the morally-bounded member of a 
community. Increasing knowledge, and increasing understanding of the means to achieve any 
given end, could serve to expand the desires of the unbounded individual even as it weakened the 
strength of religious doctrines that had had quasi-scientific content—thereby depriving the moral 
conscience of the individual of the traditional supports provided by religious authorities.
108 
Public opinion, for Tönnies, had close connections with the demystifying force of science. 
“Public opinion aspires to lay down universally valid norms, not on the basis of blind faith but of 
clear insight into the rightness of the doctrines that it recognizes and accepts. In both form and 
orientation it is scientific and enlightened.”
109 Generated by the increasing prominence of free 
discussion in print and in person, public opinion came gradually to consider all aspects of social 
and moral life.  The consensus assessment of practices, values, and people, spread through 
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newspapers and conversation, when “erected into general maxims constitutes a kind of moral 
code. It is, of course, a very variable code, depending on what are supposed to be the most 
advanced ideas, and it may encounter much opposition, but it is nonetheless strict in its 
prohibitions, condemnations and penalties. Since it is not concerned with the sentiments behind 
actions but only with formal correctness of procedure, it reacts only when rules are transgressed.  
Acknowledgement of positive worth is well-nigh impossible, because no more than strict 
adherence to the rules is either expected or desired.”
110 Concerned, like the institutions of 
exchange, law, and state, with formally correct procedure, public opinion could allow the free 
individual to pursue his ends with the minimum of interruption or hindrance so long as 
procedures were followed.  And indeed, many areas of opinion became matters of indifference or 
taste, or simply another region of competitive struggle to enact one’s own wishes, as in the case 
of political opinions.
111 
  With the major institutions of social life all promoting the values of the free and 
uninhibited individual, the decisions of the social agent were increasingly oriented toward the 
instrumental pursuit of his own ends.  The social powers and the individual Kürwille thus 
reinforced one another in a spiraling motion towards an ever “purer” expression of Gesellschaft, 
and the instrumentally rational actor was stripped of even the appearance of objective guiding 
values imposed from outside by powers beyond his control which Gemeinschaft had once 
provided.  Although Tönnies often suggested that both Wesenwille and Kürwille were “rational,” 
in discussions of Gesellschaft he also made it clear that “reason” in modern life meant no more 
and no less than instrumental reason, which could smoothly match the most effective means to a 
given end, but which was itself powerless to determine the proper ends to be pursued.  Kürwille 
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thus took on the traits of instrumental rationality while Wesenwille increasingly embodied a mix 
of reason and emotion, or even pure emotion, as Tönnies occasionally portrayed it in unguarded 
moments.
112 Under modern conditions, then, to be a rational individual at all meant being skilled 
at determining the necessary means to an end without having any objective reason for pursuing 
that end—only subjective inclination or disinclination. 
Tönnies drew several conclusions from this situation about the individual’s orientation to 
action.  It led, first, to a conceptual sharpening of the distinction between means and ends, as 
selecting the former became increasingly easy while choosing among ends became more 
difficult.
113 As technical knowledge grew, it led to increasingly large “chains” of means, as one 
step required another in sequence before arrival at the goal—contrasting with the more 
immediate pursuit of ends in traditional forms of action.
114 Many of the steps along this path 
might be unpleasant to the individual agent, and even when they were not actively so, they still 
appeared as necessary evils to be gotten through; as Tönnies remarked, for “Hobbes’ people and 
their descendants in my Gesellschaft,” ends and means are seen as “natural enemies, mutually 
exclusive and contradictory.”
115 In these cases, “means and end confront each other as if they 
were strangers and of a different kind; and inasmuch as the one event is a movement which 
meets an impediment in the movement or position of the other, so that they obstruct each other, it 
can be said that their confrontation is essentially hostile. Their interaction consists in mutual 
mechanical coercion; to desire the end becomes the cause of the willing of the means—which is 
supposed not to be wanted spontaneously—so that the willing of the means becomes the cause 
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that achieves the end.”
116 It was easy enough under these conditions to see not only particular 
actions but other people as merely steps along the long chain of actions required for the 
attainment of a goal, and thus instrumental rationality also had a tendency to introduce the 
treatment of others as objects or mere “stuff.”
117 Tönnies noted that from the perspective of 
Wesenwille, such actions would be judged negatively—but from the perspective of Kürwille, and 
from that of modern science itself, such a judgment cannot be made, and Tönnies explicitly 
declined to endorse this judgment of instrumental consideration of others as “evil,” however 
clear it is that he thought so as a personal matter.
118 
d)  Science and Tönnies’ Ambivalence about Modernity 
This modernization process, as Tönnies described it, yielded gains and losses. Tönnies 
did not hide his own views in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, and there was much about the 
passing of Gemeinschaft which he lamented at a personal level.  This could be taken as an 
implicit rejection of Tönnies’ own claims to objectivity or as evidence of his failure to achieve 
“value-freedom” in his own work; but it may just as well be evidence of the fact that for Tönnies, 
“objectivity is not neutrality.”
119 He did sometimes convey his own personal stance, but did not 
think that this affected the objective case made by his overall argument, for instance chiding 
Paulsen that he placed placed “too much weight on my evaluation [Beurteilung] of present 
things” and not enough on the caliber of the supporting arguments.
120 At any rate, what matters 
here is that Tönnies did not see modernity in a uniformly negative light. 
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  For the growth of “rationalism” in individuals’ thoughts and actions which yields 
Gesellschaft also brings forth modern science.  The same ability to observe acutely and 
passionlessly the “objective relations” of the surrounding world, and to represent them abstractly 
using ‘counters’ like money or concepts, leads to success in trade and in scientific research.
121 
“The societal (gesellschaftlich) process is essentially one of rationalization, and shares 
fundamental characteristics with science. It elevates the rational, calculating individuals who use 
scientific knowledge and its carriers in the same way they use other means and tools.”
122 And 
just as the increasingly instrumental-rational orientation of individual action threatens traditional 
impediments to self-interest, so scientific knowledge threatens the basic beliefs of Gemeinschaft: 
 
I have spoken already of the dissolving principle which lies in the pursuing of one’s own personal affairs, of which 
the chase after profit is but the most characteristic form. But the same individualistic standpoint is the standpoint, or 
at least the prevailing tendency, of science also. It is nominalism which pervades science and opposes itself to all 
confused and obscure conceptions, closely connected as it is with a striving after distinctness and clearness and 
mathematical reasoning. This nominalism penetrates into men’s supposed collective realities (supernatural or not), 
declaring them to be void and unreal… [except insofar as made up by individuals.] The spirit of science is at the 
same time the spirit of freedom and of individualistic self-assertion, in contradiction and in opposition to the laws 
and ties of custom—as well as of religion….
123 
 
  Tönnies was an arch-rationalist and partisan of the Enlightenment, and so his vision of 
the nature of modern science displayed an ambivalence which was absent in his condemnation of 
economic liberalism and the effects he perceived it to generate.  He was capable of going so far 
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as to see scientific enquiry as merely one facet, alongside modern politics and economic activity, 
of a general tendency of “rationalism” to gain mastery (Herrschaft) over nature and other people 
through a process of abstracting, equalizing, and manipulating objects, making them fungible 
and interchangeable, in a way more evocative of Nietzsche or of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s 
Dialectic of Enlightenment than of Tönnies’ other work.
124 But generally he extolled 
Enlightenment reason and its embodiment in modern science as a triumph over barbarism and 
religion.
125 There was an element of tragedy in the process whereby modernity shed its 
communal roots, but science, an outgrowth of that process itself, could help us observe this 
tragedy in a more or less stoic spirit.
126 Whatever our subjective assessments of the social world, 
science could help us achieve an objective understanding of it, and perhaps thereby help us alter 
it.  As one of the distinctly modern powers, science necessarily reflected the influence of 
Kürwille and Gesellschaft. 
 
III.  Values and Science 
 
Tönnies was certainly not the first to present a narrative of the transition between 
traditional societies and modern societies by emphasizing the effects of increasing rationalization 
and individualization on norms and values.  But he was first among the founders of professional 
sociology in Germany, preceding Simmel and Weber by a number of years, and helped to 
establish these as guiding preoccupations for the discipline.  We have now seen that in Tönnies’ 
vision of the post-medieval West, the values that steer human action have increasingly been 
determined by individuals acting in their own interests and deploying their knowledge, power, 
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and relations with others to advance these interests.  Social norms and human institutions, from 
the rules governing economic exchange to the rules governing the population through state 
administration, are based in the modern world on the sovereign value of the free individual.  This 
represents a substantial change from traditional beliefs which saw the individual as existing 
within a pre-established social order, governed by a hierarchical value system imposed from 
above and seen as permanent. 
This picture of social change, and of the changing perceptions of human values that 
accompany it, is familiar today.  But several aspects of it are worth noting if we are to understand 
the foundations of Tönnies’ views on value-freedom in science.  Tönnies places a great deal of 
emphasis on the actions of individuals in bringing about a Gesellschaft-like society: the drivers 
of change in his account are not mysterious social forces or laws of history, but the choices made 
by individual people.  Related to this first point, and representing the central pivot of Tönnies’ 
views on values, we have seen that even in a Gemeinschaft order, the validity and legitimacy of 
values depends on the assent of individual wills.  Without this ultimately contingent assent, 
values would cease to have their normative heft.  That is, even when seen by social actors as 
externally compelling, values are portrayed by Tönnies as rooted in personal acceptance and 
rejection—nothing more.  Finally, Tönnies sees modern science as part and parcel of a world in 
which the individual is recognized as sovereign and the role of authority is explicitly questioned.  
Science, too, has moved away from its origins in contemplation, wonder, and devotion, toward 
an ideally passionless, means-oriented study of the natural and social worlds.  It is closely 
connected with public opinion in jostling priests and prophets from their claimed authority and 
replacing churchly pronouncements with open (and open-ended) discussion of individuals’ 
opposing views under an agreed-upon set of rules.  
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These observations help to make sense of seemingly conflicting statements which 
Tönnies made in the course of explaining his views during the value judgment dispute.  
Throughout his life’s work, he consistently presented values as “subjective” in contrast to 
“objective” facts; and yet, he sometimes made statements suggesting that value judgments could 
gain a certain level of “objectivity.” The riddle is solved when we distinguish between two 
meanings of “subjective.” On the one hand, the term may suggest that values are selected by the 
individual person or subject in a way which is not universally compelling (as they would be, e.g., 
if commanded by an eternal and unchanging God or reason). On the other hand, it may mean that 
they are selected by the subject in a way which is groundless, in the sense that the selection is 
made on the basis of an arbitrary preference or decision.  In the former case, it may still be 
possible to identify areas of intersubjective agreement which can achieve a certain level of 
intersubjective or purely human “objectivity” for a given individual under specified conditions, 
while in the latter case, it is not. 
Tönnies’ contention that the normative force of values rests in the individual subject’s 
will in either Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft could theoretically be consistent with either of these 
meanings of “subjective.”  For instance, even in the absence of a universally compelling 
justification for a given value—again, say, that its validity is guaranteed by the will of God or by 
a rational argument that holds for any rational creature—it might be the case that human beings 
are so constituted that they will as a matter of fact all regard the given value as valid.  
Interestingly, Tönnies considers this first possibility in his main explicit contribution to the value 
judgment dispute in 1912.  But before we come to that, let us note that the main trend in 
Tönnies’ thinking about values from his earliest publications onward indicates he held the 
second possible meaning as the main one.  Values were subjective in the sense that they were the  
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result of a choice made on the basis of caprice, of liking or dislike: Tönnies was in ethical terms 
an emotivist. 
a)  Early Views: Value Subjectivism and Science 
As this dissertation argues, the advocates of value-freedom in the German social sciences 
adopted different parts of the value-freedom complex for different reasons.  In Tönnies’ case, the 
conviction that values were at base a matter of non-rational emotional and volitional 
commitment led him to believe that a fully rational, modern (social) science could not generate 
normative statements or imperatives for action and that the theory/practice distinction must 
consequently be carefully observed.  Tracing the roots of Tönnies’ views on the subjectivity of 
values is consequently of use in understanding what the phrase value-freedom meant to him and 
the nature of his commitment to it. 
The intellectual-historical sources of his views differentiate him in part from his fellow 
advocates of value-freedom.  As we have seen above, he was not persuaded by neo-Kantianism 
of the logical importance of the naturalistic fallacy of confusing Is and Ought or deriving the 
latter from the former.  Unlike many of the economists considered in the previous chapter, 
Tönnies’ conception of economic value was essentially classical (or, really, Marxian), and thus 
did not open a window onto the riotous world of purely subjective consumer preferences in 
which a good had no inherent value independent of the wishes and desires of the population.  
Indeed, Tönnies’ understanding of value in the economic sphere as based on cost and especially 
labor alone was more or less at odds with his insistence on the source of normative evaluation in 
the individual will—one of the areas of inconsistency in his thought.
127  Nor were his views on 
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the subjectivity of values given important stimulus by the literature of legal positivism, despite 
his interest in law in the 1880s, as was the case for scholars like Jellinek and Radbruch.
128 
Rather, in his thinking on law as on society more generally, Tönnies was profoundly 
marked by seventeenth-century literature.  We saw above (in Section I) the claim that Tönnies’ 
interest in natural law was one of the factors that purportedly kept him from endorsing the idea 
of value-freedom.  He was indeed fascinated by natural law thinking, but not, pace Sibylle 
Tönnies, because it provided a presumed instance of normative science—quite the opposite.  As 
he argued in a brief 1911 article on the relations of sociology and legal philosophy written just at 
the time of the Werturteilsstreit, “the lasting significance of natural-law legal philosophy lies in 
the detachment of the concepts of law from theology; in the claimed autonomy of the human will 
also in the matters of the morally and politically valid social values.”  Thus, he added, more or 
less following the later Rudolf von Jhering, whose attempted “renewal” of natural law he had 
studied closely in the 1870s and 1880s, “the true meaning of rationalistic natural law lies in the 
gradually pervading separation of the theory of law from the theory of morals: in the knowledge 
that law-establishing reason is and must be essentially utilitarian,” and must weigh and balance 
“conflicting interests” and “opposed elements” of society.  “The natural-law legal philosophy 
does not intend to present in detail a law valid for all times and places, but rather only to lay the 
foundation of all law, under the presupposition of general personal freedom and abstracting from 
all ethical claims and duties between people,” a goal that, Tönnies added, had to some extent 
been achieved in modern private and public law.
129 The seventeenth-century and Enlightenment 
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natural law tradition was essentially a stage in the development of a modern secular law 
appropriate to Gesellschaft, with its open individualism and absence of any claim at overarching 
norms—not, for Tönnies, a source of objective normative validity. 
Above all, it was Thomas Hobbes who served as the principal driver of Tönnies’ 
nominalist and emotivist commitments.  His early article series, “Notes on the Philosophy of 
Hobbes,” concentrated principally on Hobbes’ theory of science, setting him in what Tönnies 
argued more or less originally was the proper context of Galilean and Cartesian natural science 
and the tendency toward the employment of a “geometric” method in studying human as well as 
natural phenomena.
130  Explaining Hobbes’ nominalistic procedure of refusing to accord 
“reality” to the “names” human beings assign to the matter-in-motion that presents them with the 
uncertain appearances given in experience, Tönnies noted that Hobbes was essentially led to a 
position of separating certain knowledge of purely analytic truths (relations between “names” or 
“concepts” [Begriffen]) and uncertain knowledge of synthetic truths (the perceptions of 
experience).
131 It is easy to see how Tönnies’ own emphasis on the elaboration of conceptual 
typologies of pure sociology, and refusal to confuse pure types with the concrete phenomena of 
experience they were designed to explain, unfolded from his detailed explication of Hobbes’ 
efforts to keep names and things rigidly separate.
132  Important as this aspect of his reception of 
Hobbes is for Tönnies’ methodology, in the impetus toward type-building it lent him and in its 
role as inoculation against reifying collective concepts like “society,” what is most of interest for 
our purposes is Hobbes’ emotivism.  After describing Hobbes’ view that we can consider 
judgments of “good” and “bad” as generated by the motions of attraction or aversion with which 
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the human subject confronts stimuli, Tönnies suggests that Hobbes’ argument is “the first 
attempt to carry over to the moral arena that opposition to teleological dogmatics which rational 
physics had made possible.”
133 His lasting meaning for the realm of morals is the opposition to 
the “medieval worldview” occasioned by his “eliminating” the “objective reality of the moral 
qualities.”
134 The acting person is moved, then, not by “a specifically human, essentially 
intellectual or rational process, but rather one pertaining to the animalistic life as such or to a 
pure process of will: a changing play of affects.”
135 Although these articles were simply an 
interpretation of Hobbes’ work rather than an endorsement, the residue of Hobbesian modes of 
thinking is visible throughout Tönnies’ work. 
The debt was easily apparent in his earliest sociological writing.  At the same time 
Tönnies was completing his first series of studies on Hobbes, he was working on the brief but 
dense and convoluted first draft of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Delivered to the faculty of the 
University of Kiel in 1881 as Tönnies’ habilitation, it was turned down in favor of his Hobbes 
studies, as noted above.  Although even Paulsen gently criticized it as obscure, and although it 
contained little of the historical or developmental storyline that marks the book he published six 
years later, it does provide an early window into Tönnies’ emotivism and value-subjectivism, 
and his thinking on the proper “relations” between values and science. 
One of the most remarkable things about the document is the regular use of the words 
“values” and “value judgment,” not at all in common parlance in 1881 in their modern meanings.  
It is not entirely clear from what source Tönnies drew the terminology.  The term “value” or 
“values” was used in a non-economic sense, if sparingly, in works by Nietzsche that Tönnies had 
read, such as the 1878 Human, All-Too-Human.  It had been used by the philosopher Hermann 
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Lotze, who was highly regarded by Paulsen and with whom Tönnies tried to develop a 
relationship in Berlin.
136 And it may have been used by the logician Christoph Sigwart, with 
whom Tönnies studied philosophy at Tübingen without reporting any particular enthusiasm for 
his lectures.
137 
But regardless of the source, the draft not only showed Tönnies’ early familiarity with the 
notion of “values”; it also demonstrated that he had not just assimilated Hobbes’ emotivism but 
been persuaded by it.  The very structure of the text is reminiscent of Hobbes’ catalogue of the 
passions, virtues and traits of human psychology in the first part of the Leviathan: it is an 
extended exercise in the definition of “names.”  Tönnies’ position on values is laid out clearly.  
In contemplating the spread of the practical philosophies of the ancient schools of thought, he 
noted that these schools would probably have resisted the realization that “most of the power” of 
their ideals “is created not out of common thoughts, but out of common feelings or tendencies of 
will [Willensrichtungen], and they [the ideals] must prove themselves therein.  In reality, 
however, it is like this: anyone may claim that one’s ‘own’ is better than something foreign; but 
the category of truth finds no use here, as the category of ‘good’ finds none in pure science.  The 
one possible argument for the objective value of a philosophical life-ideal was that which Plato 
attempted to give in the Republic, B VII.  But its weakness characterizes the undertaking.”
138 
Attempts at establishing “objective” values were doomed to failure; the categories of truth or 
falsity were misapplied to questions of values, which could not be said to be objects of 
knowledge per se.  How were values grounded, then, if not in reasoned knowledge? “We are not 
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content to understand the human [das menschliche],” Tönnies argued, “but rather, like 
everything that concerns our volition [Wollen], we wish to know and to judge its value.  What 
can this involve?” Using Hobbesian language, he answered, “In life, things and their motions 
[Bewegungen] draw near to us and arouse pleasure and pain in us; accordingly, we judge them in 
diverse ways and say that they please or displease us.”  The assessment of values—including 
aesthetic and ethical values—is carried out by each individual according to a subjective calculus 
of attraction or aversion based on the sensational and emotional impact of the things human 
beings evaluate.
139 
Tönnies suggested in this early manuscript that he was in pursuit of “philosophy” 
conceived as a general cultural science that would provide a “worldview” for its adherents.  It 
has been maintained that this goal indicates Tönnies’ fundamental divergence from Max Weber 
and other adherents of value-freedom.
140 But Tönnies explicitly observed that in “this modern 
age” with its multiplication of diverging life-ideals, philosophy, “insofar as it is pervaded by an 
ideal, may even under other favorable conditions find admission only among similarly-thinking 
and well-prepared minds.”
141 This was hardly an endorsement of a normative “science” of 
philosophy.  And much more interestingly, this philosophy, as Tönnies described its role, had 
features that anticipated both Weber’s conception of the ideal type and his argument that science 
could help clarify value-positions by examining their internal structure and consistency. 
If, Tönnies suggested, value judgments express purely internal feelings of pleasure or 
pain in the individual and cannot be assessed by others as to their reality, then the cultural 
scientist must acknowledge that the nuances of particular subjective feelings will not be captured 
as generally or universally as nuances of thoughts (which are more easily subject to agreement as 
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in nominalistic definitions).
142 The appropriate method for the scientist intending to understand 
and assess a particular instance of human valuation, whether in history or in contemporary 
society, is then to attempt a thinking through of his own value judgments on the same matter as 
his subject through self-reflection, and follow it up with a comparison (Vergleichung) using the 
“rules of thought.”  He faces a fourfold task: first, he must conceptually stabilize his own value- 
judgments about the objects of his thought so that they lose their hazy outlines and take a clear 
form.  Second, he must see what most basic values, or “final values,” correspond to and direct 
these judgments in his own mind.  Third, he must determine the possible systematic connections 
between his various final or ultimate values, and between these ultimate values and the various 
value judgments he makes, assessing the entire value system for its coherence.  Finally, he will 
then be able to appraise the individual objects that his value judgments refer to, bringing him 
back in a circle to the first step.  The purpose of this procedure for the scientist is ultimately to 
identify and describe a pure, fixed, and consistent ethics that can be used—ideal typically—as a 
heuristic device against which to compare actual value judgments made by people.  This 
philosophical account is no normative science of values, but rather a neutral model for the 
assessment of value choices. 
It is not only fascinating to see one of the most famous features of Weber’s position on 
what science can tell us about our values anticipated in this unpublished text from 1881; it also 
demonstrates that Tönnies had a commitment to value-freedom early on.  Even if Tönnies did not 
publish the document until the first volume of his Soziologische Studien und Kritiken collection 
appeared in 1925, he had expressed some of his views clearly in print in the preface to 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft when it appeared in 1887: 
                                                 
142 The following account is drawn from “G&G: Theorem der Kulturphilosophie,” 9-11, and the excellent 
reconstruction in Merz-Benz, Tiefsinn und Scharfsinn, 236-39.   
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Much effort and practice are required, perhaps even a natural bent for cold reasoning, to study the facts of history 
with the same detached attitude with which a natural scientist pursues the life processes of a plant or animal. And 
even a learned and critical public does not as a rule want to be told the view of an author about how things are, how 
they came about, and how they will turn out; they would much rather hear how he thinks they should be. We are 
used to seeing facts organized according to certain premises, and this may be up to a point inevitable, but people fail 
to see that deliberate avoidance of this pitfall is what forms the scientific habit of mind. We expect and almost 
encourage the opinionated and violent rhetoric of an interested party instead of the calm and composed logic of the 
unbiased observer. Thus in modern social science, and especially in Germany, a struggle is being waged about the 
implications of underlying theory. We may well accept this as being a reflection of conflicting currents in debates on 
policy and legislation, through which the representatives of rival interests and classes may claim with greater or 
lesser sincerity to speak on behalf of opposing convictions and doctrines.... These differences may sometimes come 
from a deeper source in the moral sensibilities and inclinations of those who represent them, but even so, like other 
passions, these feelings should not be allowed to distort an objective view of things…. We must situate ourselves 
completely outside the things we are examining and observe bodies and movements as if with telescope and 
microscope.
143 
 
Here we have an early statement that should long ago have been recognized as pathbreaking. 
 
b)  Tönnies’ Contributions to the Werturteilsstreit 
We now have a full context for the documentation, explication, and critique of Tönnies’ 
views on freedom from value judgment, which will draw upon the writings and letters he 
produced during the controversies in the Verein für Sozialpolitik and the Deutsche Soziologische 
Gesellschaft between 1910 and 1914.  As far as Tönnies was concerned, there was no conflict 
between these two organizations, and he did not see his continued participation in both as 
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problematic in any way; he rejected the argument of the economist Julius Wolf that the founding 
of the DGS would lead to a loss of credibility for the Verein as its policy studies would 
increasingly look tendentious in comparison.
144 But he left no doubt that if he had to take sides 
on the matter of value judgments, he would stand with Weber: when the latter resigned from the 
DGS executive board in 1912 over what he saw as a hopeless abuse of the bylaw against the 
expression of value judgments in scientific discussion, Tönnies wrote to Simmel, Sombart, and 
Hermann Beck that “we are all, indeed, on his side in the matter.”
145 Tönnies had clearly 
demonstrated this, as we saw above, in his opening lecture at the first DGS conference in 1910.  
He wished to keep the peace between the factions—between the “committed” and the “value-
free,” as it were—but the internal logic that grew from his fundamental emotivist assumptions 
led him toward Weber, whatever hopes of reconciliation he sometimes expressed. 
The first DGS conference itself generated controversy over the value-freedom criterion, 
and in responding to complaints lodged by Hermann Kantorowicz, Tönnies provided as clear a 
statement of his continued adherence to emotivism, and its origins in Hobbesian nominalism, as 
could be wished: “We [the DGS] have placed ourselves on the nominalistic—if not also the 
theological-nominalistic—standpoint: the good and the right are always determined in the last 
resort by (human) ‘will,’ that is by feelings and purposes [Zwecke], which according to their 
nature are not general and necessary, as is everything known through reason.”
146 From this basic 
starting point, Tönnies would move in two directions: one toward Weber and the DGS, one 
toward Schmoller and the Verein. 
                                                 
144 This is the burden of Tönnies’ principal published contribution to the Werturteilsstreit, the open letter “Die 
neuesten Angriffe gegen den Verein f￼r Sozialpolitik,” originally in Schmollers Jahrbuch 36:1 (1912), 6-9; reprinted 
in TG 9, 237-41. 
145 “Wir alle stehen ja in der Sache auf seiner Seite.” Tönnies to Simmel, Sombart and Beck, 27 October 1912. GStA 
PK, VI. HA, NL Sombart, Nr. 18b. 
146 Tönnies to DGS Vorstand, 2 Nov. 1910. NL Tönnies, 61:1.1.54A. All emphasis in quoted letters (generally 
underlining) is original unless otherwise noted, and is represented here by italics.  
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The path that led toward Weber began by registering that if values were at base founded 
only on emotion and will, then there could be no scientific determination of their validity.  
Continuing his post-conference remarks to the DGS executive board, Tönnies noted that 
“Discussions of the methods for knowledge of, for the ‘science’ of, the good and right are 
thereby excluded.  We have accepted that such things are not possible without subjective 
judgments of feeling, taste, and partisanship.  And so it is, certainly.  In such things, the more or 
less ‘hot-blooded’ [‘temperamentvollen’] personalities are operative, not the more or less cool-
blooded [temperamentlosen] brains.” It was perfectly possible to discuss different tendencies of 
thought without choosing among them, but no discussion of claims to a purported 
“Normwissenschaft” was to be permitted.
147  Indeed, when Tönnies later presented his own 
preferred formulation of the idea of value-freedom, it was not that of “the exclusion of all value 
judgments,” but “‘limitation to theoretical discussion, sharp demarcation against all practical 
disciplines making claim to normative validity.’”
148 He held any prospect of a universal scientific 
system of values, with a claim to normative validity for all, to be impossible; discussion of such 
things was itself inherently unscientific. 
The reason for placing debate about Normwissenschaft outside the pale of science was 
that it was psychologically impossible to make claims on its behalf without being directed by 
one’s own feelings and partisanship: by what one preferred.  This was an instance of Tönnies’ 
favored injunction against confusing what “is” with what one “wants,” which he employed 
instead of resting his case on the philosophical distinction between “is” and “ought.” Not just in 
methodological discussions like the one over value-freedom and Normwissenschaft, of course, 
but in all social scientific work, he thought that one should aim for dispassion in studying social 
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phenomena, acknowledging the difference between one’s preferences and reality—“one of the 
hardest tests of the purity and rigor [Strenge] of theoretical consciousness.”
149 As he would put it 
in an undated manuscript written sometime after 1920, “inasmuch as I observe, research, think, I 
have no wish nor will that things may be or become anything other than what they are.”
150 There 
was, of course, a clear model for this attitude to be found.  In his opening speech at the DGS, he 
echoed his early remarks on emulating the natural scientific attitude in the first preface to G&G, 
lamenting that “the idea of wholly theoretical insight, of the study and observation of the social 
operations of our environment as if they were operations of a moon and mean nothing to us, and 
the idea of the study and observation of human passions and strivings as if they were the angles 
of a triangle or calculable curves, is still seen as being foreign to the public service aspects of our 
discipline.”
151 
Tönnies’ view of objectivity was thus the older, “ascetic” version, calling for the exercise 
of restraint and scholarly virtue, rather than the newer version guaranteed by procedures for 
challenge and validation by the scholarly community, as it appeared in Weber or, as we will see, 
in Jellinek.  Tönnies was not naïve, recognizing the impossibility of eliminating one’s own 
feelings entirely.
152 “Interest and prejudice falsify the knowledge of the facts just as strongly as 
they influence value judgments,” he noted.
153 And he recognized as well the fact that there were 
powerful outer as well as inner pressures on scholars to put the mantle of objectivity aside and 
engage in scholarly work with an explicit “agenda.” In a letter to Sombart in 1907, for instance, 
Tönnies had expressed dismay over the continuing lack of acknowledgement of his work by 
                                                 
149 Tönnies, “Sinn und Wert einer Wirtschaftsphilosophie,” SSK II, 108. 
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“Werturteilsfreiheit. Wissenschaft als Beruf.” NL Tönnies, 34:66, p.3. Can be dated to post-June, 1920 period by 
reference to Weber’s death. 
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leading social scientists, wondering “…is it merely the punishment for my outer objectivity 
[Objektivität], that I’m nearly always treated as if I weren’t there [dass ich doch fast immer wie 
Luft behandelt werde]?”
154 But he did not address the core philosophical question raised by 
Baden neo-Kantianism, the question of the inherent role of values in the very selection of any 
problem or topic for research in the human sciences.  Cornelius Bickel has pointed out that 
Tönnies’ self-proclaimed nearness to Anglo-French “positivism,” in opposition to the German 
tradition of implicitly relativistic historicism, led him to neglect the philosophical problems 
raised by the German tradition about the hermeneutic component of the human or social 
sciences.
155  He thereby failed to address the very issues which led Windelband and Rickert to 
their own consideration of the role of values in historical and social scientific methodology, 
which we examined in Chapter 1. 
Lack of engagement with these concerns was a major point of difference between 
Tönnies and Weber.  However, it reflected the absence in Tönnies of a sustained confrontation 
with some deep methodological issues rather than a substantive difference in opinion regarding 
the adequacy of the value-freedom criterion.  Far from leaving open the possibility or probability 
of a future normative science of sociology, as Klaus Heberle has claimed,
156 Tönnies’ 
psychological reformulation of the Is/Ought distinction into “Is/Wants,” in conjunction with his 
conviction of the subjectivity of values, meant that the social scientist was always obliged to 
keep the study of social reality separate from the projection of preferred social arrangements.  
Since Tönnies had started from the premise that the values guiding one’s will (or wants) derived 
from non-rational sources that could never be made universally binding, it was impossible to 
shift this position in mid-argument and claim that there was in fact a basis for scientific 
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prescription. This, in turn, meant that Tönnies could readily agree to the final element of Weber’s 
position: the social scientist was not to promote or condemn the setting of any particular policy 
goal or policy proposal on the claimed basis of his scientific authority. 
Insofar as a man was a sociologist, and not a Sozialpolitiker, wrote Tönnies in 1912, he 
“has as a matter of principle nothing to do with practical, that is, with political tasks.  He will 
exclusively address himself to theoretical problems.  That is, he not only does not presuppose that 
something is desirable [wünschenswert] or not, but rather does not concern himself at all with the 
question of desirability.”
157 He was certainly permitted, indeed encouraged, to study social 
problems that were perceived to need remedying, but without endorsing particular practical 
conclusions: “but he abstains from drawing any implications from the results,” remaining an 
anatomist rather than a doctor respective to the “social body.”
158 Tönnies thus endorsed the 
theory/practice distinction as the core element of value-freedom.  Not only in his DGS address 
but in a publication in Kunstwart shortly thereafter, he remarked of sociology that “it will be 
exclusively theoretical and not at all practical. It will know and understand the phenomena of 
social life, not master or reform them, not even in the form of teaching how one can master or 
reform them. Such a separation is necessary today precisely because of the massive expansion of 
efforts setting out from reform and renewal of institutions and orders.”
159 Tönnies endorsed this 
view in person as well as in print, attempting to ensure that it was enshrined in the DGS of which 
he remained president.  We observed above, for instance, that in 1914 the executive committee 
allowed the creation of a “social-biological section” of the association at the behest of Alfred 
Grotjahn, a noted eugenicist.  Tönnies, explicitly reminding his fellow committee members of 
their common agreement on the principle of value-freedom, remarked “that the executive board 
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can only grant its approval if ‘racial hygiene’ and ‘eugenics,’ as practical-scientific efforts, 
remain strictly excluded from the program…. Naturally, this is not to render judgment on the 
significance of these tendencies.  They belong, however, necessarily in another framework, 
insomuch as Sozialpolitik remains outside of our social and political research.”
160 
If all this represents Tönnies’ “path” toward Weber’s position, then his path toward 
Schmoller, as it were, began on the other hand with Tönnies offering a caveat to his own 
emotivism.  Even at his most conciliatory, it must be stressed, Tönnies continued to assert 
emotivist premises; in his contribution on the value judgment dispute to Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 
he stated in no uncertain terms: “That a ‘purpose’ is desirable, will however in the strict sense 
never be provable.”
161 In the strict sense: that is, rationally, definitively. But Tönnies thought he 
had found a way in which a compromise might be sought.  He suggested that the cleft between 
subjective value judgments and objective theoretical judgments was not as “absolute” as had 
been recently proclaimed (presumably referring to Weber and Sombart).  For, he observed, there 
were areas of widespread agreement on values in a given society.  Indeed, there were cases in 
which it was easier to gain agreement on a question of values than a question of fact: for 
instance, he said, it was easier to reach complete unanimity on the principle that forcing workers 
to join a union against their will was wrong, than on the interpretation of a given case as an 
instance of compulsion in fact.
162 
Tönnies claimed therefore that both objective theoretical judgments and subjective value 
judgments can be said to hold under conditions of a general level of comparability in the mental 
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constitution of human beings, whether of the “organs” of knowledge or of feeling and will.  That 
is, there is a certain range of “normal” mental functioning for human beings, in both the areas of 
value judgment and factual judgment.  A given judgment, whether it is one of fact or of value, 
may be seen therefore as objective or subjective, or even valid or invalid, depending on whether 
it is in accord or in disaccord with the normal area of functioning: 
 
Objective theoretical judgments too are valid only under the presupposition of a general human (that is to say, 
identical) composition of the organs of knowledge.  Subjective value judgments too can be raised up to a 
comparable level of objectivity [Objektivität] with a general human (that is to say, identical) composition of the 
organs of feeling and will. In one case as in the other there are physiological-normal compositions of these organs 
and in contrast pathological-abnormal compositions which necessarily lead respectively to correct and valid or to 
false, that is, invalid, merely subjective judgments of the one or the other kind [i.e. theoretical or practical].
163 
 
  Under these conditions, practical disciplines like medicine and Sozialpolitik could quite 
legitimately lay claim to be pursuing scientific knowledge, even though they definitionally 
presupposed certain value-oriented goals (health, and the improvement of social conditions, 
respectively).
164 The Verein für Sozialpolitik was therefore fully justified in being a scientific 
organization devoted explicitly to social policy in all its obvious value-ladenness: “The Verein 
für Sozialpolitik need not occupy itself at all with the objectification [Objektivierung] of value 
judgments; it can hold to certain fixed [feststehende] objective value judgments, and these too 
need not be claimed as generally valid if it simply makes the invocation: ‘I stand or fall with this, 
my presupposition, which however includes within itself an abundance of value judgments.’ The 
Verein has in fact never denied that it is in this regard ‘partisan’; whoever is against Sozialpolitik 
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does not belong in it.”
165 Hedged though this statement is, its overall intent is to justify the 
legitimacy of the Verein in its claims to represent a science of social policy. 
   How can we reconcile such claims with the position we saw Tönnies adopt above? The 
two positions appear to be in contradiction: either a genuinely normative science is possible or it 
is not.  What has happened is that Tönnies subtly—and presumably unconsciously—redefined 
the meanings of “subjective” and “objective” in the course of his position paper in Schmollers 
Jahrbuch.  From Tönnies’ standard emotivist definition of “subjective,” he has shifted to the 
meaning of “in disaccord with the average views of the relevant human group,” while 
“objective” has come to mean “in accord with the average views of that group.”  A further 
problematic feature of Tönnies’ attempted conciliatory move is that he did not define the extent 
of human group: is it the set of all functioning human beings? Is it culturally, socially, or 
temporally specific? Moreover, within the group, however defined, Tönnies seemed to believe 
that it is relatively easy to determine what the “objectively” (or, in more recent terminology, 
intersubjectively) valid value judgments are.  But he gave us no reason for this claim beyond his 
mere assertion, and a few examples—condemnation of a newspaper’s allowing its editorial line 
to be “bought” by a business interest, for instance, or the moral superiority of the claims of labor 
against capital—which can hardly be seen as uncontentious.
166 
It is also worth mentioning that his “normal functioning” argument runs the risk of 
landing Tönnies in the terrain of cognitive as well as value relativism since it involves a re-
definition of rationality as conformity to contingent standards of a given human community.  
And given Tönnies’ picture of the development of modernity and modern science, his attempted 
equation of value judgments and factual judgments as both functions of intersubjective 
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agreement must fail—for, according to his account, as scientific judgments of fact have gained 
greater certainty and universal assent in the modernizing world, moral and other value judgments 
have become less compelling of uniform agreement. Why would this be if both types of 
judgment had the same cognitive status? 
The problems in Tönnies’ account cannot be dealt with merely by observing that he has 
created a distinction between “pure” sociology and Sozialpolitik, however relevant and legitimate 
such a distinction may be.  The reason is that this formulation might lead one to believe that 
there were actually certain sciences (including the “science” or Wissenschaft of Sozialpolitik) 
which yielded objective knowledge of the validity of values, allowing us to rank value-based 
decisions and so to implement political measures in the genuine knowledge that we are right. 
This, however, is not possible on Tönnies’ basic assumptions, and it only appears possible 
because of his sleight-of-hand with the meaning of the words “normal” and 
“subjective/objective.” 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
 
It should be clear at this point that Tönnies did in fact stand with Max Weber and others 
in the value judgment dispute, however much he may have been inclined to defuse the conflict 
with more traditional, normatively-minded social scientists.  Equally apparent are the reasons 
why his cognitive commitments regarding values and normativity and his general way of 
thinking would have inclined him to this position. 
A lifelong philosophical materialist who rejected any transcendental sources of values, 
whose pessimism kept him from hypostatizing history to take their place, Tönnies was shaped by  
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seventeenth-century currents of nominalism and voluntarism and by nineteenth-century scientific 
conceptions of human will and decision-making.  More or less ignoring the neo-Kantian focus on 
the Is/Ought distinction, Tönnies was drawn to value-freedom by the logic of his own emotivist 
convictions.  Despite his reputation as a promoter of the encompassing institutions and strong 
social norms of traditional community, Tönnies neither believed that such communities could be 
revived in their old form nor that they had in fact provided sources of values that transcended the 
assent of individual feelings and volition.  This is hardly to say that he saw no difference in the 
values promoted by Gemeinschaft-like and Gesellschaft-like forms of social organization: the 
latter involved the ever-increasing presence of individualistic “arbitrary will,” and the 
abandonment of traditional impediments to it and the market-based, formal relations that 
accompany it.  But his account of the sources of norms and values shows them in essence to be 
just as dependent, metaphysically speaking, on individuals’ assent to their legitimacy in 
community as in society.  What shifts during the process of social change is not the “true” basis 
of values in the biological wills and emotional reactions of human animals, but the visibility and 
legitimacy of any source that appears and “feels” compelling, and the prominence of 
instrumental or means-ends oriented actions—both developments that tend to promote values 
originating in individual-specific and non-social wants or impulses.  Science, as a 
quintessentially modern power, is part of this process, eroding sources of externally imposed 
values, and thus can hardly be a source of normativity itself.  Moreover, in the absence of a 
universal human nature that Tönnies’ historicism leads him to reject, modern science necessarily 
also tends to remove remaining areas of apparent intersubjective agreement about values 
between individuals, since there is no reason to assume that they share goals or purposes in an 
increasingly competitive, individualistic environment.  
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Fundamentally, then, Tönnies believed that values depended on the emotions and the will 
of the individual for their validity, and that they were thus, at base, groundless.  He thought that 
by giving an account of how some groups of people could come to an intersubjective agreement 
on the validity of values, it would be possible to show that some value judgments are valid and 
some are not. This was why he kept the open stance on the question of the future possibility of a 
guiding normative philosophy or a normative science of ethics that we noted in the introductory 
section to this chapter.  And it also suggests why he thought that some judgments on the social 
policy questions of his day were simply within the range of “normal” intersubjective agreement, 
when in fact other perfectly rational people disagreed with him.  But his argument rested on a 
confusion of the two senses of “subjective,” as outlined above. If value choices really are 
dependent on emotion and willed decisions, then it is completely contingent that they will accord 
with decisions made by other individuals in a given social grouping, however defined. The social 
structure that provides for the possibility of unanimity and intersubjective agreement may itself 
change—as we have seen in Tönnies’ historical account of the shift from Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellschaft—leading to the disappearance of unanimity.  Through the definition of the average 
as the “normal” in his effort to be conciliatory, Tönnies, much like Durkheim and some other 
social theorists, has subtly and inadvertently derived an “ought” from an “is.” 
So why have we considered Tönnies as a reasonably important figure in the early history 
of value-free science? Doesn’t this attempt at reconciling “ought” and “is” mean that Tönnies in 
fact advocated a prescriptive science? On the contrary, seen in light of all of his contributions to 
the debate, what it demonstrates is rather that the notion of value-free science involved more than 
the Is/Ought distinction.  Despite his hedged and hesitant attempt to leave as an open question 
the reconciliation of descriptive and normative statements within scientific language, either in  
211 
 
certain normative sciences such as health and social policy, or in some possible future ethics, 
Tönnies called strongly for a separate, pure science of sociology that would have no business 
advocating one policy over another.  Even in justifying the practical-policy orientation of the 
Verein f￼r Sozialpolitik, as we have seen, Tönnies suggested that its best defense was a “here I 
stand” policy rather than a specious claim to be a Normwissenschaft. Because his basic 
philosophical commitments required acceptance of value subjectivism, he faced substantial 
logical pressure to make the distinction between theory and practice central to his methodology.  
Pure social science—“theory” as opposed to “practice”—could check the consistency of value 
systems in a Weberian manner, but could not generate theoretical support for holding one system 
over another.  He showed his true colors in both words and actions: the possibility of a normative 
science was at most a vague hope for the future, while the present demanded the cultivation of a 
new organization for the support of pure sociology.  For Tönnies, as for all the advocates of 
value-freedom, both theory and practice were legitimate pursuits, but they were not the same 
pursuits. 
Thus, Tönnies’ inconsistencies in practice, which are apparent to any reader of his work, 
do not reflect a lack of commitment to value-freedom.  Instead, they indicate the weakness of his 
preferred conception of objectivity within the “theory” side of the theory/practice distinction.  
Lacking the neo-Kantian impetus to consider how reference to values in social science is 
unavoidable, Tönnies continued to employ the older “ascetic” vision of objectivity, inspired in 
his case as in many others by natural scientific practice and by nineteenth-century positivism.  
“Value-freedom” as a principle could not become a persuasive redefinition of objectivity without 
addressing this problem.  Here Weber provided a more plausible solution than had Tönnies.  But 
he was not alone: as the following chapter will argue, Tönnies’ older contemporary and fellow  
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value-freedom advocate Georg Jellinek also put in place the elements necessary to transcend the 
ascetic conception of objectivity with a process-oriented conception.  
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Part II: Law 
Chapter Four 
Law as “Value-Free” Social Science: Georg Jellinek and Hermann Kantorowicz 
It is a familiar nineteenth-century literary trope: the young man enters into student life 
with dreams of becoming a philosopher or writer or artist, only to have his parents insist he study 
law and enter a practical profession.  Defiant, he rejects “bourgeois” convention and leads a 
raucous and vivid bohemian life; or, cowed, he obeys and enters into a career full of drudgery 
and meaninglessness, leading in the darkest case to despair and death.  The law, it seems, was 
not much liked by literary writers.  
 In reality, many students faced just such a choice in their university studies, but found 
that the outcome lay more or less happily between these two extremes.  Victor Ehrenberg, a law 
professor and close friend of Georg Jellinek from their student days in the early 1870s, later 
recalled that like many of his peers, he chose the study of law without great enthusiasm but 
without dislike, and pursued his literary, historical and philosophical interests at the same time.
1 
Much the same could be said for Jellinek (1851-1911) and, a generation later, for Hermann 
Kantorowicz (1877-1940) and to a lesser degree Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949), all of whom 
ultimately accepted a parental preference that they devote themselves to legal rather than literary 
and philosophical studies.  In each case, they did so by focusing on research topics at the 
borderline between law and other fields such as philosophy and history.  And whatever may have 
been the case among their fellow students who went on to state service or private practice, the 
jurists considered here would retain their early-awakened interests in philosophy and the arts 
throughout their careers. 
                                                 
1 Christian Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek im Spiegel ihres Briefwechsels 1872-1911,” in Keller, ed., 
Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek: Briefwechsel 1872-1911 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2005), 13-140, here 14.  
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  There is no question that this breadth of interests and knowledge of other fields 
contributed to the tendency toward methodological reflection and innovative scholarship in the 
work of Jellinek, Kantorowicz, and Radbruch, which forms our main subject in the second part 
of this dissertation.  Along with Franz von Liszt, Eugen Ehrlich, Richard Schmidt, and many 
others, they were instrumental in bringing the study of criminal law and “state law” (Staatsrecht) 
into the orbit of the social sciences.  The study of law in the German-speaking lands, known as 
Rechtswissenschaft or “legal science,” underwent a period of intensive methodological 
discussion beginning in the late nineteenth century which paralleled and overlapped with the 
debates among economists and sociologists that we have examined in the previous chapters.  The 
jurists’ discussions of method were hardly limited to the question of whether legal science should 
be a “social” science; they involved many other questions about the nature of purely legal 
reasoning and about a raft of discipline-specific issues.  But a very large swathe of the terrain of 
methodological argument among jurists during this period was composed of problems that had a 
direct bearing on our central question of value-freedom in social science.  And among the major 
legal thinkers of the day, Jellinek, Kantorowicz and Radbruch were at the heart of the efforts to 
conceive a form of Rechtswissenschaft as a methodologically self-aware social science that 
would ensure a clear separation of facts from value judgments and other normative statements. 
  Turn-of-the-century German jurisprudence is not particularly well known in the English-
language literature on social scientific methodology.  This state of affairs may seem hardly 
surprising, given the differences between Anglo-Saxon common law and continental civil law 
traditions, which would lead one to expect a very limited familiarity with the terms of German 
legal discourse whether today or around 1900.  In fact, many American and British scholars were 
well aware of the work of their German colleagues early in the last century.  Major American  
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social scientists from John W. Burgess to W.E.B. DuBois studied with German jurists, while 
figures in Anglo-American legal and political thought of the stature of Karl Llewellyn and Ernest 
Barker readily credited a variety of German figures in their own work.
2 But this high level of 
engagement with German jurisprudence and its methodology even among non-lawyers was not 
sustained beyond the first decades of the twentieth century. 
This chapter and the next aim to persuade the reader unfamiliar with this literature that 
jurisprudence is an important part of the story of methodological controversy in German social 
science before World War I, even though it has received relatively little attention from historians 
outside of Germany.
3 There are reasons to suspect as much from the outset.  As we have already 
seen in the case of Max Weber, recent scholarship has increasingly recognized the importance of 
“legal science” itself as an ancestor to modern social science, has indicated the extensive use of 
modified legal concepts in early social scientific explanations, and has called attention to the fact 
that many of the influential social scientists of the Wilhelmine period were originally trained in 
the law before entering other fields.
4 Moreover, many jurists were substantially involved in the 
early stages of the professional development of sociology and political science even while they 
retained their disciplinary affiliation with the law.  This is eminently true of Jellinek and 
Kantorowicz.
5 And naturally they and other legal scholars introduced elements of the 
                                                 
2 Wilhelm Bleek, Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 2001), 182-86; Michael 
Ansaldi, “The German Llewellyn,” Brooklyn Law Review 58:3 (1992), 705-777. The interest in German legal 
thought and legal philosophy is particularly evident in the two series of translations carried out under the auspices of 
the Association of American Law Schools, and published by the Harvard University Press under the heading of 
“Modern Legal Philosophy” and “20
th Century Legal Philosophy” from the 1910s to 1940s. 
3 An exception must be made for Italian scholarship on German law and legal methodology, which has been 
extensive; I have not been able to take this body of work into account, however. 
4 See Chapter Four above. For a recent and more general survey of the ways in which the study of law was bound up 
with the growth of modern social science in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Mathieu Deflem, 
Sociology of Law: Visions of a Scholarly Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chs.1-3. 
5 The period 1890-1918 also saw the shift of most universities’ departments of economics (Nationalökonomie) from 
the philosophical faculties to the legal faculties, where they formed part of a renewed alliance of law and 
Staatswissenschaft: see David Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 305.  
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methodological thinking of their social scientific colleagues back into the discussions carried out 
within jurisprudence.  This chapter and the next suggest that more careful contextualization of 
the idea of value-freedom in Wilhelmine social science must include increased attention to 
professors of law, and the ways in which specifically juridical problems entered into or were 
shaped by the broader stream of social scientific methodology. 
Methodological debate among the jurists of the German Empire played out within a 
different constellation of new and traditional problems than the one that preoccupied the 
economists and sociologists we have considered.  The most important issues were raised by a 
spate of attacks on the adequacy of two fundamental and related components of mainstream 
imperial legal thought: legal positivism and the method of legal constructivism, also known 
polemically as Begriffsjurisprudenz or “conceptual jurisprudence.” Broadly, the former offered a 
theory of the legitimate sources and forms of law, and the latter a theory of the methods by 
which it was to be expounded.  We will return to these concepts in more detail below.  Both were 
subject to question by distinguished law professors during the Bismarckian era, but the sense of 
“crisis” in the law that would later famously plague the Weimar Republic’s legal faculties and 
constitutional lawyers began to grow only in the last two decades of the Empire, as the critics 
increased in number and consequentiality after 1900.
6 
The two jurists under consideration in this chapter each contributed to the critique of 
imperial legal thought, and each sought to supplement purely legal reasoning with social 
scientific studies, although in quite different ways.  Georg Jellinek was an eminent professor of 
public law—a category which includes constitutional and administrative law—and sought to 
                                                 
6 Stefan Korioth, “Ersch￼tterungen des staatsrechtlichen Positivismus im ausgehenden Kaiserreich,” Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts 117 (1992), 212-238. Korioth principally discusses public law work by Carl Schmitt, Rudolf 
Smend, and Erich Kauffmann in the years before 1914; earlier critics included the public law specialists Felix Stoerk 
and Edgar Loening, and, much better known today, Otto von Gierke and the later Rudolf von Jhering, in the fields of 
German and Roman private law respectively.  
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reform rather than to abandon legal positivism in his studies of the state and of citizens’ rights.  
Hermann Kantorowicz, a scholar of criminal law and its history, was one of the leaders of the 
Freirechtsbewegung (Free Law movement), which was an insurgent program for changing the 
way law was applied at the level of the judicial decision and included a strong critique of the 
methods of legal constructivism.  Both were known for their affinities with neo-Kantian 
philosophy, although as this chapter will show, it is mistaken to see their methodological thought 
during the period before World War I as shaped principally by southwest German neo-Kantian 
value theory. 
It may initially seem strange to juxtapose the work of a scholar of constitutional law and 
political science with that of a scholar of criminal law and legal history.  But disciplinary 
boundaries were still fluid in the late nineteenth century—Jellinek’s early work, for instance, was 
in criminal law—and the most foundational tenets of the methodology of legal science were 
shared across the fields of civil, criminal, and public law. In order to understand Jellinek’s and 
Kantorowicz’s views on normativity in the law, and on values and value-freedom in legal 
science, we must begin by examining this shared professional background.  In the traditions of 
conceptual jurisprudence and legal positivism, problems involving the nature and grounds for 
value judgments and other normative judgments, the separation of the normative from the 
factual, and the problem of objectivity in the sciences were raised that were formative for 
Jellinek and Kantorowicz in their different ways. 
I.  The Heritage of Constructivism and Legal Positivism in Nineteenth-Century 
Germany 
The method of “construction” that gives its name to legal constructivism may be defined 
neutrally as “the logical and systematic ordering of terms, principles, and institutions of law”  
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drawn from the existing valid legal sources, however disorderly and disorganized they might 
initially be, in the pursuit of a clear system of legal norms.
7 Constructivism has typically been 
associated with the thesis that deductive logic is the only appropriate method for such ordering, 
as we shall see. Legal positivism is challenging to define, as it has taken many forms, but it is 
generally agreed to possess several basic characteristics. The philosopher H.L.A. Hart identifies 
five “contentions” which are attributable to the best-known legal positivists: “(1) that laws are 
commands of human beings; (2) that there is no necessary connexion between law and morals…; 
(3) that the analysis or study of meanings of legal concepts is…to be distinguished from (though 
in no way hostile to) historical inquiries, sociological inquiries, and the critical appraisal of 
law…; (4) that a legal system is a ‘closed logical system’ in which correct decisions can be 
deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means alone; (5) that moral judgments cannot 
be established, as statements of fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof….”
8 In short, 
law is not to be mixed with any extra-judicial input, and it is not inherent in the natural order but 
is instead a malleable set of norms produced by human beings and developed thereafter by logic.  
Nineteenth-century German positivism specifically has been “characterized by its adherence to 
three fundamental propositions about the nature of the legal order: its radical separation of public 
and private law; its insistence on treating the law in isolation from political, social, and ethical 
questions; and its conviction that the legal order, which lay beneath the often imperfect 
framework of statute laws, could be construed by value-free deduction.”
9 Positivism and 
                                                 
7 Hasso Hofmann, “From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of Traditional Legal Concepts to the Social Theories of 
Law to the Renewal of Legal Idealism,” in Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi, and Hasso Hofmann, eds., A History of 
the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900, Vol. 9 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General 
Jurisprudence (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 301-354, here 305. 
8 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 253. 
9 Michael John, “Constitution, Administration, and the Law,” in Roger Chickering, ed., Imperial Germany: A 
Historiographical Companion (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), 185-214, here 201. See also Peter Caldwell, 
Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar 
Constitutionalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 3-4, for a differentiation of the meanings of positivism.  
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constructivism are not identical, but they could easily interrelate.  Critics have argued that they 
did in fact lead in the German Empire to the same situation, in which “new [legal] cases 
requiring new decisions which were unforeseeable when the laws were enacted [did] not give 
rise to a contentual ‘enrichment’ of the laws [and especially not by the introduction of social, 
political, or economic considerations—AJS] but only to a new formulation of concepts which 
were already completely laid out in the existing system, but only not sufficiently formulated.”
10 
In other words, the law was said to develop through purely juridical logic from the norms 
contained in duly established statute or precedent alone. 
Both doctrines were mined from the seemingly inexhaustible vein of Roman law, which 
had enriched German jurisprudence in the thirteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and 
once again at the beginning of the nineteenth.
11  In the aftermath of the Napoleonic occupation, 
the Historical School of Jurisprudence, under the leadership of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, had 
directed German legal scholarship decisively away from the influence of Enlightenment natural 
law and toward the historical study of the Roman law.
12  Savigny and his students and allies were 
remarkably successful in shaping the terms of legal discourse throughout the subsequent 
decades, and their approach gradually became consolidated into what we can call classical 
imperial legal thought, marked by positivism and the “conceptual” or constructivist method.
13 
                                                 
10 Arthur Kaufmann and Winfried Hassemer, “Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in German Jurisprudential 
Thought,” University of Toronto Law Journal 19:4 (1969), 461-86, here 463. 
11 Two classic works on the history of the civil law in Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, since the early modern 
“reception” of Roman law are Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 2d ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1967), English translation as A History of Private Law in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), and 
Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, 2 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1985-89). For the nineteenth century and after, see 
also Filippo Ranieri, Das Europäische Privatrecht des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2007). 
12 Authoritative on Savigny are Joachim Rückert, Idealismus, Jurisprudenz und Politik bei Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny (Ebelsbach: Gremer, 1984), and idem., Savigny-Studien (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2011). In English, see 
also the symposium in the American Journal of Comparative Law 37:1 (1989). 
13 I borrow the term “classical legal thought” from the historian of American law Morton Horwitz, who uses it to 
refer to fairly similar patterns in nineteenth-century American jurisprudence in The Transformation of American 
Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
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This development was not linear, and any attempt to portray a mainstream “school” of 
imperial legal thought is fraught with risks.  Throughout the nineteenth century, there were sharp 
controversies
14 between advocates of “native” German private law, and two types of 
“Romanists”: historians who regarded only the original Roman sources as legally valid, 
sometimes even dismissing the sixth-century Corpus Juris Civilis as “impure” Roman law, and 
the inheritors of the sixteenth-century “reception” of Roman law, which had developed through a 
semi-scholastic tradition of commentary into a distinct body of scholarship known as the usus 
modernus pandectarum or Pandektistik.
15 Further conflicts arose between those favoring 
legislatively enacted statutory law, and proponents of slowly developing and often judge-made 
common law, while the related and ongoing debate about private law codification was not 
concluded until 1896 with the acceptance of the new Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, or 
BGB).
16  Opposing philosophies of legal validity, relying respectively on claims of fidelity to the 
original sources of the law, and on claims of the law’s appropriateness to current economic, 
social, and political conditions, were in tension throughout the century and particularly in its 
second half.
17  Meanwhile, public law scholars struggled with the question of whether it was 
legitimate to use the primarily Roman law methods and assumptions of civil law in describing 
the legal relations of state and citizen (or subject). 
                                                 
14 Rückert notes that Germanist-Romanist quarrels after the 1830s were more about politics than about method: 
Savigny-Studien, 98. 
15 Pandektistik was the nineteenth-century study of the “pandects” or “digests,” a portion of the late Roman Corpus 
Juris Civilis (the law code compiled at the behest of the emperor Justinian), in their contemporary usage, which 
formed the centerpiece of German common law (gemeines Recht) and of civil law education in the universities of 
northern Europe prior to the codification movement; the older term “usus modernus” derived from a book by a 
seventeenth-century German scholar and represented a combination of the pandects with medieval customary and 
canon law.  See Wieacker, History of Private Law, 159-95. 
16 Michael John, Politics and the Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Origins of the Civil Code (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1989), provides an encompassing history of the codification debates and their political and social 
significance. “Common law” in the German context primarily means the usus modernus form of Roman law. 
17Kauffmann and Hassemer refer to these two approaches as the “subjective” and “objective” theories of 
interpretation, respectively, owing to their attempts at reconstructing the “subjective” intentions of the original 
legislator or at assessing the “objective” social and economic needs of the day: “Enacted Law,” 465-66.  
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In light of this dissensus, the notion of a mainstream body of imperial legal thought must 
be used with caution.  Critics such as Otto von Gierke, Rudolf von Jhering in the second half of 
his career, and Kantorowicz were nonetheless persuaded that there was indeed a set of dominant 
positivist and constructivist assumptions from at least the 1850s through the 1890s, reflected in 
the standard textbooks for legal education and in the two decades of work which went into the 
preparation of the Civil Code.  The critics’ view has been the prevailing wisdom since the early 
twentieth century, though it has recently been challenged by more balanced accounts.
18 In this 
section, we will acknowledge the recent revisionist picture of mid-nineteenth-century and 
imperial legal thought, while also recognizing that the way in which critics like Jhering and 
Kantorowicz saw the state of their discipline is more important for understanding their thought 
than is the accurate reconstruction of the work they criticized. Our sole concern here is with 
constructivist and positivist doctrines bearing on value-judgments, normativity, and objectivity.  
We begin with private law. The agenda set by Savigny (1779-1861) at the beginning of 
the century involved, as already indicated, placing Roman law at the heart of legal education, and 
expounding it with careful, philologically informed attention to its original Roman meanings 
rather than to those that had grown up under the usus modernus.  Savigny spent much of his 
career gathering archival materials and publishing histories not only of ancient Roman law but of 
the medieval Roman law as well (taken on its own terms), and preferred teaching private law 
according to the Roman sources instead of offering instruction in the late eighteenth-century 
Prussian code, the Allgemeines Landrecht.
19 Nevertheless, as Joachim Rückert has pointed out, 
                                                 
18 Representative works accepting the idea of a positivist and constructivist mainstream in the Kaiserreich include 
the influential Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Springer, 1960), 16-82; Wieacker, 
History of Private Law, 279-370; and Walter Wilhelm, Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19. Jahrhundert: die 
Herkunft der Methode Paul Labands aus der Privatrechtswissenschaft (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1958). 
19 Theodore Ziolkowski, Clio the Romantic Muse: Historicizing the Faculties in Germany (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 113; 126-28.  
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the “Historical School” was not one of legal history (Rechtsgeschichte) alone, but of historical 
legal science (geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft), and it was very much oriented toward the 
socioeconomic and political issues of Savigny’s own day.
20 Savigny and allies like Georg 
Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846) fully intended to deploy the Roman law against Enlightenment 
absolutism and natural law. Marked by a late eighteenth-century revival of “ancient-
constitutionalism,” decentralization, and support for the Holy Roman Empire against princely 
absolutism, they also sought to respond to the upheavals of the revolutionary wars by remaking 
the legal order in imitation of more stable ancient Roman social relations, and by de-feudalizing 
the peasantry without destroying the estate-based social order.
21 History could be pressed into 
service, in other words, and not simply used to establish the purely juridical meaning of 
particular legal texts with philological precision. 
Not only did Savigny allot history a central place in the study of Rechtswissenschaft—a 
term that he popularized—but he held other views differentiating his work from later positivist 
and constructivist tenets.  Unlike his Kant-influenced teacher, Gustav Hugo, who had preceded 
him in attacking the Enlightenment natural law tradition of Christian Wolff and in producing 
historical studies of Roman law, Savigny rejected the strict separation of “is” and “ought.”
22 He 
was a man of his day, and that meant among other things that his thinking was deeply shaped by 
romantic metaphysics and the conviction that there were real “essences” such as the spirit of the 
people (Volksgeist)—that such terms were not only a manner of speaking but denoted real 
entities.
23  Accordingly, a recent study has argued in depth that he adopted without reservation an 
organicist metaphysics of the “objective reality” of the legal order as revealed through the 
                                                 
20 Rückert, Savigny-Studien, 80. 
21 James Q. Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 149-50 and Ch. 5 passim. 
22 Rückert, Savigny-Studien, 84. 
23 Ibid. Hugo’s critique of these ideas, noted by R￼ckert, had little effect on Savigny.  
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historical development of the Volksgeist, and that his metaphysical worldview allowed him to see 
law, like religion, as having an objective normative meaning for the individual-in-society that 
could link Sein and Sollen.
24 Yet, despite its grounding in the romantic world of ideas, several 
aspects of Savigny’s thought nevertheless helped set the direction for later developments. 
The rejection of natural law was pivotal, of course, as positivism is defined in opposition 
to natural law currents of thought.  But for Savigny as for his peers and successors the 
abandonment of natural law did not at all mean the abandonment of a rational, systematic order 
that had a life of its own.
25  In fact, Savigny inaugurated the constructivist and positivist practice 
of treating the positive law as an independent system.  He insisted that the “grammatical, logical, 
historical, and systematic” elements of legal interpretation were coequal, one of his most lasting 
doctrines.
26 There was no contradiction here because the law, developing organically rather than 
through contingent or arbitrary historical changes, could always be seen as a real “whole 
[Ganze], ordered according to [its own] principles.”
27 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde has observed 
that Savigny’s metaphysics led him in fact to a rather un-historical position from which 
systematics began to look increasingly attractive.  If history was not a process of contingent 
change, but a unified, natural, organic process directly tied to the Volksgeist, scholars did not 
need to look for law’s justification in its concrete social functions in a given society, but could 
assume it and restrict themselves to “explain[ing] and understand[ing] law in terms of itself,” 
thereby allowing them “to adopt or construct and develop legal concepts and legal institutes on 
the basis of the legal fabric as handed down.”
28 And it was noteworthy that despite the central 
                                                 
24 Wolfgang-Paul Reutter, “Objektiv-Wirkliches” in Friedrich Carl von Savignys Rechtsdenken, Rechtsquellen- und 
Methodenlehre (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2011), 74, 461. 
25 Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, 80. 
26 Rückert, Savigny-Studien, 612. 
27 Ibid., 89; Ziolkowski, Clio, 114-15. 
28 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society, and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law 
(New York: Berg, 1991 [1976]), 12.  
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place accorded to the Volksgeist, Savigny and his contemporaries saw the rigorous science of 
Rechtswissenschaft as the primary way of translating popular consciousness into the tangible 
form of a valid written legal source (Rechtsquelle).
29 This emphasis on the professional Roman 
law scholar was a manifestation not just of tendencies toward constructivist systematics but 
toward positivist concerns about impartiality, objectivity, and exclusion of extra-legal 
considerations.
30 
The professor of law oriented toward systematics would now hold the field, and his 
embodiment was G.F. Puchta, Savigny’s successor at Berlin as of 1842.  He was also shaped by 
early nineteenth-century philosophical currents, but was somewhat closer than Savigny to 
German idealism.
31 He, too, acknowledged the place of history and the Volksgeist as a source of 
law, but placed much more emphasis on the role of “expert academic interpretation” at the 
expense of popular understanding; and without reverting to reliance on a rational natural law, he 
increasingly attempted to “deduce points of legal principle from the inner-juridical preconditions 
of the [positive] law itself,” particularly from the Roman law idea of the legal person.
32 “[I]t is 
the task of legal science,” he wrote, “to apprehend the legal provisions in their systematic 
interconnection as entities which condition each other and originate from each other, in order to 
trace the genealogy of every legal provision up to its principle and likewise in order to be able to 
descend from the principles down to the lowest rungs of the ladder. In this activity, those legal 
provisions are brought to the daylight which, hidden in the spirit of national law, have come into 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 4; Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, 101, 117-19; Rainer Schröder, “Die deutsche Methodendiskussion um 
die Jahrhundertwende,” Rechtstheorie 19 (1988), 323-367, here 329. 
30 Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, presents throughout a compelling argument that the Roman law was perceived 
to be “uniquely impartial,” in strong contrast to the scattered and uncertain customary law, and its professors 
enjoyed and encouraged the associated prestige. 
31 Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Georg Friedrich Puchta und die “Begriffsjurisprudenz” (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2004), 
315-24, and Part II, Ch. 4 generally, discusses his views of Hegel—an early influence—and especially Schelling. 
Law itself for Puchta was not “rational” (vernünftig), but must become rational through its development process and 
with the assistance of legal science: ibid., 356. 
32 Chris Thornhill, German Political Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Law (London: Routledge, 2007), 192.  
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appearance neither in immediate consciousness of the members of a people and in their actions 
nor in the utterances of the legislator.”
33 
The traditional picture of Puchta’s method portrayed it as a translucent “pyramid” whose 
uppermost point is the axiom of the legal person: with each step up the pyramid to a higher level 
of generality, one can “see” the way in which the levels of rules below are ordered according to 
the principle of one’s own level, and one loses “breadth” but gains “height” in terms of the legal 
rules explicitly covered by the principle in question.
34 Puchta is said to have endorsed the 
following schema for the scientific jurist to follow when confronted with the need for a new legal 
rule: old rule—induction across the relevant doctrine (Dogmatik)—derivation of principle—
deduction from principle—new rule.  Both of these depictions imply that the jurist needs only the 
tools of logic to understand the entire legal system and how its parts relate.  A recent study has 
argued persuasively that this picture caricatures Puchta’s more nuanced theory, which was 
considerably more sensitive to history in particular, but it does not deny that he relied on the 
concept of the legal person as a “highest principle” (oberster Grundsatz) or that logical 
deduction plays a central, if not unique, role in his thinking.
35 If Savigny had once remarked that 
the juridical method entailed a level of certainty “which is not to be found anywhere outside of 
mathematics, and [that] one can say without exaggeration that [jurists] calculate [rechnen] with 
                                                 
33 Puchta, 1 Cursus der Institutionen, 9
th ed. (Kr￼ger, 1881), 22, cited in Kaufmann and Hassemer, “Enacted Law,” 
464. 
34 Larenz, Methodenlehre, 17-18, gives one such account. Sometimes the pyramid is “inverted” in order to make the 
most general principles the most “basic.” 
35 Haferkamp, Puchta: especially Part I, Chs. 1-3, and 443-460; an earlier critique, placing Puchta much closer to 
romantic metaphysics, is in Dietrich Tripp, Der Einfluss des naturwissenschaftlichen, philosophischen und 
historischen Positivismus auf die deutsche Rechtslehre im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983), 
202-3.  
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their concepts,” Puchta made this conceptual-deductive approach central to mid-century 
jurisprudence.
36 
  Constructivism and positivism gained ground especially after 1848 in part because of 
scholarly developments and in part for political reasons.  The 1840s and 1850s represented a 
shift in epistemological ideals away from the great systems of German idealism toward the 
model of the natural sciences, whose spectacular progress lent authority to those who would 
deploy their methods and metaphors in the human sciences.  The mid-century consequently saw 
the popularity of “positivism” in the more general sense, owing to Comte and his vulgarizers.  
Essentially a philosophy of science that aimed to pare down the extremes of speculative 
philosophy by refocusing attention on systematic study of empirical regularities in the physical 
and human worlds, positivism never really distanced itself as fully from metaphysical baggage as 
it claimed.
37 Its impact on legal science took various forms, including attempts at sociological 
and psychological theories of law which removed effective notions of the freely willing legal 
person in favor of determinist models, and recommended altering legal rules to correspond with 
this shift in understanding.
38 But it also gave support to constructivist and legal positivist 
doctrines. 
In legal science, no one better embodied this shift from speculative idealism to “natural 
scientific” positivism than did Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892). Throughout his life, Jhering’s 
work involved a liberal use of natural scientific metaphor; his early writings favored chemical 
metaphors, particularly the conception of legal concepts as physical “bodies,” while his later 
                                                 
36 Savigny’s Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, quoted in Peter Raisch, Juristische 
Methoden (Heidelberg: Müller, 1995), 95.  
37 There is an excellent critical survey of positivist forms of thinking in natural science, in philosophy, in history, 
and in the philosophy of natural science in Tripp, Positivismus, 43-165, which concludes that the latter three forms 
did not break away from speculation in any meaningful sense. 
38 Ibid., 257-86.  
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writings drew (in rhetoric, if not in substance) on Darwinian biology. He referred to legal science 
as a “Naturwissenschaft auf geistigem Gebiet.”
39 The substantive connection with natural 
scientific method was negligible, but it provided a new way of looking at the constructivism 
Jhering inherited from Puchta, to whom he dedicated his main early work, Geist des römischen 
Rechts (four volumes, 1852-1865). 
The second volume of this work, which was reprinted throughout the century, provided 
the classical expression of constructivism for jurisprudence in the age of Bismarck.  Mario 
Losano has argued that what truly characterized early constructivism was that it relied on a 
“substantive” or “inner” definition of “system.” That is to say, if a formal (or “outer”) 
systematics confronts a body of legal doctrine with a set of principles that allow the jurist to gain 
“orientation” or understanding of the material through an imposed order, the “inner” approach 
characteristic of constructivism takes the material itself to embody a substantive order.
40 
Although this conception coincides closely with the metaphysical assumptions of Savigny, and 
Losano suggests that Jhering was himself receptive to it, Jhering clearly distanced himself from 
the remaining historical elements in Rechtswissenschaft in the 1840s.
41 And indeed, what marks 
the new, more “scientific” version of constructivism in Jhering’s work is the appeal to method or 
technique as what constitutes the guarantee for the certainty of a branch of knowledge, including 
legal doctrine.  Where Savigny and Puchta sought objectivity in the legal order itself, for Jhering 
objective knowledge relied not on discerning the true essence of a legal system, but rather on 
deploying the right method.
42 
                                                 
39 Quoted in Hofmann, “From Jhering to Radbruch,” 304-05. 
40 Mario Losano, Studien zu Jhering und Gerber (Ebelsbach: Gremer, 1984), 114-15. 
41 Christoph-Eric Mecke, “Objektivität im Recht und Rechtswissenschaft bei G.F. Puchta und R. v. Jhering,” Archiv 
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 94:2 (April 2008), 147-168, here 158. 
42 Ibid., 159.  
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For the early Jhering, until the 1860s, legal technique meant the “simplification” and 
ordering of the inherited legal materials according to criteria similar to those proposed by Puchta.  
One of the non-scientific metaphors Jhering used to explain the process of construction was the 
alphabet: a given set of legal concepts, properly ordered according to the rules established by 
legal science, could, like letters of the alphabet, be combined in any allowable fashion to meet 
the needs of a given case or contract.
43 But his most striking claim was for the generative power 
of legal concepts.  Rather than passive ciphers ordered by the legal scholar, he sometimes spoke 
of them as “a source of new material that can never run dry” and even claimed that “concepts are 
productive: they mate and create new concepts.”
44 Such a position easily allowed for the notion 
that the legal order was a “gapless” fabric of concepts that could cover any legal case, no matter 
how novel, and in which any apparent “hole” could be closed by new deductions to fit the new 
situation. Jhering’s contemporary Bernhard Windscheid, probably the most influential civil 
lawyer in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, shared this view that the law was 
a gapless fabric, as did the author of a summa of legal positivism, Carl Bergbohm.
45 The draw of 
this viewpoint was that it presented the law as a pristine and neutral instrument which could help 
trained jurists tender unbiased and objective answers to any claimant, whether in the courtroom 
or the boardroom.  Small wonder that a thoughtful later critic like the jurist Max Rümelin 
identified the desire for objectivity and the avoidance of value-judgments as the principal reason 
for the popularity of legal constructivism in its classical form.
46 
                                                 
43 On the legal alphabet analogy and Jhering’s method generally, see Alexander Somek, “Legal Formality and 
Freedom of Choice: A Moral Perspective on Jhering’s Constructivism,” Ratio Juris 15:1 (2002), 57 and passim. 
44 Quoted in Hofmann, “From Jhering to Radbruch,” 305. 
45 Gerhard Sprenger, “Rechtsbesserung um 1900: Im Spannungsfeld von Positivismus und Idealismus,” in Gangolf 
Hübinger, Rüdiger vom Bruch and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, eds., Kultur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900, vol. 2: 
Idealismus und Positivismus (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997), 135-63, here 148-49. 
46 Max R￼melin, “Developments in Legal Theory and Teaching During My Lifetime,” (1930), in M. Magdalena 
Schoch, ed. and trans., The Jurisprudence of Interests (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 14.  
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  Political developments in Germany also contributed.  Both constructivism and positivism 
received an impetus from the responses to liberal failures in the 1848 revolutions.  In the 
aftermath of those events, the “speculation” of the idealist systems seemed not just unscientific 
but suspect through its perceived association with revolutionary violence.  Both constructivism 
and positivism, but particularly the latter, could be seen as friendly to the existing monarchical 
order, in the patchwork of German states as well as in the German empire after 1866-71.
47 But 
they could also appear to be part and parcel of German liberal goals following the revolution, as 
they were instrumental in the fight for the Rechtsstaat – the state constrained by the rule of law 
and established administrative-legal procedures.  German liberals in the 1850s,  abandoning the 
demand for active political participation up to a point, focused on achieving “legal certainty” 
(Rechtssicherheit): the impersonal, non-partisan and universal extension of uniform rules to 
cover all citizens regardless of status, which would make freedom possible in the sphere of civil 
society and the economy.
48 The exclusion of politics and political value-judgments from law in 
positivism was closely tied to this goal of decreasing the justice system’s arbitrariness and 
making it more objective.  Of course, the attempt to erect a wall of law against the tides of 
political power, and to establish formal rules and procedures based on neutral logic, can itself be 
seen as a political or value-oriented goal.
49 The genius of liberalism, its opponents have claimed, 
is that it “quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting rid of politics.”
50 
                                                 
47 For a reductionist view of positivism along these lines, see Hermann Klenner, “Rechtsphilosophie im Deutschen 
Kaiserreich,” in Gerhard Sprenger et al., eds., Deutsche Rechts und Sozialphilosophie um 1900. Archiv für Rechts- 
und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 43 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991), 11-17. Klenner uses an 1854 speech by Windscheid as 
symbolic of the decisive turn away from both the remainders of natural law in Vormärz liberalism and from 
progressive philosophies of history, and toward state authority. 
48 Michael Stolleis, Public Law in Germany, 1800-1914 (New York: Berghahn, 2001), 255-57; Pierangelo Schiera, 
Laboratorium der bürgerlichen Welt: Deutsche Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 112. 
49 As Thomas Nipperdey points out: Deutsche Geschichte, 1866-1918, vol. 1, Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist (Munich: 
Beck, 1990), 655. 
50 David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997), 39.  
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  Whether or not that is a fair judgment, it is clear that positivism and constructivism 
created a climate in which questions about the objectivity of legal science were settled by 
reference to pure logic, systematicity, gaplessness, and the exclusion of extra-judicial factors—
however the reality may have been.  When the two doctrines began to come under attack toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, from a “reformed” Jhering and others who followed in his 
tracks, it was not from a methodological angle but for their seeming inability to address the new 
social and economic conditions of a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing nation.  Proposals to 
open law to the consideration of social “interests,” such as those of Jhering’s famous late work 
Der Zweck im Recht, were intended to bypass the process of “calculating with concepts” and to 
make law more sensitive to economic realities. These efforts, of course, raised methodological 
questions in turn.  If the law were to open to social considerations beyond rote logic, what would 
keep these from destroying its precarious objectivity? If the legal order were in fact not 
“gapless,” and must rely on the introduction of human judgment about social realities, what 
would keep a judge’s decisions “objective” and preserve the separation of legislative from 
judicial powers? 
These were some of the questions confronted by legal scholars in the Wilhelmine period, 
including Jellinek and Kantorowicz.  Their answers would show, once again, a shift from a mid-
nineteenth-century conception of objectivity as the rigid exclusion of value-judgments from 
social science, to an acceptance that such judgments are unavoidable and—in Jellinek’s case—an 
attempt to provide a new way of conceiving objectivity that relied on “process” rather than on 
personal asceticism. 
II.  Georg Jellinek and the Science of State Law  
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  Jellinek has been regarded as an important methodological innovator for bringing “value-
free” and “zweckrational” social science, conceived as an ideal-type-driven, empirical 
Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, to constitutional law, and for introducing “scientific value relativism” 
into German political science.
51 His own intellectual formation as a public law scholar was 
deeply indebted to the tradition of state-law positivism represented by Gerber and Laband and 
having its roots in the private law scholarship we have examined.  But his work, beginning in the 
1870s, was marked by its ready confrontation with new currents of thought which placed 
emphasis on social and economic problems, and on the need for methodological foundations in 
the rigorous tradition of Kantian critique.  What he produced was a classical “synthesis” of 
positivist method with sociological investigation and neo-Kantian methodology, which served as 
a benchmark for later public lawyers and political scientists.
52  Basically unknown in Anglo-
American scholarly literature, and having only begun to receive attention in Germany amid a 
brief “Jellinek Renaissance” centered on the centennial of his Allgemeine Staatslehre in 2000, 
Jellinek’s methodological work deserves extended treatment.  Here we examine one aspect of it: 
his personal path to the value-freedom doctrine, and to an associated idea of objectivity, which 
he helped introduce into public law and political science. 
a)  Life, Career, and Philosophical Background, 1851-1911 
  Born in Leipzig in 1851 to a Jewish rabbinical family, Jellinek moved to Vienna with his 
family in 1857 when his father accepted a position at the new temple in the Leopoldstadt 
quarter.
53 Camilla Jellinek, his wife, would later write a rather touching description of his 
                                                 
51 Martin Sattler, “Georg Jellinek: Ein Leben f￼r das öffentliche Recht,” in Helmut Heinrichs, et al., eds., Deutsche 
Juristen jüdischer Herkunft (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1993), 355-68; Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations 
of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 220. 
52 Stolleis, Public Law, 441. 
53 Klaus Kempter, Die Jellineks, 1820-1955: Eine familienbiographische Studie zum deutschjüdischen 
Bildungsbürgertum (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998), 113-14.  
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devotion to his parents, and of the intellectual interchange between Georg and his scholarly 
father Adolf, who remained his closest confidant and advisor throughout the rest of the father’s 
life.
54 
The only tension between the two lay in Georg’s relationship to Judaism.  Despite 
Adolf’s tolerant and liberal religious convictions, his son found it difficult to muster an interest 
in the Jewish faith, and throughout the first part of his life found the official designation of 
Jewish confessional identity a burden owing to Austria’s increasingly anti-Semitic climate. As 
Camilla described her husband’s views in the 1870s and 80s, “Since this Judaism, to which he 
was confessionally indifferent and to which he felt bound for his father’s sake, threatened to 
close all free paths into life, he sometimes hotly cried out to his father, ‘I must bleed for your 
convictions!’”
55 And indeed, to some extent he did—for he had to confront vigorous anti-Semitic 
opposition in his early academic career from the Austrian clerical faction within the University 
of Vienna and the education ministry, which left him with a lifelong dislike of Catholicism.  
Shortly before his father’s death, Jellinek quietly left the Jewish religious community along with 
his wife and remained officially “without confession” until being baptized into the Lutheran 
church at the end of his life in 1910, a step he and his wife had taken for their children in 1896 so 
as to minimize anti-Semitic obstacles to their advancement.
56 
Despite this background, and despite his own lack of conventional belief, Jellinek was 
nonetheless far from hostile to religion.  He argued in his most popular book that religious 
minorities’ pursuit of freedom of belief and practice was central to the development of the liberal 
                                                 
54 Camilla Jellinek, Georg Jellinek: Ein Lebensbild, reprinted from Georg Jellinek, Ausgewählte Schriften und 
Reden Vol. 1. (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1970), 7-9. Camilla contributed to the Heidelberg tradition of professors’ 
widows writing the biographies of their husbands, joining Marianne Weber, Marie-Luise Gothein, and others. Her 
description is amply confirmed by the surviving letters between Jellinek and his father. 
55 Ibid., 10. 
56 Kempter, Die Jellineks, 288-89; Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” 138.  
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tradition of human rights,
57 and he shared prominently in the Heidelberg fascination with the 
impact of religion on other areas of social and economic life which was institutionalized in the 
Eranos Circle and included Weber, Gothein, and many others.
58 In a privately printed memorial 
of his mother after her death, circulated to other members of the Jellinek family, he wrote that “I 
understand by religion the consciousness (mediated by feeling) of the existence and ceaseless, 
unmediated  action of divine powers in the course of nature and of the fate of man,” and praised 
his mother’s deep religious feeling over the “frozen forms and customs which have become 
meaningless, in which the bulk of religion consists for the greatest number of people.”
59 
  Although occasionally chided for ignoring books on Judaism, Jellinek made full use of 
the rest of his father’s library, and was well prepared for the relatively secular and classical 
curriculum of the Vienna Gymnasium.
60  He did not spend long there, entering the University of 
Vienna in 1867 at age sixteen, where he began a program of studies that lasted him until 1878, 
excepting only a year of administrative work in the Austrian civil service.  Jellinek studied not 
only at Vienna, but at Heidelberg and at Leipzig, and proceeded to gain a very broad education 
in philosophy, law, history, economics and social problems, the natural sciences, German 
literature, and the arts.  His father supported him in this omnivorous learning, and Jellinek 
eventually earned two doctorates, one in philosophy and one in law.  It was difficult for him to 
decide on a single area of study; Camilla later wrote that “he often said that he had shed ardent 
tears over the fact that he couldn’t learn everything, everything, and assimilate it all; that it came 
                                                 
57 Georg Jellinek, Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte: Ein Beitrag zur modernen 
Verfassungsgeschichte, 2d ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1904 [1895]), esp. 35-46. This is the only work of 
Jellinek’s ever translated into English. 
58 Kempter, Die Jellineks, 285. 
59 Nachlass Georg Jellinek, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NL 1136/36. Hereafter NL Jellinek. 
60 Kempter, Die Jellineks, 154-59; Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 10-11.  
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down to having to make a choice.”
61 And so he chose the law, initially with a focus on the 
criminal law, but he continued his philosophical studies and attempted to postpone a decision 
between the two fields by writing on legal philosophy.
62 
  Having settled on an academic career by the late 1870s, Jellinek was to confront 
substantial opposition and continual reversals during the first dozen years of his scholarly life, 
largely owing to anti-Semitism.
63  His first book, the 1878 Sozialethische Bedeutung von Recht, 
Unrecht und Strafe, which was positively reviewed and was subsequently seen as an important 
step in the introduction of social scientific arguments into criminal law dogmatics, was 
unexpectedly rejected as Jellinek’s habilitation by the Vienna law faculty.  A short manuscript on 
Die Klassifikation des Unrechts, published only posthumously, was accepted the following year, 
allowing Jellinek to teach as a Privatdozent.  The same process played out in 1880-83 as Jellinek 
attempted to gain an associate professorship with an expanded remit that would allow him to 
teach state law and international law, and he was forced to write not just one but two substantial 
books on international treaties and federalism to attain the position.  His 1882 Lehre von den 
Staatenverbindungen won the admiration of the liberal jurist and influential Austrian minister 
Josef Unger, who was particularly attuned to Jellinek’s difficulties because of his own Jewish 
background.  Even Unger’s support, however, was not enough to avert a major controversy over 
Jellinek’s candidacy for a chair in state law and international law at the end of the 1880s, 
however.  Besieged by opposition from the clerical faction within the law faculty, and from 
agitation in the press about the feared “Judaization” of the university, Jellinek held out hope that 
                                                 
61 Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 12. By 1872, Adolf Jellinek suggested that Georg was beginning to act like Wagner 
in Goethe’s Faust, taking on too many philosophical interests one after the other without finishing any of them, and 
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62 On Jellinek’s university education, see Lebensbild, 12-22; Kempter, Die Jellineks, 162-190; and Keller, “Victor 
Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” 33-34. 
63 The following account of Jellinek’s career path is also based on the sources identified in the previous note.  
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the ministry’s promise of a professorship would be upheld.  When in 1889 the promise was 
broken and a Catholic professor appointed instead, he resigned his position and, with the help of 
Laband, Jhering, and others, sought habilitation in Germany.  After teaching briefly at the 
University of Basel in Switzerland, he became a full professor of public law at Heidelberg in 
1890.  There he settled into a highly successful career, which brought him renown as one of 
Germany’s most important constitutional law professors, status as Geheimer Hofrat, service as 
dean of the law faculty on several occasions, and rectorship of the University in 1907. 
  Some of Jellinek’s critics, such as Hans Kelsen, who studied with him around the time of 
his rectorship, complained about the adulation and superlatives heaped on him by his students 
and charged him with encouraging it,
64 but in fact he seems to have retained the kindly persona 
of his youth.  Like his younger friends and colleagues Max Weber and Gustav Radbruch, 
Jellinek occasionally suffered from “nerves” and personal “crises,” generally occasioned by 
overwork.  His work was interrupted by a particularly severe bout in the mid-1870s, as he 
struggled to find direction, and in 1889 the death of his eldest son brought about a deep 
depression which, as his wife observed, would return “often and quite intensively” in the 
following years.
65  But he was also known for his sense of humor,
66 ambition, and independent 
mind: Camilla observed that no less an eminence than Jellinek’s senior colleague and friend at 
Vienna, Carl Menger, once informed her, only half-joking, that he had first realized how 
uncommonly brave Jellinek was when the young associate professor voted against him at a 
                                                 
64 For Kelsen’s criticisms, see Kempter, Die Jellineks, 375. 
65 Jellinek to Victor Ehrenberg, 20 April 1876, 26 November 1876, and 31 December 1877, in Keller, ed., Victor 
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Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 55-56. 
66 He once advised his friend Victor Ehrenberg that the latter was in need of a little Viennese frivolity, for “Es ist 
doch verdammt wenig, wenn man sein Leben mit nichts anderem als dem Befolgen des kategorischen Imperativs 
ausgefuellt hat.” Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 20 September 1872, in E/J Briefwechsel, 155. An amusing example of what 
he meant is contained in a sonnet he wrote—anonymously—mocking the pomposity of the Hegelian legal 
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faculty meeting.
67  More signally, of course, by resigning in 1889, Jellinek refused to accede to 
his maltreatment by the Austrian education ministry, in a display of courage that forced him into 
a very uncertain situation with his young family. 
In part, he could rely at that juncture on his already lofty academic reputation.
68 Admired 
by senior figures like Jhering and Laband, he would also subsequently exert a very substantial 
influence on the next generation of legal scholars.  The most prominent German positivists of the 
Weimar period, for instance, Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma, were not only assisted 
directly in their careers by Jellinek, but regarded his work (in the words of Thoma) as “quite 
determinative for [their] own scientific…interests.”
69 Max Ernst Mayer, who along with Gustav 
Radbruch would introduce “southwest German” neo-Kantian thought into criminal law and legal 
philosophy, near the beginning of his career in 1901 wrote to Jellinek remarking that he was 
“proud” of the agreement between his own just-published methodological views and Jellinek’s 
own.  He also offered that hearing Jellinek’s lectures had been determinative for his 
understanding: “Erst jetzt werde ich gewahr, wie die rechtsphilosophischen Gedanken, die ich im 
naechsten Semester zum ersten mal vorzutragen  gedenke, zum grossen Teil in jenen [Jellinek’s] 
Vorlesungen wurzeln.”
70 
Jellinek was well regarded not only in his own academic home discipline of public law, 
but in many neighboring areas, particularly within the social sciences.  His interests and wide 
reading always allowed him to speak with other social scientists in an informed way about their 
particular subfields,
71 and he was viewed by his peers as being a serious contributor to sociology, 
                                                 
67 Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 47. 
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political science, history, and legal philosophy.  For instance, the historian Erich Marcks sought 
his expertise on several problems in the history of law and religious thought; Georg Simmel 
requested that he be a founding member of the German Sociological Society; and his colleague 
and later successor at Heidelberg, Anschütz, found himself compelled to send students with 
sociological questions to Jellinek, remarking with good humor that “Sie seien f￼r solche 
allgemeinen… sozialwissenschaftlichen Dingen der dominus decernens ordinarius (‘d.d.o.’).”
72 
His influence on Max Weber, both methodologically and in terms of Weber’s understanding of 
the state, has been shown decisively by several scholars.
73  Jellinek’s prestige among scholars of 
political science in the United States was exceptionally high, as his many American students 
reported to him.
74 
Jellinek had, in particular, a philosophically inclined temperament, which was also 
widely noted.  He once remarked that “I live in a marriage of convenience with jurisprudence, 
but philosophy is my love,” a statement his wife seems to have taken remarkably well.
75 In the 
preface to Jellinek’s posthumously published collected writings, his friend Wilhelm Windelband 
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75 Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 21.  
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confirmed that Jellinek’s intense fascination with ideas from all the different disciplines was 
what lent him his methodological sophistication: “It was from the rich, comprehensive 
comparison of different scientific lines of thought that he gained the methodological schooling 
by means of which he gave the treatment of the general theory of the state [allgemeine 
Staatslehre] greater impetus and wider outlines [grössere Linien] once more.” But it was above 
all a philosophical drive that had oriented Jellinek in his work since his student days, as 
Windelband rightly emphasized.  Jellinek “was led into the very midst of philosophy by the 
burning wish to become clear on the ultimate connections [die letzten Zusammenhänge] within 
his own life’s work.”
76  As Windelband well knew, Jellinek began his university education with 
the intention of doing work in philosophy.
77 In fact, the two of them became close friends in the 
early 1870s when Windelband was just beginning his teaching career, and Jellinek was his 
philosophy student at Leipzig. 
  Jellinek’s philosophical background therefore provides an indication of the sources of his 
thinking on the theory of science and on values.  From the first, Jellinek sought out forms of 
philosophy that were critical of both speculative idealism and rigid materialism while also being 
receptive to natural science.  Like most of the advocates of value-freedom discussed in this 
dissertation, he had a largely nominalistic cast of mind and placed strong emphasis on the 
importance of conceptual clarity.  His early works left no doubt that vague analogies, images, 
and attempts to mix separate problems in the interest of some sort of “higher” or purportedly 
dialectical unity, needed to be left in the past.  “The concepts for which we are searching,” he 
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wrote in 1882, “must however be sharp, definite, stable, and strongly demarcated from one 
another…. Legal concepts are always hard-edged [kantig]; the blurring of one into the other 
would be the death of science, the death of the law [des Rechtslebens].”  Life itself may be 
messy, with one relationship flowing into another, but “where concepts once begin to fall into 
the Heraclitean flux of things, there jurisprudence has lost its field.” He explicitly equated here 
the presence of conceptual clarity with the degree of scientific character achieved by a given 
branch of knowledge.
78 Even from his early days, Jellinek also associated unclear thinking with 
political intolerance and violence: discussing theosophical speculations with his father, he 
rejected the speculators’ “misty sentimentality, their [attempts] to lend clear words to their 
unclear thoughts,” and insisted that such ideas would find their logical conclusion in the images 
of heretics and stakes for burning them that he called to mind. “It is not for nothing that truth 
(Wahrheit) and clarity (Klarheit) are rhymes!”
79  
Jellinek’s nominalism was lifelong and played out in his substantive work on the state as 
well as in his methodological reflections.
80  He often warned readers against mistaking collective 
concepts for real things.  His 1879 inaugural dissertation rejected the hypostatization of a super-
personal will as a “substance” acting in history, which saw as a risk of latter-day Hegelian 
thinking,
81 alongside the slightly less mystical but no less fictional notion of a national will.
82 
Much as he appreciated incipient sociological corrections of the picture of social relations given 
                                                 
78 Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Berlin: Haering, 1882), 15. 
79 Jellinek to Adolf Jellinek, 23 November 1872, quoted in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 18. 
80 This statement requires slight qualification: a very early piece on moral statistics from 1874 showed a tendency to 
accept the idea of society as a “real” actor, capable of guilt, and a temporary explicit preference for realism over 
nominalism in this case: “Moralstatistik und Todestrafe,” in ASR I, 75. A brief summary of the ways in which 
basically nominalistic attitudes were reflected in Jellinek’s work is Gangolf H￼binger, “Staatstheorie und Politik als 
Wissenschaft,” 148-49.  
81 Jellinek, “Die Klassifikation des Unrechts,” previously unpublished Habilitationsschrift (1879), in ASR I, 76-150, 
here 80, note 2. 
82 Peter M.R. Stirk, Twentieth-Century German Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 
30-31.  
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by social contract theory, he regarded some sociologists’ reification of society as a “chimera.”
83 
And his magnum opus, the Allgemeine Staatslehre, was peppered with reminders that the state 
was no “real substance” or “organism,” despite the nineteenth-century tradition of political 
organicism: the state as a collective entity was comprised, without remainder, of the results of 
individual acts of human will.
84 Jellinek maintained that a science of “last things” or fundamental 
realities was impossible, and that knowledge was always “knowledge for us.”
85 
  Such views were explicitly held in reaction against post-Kantian idealism, and what 
Jellinek saw as its tendency to replace causal explanations with mere “names” (nomen) and 
personal opinions under cover of obscure terminology.
86  But Jellinek was not drawn by simple 
empiricism, either; he preferred among natural scientists those philosophically inclined toward a 
form of Kantianism, such as Hermann Helmholtz.
87 Altogether, Jellinek was well positioned to 
participate in the Kant revival which began in the second half of the century.  His first 
substantive published article, an account of “German Philosophy in Austria,” argued that the 
materialist or vulgar positivist reaction to idealism represented by Vogt and Moleschott in the 
1850s had lasted only until natural scientific research itself—the study of the physiology of 
human organs of perception—suggested a return “to the source of the modern philosophical 
                                                 
83 Breuer, “Fachmenschenfreundschaft,” 308. 
84 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3
rd ed. (Berlin: Häring, 1914 [1900]), 145, 150ff., 161, 167, 175; see also Hans 
Boldt, “Staat, Recht und Politik bei Georg Jellinek,” in Andreas Anter, ed., Die Normative Kraft des Faktischen: 
Das Staatsverständnis Georg Jellineks (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 13-14. This chapter will refer to the third, 
posthumous edition of Jellinek’s principal work, but only in cases where the substance of the text was not altered 
from the first edition of 1900. 
85 Oliver Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie,” in Stanley 
Paulson and Martin Schulte, eds. Georg Jellinek: Beiträge zu Leben und Werk (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000),  
315. 
86 Jellinek, Die Sozialethische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht und Strafe (Vienna: Hölder, 1878), 5-7. 
87 See the same letter of 23 November 1872, quoted in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 18.  
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spirit: the Kantian criticism.”
88 He endorsed this return to Kant, favoring a view of philosophy’s 
task as the science of sciences: the grounding and synthesizing of the separate sciences.
89 
No doubt he was given an impetus in this direction by his studies with Windelband, who 
helped him to see philosophy as a foundational epistemological science.
90  Windelband was the 
most frequently mentioned figure in Jellinek’s early correspondence, and helped make him 
aware of the work of Windelband’s own teacher, Hermann Lotze, among others.
91 Jellinek was 
particularly struck by Windelband’s early work, Über die Gewissheit der Erkenntnis: eine 
psychologische-erkenntnistheoretische Studie, and his inaugural lecture on the relationship of the 
theory of knowledge to metaphysics.
92 Jellinek’s early assessment was that “Windelband’s 
course is probably the most significant currently being given in Germany,” and that “his theory 
of knowledge [Erkenntnis] traces the most secret beginnings of our psychic activity and follows 
them up to the highest problems of knowledge [des Wissens].”
93 Windelband’s influence was 
strongest in Jellinek’s student days, some twenty years before the former’s rectoral address 
which we considered in Chapter 1, but the extent to which Windelband’s view of the sciences 
was constitutive for Jellinek is not entirely clear.  In the interest of showing his reliance on 
Windelband, it has been recently observed that Jellinek’s early work on criminal law tended to 
differentiate between the social and natural sciences according to their objects or domains—
much as Dilthey would do in his 1883 Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften—and that the 
differentiation of sciences according to method took place first in Jellinek’s 1892 System der 
                                                 
88 Jellinek, “Die deutsche Philosophie in Oesterreich,” (1874), in ASR I, 59. 
89 Ibid., 67-68. 
90 Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” 35. 
91 See, e.g., Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 20 October 1872, in E/J Briefwechsel, 158. Jellinek visited Lotze in the summer 
of 1874: see ibid., 223, note 1. 
92 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 29 April and 9 June 1873, in ibid., 180, 191-92. 
93 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 27 June 1874, in ibid., 222-23.  
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subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte.
94 And indeed, it seems likely that Jellinek’s acceptance of 
method as the criterion for differentiation stemmed from Windelband.  However, it is far less 
clear that his acceptance of the Is/Ought dichotomy and the place of values in the sciences had 
much to do with Windelband’s brand of neo-Kantianism. 
  One quite obvious alternative source for his commitment to the sharp separation of the 
factual and normative realms was, of course, legal positivism.  The most thorough modern 
student of Jellinek’s work has made a persuasive case that Jellinek’s famous “Zwei-Seiten-
Lehre” or “Two-Sides Doctrine” of the state, which holds that the state may be seen from both a 
juristic and a social scientific angle, owed more to Gerber and Laband than to neo-Kantianism 
for reasons we will examine below.
95  Jellinek’s overall debt to these two predecessors in the 
content of his Staatslehre is extensive, although owing to their parsimony in addressing 
methodological questions, their contribution to his theory of legal science may well be limited to 
encouraging him to adopt the normative-factual split that correlated with the Zwei-Seiten-
Lehre.
96 We need not belabor this connection, but it is worth observing that Laband himself 
clearly viewed Jellinek as an ally in ensuring that legal and factual-sociological analyses of the 
state were not improperly intermingled.  In letters to Jellinek in the 1880s and 1890s, Laband 
often noted their differences on individual points of doctrine but reiterated his view that “we rest 
in all principal matters on the same scientific standpoint,” and on one occasion called on Jellinek 
to demonstrate “the worthlessness of political speculations for the knowledge of legal 
concepts.”
97 In his speech at Jellinek’s funeral, Laband would remark that “In his modesty, the 
                                                 
94 Frederike Wapler, Werte und das Recht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 169. Note, however, that he held the first 
view at least as late as 1878—in other words, well after he had studied with Windelband. 
95 Jens Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 54-55, 63. 
96 Ibid., 50-68, for an assessment of the importance of Gerber (“unser aller Meister”) and Laband for Jellinek. 
97 Laband to Jellinek, 21 October 1895 and 6 January 1889, in NL Jellinek, 1136/15; see also, e.g., 29 June 1892 for 
their “complete agreement” on the “legal nature of the state” in Laband’s eyes.  
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great man who has left us [der grosse Verblichene] used to describe himself as my student.  He 
was that once [NB: Jellinek was never literally Laband’s student—AJS], but the student became 
a colleague, the colleague a master, and this master became in turn my teacher in many 
respects.”
98 
  One of the areas in which Laband could have learned from Jellinek was in the 
deployment of social scientific methods in the study of the state.  Laband may have 
acknowledged their legitimacy, but he did not pursue them.
99 Jellinek did, however—indeed, 
from the beginning of his career.  His first acquaintance with the field of social science was in 
the form of the traditional moral-political science of Staatswissenschaft, which he preferred to 
his other legal studies.
100  From there he became enamored of Jhering’s post-constructivist 
approach to the law, rejecting what he saw as the focus on antiquated legal texts and the search 
for a “magic word” in legal interpretation instead of pursuing knowledge of the social and 
economic problems or transactions the law was intended to address as its “purpose” or Zweck.
101 
He advised his friend Ehrenberg in 1873 to overcome the boredom of constructivist dogmatics 
and to “grapple, at least, with the field of social sciences [socialen Wissenschaften] which lies 
close to juridical studies—fresh life pulses there, everything there is ‘present’ [Gegenwart] and 
truth, the musty smell of past centuries doesn’t cling to it.”
102 
Particularly impressed by his Leipzig teacher G.F. Knapp’s work on “moral statistics,” 
demographic data relating to social and familial mores, Jellinek was persuaded of the existence 
of social regularities and of the need to take them into account as influences on individual actions 
                                                 
98 Laband, Untitled funeral address, printed in a Heidelberg newspaper (name and date unknown, but likely 14 
January 1911), preserved in Nachlass Gustav Radbruch, Heidelberg HS 3716 (hereafter cited as NL Radbruch), 
III.F.565. 
99 Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 64-65. 
100 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 5 August and 25 September 1873, in E/J Briefwechsel, 197, 201; see also Bleek, 
Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft, 159-160. 
101 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 30 December 1873, in ibid., 209. 
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in a criminal law context.
103 His work in the 1870s was marked by an attempt to contribute to 
“the founding of a sociology [Sociologie]…, a science of the future which possesses the closest 
contact with the study of law and politics.”
104 This work could not be described as “value-free”; 
rather, it was informed by the meliorative attitudes customary in the Sozialpolitiker of the 1870s.  
Jellinek wanted to replace the older, Hegelian theories of punishment in criminal law as the 
logical response of society to the negation of its norms through retribution.  Instead, he proposed 
an approach grounded in the empirical-causal study of human actions influenced by social 
position and authority, seeking both social reform—a shift in the purpose of punishment to 
deterrence and betterment of the criminal—and the replacement of philosophical speculation 
with positive science conceived initially in Comtean terms as the final “stage” in scientific 
development.
105 
  Although he would no longer take an explicitly evaluative, social-reformist stance in his 
writings of the 1880s and after, Jellinek continued to digest social scientific literature with 
impressive thoroughness.  He was especially well informed on the development of economics, in 
its “Austrian,” German “historical,” and even Marxist forms, as his voluminous correspondence 
with an Austrian friend, Ludwig Felix, makes clear.  He occupied an intermediary position in his 
views on the economic Methodenstreit, as he wrote in a letter to Lujo Brentano in 1889,
106 and 
recommended Menger’s Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaft to Felix during the course of their 
correspondence about the theory of economic value.
107 Throughout the mid-1890s, Jellinek 
reported on his critical engagement with Marx and with socialist or proto-socialist writers 
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104 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 26 July 1878, in E/J Briefwechsel, 278. 
105 Jellinek, Sozialethische Bedeutung, 3-5; Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” 50; Kempter, Die 
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107 Jellinek to Ludwig Felix, 2 July 1894, in NL Jellinek, 1136/43.  
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ranging from St. Simon to Werner Sombart,
108 though he clearly preferred the reformist 
economists Knapp, Adolf Wagner, Heinrich Herkner, and Brentano.  And he was an early reader 
of Max Weber, recommending Weber’s work on ancient agrarian history to Felix.
109 All in all, 
however, it is not likely that his views on value-judgments and objectivity were much altered by 
any of this literature, for he did not make use of any of it in elaborating his methodological views 
in published writings.  The roots of his affiliation with value-free social science were not, in 
other words, in the soil of his own reading in sociology and economics. 
  Before we examine these roots more clearly, it remains to place Jellinek politically.  
Although there is some debate about Jellinek’s politics regarding the prominence he accorded to 
the state, there is general agreement that throughout his life Jellinek was a moderate liberal.  In 
his student days he moved in liberal democratic and constitutionalist circles, and his early 
political views were shaped at least in part by opposition to the clerical and aristocratic right.
110 
He shared the optimistic nineteenth-century liberal attitude toward progress, civilization, and the 
heritage of the Enlightenment, admired technological and scientific development, saw a role for 
state social policy and social insurance, and consistently worked to further international 
understanding and peace through international law and tribunals.
111 He was, however, not 
inconsistently for his day, a moderate nationalist who admired Bismarck’s unification of 
Germany from the first, and he supported limited imperialist ventures much like his colleagues 
                                                 
108 See letters of Jellinek to Ludwig Felix of 20 June 1894, 8 January, 15 March and 20 October 1895, in ibid. 
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Weber and Friedrich Naumann and shared Weber’s early anti-Slavic attitudes.
112  A 
constitutional monarchist during his adult life, Jellinek followed Tocqueville in accepting the 
inevitability of social leveling and democracy but remained “ambivalent” about democratic 
institutions, and his support for parliament was tempered by opposition to ministerial 
responsibility and suspicion of party politics.
113 He saw the socialist movement as utopian and 
was concerned by its potential for violent populism, although he read and took socialist writers 
seriously as social critics.
114  He has been regarded as a typical supporter of the “etatist” tradition 
in German political thought, placing state power at the center of political life, and some have 
even suggested that he subordinated the individual to the state as embodiment of the national 
collective.
115 This is not, finally, a plausible reading of Jellinek’s political attitudes; the entire 
tenor of his life’s work was to emphasize the ways in which the modern state could limit itself to 
respect the rights and the personal and economic freedoms of individual citizens, and he was 
passionately committed to freedom of thought.
116  In short, Jellinek fit easily within the tradition 
of national liberalism, and, without ever joining the National Liberal party, he not infrequently 
addressed party meetings beginning in the early 1890s.
117  As Michael Stolleis has correctly 
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summarized, “Jellinek was a liberal, idealistic man, attuned to the creation of synthesis and 
harmony,”
118 the sort of man who would have become a cautious Vernunftrepublikaner had he 
lived into the Weimar era. 
b)  Jellinek on Values, Value-Freedom, and Objectivity in Social Science 
Although personally inclined to seek harmony where he could find it, at the 
methodological level Jellinek had more in common with the “agonistic” liberalism of his 
younger friend, Weber.  In fact, Jellinek’s position on value judgments in social science is 
structurally similar to Weber’s to a remarkable degree, a fact that deserves more notice than it 
has received.  We may outline it as follows before exploring its component parts in greater detail.  
Confronted with the situation described at the end of Section I, and with the solid grounding in 
social scientific studies and Jhering’s “interest”-based jurisprudence, which we have just 
examined, Jellinek accepted the need for jurists to consider social and political factors in their 
theoretical work on the state.  He recognized that this admission would necessarily open the door 
to consideration of value judgments regarding which interests or political actors should be taken 
into account, and how.  Unlike many of his contemporaries among the Sozialpolitiker, however, 
Jellinek regarded value judgments as only subjectively valid, mutually conflicting, and 
impossible to arbitrate using the tools of science.  He was therefore faced with the theoretical 
problem of separating true knowledge of the law and of the state from political assertion and 
opinion, which his positivist predecessors had tried to solve by the exclusion of value judgments 
in the first place. 
Jellinek’s most famous solution to this problem was the Zwei-Seiten-Lehre, which 
accorded both pure juristic methods and pure social scientific methods their place by requiring 
the strict separation of the normative and factual “sides” of the state and state law but giving both 
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“sides” their due.  Although he is best known for this doctrine, by itself it would have begged the 
question, since it did not address the underlying problem of what preserved the validity of 
knowledge on either “side” of the divide.  The Zwei-Seiten-Lehre was essentially useful as a 
defense against the sociological reductionism of those who wanted to equate the law and the 
state with raw power relations; it differentiated Jellinek from his colleague Laband only in that 
he insisted on including social scientific considerations of power, rule, and social influence in the 
same scholarly work as purely juristic concerns.  And indeed, the doctrine needed to be 
supplemented by examination of the ways in which the two “sides” related, if it were not to fall 
victim to the growing criticism that legal holdings obtained by juristic construction alone 
rendered the law inadequate to current social needs.  Consequently Jellinek adduced his doctrine 
of the “normative power of the factual” to explain the fact of interrelation between the normative 
and factual spheres. 
These issues have been the focus of discussion of Jellinek’s methodological position, but 
there remains the question faced not just by jurisprudence but by all social science that 
acknowledges the inevitability of subjective value judgments: the possibility of objectivity.  
Jellinek did not ignore this problem, and his answer comes through in a variety of his writings 
and public speeches.  He believed that in the final analysis, the choice of value-based 
presuppositions behind scholarly work was a matter of commitment (Bekennen)—not of an 
arbitrary and scattershot willfulness, but of accepting an internally consistent worldview which 
had proved itself over time, and with which one’s other commitments must be in conformity.  
Since there was a plurality of such worldviews on hand, the mechanism whereby scholarly 
stances based on such consistent worldviews were (hopefully) led to greater certainty in social 
scientific knowledge was, for Jellinek, academic freedom.  Set apart from political interference  
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and depending on a decentralized, federal system of university governance that allowed different 
views to flourish and compete, scholars could rely on their own free exchange of ideas and the 
process of history itself to lead, in Jellinek’s liberal and progress-oriented vision, to improved 
operational understanding of the world. 
Although the similarity of this position to what has come to be seen as the Weberian 
vision is striking, Jellinek – the as the oldest figure considered in this dissertation – certainly did 
not rely on the methodological positions elaborated in the Werturteilsstreit after 1900 for his 
understanding of values and value-freedom.  Nor, as we have seen, did he draw it from the 
sociological and economic literature of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which generally 
constituted the position against which the idea of value-free science was directed (see Chapter 2).  
So what were the fundamental sources of Jellinek’s attitude toward values? 
In Jellinek’s case, his ideas about the nature of values were formed early on, at latest by 
the mid-1870s, and the process had much to do with his view of philosophy and natural science.  
Fascinated by philosophical problems, the young Jellinek nevertheless showed increasing 
frustration in the 1870s with the hope that philosophy could lead to knowledge of the true, the 
good, and the beautiful.  As he completed his degree in the subject in 1871-72, he often remarked 
on what he saw as its negative impact on his life—studying philosophy was a “corrosive 
process” [Zersetzungsprozess] and it seemed to him that it “killed every fine original feeling with 
the icy breath of reflection.”
119 His short 40-page dissertation on Schopenhauer and Leibniz 
argued that the two actually held many similar basic premises but took them in very different 
directions largely because of their personal worldviews, and that “the cause [Ursache] of their 
practical philosophy cannot lie in the metaphysical dogmas upon which they wish to erect the 
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edifice of their systems.”
120 Rather, he called attention to their social circumstances and above all 
their personal temperaments to account for their different practical philosophies, and he quoted 
with approval the remark by Fichte that proved so popular among our protagonists, that “which 
philosophy a man chooses depends on what kind of man he is.”
121 By 1877, as he confessed to 
Ehrenberg, he had no faith that philosophy could offer answers, and he could no longer in good 
conscience consider teaching the subject to students. “The older I get, the more exhaustively I 
occupy myself with the old unsolved, unsolvable problems, the deeper I feel the impossibility of 
approaching the eternal, the absolute, the true, in any way other than by guessing; the more I 
realize that every apodictically expressed proposition about the last things [die letzten Dinge] is 
necessarily a lie…. The philosophical signature of our time is skepticism.”
122 
Windelband suggested that in this regard, Jellinek was enveloped by the “agnostic 
current” of the time in which he studied, and “that all his life he skeptically confronted all 
attempts at scientific metaphysics, and modestly committed the satisfaction of the metaphysical 
needs which no one could have possessed more than he, to personal convictions [alone].”
123 In 
this respect, not unlike his younger contemporary Tönnies, Jellinek was marked by the climate of 
natural scientific “positivism” of his youth without ever adopting it as his sole intellectual 
habitat.  His work in the 1870s reflected his belief that it was time to put the “phantasms” and 
“metaphysical orgies” of the past to rest, and that instead “the best criterion for any philosophy is 
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its relationship to positive, particularly natural, science. No genuine philosophy can stand in 
opposition to it.”
124 
Jellinek preferred to treat questions of values and “practical-philosophical” orientation 
naturalistically as empirical-psychological givens.
125 He was enough of a Kantian to insist that 
the world of the individual psyche or Geist was not simply reducible to an epiphenomenon of 
physical states of the human organism.  The physical world, the domain of causality and “blind 
mechanism,” contained no norms, and could not: only “in the pure region of thought does the 
perception of value-differentiations of what is [das Seienden] arise; only here are criteria 
[Maßstäbe] for assessing reality created!”
126 But he did not believe that this “creation” was 
entirely rational or that the human will could be directed in its goals by reason.  “I know that in 
all human things there is no absolute measure [Maß],” he wrote his father in 1886 or 1887. “Each 
[human] subject is, with his historically conditioned subjectivity (as the sophists were already 
aware), the only possible measure [Maßstab] of things.”
127 He refused, consequently, to teach 
that there were universally valid philosophical solutions to any problems which required that a 
normative judgment be made, including in legal philosophy.  Given the chance that same year to 
suggest requiring that students take a course in legal philosophy—one area of his own teaching 
remit—Jellinek declined, for, as he said, “There are no generally recognized doctrinal 
[dogmatische] solutions to legal philosophical problems. Such solutions must be worked out by 
each individual who has the talent for it at all; a philosophical system must be lived [erlebt], not 
                                                 
124 Jellinek, notes “Aus einem Notizbuch,” dated to 1871 and 1877 respectively, in ASR I, 168, 171-72. 
125 See, e.g., Jellinek, Sozialethische Bedeutung, 37-42. 
126 Jellinek, “Klassifikation des Unrechts,” 87. See also Allgemeine Staatslehre, 332. 
127 Quoted in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 10. Wapler also observes that his Kantianism did not extend beyond the 
separation of the worlds of causality and practical moral life to the acceptance of objectively valid norms of any sort: 
Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 166.  
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learned by rote.”
128 Nor was this situation merely temporary, awaiting further development of a 
scientific philosophy or ethics.  As he remarked in 1892, there simply was “no theoretically 
compelling proof of any basic ethical position [ethische Grundanschauung], which is to a certain 
degree always a matter of not-further-deducible personal conviction.”
129 
The upshot of these early conclusions was to set Jellinek in the camp of those who 
maintained that value judgments were unavoidably subjective and not capable of determination 
by scientific or reasoned efforts.
130  His sense of the limits to “knowledge” of morals, and his 
separation of theory and practice, were visible already in his first book.
131  People naturally 
looked to the new social sciences for answers in the pursuit of satisfying social needs, he 
observed.  But “giving the desired answer does not lie in the domain of science itself, for it can 
and wants to know only what is and whereby it is, nothing more. It is much more the work of the 
practical, purposive [zweckbewusst] mind to apply the results won on the theoretical path 
towards its goals.  In this respect it is indeed a contradiction to speak of a practical science.”
132 
He emphasized that it was a mistake—commonly made by the speculative metaphysicians—to 
claim the existence of a teleologically oriented social science, forgetting that human purposes 
must be exogenously supplied, and that “absolute knowledge” of universally valid purposes 
would be necessary for this to be a legitimate claim.
 133  “So long, however, as the existence of 
such a possibility [of gaining knowledge of universally valid purposes] is more than problematic, 
                                                 
128 Jellinek, “Gutachten, betreffend die Stellung der Staatswissenschaften, der Rechtsphilosophie und des 
Voelkerrechts” [for the University of Vienna, 1887], in ASR I, 305. He had long thought as much, having written in 
1870 that “we understand only that which we experience. We can only grasp those spiritual and psychic happenings 
which we have come to know in ourselves.” In “Aus einem Notizbuch,” ASR I, 165.  
129 Jellinek, System, 11. 
130 We have emphasized his early views to make clear that Jellinek’s value relativism did not stem from the 
Heidelberg milieu of his later work, but should note that he did not change his opinion; see, for but one of very 
many examples in the Allgemeine Staatslehre, 21. 
131 Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 96, observes this as well. 
132 Jellinek, Sozialethische Bedeutung, 13. Italics added. 
133 Ibid., 13-14. See also a later statement in Allgemeine Staatslehre, 262.  
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social science will have to be on guard against pronouncing unconditional value judgments.” 
Otherwise empirical social science would risk suffering scholars to absolutize their own 
“prejudices” or prejudgments to the level of facts.
134 Law was in a special position of delivering 
judgments based on applied knowledge, having like medicine an active and therapeutic role, but 
empirical social science was to avoid making “value judgments” altogether.
135 
This most certainly included political science, as Jellinek developed it.  As he stated 
classically in the introduction to the Allgemeine Staatslehre, 
As absolute goals can only be demonstrated only by the route of metaphysical speculation, an empirical political 
science complete in itself and invested with the general power of conviction is not possible.  Only relative political 
investigations can attain scientific value, that is, such as hypothetically take a certain goal to be achieved, but which 
must acknowledge the possibility of different teleological judgments.  As a rule, for this reason, political 
investigations come by a partisan character…. Even a cursory glance at the political literature teaches that the 
difference between worldviews, between convictions about the final goals of human communal life, determines—
often unconsciously—the direction of a very large part of political research.
136 
The partisan character Jellinek attributed to the value judgments that lay behind the 
direction of scholarly investigations in the social sciences was a reflection of his basically 
antinomian vision of Weltanschauungen or value systems.  That is to say, just like Weber, the 
much less personally pugnacious Jellinek saw the world as a stage for the conflict of 
irreconcilable ideals.  There could never be agreement on a single set of human values; indeed, 
even in a limited scientific area such as the definition of the state, no ultimate agreement was 
possible because different definitions rested on mutually conflicting and rationally 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 13-14. A good instance of this, Jellinek observes, is provided by the claims about laws of inevitable 
historical development which are supposed to provide practical orientation but which in reality simply rest on the 
authors’ “undemonstrable presuppositions” and insufficient knowledge of the facts: Allgemeine Staatslehre, 28-29. 
135 Ibid., 14. Jellinek uses the word Werturtheile here in 1878. 
136 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 13-14. NB: this passage (which is also cited by Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, 
220) appeared in the 1900 edition in the same form, and was read by Max Weber during his convalescence prior to 
his methodological writings of the years 1903-1907.  
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undemonstrable “metaphysical principles.”
137 His account of the different attitudes toward the 
proper purposes and goals of the state (including utilitarian, welfarist, libertarian, and others) 
reflects their different and sometimes mutually exclusive value-orientations.
138 
In a much discussed 1907 public lecture, “Der Kampf des alten mit dem neuen Recht” 
(The Struggle of the Old Law with the New), Jellinek expanded on this issue.  Lawyers were 
familiar with the problems raised by the conflict of recently passed laws with older customary 
and statute law, or between parties in press and parliament on the content of new legislation, he 
observed; and only seven years after the official introduction of the Civil Code his audience 
would not have been at a loss for examples.  The topic of his address was not the conflict of 
individual laws, however, but of entire legal orders.  A difficulty recognized already in ancient 
Greece in the Eumenides, according to Jellinek, there had been numerous instances of it ever 
since, from the imposition of new laws on conquered lands, to the contest for supremacy 
between church and state law in the middle ages, to the tensions between feudal-patrimonial and 
contract-based legal orders within the modern state.
139 Like all other normative orders or value 
systems, legal orders were ultimately founded on separate and irreconcilable basic principles that 
were regarded by their adherents as making claims to exclusive validity and legitimacy.  “Since 
they rest, however, on opposing principles and factually want to regulate the same domains, they 
must necessarily fall into conflict with each other.”
140 From the perspective of each, the 
extension of the opposing legal order by a judge or legislative body appeared as non-legal, as an 
act of Willkür or arbitrary will.  Describing a situation not unlike the conflict of Kuhnian 
paradigms, Jellinek observed that their partisans could not understand each other because they 
                                                 
137 Ibid., 228. 
138 Ibid., Ch. 8, esp. 239-250. 
139 “Der Kampf des alten mit dem neuen Recht: Akademische Rede.” Heidelberg: J. Hörning, 1907. Reprinted in 
ASR I without its initial paragraph; here 397-403, 404-416 for discussion of these examples. 
140 Ibid., 396.  
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spoke different, incommensurable languages.  “Since they, as it were, speak different languages, 
possess their own sphere of ideas [Ideenkreis] which is not recognized in its foundations by the 
other, they do not understand each other and cannot understand each other. In the struggle of 
intellects there is no mutual persuasion.”  The literature and arguments of both sides seemed 
designed only for their own previously convinced partisans.  It did not solve the theoretical 
problem to state that the “new” law tends by definition to replace the old, for the real issue was 
that “not statute against statute, but idea against idea, principle against principle, stand here in 
bitter conflict,” and old viewpoints could often be revitalized.
141 Any “eternal peace” between 
the two was “entirely excluded” because of their respective claims to supremacy; “one can place 
oneself in only one standpoint or the other, however the respective practical solutions may turn 
out.”
142 
  Naturally, this situation entailed difficulties for anyone upholding the possibility of a 
genuine science of the law.  Jellinek was an advocate not only of legal science, but of an 
explicitly related social science of the state, each of which confronted somewhat different 
challenges in the face of the stipulated subjectivity of all normative claims.  In order to examine 
how he dealt with this issue, we need to take in turn his account of the methodological grounding 
of state law and of the social theory of the state—both “sides” of the Zwei-Seiten-Lehre—and to 
see how they belonged together. 
The juridical science of the state was secured in its objectivity in a way indebted both to 
legal positivism and to neo-Kantianism: a strict separation of juridical from non-juridical 
considerations paralleling the distinction between Ought and Is.  In his earliest work on state law 
in the 1880s, Jellinek expressed concern about the threat of the “continual commingling of the 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., 404.  
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political with the juridical, which is equally ruinous for the clear knowledge of the one as much 
as of the other.”
143 A strenuous effort to separate the two would not lead to mere scholasticism, 
as Otto von Gierke alleged.  Gierke’s qualms would be justified if the juridical method was the 
only approach to the state allowed, but Jellinek disclaimed this as analogous to believing that 
private law alone can explain all of social and economic life. “The law is but one side of the 
state, for the investigation of whose whole extent and content almost all the sciences must work 
together…. [But] within the theory [Lehre] of the state, within Staatswissenschaft, the law is 
assigned a position that is as sharply demarcated as possible.”
144 Jellinek credited Gerber, among 
others, with showing the need for the separation,
145 but he also went beyond his legal positivist 
predecessors to call in 1892 for a justification of the theory-practice split on the basis of 
epistemological reflection.  “Without an exact demarcation of the world of juristic concepts from 
other areas of knowledge, a thriving investigation of the foundations of state law is impossible,” 
and controversy will persist until a new Kant has arisen to offer jurisprudence “a critique of the 
juridical power of judgment.”
146 Jellinek aimed to work towards, if not himself to offer, such a 
critique. 
In its most extensive form, in the Allgemeine Staatslehre, his development of this 
justification did have a notably neo-Kantian tinge.  He observed that “from the enormous, 
incalculable tally of human social actions, a part is separated out… and integrated into a unity in 
the consciousness of the political actor as well as the researcher and appraiser.”
147 He did not, 
                                                 
143 Jellinek, Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, 7. 
144 Ibid., 9. 
145 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 63-64. 
146 Jellinek, System, 13. 
147 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 137.  
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however, develop this notion in the direction of the Rickert-Weber notion of value-relevance,
148 
and in fact it was becoming increasingly common around the turn of the century for even non-
Kantian practitioners of allgemeine Rechtslehre to insist that the state could be approached from 
many different perspectives.
149 What differentiated Jellinek from them,
150 and helped open a line 
of Kant-influenced legal philosophy that would reach its fruition in Hans Kelsen, was his 
conception of the law/politics divide as a distinction between two types of sciences classified 
according to their methods: what the Allgemeine Staatslehre referred to as Normwissenschaften 
and Kausalwissenschaften, sciences of norms and causal sciences.
151 
It was not that political or social analyses of the law were ignorable or even illegitimate, 
as critics accused the legal positivists of believing; legal norms could certainly be studied as “a 
factual element in popular life [Volksleben]” by those conducting “legal- and economic-historical 
investigations, social-political critique[s] of given conditions, etc.”
152 But such approaches could 
only consider the factual effects of law according the causal-empirical method, which by itself 
could say nothing about the validity of law as a system of norms.  Only the juridical method, as a 
Normwissenschaft, could be used to study law in this manner.
153  “The doctrinal content of legal 
norms can be cultivated only through the art of abstraction from legal phenomena and of 
deduction from found norms, such as practiced exclusively by jurists,” he wrote in 1900.
154 
Normwissenschaft did not and could not, as we have seen, signal a science capable of generating 
                                                 
148 There are only four references to Rickert in the Allgemeine Staatslehre, none of which deals with his value-
theoretical approach to the cultural sciences—a term which in fact Jellinek disclaimed on the first page of the book 
in favor of the more traditional term Geisteswissenschaften. 
149 Anter, “Modernität und Ambivalenz,” 38. 
150 Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 91. 
151 See especially Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 19-21. 
152 Ibid., 20-21. 
153 As Oliver Lepsius points out, this insistence on legal science as a “science of norms” differentiates Jellinek from 
positivist writers like Laband who preferred to see Rechtswissenschaft on the model of a natural science of causality: 
“Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,”  316. 
154 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 51. See System, 3, for another (in that case, implicit) endorsement of 
constructivist methods on the purely legal “side.”  
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normative results out of itself; rather, in effect, it was the equivalent of what Jellinek referred to 
in political science as “relative” or “hypothetical” investigations
155 which took its starting point 
in foundational normative axioms that were exogenously given to the jurist.  “It is not the task of 
jurisprudence to determine the way the state is in itself [das An-Sich des Staates; by which 
Jellinek means its real empirical existence, not any sort of noumenal reality], but much rather to 
order the given [das Gegebene] according to definite purposes and viewpoints, and to subject it 
to a judgment according to the abstract norms of law.  Legal science is therefore a 
Normwissenschaft, akin to logic, which teaches us not how things are, but rather how they must 
be thought through in order to produce a knowledge without internal contradictions.”
156 The 
science of the law is, then, essentially to be seen as analogous to that of any other normative 
order, such as an ethical system or political ideology: it rests on certain basic principles, and may 
be treated scientifically as a system of norms by using logic to move from one proposition to 
another, to ensure its internal consistency thereby, and to render judgments without introducing 
arbitrary social or political value judgments. 
Thus far, Jellinek would seem to have affirmed positivist and constructivist methods 
wholesale.  But in all of his discussions of Rechtswissenschaft as an objective science of norms, 
he immediately qualified this description by observing that law, like any normative system, 
necessarily had to rest upon non-normative, factual foundations.  Oliver Lepsius nicely 
summarizes Jellinek’s position: the “givens” of the factual level, of the Is as opposed to the 
Ought, “form the basis for the normative constructions [Konstruktionen], make them possible, 
and limit them.  The legal level is indeed dependent on them as its point of departure, but then 
independent in its juristic validity.  Laws are therefore of a normative nature, which, however, 
                                                 
155 See above. 
156 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 138.  
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would be meaningless without factical foundations.”
157  Any given legal problem might find an 
objective solution within the given system of norms—but carry the line of argument far enough 
back, and the risk of either infinite regress or of a hidden, arbitrary decision to accept a certain 
legal order as legitimate became apparent.  The objectivity of the law as a science could be 
maintained only if there were an equally objective social- or “causal”-scientific account 
available of what the given axiomatic grounds of a legal order were in fact.  If all legal scholars 
could agree that one particular set of basic axioms, one legal order, was factually “given,” or 
accepted as the source of the system of legal norms, then they could all agree on what its logical 
consequences would be in any particular case without an element of subjectivity entering in.  
There must, then, be a point at which the normative and factual levels were connected, without 
their becoming intermingled or confused.
158  Here Jellinek’s doctrines of the “normative power 
of the factual” and of sovereignty came into play. 
From the beginning, Jellinek had insisted that there was a difference between separating 
Is and Ought to avoid confusing indicative and imperative propositions, and disallowing any 
connection between the two.
159 He always saw the social or political “side” of the state, and the 
social scientific methods for studying it being as more than a mere supplement to the juristic 
“side.”
160 In the System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte and the Allgemeine Staatslehre, he 
suggested that the connection between the sides lay not in raw power or force imposing law, but 
in the psychological states of the people who together made up the national state and the 
                                                 
157 Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,”  318. 
158 Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 95, rightly notes that it is strange that Jellinek was often criticized for allowing the 
juristic and social theories of the state to be presented with no connection to one another: while he made strenuous 
efforts not to mix them, he explicitly acknowledged their connection. Indeed, as we are arguing here, the connection 
was an essential underpinning for Jellinek’s argument for the objectivity of the juristic side of the Staatslehre. 
Although not noted by Kersten, one such critic is Hans-Joachim Koch, Seminar: Die juristische Methode im 
Staatsrecht (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), 67. 
159 An especially clear statement is Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, 9-11. 
160 E.g., “Klassifikation des Unrechts,” 122; System, 18; Allgemeine Staatslehre, 12.  
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community regulated by the state.  Their wills and purposes (Zwecke) were the factual grounding 
for the most basic axioms from which the entire system of legal norms branched off.
161 In what 
he labeled “the normative power of the factual,” Jellinek called attention (not unlike Tönnies, as 
we have seen), to the tendency of habitually performed actions to generate a psychological sense 
of normative force.  “Man considers that which always surrounds him [das Umgebende], that 
which he continually perceives, that which he uninterruptedly practices not only as a fact, but 
rather also as a norm for judgment,” by which he judges deviations from standard practice as 
foreign to him, and this was true of all “values” or value spheres, including in daily life as well 
as ethics or law.
162 Such a tendency could be observed in the development of children, and 
throughout human history, Jellinek argued, obviating the need to presume any special law-
creating “act” of the Volksgeist or any other collective entity beyond one of the commonest 
human psychological predilections.  And it explained not merely the origin of modern law in 
customary law, but its continuing authority.
163 Part of the purpose of the “social theory of the 
state” was consequently to provide a persuasive social scientific account of how groups of people 
came to agree on basic rules through this process, with attention to how their goals and values 
shifted over time, bringing the law with them.
164 Again, this was not the claim that the Ought of 
law could be “derived” logically from the Is of factual acceptance, but that social scientists could 
                                                 
161 Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,”  319, suggests that Jellinek treats common purposes as the fulcrum of 
connection between the normative and the factual in the System, and factual agreement among wills in Allgemeine 
Staatslehre, but both ideas are present in both works: see, e.g., Allgemeine Staatslehre, 333 for the centrality of 
Zweck or purpose in law. 
162 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 337-38. 
163 Ibid., 338-44. 
164 Ibid., 353ff. on Jellinek’s discussion of the tensions between conservative and progressive tendencies in the law, 
and the constant change that it underwent in response to social changes. Hugo Sinzheimer rightly recognized that 
Jellinek rejected the notion of a closed or gapless system of law unresponsive to changes in social purposes: 
Jüdische Klassiker, 210-11. (Jellinek speaks of the “false dogma of the closedness of the legal system” in 
Allgemeine Staatslehre, 353.) For an assessment of how well Jellinek actually employed social scientific and 
especially sociological theories to these ends, see Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 151-56; the results are mixed, though this 
has no necessary bearing on his theory.  
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establish the fact of acceptance which the jurist could then take as a “given” from which to 
derive legal conclusions in a constructivist manner. 
Jellinek’s account of state sovereignty offered another location for conceiving of how 
factual realities might connect with the system of legal norms.  The most obvious factual 
grounding for a legal order lay in the claims to authority by the state, and Jellinek’s positivist 
predecessors like Laband had simply accepted the fact of state sovereignty as the legitimate 
source of all law.
165 This practice tended to equate the power of Herrschaft with legality in an 
unreflective way, which not only irritated the critics of positivism, but also ignored the 
Hobbesian problem of how a sovereign power (the state) could be bound by law if it were also 
the source of law.  Rejecting natural law for its lack of realism, like virtually all of German legal 
opinion in his day, Jellinek agreed that the sovereign power to make law rested with the state, 
and positivization through proper enactment alone made law legitimate.
166 However, where the 
political contests surrounding state promulgation of the legal order were entirely absent in 
Laband, Jellinek made full use of them to explain the ways in which the state was constrained to 
operate under the rule of law.  Its sovereignty meant possession of unlimited power, so in order 
to make possible the Rechtsstaat—the state bound by the rule of law—the state must be able to 
bind itself to its own laws, a situation that has been referred to as “Jellinek’s Paradox.”
167  
Jellinek did offer a theoretical justification for this “self-binding” or “auto-limitation” doctrine at 
the legal “level.” If the autonomous subject of Kantian moral philosophy could bind himself or 
herself to rules, so could the state; and since it was constitutive for the idea of a legal relationship 
                                                 
165 The attribution of sovereignty to the state, rather than to the monarch or to the people, was a typical move by 
which legal positivists during the Empire deflected the question of where sovereign power really lay. The debates, in 
which Jellinek participated, about whether to conceive the state as a legal person and its officers (notably the 
monarch) as “organs” of this person need not concern us here. 
166 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 475-77. 
167 Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty, 42. Properly speaking, according to Jellinek, sovereignty did not mean unlimited 
power but the power to be bound exclusively by one’s own will (Allgemeine Staatslehre, 481) for the reason 
expressed in the following sentences.  
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that it must always presuppose at least two “legal subjects” bearing certain rights, the state must 
accord its citizens such rights and mechanisms for their protection, which meant that the state 
would have to limit itself or abandon the notion of a legal order entirely.
168 But he clearly 
stressed that what really limited state power and helped establish a legal order based on the rule 
of law, as opposed to absolutism, patrimonial justice, or some other type of order, were the 
concrete historical circumstances that allowed for competing social and economic powers to 
check the state.
169 If the political scientist could supply the public lawyer with accurate factual 
data regarding the ways in which the state’s power was constrained to establish a legal order that 
accorded with the balance of conflicting interests, then the latter would be able to pursue his 
normative inquiries at the juristic “level” without fear of losing his objectivity. 
Such was Jellinek’s theory.  It clearly attempted to defend a broadly positivistic 
conception of the task of legal science while acknowledging and actively promoting the social 
scientific study of law, and recognizing the importance of social and economic change for 
correct legal analysis.
170  As a response to the demand for greater attention to social problems in 
the law which nonetheless protected legal reasoning from becoming the mere expression of 
personal opinions on those problems, it was a remarkably workable and persuasive position.  
Nonetheless, it was open to criticism.  From one angle, it minimized the tensions between juristic 
analysis and social needs by assuming that the latter could be settled first and then taken as 
                                                 
168 For this argument, see Jellinek, System, 10; Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” 56, and especially 
Christoph Schönberger, “Ein Liberaler zwischen Staatswille und Volkswille: Georg Jellinek und die Krise des 
staatsrechtlichen Positivismus um die Jahrhundertwende,” in Paulson and Schulte, eds., Georg Jellinek: Beiträge, 
20-21, and the sources cited there (Jellinek’s earliest expression of this view dates to 1880). 
169 See the analysis in Caldwell, 42-43, and in Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and 
the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz Neumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
98-99. Jellinek was well aware that such circumstances, interests, and powers were constantly changing: see, e.g., 
Allgemeine Staatslehre, 257, and, especially, his last major work, Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung 
(Berlin: Häring, 1906). 
170 That Jellinek regarded such openness as essential is also suggested by his negative remarks on the effects of the 
constructivist-inspired Civil Code: he wrote to Josef Unger in 1908 of the “desolations” (Verwüstungen) that it had 
introduced into German jurisprudence, which, he observed “is doubtless in decline!” Jellinek to Unger, 11 June 
1908, NL Jellinek 1136/41.  
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givens by jurists, whereas on the most contentious issues, a consensus was not likely in the 
offing, and the law itself would “take sides” in the meantime if only because it would continue to 
employ its traditional holdings until and unless they became invalidated.
171  Moreover, it is 
hardly implausible to assume that a change in social and political opinions that altered one basic 
legal principle might create contradictions within the legal order as a whole, by altering its place 
in the network of other basic principles, which could not be worked out by legal reasoning alone. 
The plausibility of his position also relied on his assumption that the same object—“the 
state”—was the object of investigation of both the juristic and the social scientific methods.  For 
the basic premises supplied to the Normwissenschaft of legal science by the Kausalwissenschaft 
of the social or political study of the state needed to be the same type of propositions, or they 
could not be legitimately transferred between the two types of sciences.  Here Jellinek showed 
his debt to Gerber and legal positivism by conceiving of the state as a primordially “given” 
object studied by different perspectives, rather than as an object created by the particular method 
deployed by the scholar, in the neo-Kantian fashion of Jellinek’s friend Windelband.
172 But this 
procedure opened him to criticism from the man who would become the most consistent neo-
Kantian positivist, Hans Kelsen, who reviewed Jellinek’s work in his massive habilitation book, 
Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, in the year of the latter’s death.  Kelsen argued that 
Jellinek’s attempt to explain the connection between the normative and factual levels violated his 
own injunction to separate Is and Ought.  Jellinek’s mediation did not ultimately work, according 
to Kelsen, because the methods of Normwissenschaft and Kausalwissenschaft created two 
                                                 
171 A related criticism is that made by Stefan Korioth, who remarks that for Jellinek, “[t]he theory of the law of the 
state can merely track the success or failure of transformative strivings of political forces,” and must acknowledge 
irrational political faits accomplis without any normative theory of why it must do so: Korioth, “The Shattering of 
Methods in Late Wilhelmine Germany: Introduction,” in Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, eds., Weimar: A 
Jurisprudence of Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 46. 
172 Breuer, “Fachmenschenfreundschaft,” 314-15; H￼binger, “Staatstheorie und Politik als Wissenschaft,” 147.  
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different objects of study, namely the state taken as a unified normative order, and the state taken 
as a concrete political and historical phenomenon.  To refer to them by the same predicate 
created a confusion between the two objects that Jellinek then employed to suggest a 
connection.
173 This critique was to be extremely influential, for, as scholars of the more raucous 
debates in Weimar jurisprudence have observed, “By taking the positivism of the Empire to its 
extreme, Kelsen also forced those who rejected positivism and urged going beyond it to an 
extreme. They all believed in a one-sided state and in a one-sided way of viewing and treating 
it—albeit in a form very different from Kelsen’s.” Kelsen helped to ensure that Jellinek’s “two 
sides” were not reconnected.
174 
Finally, Jellinek’s theory meant that the problem of objectivity was moved back a step 
from the juristic to the social sciences.  Social science was to supply facts for the jurists’ 
consumption, but as we saw above, Jellinek believed that social scientific researchers relied 
inevitably on purely subjective value-orientations to give them their direction. How, then, could 
the objective social scientific knowledge of the state be provided, which was necessary for 
understanding both its factual reality and the underpinnings of its normative reality as a legal 
order? This problem would seem to threaten both the juristic and the social scientific “sides,” 
both the normative science of law and the factual science of state. 
Like most of his contemporaries, Jellinek believed on a personal level in the need for an 
ascetic practice of scholarly objectivity much as Weber did.
175 Radbruch observed that even 
                                                 
173 For Kelsen’s critique, see Korioth, “Shattering of Methods,” 47; Stirk, Twentieth-Century German Political 
Thought, 25; Stolleis, Public Law, 443. For a defense of Jellinek (who was indeed well aware of the constitutive 
effects of scholarly perspective, as we saw above), see Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 171-73, who points out it is not 
necessary to assume that there can be no single transcendental object behind the empirical objects created by the two 
methods, and that neither Windelband nor Rickert joined Kelsen in assuming this. 
174 Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, “Introduction: Constitutional Crisis: The German and American 
Experience,” in Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, 16-17. 
175 Anter, “Modernität und Ambivalenz,” 42, calls attention to his “calvinistisch strenge[n] Wissenschaftsideal” and 
self-discipline bordering on asceticism, and points to various places where Jellinek rejected political passion in favor  
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Jellinek’s interventions on topical political issues in the last decade of his life were written “with 
the skepticism of the theoretical-contemplative man,”
176 a trait which seems to have been with 
him from his youth, since he was willing to criticize his liberal compatriots in the feuilletons of 
the Vienna press for debasing “true, genuine science” by politicizing it for their own gain against 
the clerical adversaries they shared.
177 And he certainly rejected explicitly partisan scholarship, 
as is apparent from his report to Ludwig Felix from 1893 about a discussion in which the famous 
historian Theodor Mommsen had debated with him about the possibility of objectivity in 
scholarship—and the fact that he later agreed with Mommsen’s opposition to what they both 
perceived as the establishment of a specifically Catholic chair of history at Strassburg for the son 
of a Catholic Center Party leader in the “Martin Spahn affair” of 1901.
178 
Nonetheless, for reasons suggested above, it was clear that a call for personal virtue 
would never be enough to secure objectivity for Jellinek.  In practice, he insisted, positivists who 
had relied on ethical injunctions to exclude “political value-criteria” made them implicitly or 
explicitly all the time, and if anything the process was intensifying, threatening to make the 
science of state law merely a “handmaid” for party politics much as philosophy once was for 
theology.
179 The very idea of producing scientific knowledge without the presuppositions 
delivered by subjective value judgments was “impossible,” for “absolute presuppositionlessness 
                                                                                                                                                             
of calm scientific analysis from 1885 to his death (“To express political wishes here is not my office [Amt],” and so 
forth). 
176 Radbruch, untitled review essay in Biographische Schriften, 22. 
177 Jellinek, “Die deutsche Philosophie in ￖsterreich,” ASR I, 65-66. 
178 Jellinek to Ludwig Felix, 5 June 1893, in NL Jellinek 1136/43 (a letter reprinted inaccurately and with silent 
deletions in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild). On the Spahn case, see Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 29 December 1901 in E/J 
Briefwechsel, 419 and Paul Hensel to Jellinek, 20 December 1901, in NL Jellinek 1136/11, as well as Kempter, Die 
Jellineks, 334. 
179 Jellinek, “Kampf des alten mit dem neuen Recht,” ASR I, 423.  
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in human things does not exist,” and the human subject conditioned the knowledge he or she 
produced just as the constitution of a mirror conditioned what it could reflect.
180  
Man is himself always the presupposition of his research, and this man is not thinkable as a tabula rasa which is to 
be first described by the researcher.  Each individual can approach the material he is to study only in his capacity as 
the product of an unending series of cultural forces [Kulturwirkungen].  So it is, then, quite natural that the scholar 
of state law cannot be entirely without political opinions when he enters his area of knowledge.  Who could address 
himself to the study of human institutions, according to any particular orientation, if he were not able to ascribe 
some values to them!
181 
These orientation-providing values were obtained simply by commitment or avowal.  
“For the final foundations of our research here, as everywhere, there is no doubt-free knowing, 
but only an avowal [Bekennen] is possible, and unity in commitment [Bekenntnis] is as little to 
be found here as in any other area.  But random, arbitrary will in the choice of commitment by 
no means prevails in science.” For every scientific stance (Richtung) “which wants to pass 
critical muster can in the final analysis grow only from the soil of a firm [festen] and self-
contained Weltanschauung.”
182 This meant, above all, a thoroughgoing and rational consistency 
within one’s value set.  If one were to adopt a particular value-based preference, for instance that 
of the medieval conception of sovereignty as the preferred doctrine of state, one would then have 
to abjure all other modern developments that would conflict with this preference.  If unable 
realistically to remove these developments, one must either abandon one’s value commitment or 
adopt the attitude of Don Quixote, who, Jellinek observed, at least maintained his nobility 
through a consistency of worldview and a denial of opportunism.
183 
                                                 
180 Jellinek, System, 12. 
181 Jellinek, “Kampf,” 424-25. 
182 Ibid., 425. 
183 Ibid.  
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Such worldviews might be more or less appropriate to their times, as this example was 
meant to show, and on a practical level, this fact helped the individual in deciding between 
them.
184  Nevertheless, he wrote, “in all the opposition of opinions, which is unavoidably 
connected with any activity of valuing, the possibilities for assessing the past from… a universal 
standpoint are limited.”
185 There was, after all, inevitably a plurality of ‘living’ worldviews at 
any given time, and even those which were not a ‘live option’ for many people were capable of 
resuscitation by quixotic individuals.  Universal agreement in Jellinek’s pluralist world was not 
likely. Far from deploring this situation, however, Jellinek saw in it the very precondition for 
progress in knowledge.  In his academic addresses during the year of his rectorship, Jellinek 
voiced approval of the plurality and competition of opinions and worldviews, and the danger of 
having unity in intellectual life at the cost of authoritarian imposition.  “ [A] great people can 
only regard the subjection of its whole intellectual life under central direction [zentrale Leitung] 
as a grievous national disaster,”
186 he observed, since it was awareness and acknowledgment of 
plurality that kept the researcher from “one-sidedness” and the restraint or limitation of 
knowledge.
187 
The Grand Duke of Baden, whom Jellinek so admired, had done his duchy a great service 
by his willingness to promote intellectual and academic freedom.  The freedom to argue as one 
saw fit was not then, and never would be, free from threat.  “Once,” Jellinek wrote, “one 
believed naively that popular freedom [Volksfreiheit] also meant intellectual freedom.  Today we 
know that political parties that have their firm support in broad popular circles can become even 
                                                 
184 Sinzheimer, Jüdische Klassiker, 228, rightly points to Jellinek’s use of historical appropriateness and “world 
history as judge” to suggest which self-contained Weltanschauungen might be most appropriate, though he leaves 
the mistaken impression that Jellinek regarded the judgments of world history as more definitive than in fact he did. 
185 Jellinek, “Kampf,” 426. 
186 Jellinek, “Grossherzog Friedrich I. von Baden…Gedächtnisrede,” 385-86. 
187 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 74.  
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more dangerous to the freedom of research and teaching, as the governments are often dependent 
on the support of those parties.”
188 Doubtless his own experience with political interference in 
academic life in the 1880s had a bearing on his views.  Much like Laband in his experience of 
anti-Semitic hindrances and concerns about right- and left-wing populism, Jellinek would have 
wholly endorsed the sentiments of a letter the former once wrote him, remarking that “I have 
always wished you a professorship in which, free from the hustle and bustle of parties 
[Parteigetriebe] and from political bickering, you can live solely in your scientific studies.”
189 It 
was above all federalism, decentralization, and competition among universities and among 
professors, which Jellinek saw as ensuring the progress of science, keeping it free of external 
political threats and the internal threat of a single opinion.
190  The comments he made to this 
effect in October 1907 at the opening of a museum in Frankfurt deserve to be quoted extensively.  
He found it especially admirable that the museum had been opened with the support and at the 
behest of private citizens, a deed that 
 
enhances and supports in a peculiar way not only German science, but science as a whole. There is no human and 
national interest which so requires decentralization [Dezentralisation] as science, which can indeed be supported 
from the outside, but never created; which can only bloom in the greatest multiplicity of institutions and 
personalities—science, which must breathe the air of fullest freedom of intellect and research [Wissenschaft, deren 
Lebensluft die vollste Freiheit des Geistes und des Forschens ist]. Such freedom is protected, with us, by the wise 
self-limitation of the state, protected through the existence of a great number of independent members of our Empire 
all competing with each other in the wide domain of the fostering of culture. But even with the best intentions of the 
leading men, political streams may well up that threaten a flood against this freedom. Moreover, one-sided 
dominance of schools within the academies can lead to the exclusion of newly emerging directions and thereby to a 
                                                 
188 Jellinek, “Grossherzog Friedrich I. von Baden…Gedächtnisrede,” 381. 
189 Laband to Jellinek, 29 December 1892, in NL Jellinek, 1136/15. 
190 Jellinek, “Grossherzog Friedrich I. von Baden…Gedächtnisrede,” 386.  
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bending of the free mind.  And therefore it is of the highest importance that free associations exist, which in their 
way promote multiplicity and safeguard and ensure [gewärleisten] intellectual freedom, out of which alone the 
bloom of science can rise.
191 
 
There could be no complete certainty in science because of the unavoidable presence of 
subjective value judgments.  But Jellinek was convinced that through the mechanism of 
academic freedom and the competition of ideas, science could be driven forward.  The value of 
his own works, he wrote in the preface to the System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, “in no 
way…lay in their content of absolute truth, which is never to be stated with certainty, but much 
rather in…[their being suited to be] a driving moment [Moment] in the scientific process of 
knowledge [NB: Erkenntnisprocesse]. Not so much their lasting results as the measure of 
forward-striving power that they foster, assigns them their scientific place.”
192 It was the task of 
social scientists to attempt to provide a comprehensive view of the state—or by extension any 
other subject matter—for their time.
193 Jellinek, whose own worldview as a moderate liberal 
emphasized progress and the almost “religious” commitment to the individual personality and its 
moral growth,
194 ultimately hoped that properly channeled ideational conflicts would lead the 
history of science, like history in general, to be a genuine development rather than ‘one thing 
after another.’
195 To the degree that objectivity in social science was possible, Jellinek thought, 
one could not rely on moral injunctions alone, but only on the establishment of a framework of 
institutions and processes. 
III.  Hermann Kantorowicz: Free Law and Value Relativism 
                                                 
191 Jellinek, “Ansprache des Prorektors in Frankfurt am Main bei der Eröffnung des Museums der 
Senckenbergischen Naturforschenden Gesellschaft,” 13 Oct. 1907, in ASR I, 360. 
192 Jellinek, System, vi. 
193 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, xvi. 
194 See, e.g., Radbruch, untitled review essay in Biographische Schriften, 22, for this characterization. 
195 For remarks on his hopes for such conflicts leading to moral development in history, see “Kampf,” 427.  
270 
 
Jellinek and Hermann Kantorowicz were very dissimilar in personality and did not much 
like each other in their limited interactions, although their basically liberal worldviews 
overlapped to some degree.  Both men shared an openness to introducing sociological 
considerations into the law—as well as a less uncommon interest in legal-historical studies—and 
both found inspiration in neo-Kantian epistemology and theory of science.  They have been 
considered together before, albeit very briefly, as examples of the critique of imperial legal 
thought from two sides: of the legal system’s origin and legitimacy in one case, and of the 
application of law in cases where there was no clear precedent for easy subsumption under a 
given rule in the other.
196 It is the latter problem, and Kantorowicz’s attempt to solve it through 
his program of “Free Law” without falling into a purely emotive “Gefühlsjurisprudenz,” that will 
occupy us in the following section. 
  The picture of Kantorowicz’s methodological ideas drawn here will be somewhat less 
complete than that of Jellinek’s, for several reasons.  First, unlike Jellinek, Kantorowicz was only 
beginning his career in the decade before World War I, which forms the temporal boundary for 
this dissertation, and his later writings are not considered.  Neither Kantorowicz nor his 
contemporary and friend Gustav Radbruch was able to produce a persuasive methodological 
position on objectivity in these years, to supplement or rival the schemas of Weber and Jellinek.  
But they both shared similar views on the nature of science, values, and value judgments in 
social science—themes to which Radbruch devoted substantially more attention than 
Kantorowicz, justifying his treatment in a separate chapter.  Kantorowicz’s ideas on values and 
value-freedom were deeply marked by his reception of the thought of Georg Simmel, Heinrich 
Rickert, and Max Weber, and thus in this area his thought was less noteworthy for its originality 
                                                 
196 Peter Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty, 42-44, considers them in this fashion; both appear, again briefly, in Arnold 
Brecht’s path-breaking account of the origins of “scientific value relativism” in Political Theory, 220-21, 232-33.  
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than for the promptness and thoroughness with which he embraced value relativism.  In later life, 
and particularly in exile after 1933, Kantorowicz did yeoman work in spreading the Weberian 
vision and in producing a thoughtful critique of American legal realism, a school that might have 
seemed for all intents and purposes to be a continuation of his own early ideas.
197 But what he 
wrote on methodological issues during the pre-war period principally concentrated on 
combatting constructivism and on defending himself from the attacks on his youthful polemic, 
Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft. Finally, there are fewer biographical sources available for 
Kantorowicz, who did not write autobiographical reflections or benefit from a family 
biography,
198 although he did leave behind correspondence allowing us to reconstruct some of 
his attitudes.   
Nevertheless, Kantorowicz is of interest not just as an early adopter of value-freedom, but 
because he embraced the doctrine despite its lack of immediately obvious alignment with the 
primary goals of the Free Law movement to which he belonged—a step other key members such 
as Eugen Ehrlich and Ernst Fuchs did not take.  Moreover, he provides yet another instance of 
the variety of paths to value-freedom, for unlike most of the other early adopters, the young 
Kantorowicz was not persuaded of the logical impossibility of deriving Sollen from Sein until 
well after he had embraced Werturteilsfreiheit. 
                                                 
197 The best assessment of this relationship is Vivian Grosswald Curran, “Rethinking Hermann Kantorowicz: Free 
Law, American Legal Realism, and the Legacy of Anti-Formalism,” in Annelise Riles, ed., Rethinking the Masters 
of Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 66-91, which is also devoted to an effective rebuttal of the occasional 
claim that the Free Law movement helped clear the theoretical path for Nazi illegality. 
198 The recent article by Kantorowicz’s son from his second marriage, Frank Carter (d. 2010), “Gustav Radbruch and 
Hermann Kantorowicz: Two Friends and a Book – Reflections on Gnaeus Flavius’ Der Kampf um die 
Rechtswissenschaft (1906),” German Law Journal 7:7 (July 2006), 657-700, makes sparing use of the author’s own 
recollections and refers to the existence of an autobiographical manuscript by Kantorowicz’s second wife, but the 
latter is not publicly accessible.  
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  Kantorowicz was born in late 1877 in the Prussian city of Posen, now in Poland, and he 
grew up there until 1884, when his family moved to Berlin.
199 His father, Wilhelm Kantorowicz, 
was a prosperous distiller and director of the Ostdeutschen Spritfabrik, who was able to ensure 
that Hermann received a first-rate education and later provided for him to live and conduct 
research in Italy for several years before receiving his first academic job.  Although he had only 
briefly attended a Gymnasium without graduating, Wilhelm was an intellectually engaged 
businessman who wrote several books on aesthetics, politics, and economic policy.  A convinced 
liberal and internationalist, he was concerned about the maintenance of market competition in the 
face of the contemporary tendency toward cartelization, and he wrote against continuing the war 
after 1914.  Although the younger Kantorowicz’s biographer exaggerates in saying that 
Hermann’s political stances and aesthetic interests are “unthinkable” without Wilhelm’s 
example, the son certainly came to share “his political engagement, his pacifism, his economic 
liberalism, [and] his…radical objectivity” especially in the matter of assessing Germany’s “war 
guilt.”
200 
  The family was confessionally Jewish but Kantorowicz does not seem to have had a 
religious upbringing.  Like Jellinek, he was indifferent to his family’s heritage and took the step 
of becoming “without confession” and subsequently converting to Lutheranism in 1905, 
although unlike Jellinek he did so at a young age and without concerns about alienating his 
                                                 
199 The brief biography of Kantorowicz by Karlheinz Muscheler, Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz: Eine Biographie 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984), is the source of most of the biographical information supplied here. For other 
biographical sources (mostly encyclopedia entries), see the extensive list by David Ibbetson in his article “Hermann 
Kantorowicz (1877-1940) and Walter Ullmann (1910-1983),” in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 
Jurists Uprooted (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), note 2. There is no basis for the middle name “Ulrich”; 
Kantorowicz occasionally added an invented middle initial “U.” to distinguish himself from another Hermann 
Kantorowicz, but did not have a given middle name: Carter, “Gustav Radbruch and Hermann Kantorowicz,” 657, 
n.2. 
200 Muscheler, Kantorowicz, 12. It may be noted in passing that Hermann was not related to the other famous 
medievalist Ernst Kantorowicz, although both were born in Posen and both had connections with the Stefan George 
circle—considerably more intimate in the latter’s case than in Hermann’s. For more on this see Muscheler, 10, n.3.  
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family.
201 In a letter to Radbruch, which is reprinted at length by his biographer, Kantorowicz 
discussed what he remarkably referred to as his own “anti-Semitism,” albeit not, he said, “in the 
stupid sense.” He wrote that conversion was “the only practicable way for me to feel myself to 
be a German, and to make it possible for my children to be absorbed into the German nation 
[Deutschentum]. I am not a Jew, because I do not feel myself to be such.”
202 The step was not 
taken just to help him to clear the path of anti-Semitic obstacles to an academic career, but was 
for him, as he later suggested in an obituary of his fellow medievalist Max Conrat (Cohn), also a 
way of identifying with Germany and the “German ideal of science” [deutsches 
Wissenschaftsideal] which had its roots, or so he said, in Protestantism.
203 
  Educated principally in Berlin at the Royal Luisen-Gymnasium and then at the capital’s 
university, Kantorowicz’s pattern of study was leisurely.
204  Focusing principally on law, 
philosophy, and political economy, he began his doctoral studies in 1896 and received his 
“Promotion” through an oral examination in Roman private and German criminal law at 
Heidelberg in 1900, apparently without having to submit a written dissertation.
205 With a year’s 
military service in a cavalry regiment in 1901-1902 as the only partial interruption, during which 
he attended classes in Munich, he continued to study criminal law in Berlin with the 
distinguished criminalist Franz von Liszt until 1903, and medieval legal history in Florence, Italy 
                                                 
201 Ibid., 12-14. Carter, “Gustav Radbruch and Hermann Kantorowicz,” 660, suggests that the family was not at all 
religious and that even Kantorowicz’s parents “preferred to think of themselves as German,” drawing thereby a 
dichotomy between German and Jewish identities that affected Hermann’s attitudes as well. 
202 Kantorowicz to Radbruch, 14 November 1905, in Nachlass Hermann Kantorowicz, Universitätsarchiv, Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, C36 IV B 19. Hereafter cited as NL Kantorowicz. The parts of this letter relevant to 
Kantorowicz’s views on Judaism are also reproduced by Muscheler, Kantorowicz, 13-14. Kantorowicz’s 
correspondence has never been published. Typescripts of his letters to Radbruch were made by his second wife and 
are available both at Freiburg (C36 IV B 20), and at Heidelberg (NL Radbruch, III. F. 601); although they are highly 
useful and generally accurate, I have checked them against the originals and cite only from the latter, since 
numerous small divergences were introduced into the transcripts. 
203 Muscheler, Kantorowicz, 14. 
204 Ibid., 17, provides the basic data. Kantorowicz also spent one semester at Geneva in 1897. 
205 Carter, “Gustav Radbruch and Hermann Kantorowicz,” 661. There is no evidence of a submitted dissertation, so 
Carter is presumably correct that Kantorowicz achieved this wondrous feat.  
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as a private scholar until 1907.  Eventually rejecting the idea of gaining a second doctorate in 
philosophy, he developed a tripartite expertise in criminal law, legal philosophy, and legal 
history.  Although it was in the third of these areas that he was to gain his highest reputation,
206 
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, he first made a name for himself with the publication of the 
controversial 1906 tract on legal method, Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft, to which we 
will return.  His attempt to habilitate at Heidelberg in early 1906 was unsuccessful, owing to a 
combination of anti-Semitism, concern about the apparent radicalism of the Kampf polemic, and 
Kantorowicz’s own alienation of some of the Heidelberg faculty during his visit to interview for 
a Privatdozent position.
207 Kantorowicz was more successful at Freiburg the following year, 
gaining Richard Schmidt’s support to habilitate there and to teach criminal law and legal history, 
a remit widened to include legal philosophy in early 1908 as Kantorowicz settled in.
208 
Nevertheless, he had great difficulties moving forward in his professional career.  Made a 
“titular” but unsalaried professor in 1913, he had to wait until 1923—interrupted by war service 
in a military hospital and as a postal censor—for an associate professorship in “juridical auxiliary 
sciences” and until late 1928 for an appointment as full professor at Kiel.
209 Dismissed by the 
Nazis in 1933 while he was on leave in Florence, Kantorowicz moved first to England, then to 
New York, where he taught at the “University in Exile” at the New School for Social Research in 
                                                 
206 Gustav Radbruch, “Hermann Kantorowicz †”, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 60 Jg. (1946), 262-76, 
reprinted in Radbruch, Biographische Schriften, 75-88, here 79-82. Radbruch points out that this historical work 
extends beyond medieval history to various essays on nineteenth-century jurisprudence. 
207 Kantorowicz defended himself against charges of arrogance in this connection in a letter to Radbruch of 5 March 
1906: NL Kantorowicz IV B 19. Among the professors whom he apparently displeased was Jellinek, who certainly 
could not be accused of anti-Semitic prejudice, although it is possible that he held back to avoid the appearance of 
supporting Kantorowicz because he was Jewish (this was Radbruch’s theory): see Kempter, Die Jellineks, 301. 
Kantorowicz would cite Jellinek respectfully thereafter, but privately described him to Radbruch as “ein schwarzer 
Intrigant,” and refused to work with him on a journal they were planning: Kantorowicz to Radbruch, 9 May and 4 
June 1907, in NL Kantorowicz IV B 19. 
208 Muscheler, Kantorowicz, 32-33. 
209 Ibid., 98.  
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1933-34.  He returned to England in 1934, where he taught at LSE, Cambridge, and Oxford until 
his early death in 1940.
210 
  Most of the obstacles to Kantorowicz’s career during the Weimar era resulted from his 
willingness to stand up for his political convictions, and this has led some scholars to claim him 
as another casualty of the anti-socialist attitudes prevalent in the universities during the early 
twentieth century.  Recent English-language accounts of Kantorowicz’s politics place great 
emphasis on his attitudes in 1903, when he briefly took the unusual step of joining the SPD, and 
although he soon had second thoughts and resigned his membership the same year, these 
accounts make use of a phrase in a 1903 letter to Radbruch to claim that he had a lifelong 
“platonic love of Socialism.”
211 In fact, as better informed German writers are aware, apart from 
this strong but brief enthusiasm in 1902-1903, Kantorowicz was much closer to the left liberals 
with his adamant support for democracy, free trade, and anti-imperialism.
212 He was in fact quite 
critical of social democracy. The same letter to Radbruch remarked that “a respectable person 
can no longer remain today in a party dominated from below by fanaticism and from above by 
cowardice.”
213 As Radbruch became increasingly inclined toward socialism after 1912, 
Kantorowicz often challenged him to remember that a consistent relativist must be able to see 
and tolerate multiple perspectives: “By the way, you, as a relativist… must also learn to look at 
things from the opposite perspective. This inclination to see everything from below and to the 
left [alles von unten links zu sehen] makes the understanding of an entity [Gebilde] like the 
                                                 
210 For Kantorowicz’s final years, see Muscheler, Kantorowicz, Chs. 10-11, and Ibbetson, “Hermann Kantorowicz 
and Walter Ullmann,” 277-82. 
211 See, e.g., Curran, “Rethinking Hermann Kantorowicz,” 67; Carter, “Gustav Radbruch and Hermann 
Kantorowicz,” 661; Margaret Crosby, The Making of a German Constitution: A Slow Revolution (New York: Berg, 
2008), 59. 
212 Monika Frommel, “Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz (1877-1940), Ein Streitbarer Relativist,” in Thomas Blanke, 
ed., Streitbare Juristen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), 249 (although even she uses the 1903 comment to Radbruch 
to suggest, without evidence, that Kantorowicz’s “platonic love” was an enduring one); Muscheler, Kantorowicz, 
chapters 5-9, provides the only adequate account of Kantorowicz’s politics. 
213 Kantorowicz to Radbruch, undated letter (presumed to be early 1904), NL Kantorowicz IV B 19.  
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Prussian army and state impossible.”
214 Nonetheless, Kantorowicz himself had no liking for the 
authoritarian institutions of the Kaiserreich.  Like most left liberals, he was willing to work with 
the moderate socialists at least from 1917 onwards, even writing to Eduard Bernstein to suggest 
political tactics for cooperation in the Reichstag.
215 And he was certainly unpopular with the 
nationalist right because of his courage in publishing a book arguing that Germany should share 
the blame with Austria-Hungary for the precipitation of the Great War.
216 Although his extensive 
Weimar political activities and commitments to the liberal German Democratic Party and to 
pacifism fall outside the scope of this dissertation, they represent a continuous development from 
his less active pre-war liberalism rather than a substantive shift.
217 
  Despite a certain political distance as the years passed, Kantorowicz’s closest intellectual 
companion and discussion partner remained Radbruch, whom he met at Liszt’s seminar in Berlin 
in 1903.  Their friendship lasted until Kantorowicz’s death and involved intensive cooperation 
between 1903 and 1908 in particular, on various projects including the writing and editing of 
Kantorowicz’s Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft. Kantorowicz certainly read Radbruch’s work 
very carefully as well, beginning with his dissertation and habilitation on legal philosophical 
questions of causality and action, and offered critical commentary.
218 Nonetheless, an assessment 
                                                 
214 Kantorowicz to Radbruch, 12 April 1917, in NL Kantorowicz IV B 19. In a letter of 30 October 1933 which 
Kantorowicz wrote in English to Lydia Radbruch during his stay at the New School in New York, he remarked of 
his fellow émigr￩ instructors that “they are most of them socialists and you know I never liked socialists and like 
them less than ever today.” Quoted in Muscheler, Kantorowicz, 111 n.277. 
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democratization and commitment to peace and internationalism, however: see Kantorowicz to Radbruch, 16 August 
1916, and Kantorowicz to a correspondent named only as Eugen, 31 July 1917, in NL Kantorowicz IV B 19. 
218 See, for instance, the first letter from Kantorowicz to Radbruch, undated but from September 1903, and the 
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of their respective views on methodological questions reveals that they continued to differ on 
important points, and that they shared a set of common interests rather than common doctrines; 
and as Kantorowicz moved closer to Radbruch’s standpoint later on, it was owing to the former’s 
acceptance of neo-Kantian “cultural-scientific” thinking in its Rickertian and Weberian forms.
219 
Kantorowicz’s biographer Karlheinz Muscheler is correct to observe that their friendship owed 
more to a commitment to mutual and open critique, and to a recognition by both parties that they 
possessed complementary rather than similar character traits, than it did to agreement on 
arguments for the advancement of a relativistic, sociological conception of law.
220 
  If Radbruch cannot really be said to have helped to determine Kantorowicz’s thinking on 
methodological questions beyond providing him with a responsive sounding board, it remains at 
least to indicate which elements of the latter’s background prepared him to write the several long 
articles and addresses of 1906-1914 in which he first embraced value-freedom.  Kantorowicz’s 
formation as a legal thinker was shaped primarily by figures within the broad stream of 
sociological or “interests”-based jurisprudence that had its source in Jhering.  Jhering himself 
held “the place of honor in the heart of the German jurist” and in Kantorowicz’s overview of 
legal theories since the middle ages, where he was portrayed as the culmination of the neo-
scholasticism of constructivist jurisprudence and the initiator of the teleological, Zweck-oriented 
conception of law, which had its “full and systematic unfolding” in the Free Law movement.
221 
The discussion group in Berlin that Kantorowicz started with Radbruch and two or three other 
law students in 1903 also read the works of other jurists who had pressed for greater attention to 
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the balancing of social and economic interests (at the expense of logical construction) as the task 
of the judge.
222 Among them was Eugen Ehrlich, a founder of legal sociology who coined the 
term “free legal science” [freie Rechtswissenschaft] in a lecture of 1903, which the group read 
early the following year.
223 Ehrlich argued here that constructivist jurisprudence was no likelier 
to generate legal certainty, and thus predictability, in difficult cases than was a judge free to 
decide the case as he saw fit, a position that Kantorowicz came to make the center of Kampf um 
die Rechtswissenschaft.
224 However, Ehrlich later began to represent a thoroughgoing 
sociological reductionism, arguing “that law in the ordinary sense, ‘lawyers’ law,’ exists side by 
side with other factors in society which may heavily influence or even in practice override it; 
such factors, inasmuch as they are recognized and influence behavior, are equally law and should 
be studied by lawyers.”
225 Kantorowicz did not follow him so far, suggesting to Radbruch that 
they avoid including Ehrlich, “who is becoming ever more absurd,” in a special issue of the 
journal Die Tat devoted to the “new” jurisprudence.
226 Neither Jhering nor Ehrlich nor any of the 
other figures who contributed to Kantorowicz’s development of “Free Law” wrote on or 
accepted the core tenets of the value-freedom complex, although both of them held essentially 
relativistic views on the validity of the social purposes that they sought to make central to law-
finding.
227 
  Kantorowicz’s views on methodological questions, and particularly in the area of values 
and value-freedom, also owed much to non-juridical philosophical sources.  During his student 
                                                 
222 The names of like-minded jurists listed in Gnaeus Flavius [Hermann Kantorowicz], Kampf um die 
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days, Kantorowicz had been greatly impressed by a young Russian-German itinerant scholar 
named Gregorius Itelson, who introduced him to philosophical logic in a trial by fire, ruthlessly 
criticizing his every opinion and “making a wholly new person out of me,” and instilling in him 
the desire to gain a strong foundation in formal logic.
228 Muscheler observes that “Kantorowicz’s 
preference for categorical determinations and classifications, for definitions and distinctions, for 
logical argumentation and refutation, as well as his delight in sharp antitheses” across his 
philosophical and historical writings, very likely gained their “early foundation” here.
229 
Kantorowicz would make full use of his training in formal logic in the devastating critique of the 
legal philosopher Rudolf Stammler which he published in 1908-1909, in which his basic 
nominalism also found expression.  Here he employed a distinction between “real” and 
“nominal” definitions to show that Stammler often failed to move beyond circular arguments and 
playing with words in his “solutions” to the problems of a formally correct and universal natural 
law with changing substantive content.
230 An attempt to avoid any sort of implicit metaphysical 
assumptions about the essence [Wesen] of anything defined, this distinction called for an explicit, 
stipulated definition, fulfilling criteria including clarity and consistency at the outset of any 
scientific investigation so that investigators could agree on what question they were asking and 
would count as evidence in answer to it.
231 Kantorowicz’s basic philosophical attitudes clearly 
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put him in line with the pattern of nominalism we have identified in other advocates of value-
freedom, as well as with the associated voluntarism, as we will see. 
  Kantorowicz also drew on neo-Kantian philosophy, especially in his thinking about 
value-freedom.  Here the early Kantorowicz was close to Georg Simmel, with whom he was 
personally associated, rather than to the southwest German school.
232  Kantorowicz’s 
correspondence leaves no doubt that he and Simmel saw one another regularly in Berlin 
beginning no later than 1901.  Not only were they socially acquainted—Simmel gave 
Kantorowicz introductions to the Stefan George circle in Munich in 1901, and Kantorowicz 
reported that they had grown to be “very close” friends during a vacation in the Austrian Tirol a 
few years later—but they read and commented on each other’s work.
233  Simmel asked the much 
younger man to recommend literature on the legal philosophy of Rudolf Stammler, and 
Kantorowicz was clearly proud to report “that Simmel sets [Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft] 
very high, and says he cannot conceive how one could contest such plausible things at all.”
234 
Kantorowicz received not only “great refreshment [Erquickung]” from “conversations with 
good, dear Simmel,” but the basis for his early psychologistic conception of the “Ought,” and of 
ethical and legal norms, as pure will.
235 
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Kantorowicz encountered southwest German neo-Kantianism somewhat later, largely 
through Radbruch’s letters and in the person of Emil Lask when the latter was studying law in 
Berlin in 1904.
236  He initially rejected Baden value theory and its sharp separation between Is 
and Ought.  However, sometime after he had begun teaching at Freiburg in 1908, he came to 
accept and work with a version of Rickert’s methodology of cultural science, eventually melding 
Simmel’s quasi-neo-Kantian perspective to the Baden approach and referring to “the 
Windelbandian-Rickertian-Simmelian philosophy of culture and history.”
237 While still settling 
in to his new position and looking for like-minded colleagues on the faculty, he wrote that he 
“had hopes for Rickert,” which must have been fulfilled at least to a degree, for the latter’s work 
became a continual point of reference for Kantorowicz in methodological statements.
238 In his 
lectures on legal philosophy in the years just before World War I, for instance, he used the notion 
of “ ‘value-relevant’ [‘wertbeziehende’] science in Rickert’s sense” to distinguish between legal 
sociology and juridical dogmatics.
239 Radbruch later confirmed this shift in Kantorowicz’s 
thinking from his early “empiricist ‘psychological-historical-realistic’ formulation” of legal 
philosophy to “another, value-theoretical [formulation] under the influence of H. Rickert and 
Max Weber.”
240 And indeed, it was probably Weber with whom Kantorowicz had most in 
common, coupling value theory with relativism as both men did.  Kantorowicz studied Weber’s 
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“Objectivity” essay in the summer of 1906,
241 cited his work regularly, and remarked in a review 
of Marianne Weber’s volume of her husband’s collected writings on “Wissenschaftslehre” that 
Weber had indeed been a philosopher despite his modesty about the claims of his methodological 
papers. “His investigations on the nature of value judgments, on ideal-typical concepts, on the 
structure of laws, and his logically consistent exclusion of all considerations of ‘rightness’ 
[‘Richtigkeit’] from concept formation—which he handled exclusively according to their 
appropriateness for the purpose at hand [Zweckmässigkeit]—belong to the most significant 
enrichments of recent German theory of science.”
242 Finally, now persuaded by the Baden neo-
Kantian style of thought, he returned to Lask’s work on legal philosophy. “I have read his 
Philosophy of Law again and this time received a really significant impression; for example, 
what he says on natural law is the best that’s been said up until now,” he wrote in 1910, adding 
that he would like to develop Lask’s thoughts on the problems of legal history.
243 
  Let us now turn from Kantorowicz’s intellectual influences to his thoughts on values, 
value-freedom, and legal methodology.  Following an early attempt at delineating objectively 
valid aesthetic values, which he soon rejected, Kantorowicz was not shy about upholding a 
vigorous value relativism.
244 The factual statements of the natural sciences, he thought, would 
always be recognized as necessarily true by all rational people.  But “the possibility of this 
necessity does not exist in the realm of values. No one can be forced to grant a particular value to 
a particular object, to let it provoke a particular feeling. The basis for the difference [between 
agreement on natural scientific facts and disagreement on values] lies in the fact of individuality.  
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As knowing beings [Wesen] we possess no individuality, not the least, as far as logic and 
mathematics reach, and as far as sense perception reaches,” with certain “pathological” 
exceptions. “As feeling and willing and therefore valuing beings, however, we possess 
individuality, indeed as far different [from others’ individuality] as our interests and our 
characters are different. I claim, then, that there is indeed an objective correctness in the realm of 
knowledge, but that there is and there can be nothing like it in the realm of feeling, of obligation 
[Sollen: ‘Ought’] and willing—that there is truth as such, but values only for me, for you, for us, 
for historically given individuals or collective personalities.”
245 The most basic values would 
always be in conflict; Kantorowicz rejected any possibility that human beings could ever attain 
“unity” in their goals and purposes, noting that even geometry has dozens of axioms, while the 
even more “incalculable abundance” of different value positions meant that a single, universal 
system of values would remain impossible.
246 
  Kantorowicz’s value relativism was integral to his views on legal methodology.  As we 
have indicated, he initially made his name—for better or worse—through the publication of a 
pseudonymous tract, whose authorship was soon revealed, criticizing legal constructivism and 
promoting “Free Law.” Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft was designed to be provocative; 
during its composition he remarked that it was a “manifesto” that “counts upon agitating the 
feelings. It’s turned out enormously radical.”
247 It was perhaps more radical for its tone than for 
its ideas, for Kantorowicz did not claim any great novelty for most of his arguments, seeing 
Kampf rather as a means of unifying and naming an already existing movement.
248 Essentially, it 
aimed to falsify the claim made by constructivists that the legal order—that is, the constitution 
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and the statutes and customary law produced or acknowledged in accordance with it—was a 
gapless fabric, and that judges could decide any given case on the basis of legal logic and 
knowledge of the statutes alone.  It was motivated by a desire to gain greater sensitivity to the 
social effects and purposes of law than allowed by the constructivist account.  As Kantorowicz 
later elaborated, what he was fighting was “a jurisprudence that engages in unsubstantiated 
conceptual constructions [ins Blaue hinein konstruiert] without contemplation of the 
consequences, and then employs the legal concepts now available from the decision of a legal 
question without regard to the suitability [Brauchbarkeit] of the results.”
249 
In place of constructivism, Kantorowicz set the notions of “free law,” “free legal 
science,” and “free law-finding.” What these terms meant in practice was not always entirely 
clear; the Free Law movement was not known for a sharply defined positive program,
250 and 
Kantorowicz later backed away from some of his sharper formulations, as we will see.  Initially, 
he defined free law as law found “independently of state power”; natural law was a form of free 
law, although mistaken in its metaphysical claims to universality, as were such sources as legal 
history, drafts for law codes, and judicial writings de lege ferenda—on what the law should 
be.
251 Such writings were not recognized as state law yet, but the state’s positive laws depended 
on and grew out of them.
252 Kantorowicz argued that such law should be deployed in judicial 
decisions as needed, leaving the actual status and grounds for validity of these sources somewhat 
uncertain.  But there was no doubt that Kampf promoted a view of at least some judicial 
decisions as matters simply of “will” and the imposition of purely subjective values in a 
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relativistic world.
253 “We claim,” he insisted, “…that many legal cases allow of no legal solution 
at all.” For there was great human variety, and “our difference, particularly so far as it deals with 
the ranking of life-values [Lebenswerte], must express itself in the different solutions of at least a 
part of the cases [to be decided].”
254 In difficult cases, Kantorowicz held, the proper “balancing” 
of different values will not be determinable, and “other types of norms or the arbitrary will 
provide the decision—since after all a decision there must be.”
255 Legal science here entered its 
“voluntaristic phase.”
256 Prepared for the objection that reliance on “emotionally grounded 
values [gefühlsmässige Werte]” was completely incompatible with the “ideals of legality, of 
passivity, of reasonable justification [Begründetheit], of scientific character, of legal certainty, of 
objectivity,” he replied drily that such “postulates” partly had never been realized in practice, and 
partly did not deserve to be realized.
257  
This conception of judicial practice was, needless to say, deliberately far afield from the 
self-image of constructivist positivism.  Kantorowicz’s own image of the constructivist judge—
the “Byzantine ideal” of the judge as “logical machine”—was common to many critics of 
classical imperial legal thought, including Weber, Ehrlich, and Radbruch.
258 As he later put it 
with tongue in cheek, the constructivists believed the judge to be an “Automat” that dealt with 
each case through “subsumption under the statute” as follows: “one sticks the case in at the top, 
and extracts the decision below. Either the case is decided immediately within the statute, in 
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which case the decision falls out upon the first try; or it isn’t, and one has to thump and shake the 
machine a bit.” The latter procedure, he elaborated, involved such measures as selecting either a 
narrower or broader interpretation of the language of the text; using another legal rule from a 
different context; or using analogy or argumentum e contrario—but always remaining within the 
bounds of existing statute law.
259 
This mechanical picture might have been plausible if there were no reason for the judge 
to exercise independent will and to bring necessarily subjective value judgments to bear on a 
case.  But the inevitability of lacunae in the positive law meant that more was required of the 
judge than the constructivist theory allowed, Kantorowicz insisted.  In one of the more extreme 
formulations of the 1906 book, he remarked that there were “no fewer gaps than words” in the 
statutory and customary law taken together, and under such circumstances there was no system 
for formal logic to operate within.
260 The most telling point he raised against constructivism was 
that in practice, judges already engaged in “free law” adjudication under cover of the mere use of 
logic.  They might even deceive themselves, but most legal constructions were ex-post 
rationalizations of the outcome that seemed most justified to the judges based on their own 
training and value sets.  “We do not, in other words, accept a [legal] construction with all its 
consequences because it is the most unconstrained [zwangloseste], the most logical, the most 
natural, the best, but rather the other way around—a construction seems that way when its 
consequences are such that we can will them.”
261 Judges might present their holdings in novel 
cases as reasoned by analogy to an established subsumption; but there were always possible 
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commonalities to be observed between any number of different cases, and so analogical parallels 
could be drawn in virtually unlimited directions.
262 In the filling in of the omnipresent gaps, “it is 
always the will that leads the understanding on a leading-string,” and the reasons given merely 
covered the deeper, personal value-oriented grounds.
263 
Those who read Kantorowicz as moving toward a form of legal irrationalism would have 
found especially provoking his conclusion that “for us the anti-rationalistic disposition naturally 
also goes hand in hand with the voluntaristic current,” and they might not have been reassured by 
his insistence that it was only “juridical logic” rather than logic tout court that he was 
dismissing.
264 Nonetheless, he saw himself as describing a present and unavoidable situation 
rather than promoting irrationalism.  It was better to acknowledge the situation openly and 
honestly and take measures to reduce judicial subjectivity rather than paper it over.  Turning the 
tables on constructivist positivism, he argued that far from securing certainty, its method 
exacerbated the problem.  Particularly in subsequent years, he emphasized that the Free Law 
movement’s “struggle” had “from the beginning” been oriented toward exposing and combatting 
the “hidden and therefore so dangerous subjectivism of conceptual jurisprudence.”
265 Classical 
imperial legal thought, in its purported lack of attention to the purposes of the law and to the 
social situation the law was designed to regulate, was likelier than Free Law to be the mere 
expression of hidden value judgments.  “Where it should interpret [auslegen], it does not 
endeavor to ascertain the binding purposes of the statute, but rather clings to the dead letter often 
where the latter makes a mockery of these purposes. And where it must fill in the gaps of the 
statute—a situation that represents not the exception but rather the rule in all seriously 
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contentious cases—there it does not take hold of open, honest free law-finding [freier 
Rechtsfindung], but conjures the decision into the statute so that it can then artificially draw it 
back out.”
266 
  In other words, Kantorowicz’s view both in Kampf and in subsequent defenses and 
elaborations of the Free Law program, was that in some cases no objective solution was possible, 
but that the constructivist attempt to pretend otherwise led in fact to a reduction in legal certainty 
and judicial objectivity by ignoring the social and economic purposes of the law in favor of logic 
games.  He proposed that the major positive tenet of the Free Law movement, the need to bring 
social science to bear on judicial decisions, was best suited to restore whatever certainty and 
objectivity were available to the law.  “Impersonality” and predictability in the application of the 
law would never be attained, but the “nonpartisan” character of the imperial judges could be 
improved by educating them in areas of the social sciences relevant to their specialization within 
the law.
267 The Empire’s judges faced criticism and dislike from the general population not 
because of any ill will on their part, but because of their ignorance of “social facts and 
viewpoints” and their “naïve class prejudices,” both of which would be reduced by educating 
judges in the results of sociological and economic studies.
268 Kantorowicz held to this 
conviction, expanding on it later in articles in the German Judges’ Journal and in his lecture at 
the first conference of the German Sociological Society in 1910.  The judge, he said, must search 
out norms of free law with attention to the “needs of the present, the dominant ideas among the 
people, the interest-situation of the individual case and its typical sociological structure” while 
“incorporating the new norm into the system of the purposes pursued by the positive law.”
269 
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Even where there was no “gap” in the law but only a problem of proper interpretation, 
Kantorowicz argued that the judge’s best recourse was to social scientific studies making clear 
what the social purposes and effects of the laws in fact were.  Much like Jellinek in this regard, 
and indeed remarking that in its use of sociological investigations, public law was probably the 
“healthiest” branch of the discipline, Kantorowicz called for statistical and qualitative studies of 
the effects of the civil and criminal statutory law, especially of the Civil Code, on economy and 
society.
270 Assimilation of this material would, he argued, help to alleviate popular discontent 
with the judges.
271 
However plausibly he argued these points, Kantorowicz’s embrace of the “voluntaristic 
phase” of legal science seemed to forebode not only subjective or willful interpretations of the 
existing law, but even decisions against the positive law.  In fact, he called for such decisions in 
Kampf, stating that the judge should generally follow the “clear wording of the statute” but that 
he “may and ought to abandon [absehen] it, as soon as the statute seems to him not to offer a 
doubt-free decision; and second, when it is not probable that the government [Staatsgewalt] 
existing at the time of the decision would have come to the decision in the way demanded by the 
statute.”
272 Statements like these were what released a storm of protest, the “violent and intense 
excitement in the legal world” that Max Rümelin later associated with the publication of Kampf, 
and which, despite Rümelin’s overall sympathy for Kantorowicz, he saw as part of a common 
prewar tendency to “shout as loudly as possible,” thereby doing damage to the reputation of the 
legal profession.
273 And indeed, Kantorowicz himself quickly thought better of this statement.  
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thinking of the intemperate tone used by Kantorowicz’s friend and ally, the Karlsruhe lawyer and Freirechtler Ernst 
Fuchs.  
290 
 
As we have just seen, he held on to the desire for objectivity at least in the form of unpartisan 
decision-making, despite his more incendiary comments, and this may have induced him to 
reconsider.  He responded to the criticism that he would allow the judge to decide contra legem 
(against the “clear wording of the statute”) throughout the years after 1906 mainly by denying 
that he had ever advocated it in the first place.  Dropping the most contentious passages from the 
Italian edition of Kampf  published in the following year, Kantorowicz argued that he had been 
misinterpreted by his critics who had invented a “Contra-Legem Fable” to portray the Free Law 
movement as “a kind of legal-philosophical anarchism.”
274 Instead, he emphasized that free law-
finding may be introduced only in “subsidiary” cases, and never in cases where the positive law 
clearly provides for a particular holding, however much it may differ from the judge’s 
preferences.  In this, as one distinguished historian of law has pointed out, he was really only 
calling for a renewed attention to the longstanding legal tradition of equity, which created new 
remedies when the old law did not suffice.
275 Voluntarism was not to indicate completely 
arbitrary will, Kantorowicz later specified, but a will shaped (if not determined) by long legal 
training.
276 
Even this more defensible post-1906 position was, of course, susceptible to the criticism 
that it was hard to determine in any objective fashion the social purposes and goals that the law 
should pursue.  Where Jellinek had granted a degree of independence and objectivity to legal 
reasoning within the limited domain of the positive law, while the content of the latter was set by 
exogenous purposes to be studied by the social sciences, Kantorowicz instead sought to allow 
sociological findings and value judgments about social and economic policy to enter directly into 
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the law-creating activities of the judge.  How were they to be determined without making law 
merely politics by other means? We will see below how he attempted, unsuccessfully, to answer 
this question, but first let us consider an obvious path that he did not take, for it reveals much 
about the nature of his commitment to the ideal of value- freedom. 
Kantorowicz could have joined his teacher, Franz Liszt, and other Free Law advocates in 
rejecting relativism for moral objectivism.  Liszt and other sociologically inclined jurists had 
sought to replace the positivist vision of objectivity—exclusion of values on the basis of the 
law/politics dualism—with a normative science of the law paralleling the normative economics 
of Schmoller, Adolf Wagner, and other members of the Verein für Sozialpolitik.  In Liszt’s case, 
he argued that the German criminal law should follow the evolutionary development 
(“progress”) he said was manifested in the comparative study of national legal traditions in the 
West, away from the goal of societal retribution against criminals and toward measures for 
reforming and improving their lives.
277 Progress here was purported to be an objectively valid 
measure.  Kantorowicz shared Liszt’s views not only on societal purposes within criminal law, 
but also, of course, his rejection of constructivism and legal positivism; and his fellow Free Law 
advocates Eugen Ehrlich and Ernst Fuchs agreed that progressive social purposes could serve as 
standards, all of which might have inclined him to re-think his relativism. 
Another potential inducement to making common cause in favor of a normative science 
was the fact that Kantorowicz did not, in his early career, find the methodological dualists’ strict 
separation of Is and Ought persuasive.
278  He did not accept it as a logical distinction, nor did he 
                                                 
277 Liszt’s views are discussed and critiqued in Gustav Radbruch, “Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschöpfung: Ein 
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see the normative and the factual as self-contained realms studied by different sciences, 
preferring instead to adopt what has been called a “realist-psychological monism.”
279  In Kampf, 
Kantorowicz remarked that “too much emphasis is placed by the representatives of 
‘methodological dualism’ [on the claim] that the social sciences represent what is, and the legal 
sciences what should be. For it may not be overlooked that all Ought [alles Sollende] is also an Is 
[ein Seiendes]. Sollen ist Wollen, if also a peculiarly tinged kind of will.”
280 In an effort the 
following year to mediate between Liszt’s and Radbruch’s opposed positions on the question of 
whether comparative law could provide the criminal law with a set of normative standards, 
Kantorowicz attempted to clarify his position further.  He suggested that Radbruch’s dualism 
represented “a correct thought…described askew,” for Is and Ought were not logically speaking 
exclusive opposites.   “All ‘Ought’ is actually always ‘Is,’ that is, either in the condition of 
actualization or as a wish in the soul of the person making the judgment. It is, then, not 
foreseeable why a kind of ‘Is,’ namely the ‘Ought,” cannot be derived from another kind of 
‘Is.’”
281 
However, he acknowledged, if there was no logical opposition there was still “a real 
opposition” within these two ideas, which is apparent from the nature of Sollen as will. “Sollen 
ist Wollen. If I say, ‘I ought,’ then at the same time I say ‘I will,’”—but this was a particular kind 
of will, accompanied by a sense of duty that differentiates it from other kinds of non-moral will 
[nicht- oder unsittlichen Wollen].  And instances of this “moral” will might come into conflict in 
the real world with each other and with a variety of types of non-moral will.
282 Explicitly relying 
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here on Simmel’s Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaften for support, he argued that there was no 
compelling reason to think that any one person’s real, contingent will should hold any normative 
force over that of another person.  In other words, while there was for Kantorowicz no logical 
problem in moving from Is to Ought when the latter was equated with the psychological fact 
(“Is”) of will, there was indeed a problem in assuming that the factual existence of a “foreign” 
will could compel an equally factual state of the feeling of normative obligation in the individual.  
The factual existence of two conflicting wills was all that could be noted, and if one will came to 
‘acknowledge’ the other, it was only the purely psychological process of persuasion that could be 
studied.  Consequently Liszt, too, was mistaken in thinking that the fact of change in foreign 
laws could supply any grounds for German judges’ having any normative obligation to change 
their holdings in accordance.
283 
  Kantorowicz’s path to the acceptance of value-free science did not, then, arise out of 
concern about the separation of Is and Ought and avoidance of the naturalistic fallacy of deriving 
the latter from the former.  Instead, he rejected the idea of a normative science because his value 
subjectivism led him to see no compelling reason to favor one “will” or course of practical 
action over another, and thus to draw a sharp distinction between theory (based on reason) and 
practice (based on emotively tinged will).  Because Kantorowicz’s position was most determined 
by the theory/practice element of the value-freedom complex, it will not be surprising to find that 
he provided an account of precisely how science and values, theory and practice could relate to 
one another, and that this account was basically identical with that of Max Weber. 
“It must now be asked,” Kantorowicz wrote in one formulation in 1908-1909, “whether 
under this relativistic outlook (whose undeniable poignancy should not deceive one about its 
unavoidability, and anyway is in many cases already recognized in one area, politics), a science 
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of the normative can yet exist. I affirm this.”
284 But he did not mean a “normative science,” for 
although scholarly consideration of values was essential, it must not unfold in “such a way that it 
[science] itself attempts to create that which ought to be [das Sein-Sollende]—there is no 
normative science…,” only a study of the implications of the “relative and subjective, not 
absolute and objective rightness of a value.”
285 For instance, using an example from the realm of 
aesthetic values, a scholar could not claim to decide whether the Pantheon or the Freiburg 
cathedral was more beautiful; rather, the “modest service” of science in this case was to provide 
reasons why one or the other was a greater realization of the criteria for beauty within its given 
style, or which would have been perceived as more beautiful by a historically given 
“individuality” such as an ancient Roman or medieval Freiburger.
286 Given one of many possible 
value sets to act as a standard, the scholar could determine how well a given instance of an 
artwork or a law lived up to it.  “But the struggle to decide between all these possibilities 
objectively lies entirely outside the competence of science…. Thus legal philosophy can also, 
employing the psychological-historical-realistic method, construct for the culturally differing 
expressions of the feeling of justice the ideal laws corresponding to them respectively. And it can 
now decide whether, within one such expression, a particular legal rule possess a higher or lower 
value or no value at all, whether it receives a relative and subjective correctness or incorrectness.  
But it must entirely relinquish the not only futile but positively nonsensical attempt to determine 
in which value relation [Wertverhältnis] the individual legal ideals [themselves] stand.”
287  
The way in which scholarship could assess a given cultural object or action according to 
a given standard involved the determination of internal coherence within the value set, and of 
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rational means to ends.
288  Schematically stated, for Kantorowicz a “science of the normative… 
treats what ought to be [das Sein-Sollende] as material empirically given to it, gathers and 
systematically orders it, clarifies the meaning of its individual elements, illuminates its 
relationships to the cultural values [of its time and place], and, as occasion demands, endeavors 
to determine the means and ways to its realization.”
289 In his own field, as he taught his students, 
the “relativistic method” required the deduction of specific legal conclusions from the given 
general purposes or goals (Ziele) of the law and “comparison of reality” with these goals so as to 
look for “gaps, contradictions, [and] obscurities” in the statutes and determine the appropriate 
“means” to removing them.
290 
  As the reference to “cultural values” suggests, Kantorowicz was beginning to move 
toward Rickert’s methodological views.  As his own thinking developed, he abandoned his 
“realist-psychological monism” for neo-Kantian dualism and came to see the distinction between 
Is and Ought as a purely logical one.
291 In later years, he would use Rickert’s distinction between 
individualizing and generalizing methods and his notion of value-relation to construct a six-part 
division of legal science according to method.  Differentiating three spheres for scientific 
study—empirical reality, pure values and norms, and an intermediary sphere of “objective 
meaning” similar to Rickert’s, Weber’s and Radbruch’s notions of value-related cultural objects 
and meanings—Kantorowicz laid out a schema for the study of the corresponding areas of the 
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factual existence of the law, the meaning of the law, and the validity of the law.  Each of the 
three areas could be studied in either an “individualizing” or a “generalizing” manner, producing 
respectively legal history and legal sociology in the first area, legal dogmatics and allgemeine 
Rechtslehre in the second, and legal politics and legal philosophy in the third.
292 Writing to 
Radbruch in mid-1915, he described this new methodological division, remarking “that my 
theory of legal science has made quite extraordinary progress,” and that he was very glad indeed 
to have waited to construct a major work of legal philosophy until now rather than having based 
it on the “unripe ideas” of his 1910 Frankfurt address to the Sociological Society or earlier.
293 
Although this schema would seem to allow legal dogmatics its own independent area, in 
fact Kantorowicz never relinquished his commitment to the Free Law movement, and this meant 
that he still had to confront the fundamental question posed earlier.  That is, his rejection of a 
“normative science” in favor of value-free science seemed hard to square with the Free Law 
program for judicial decision-making on the basis of the willed imposition of value judgments 
hemmed in solely by the findings of sociological research.  Sociology might provide judges with 
data about existing social and economic conditions, but as we have seen him contend, this data 
carried with it no inherent normative implications, and could be evaluated according to very 
different value standards. 
In his 1910 address, concerned as it was with how sociology might inform legal science, 
Kantorowicz took a page from Jellinek’s book and argued that sociology might deliver 
knowledge of which social purposes and values were, factually, accepted as normatively binding 
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in a given time and setting.  This would allow the judge to deploy such information in filling in 
“gaps” in all but the most difficult cases, without the judge himself being required to make the 
inherently subjective decision about what social purposes should be promoted by the law.
294  “In 
finding… rules of free law, the judge must…where possible hold to the particular value 
judgments dominant among the people. These value judgments… are, however, themselves facts 
of social life until they become re-formed [umgeschaffen] into norms (of free law) through their 
use as premises of judgment.  The knowledge of these facts, which accordingly is indispensable 
to the fulfillment of the judge’s task but which unfortunately many judges lack, is thus to be 
learned through sociological channels.”
295 Consequently, Kantorowicz sided with other value-
freedom proponents in criticizing the Verein für Sozialpolitik for primarily supporting research 
into measures of social reform rather than into pure sociological research, and criticized partisan 
research, whether socialist or social Darwinist in its principles.
296  
How were sociologists to provide the judge with such knowledge, however? What would 
signal to the sociologist that he had encountered an area of normative agreement that could 
genuinely direct the social purposes of the legal order? There were, after all, as he acknowledged 
in his criticism of Stammler’s revival of natural law, numerous and differing 
“Gerechtigkeitsgefühle.”  Kantorowicz’s only answer to this question was to suggest that we 
“avoid the atomization of science, the cliff on which subjectivism is so often dashed,” when we 
recognize that out of these many possible viewpoints, “only those come into consideration as 
culturally important for legal philosophy as a science of values [Wertwissenschaft] which are in 
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accordance with a powerful social group.”
297 In practical terms, such an answer might have been 
plausible; as a solution to the theoretical problem, it simply begged the question, for the logical 
response would be to ask what criterion determined which social groups were to count as 
important. 
Ultimately, Kantorowicz fell back upon the traditional injunctions to “ascetic 
objectivity,” with a relativist twist.  In Kampf, he replied to objections that his theory opened the 
door to excessive and “uncontrollable” subjectivity by reminding the reader of the judge’s oath 
to render justice in good faith.  “For, if we cannot rely on the oath of the judge, which requires 
earnest conviction, then it’s all over [hört alles auf]…. Against excess subjectivity, the balancing 
of the plurality of minds [Köpfe] in the professional body of judges and the process of appeals 
offer enough protection.”
 298 In the course of promoting a relativist approach to the scientific 
study of values that was strictly limited in the ways we delineated above, Kantorowicz also 
observed that relativism, like legal training, brought with it a psychological ability to understand 
any perspective in a calm and collected way.  “Objectivists” were inclined to force their views on 
others, while “subjectivists” were content to build their own little kingdoms and ignore the 
outside world; the “golden middle path” was that of relativism. “As practical jurists,” he 
remarked, “we have been long accustomed to be conscientious advocates of others’ interests 
[fremder Interessen]; as theoretical jurists, we must with hard self-discipline acquire the same 
practice, relativism.”
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Chapter 5. 
Gustav Radbruch and Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Law 
 
Gustav Radbruch never really wanted to be a jurist.  He preferred literary and 
philosophical studies from his earliest school days, and when he came to teach, the need to 
preoccupy himself with legal doctrine seemed a burden.  Meeting Max Weber in April, 1904, 
shortly before giving his first lectures in criminal law at Heidelberg, he sadly resisted Weber’s 
compliments on his work and invitation to contribute an article on legal philosophy to the new 
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. But Weber was persuasive: “Upon my 
objection,” Radbruch wrote to his parents, “that it has fallen to me to wend my way more into 
practical detail, he was of the opinion that I should not let myself be talked into it by the 
academic philistines [Fakultätsbanausen] and should work at what suits me best.”
1 And that is 
precisely what Radbruch proceeded to do, both during his first, difficult decade at Heidelberg 
before the First World War, and during the rest of his eventful life as a professor, politician, and 
justice minister.  Few studies of Radbruch’s thought have failed to mark the impact of his elegant 
literary style, his insistence on the interdisciplinary study of law in the context of the humanistic 
disciplines, and his central role in revitalizing the earlier German tradition of legal philosophy.
2 
Although he did substantive and respected scholarship on doctrinal questions of criminal law, 
Radbruch would always claim that he was not really meant to be a lawyer,
3 but that he was 
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possessed of a “Zwischenbegabung,” a talent for work that lay between established fields.
4  He 
was therefore well situated for a career in legal philosophy and the intellectual history of law, 
making the law accessible to those of a humanist bent while simultaneously reminding fellow 
jurists to write readably and with philosophical soundness. 
  Still little known in the English-speaking world, Radbruch (1878-1949) is regarded in 
Germany as one of the country’s major twentieth-century legal philosophers, alongside such 
figures as Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt.  While Kelsen’s work is familiar owing to his long 
residence in the United States and many publications in English, he is not the only major voice of 
neo-Kantian philosophy of law.  Radbruch, too, drew on neo-Kantian sources in the construction 
of a view of legal philosophy and legal science which is quite different from Kelsen’s, and 
closely aligned with the doctrines of fact-value dualism and freedom from value-judgment which 
we have examined in previous chapters.  Like his close friends Kantorowicz and Lask, he 
belonged to a younger generation than the social scientists involved in the Werturteilsstreit or 
their colleagues Windelband, Rickert, or Jellinek.  Radbruch’s thought thus offers an opportunity 
to trace the impact of the ideas involved in the value-freedom complex on a jurist whose thought 
was shaped during the height of the debates. But we should take care: it is not quite correct to 
say, as some have done,
5 that Radbruch’s legal philosophy is simply a translation into the field of 
law of southwest-German neo-Kantianism and Weberian relativism.  Radbruch himself was an 
active participant in the Heidelberg soirées and discussion groups of the pre-war decade, whose 
own views influenced those of his friends and colleagues. 
  Previous studies of Radbruch have focused almost obsessively on the question of whether 
he changed his views on natural law, legal positivism, and value-relativism during the last period 
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of his life, from 1945 until his death four years later, as he returned to teaching in Heidelberg 
after enforced retirement during Nazi rule.
6  In what became the notion most closely associated 
with his name, the so-called “Radbruch Formula,” he argued in some of his many post-1945 
essays that there may be a limited number of situations in which considerations of justice can 
outweigh considerations of legal certainty in the rendering of judgment: an “intolerably” unjust 
law must be regarded as flawed law and must yield to the claims of justice when pressed; while a 
proposed or executed law that makes no attempt whatever at justice never really achieves the 
status of law at all.
7 Provoked of course by the glaring injustices of law under the Third Reich, 
Radbruch’s late reflections, which can be only crudely summarized here, raise the question of 
whether this famous relativist and (according to most commentators) legal positivist ended his 
career with an appeal to natural law—and if so, the degree to which his last views reflected 
continuity or discontinuity with his earlier thought.   
This question has been the primary subject of the few English-language publications on 
Radbruch over the years, including some recent essays and translations of Radbruch’s own late 
papers.
8 It will not be pursued further here.  Nor will his Weimar-era academic and political 
career, which has understandably been the principal focus of scholarship on his politics, 
democratic theory, and his legal philosophy in the definitive form given it by the third edition of 
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his Rechtsphilosophie (1932).
9 Rather than go over such well-trodden ground, this chapter will 
offer an examination of Radbruch’s life and thought during the Wilhelmine era, when he wrote 
the first editions of his two most influential books.  Only one study of Radbruch’s legal 
philosophy has dealt separately with his thought during his first Heidelberg period (1903-1914) 
at all, and this only briefly and only on the basis of his main early work, the Grundzüge der 
Rechtsphilosophie (1914).
10 This approach has the somewhat distortive effect of making 
Radbruch’s thought appear a mere expression of ten years’ worth of the influence of the Weber 
circle, when the reality was more complex. 
  Overall, during this period, Radbruch’s position may be summarized as follows.  The 
broadest task of the philosophy of law is not just to give a general theory of existing laws and 
their interrelation (allgemeine Rechtslehre) in the manner of the still-dominant positivist school. 
Rather, it is to provide an account of the conditions for the possibility of any law at all, in the 
manner of neo-Kantian critical philosophy. But this account, for Radbruch, will yield purely 
formal results.  So, despite rejecting pure positivism, legal philosophy does not provide 
knowledge of natural law either.  At most, it lays out a “natural law with changing content” in 
the words of the neo-Kantian Rudolf Stammler—it provides insight into requirements which 
apply universally but formally to all law while acknowledging that the specific “content” of legal 
rules and even whole legal orders may change with time.  The traditional normative vision of 
natural law is rejected as unscientific in light of the distinction between “is” and “ought,” facts 
                                                 
9 See Martin D. Klein, Demokratisches Denken bei Gustav Radbruch (Berlin: BWV, 2007); Marc André Wiegand, 
Unrichtiges Recht: Gustav Radbruchs Rechtsphilosophische Parteienlehre (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2004); Holger 
Otte, Gustav Radbruchs Kieler Jahre, 1919-1926 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1982); Michael Gottschalk, “Gustav Radbruchs 
Heidelberger Jahre, 1926-1949,” Inaugural Dissertation, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 1982. 
10 Paul Bonsmann, Die Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie Gustav Radbruchs, 2d ed. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1970). No 
discussion of Radbruch’s early thought is available in English, nor has the Heidelberg Nachlass been used for this 
period in the German literature.  
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and values or norms and the impossibility of logically deriving an “ought” statement from an 
“is” statement.  
   Accepting the fact-value dualism, Radbruch nevertheless agrees with the Southwest neo-
Kantians that law belongs in the category of “cultural sciences” that are neither purely value-free 
nor purely normative but rather “value-related.” Law is thus demarcated as a sphere of study by 
its “relation” within a given culture to legal values, which culminate in the ultimate, formal legal 
value of justice.  This ultimate value, however, really presents three co-equal aspects or sub-
values: justice, expediency or purpose (Zweck), and legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit).  Radbruch 
parts from his philosophical allies, however, in maintaining an avowedly antinomian and 
relativistic doctrine regarding these three legal values, as well as the differing political 
worldviews that give content to the law through the second value of purpose (Zweck).  In other 
words, he maintains that there is no rational or scientific way of deciding between these values 
and worldviews in those cases in which they come into conflict; though politically a social 
democrat, he, like Weber, is philosophically an “agonistic liberal.” This position leads Radbruch 
to a moderate degree of opposition to the positivist notion of the “gaplessness” of the law, and to 
a moderately decisionist solution to the question of the validity of legal judgments in “hard 
cases.” Because of the inherently normative nature of those types of legal pronouncements that 
must be resolved by decisions based on non-rational value-judgments—legislation and judges’ 
rulings are unproblematically normative—Radbruch does not feel the need to grapple with the 
problem of objectivity in the manner Weber did for the historical sciences.  Rather, in his early 
writings, Radbruch implicitly relies on the existence of a method of casuistry that is supposed to 
have more than arbitrary validity.  
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Naturally, all of the foregoing will be elaborated below in Section II on the basis of the 
full range of Radbruch’s pre-war scholarly production.  First, however, we must explore the 
sources of his views on values, value-judgments, and rationality in the juristic sciences. 
 
I.  Growth of a Legal Philosopher: The Early Radbruch, 1878-1918 
 
Like Thomas Mann, who was a classmate at the Katharineum Gymnasium, Radbruch was 
born in the old Hanseatic city of Lübeck.  And although he was to spend most of his life in 
Heidelberg and Berlin, like Tönnies he had a deep love for his Schleswig-Holstein homeland.  In 
the autobiographical writings he dictated to his wife as the bombs were falling on Germany in 
the spring of 1945, he reflected on the happier days of his early youth.  His evocative portrait of 
Lübeck is worthy of Buddenbrooks
11 and “Tonio Kröger”: at Christmas time the 
Weihnachtsmarkt in the shadow of the old town hall, when the bearded Italian organ-grinders 
would visit and appear dark-eyed under the windows; the merriment the children shared with the 
town fools whom they both loved and teased; the docks and warehouses of the harbor by the 
river Trave, with a summer smell of dust and grain and anise; the merchants’ offices lined with 
high double-desks that held old-fashioned presses and envelopes festooned with foreign stamps. 
Above it all, he recalled the hourly chorales of the Marienkirche carillon that carried over the 
entire city from the church near the Radbruch home.
12 
                                                 
11 Radbruch was, it might be noted, an early and enthusiastic reader of Mann’s Buddenbrooks (1900): he wrote his 
parents in 1903 that he was reading the novel for a second time “with deep pleasure.” Letter of 1 April 1903, in 
Heidelberg HS 3716 (hereafter cited as NL Radbruch) III.A.3. 
12 Gustav Radbruch, Der Innere Weg: Aufriss meines Lebens, 2d. ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 
10; reprinted in GRGA Vol. 16, ed. Günter Spendel, Biographische Schriften (Heidelberg: Müller, 1988), 167-297. 
Although completed late in life, his memoirs drew directly on his letters and notes, often repeating phrases and 
thoughts from them. References to Radbruch’s works in this chapter will generally be to the original editions, as the 
original-edition paginations are noted throughout the text of the GRGA.  
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  This house in the Fleischhauerstraße was the residence of Heinrich Radbruch, a 
comfortable small businessman involved in the sugar and wine trades and in fire insurance, and 
his half-French wife.  Gustav Radbruch was the youngest of their three children. The general 
impression given both by his memoirs and by his many letters to his parents after he left Lübeck 
is of a quiet, supportive, and loving family life.  Radbruch had a great deal of affection for his 
mother, and was quite distraught when she grew weak from diabetes and died during World War 
I.
13  He clearly felt, though, that his own “nature” owed most to his father, who belonged to the 
“tradition-bound variety of the ‘respectable merchant,’” and who “later came to terms quite 
difficultly with the modern, ever more instrumentally-rational commercial world.”
14 The older 
Radbruch possessed a sort of romantic love of poetry, beauty, and noble gestures, and was an 
optimist with a strong “belief in the good in things and in people,” all of which would mark his 
son as well.  A National Liberal who, Radbruch later thought, must have seen social democracy 
as rather foolish, the father was a tolerant man who found it easy to be forbearing and even 
supportive of Radbruch’s political activity for the SPD.
15 He helped inculcate a fascination with 
the concrete details of history in his son, although Radbruch also noted with some regret that his 
upbringing was lacking in attention to natural science and music, and that there was very little 
religious devotion in his family home.
16 The only gently critical remark Radbruch made about 
his father in his memoirs is, however, a significant one for the purposes of our argument: he 
suggested that the one way in which his father held him back was in keeping him sheltered from 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Karl Jaspers to Radbruch, 30 June 1914, in NL Radbruch III.F.561.1. Jaspers, as a psychiatrist, 
had provided counseling for Radbruch in the previous few years, as well as (in this case) medical advice for his 
mother’s care. 
14 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 14-15. 
15 Ibid., 16, 19. 
16 Ibid., 17-18.  
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perceived dangers and thereby preventing him from growing accustomed as necessary to 
“courage, decisiveness, and independence.”
17 
  As a student at the Lübeck Gymnasium, which had occupied the Katharinen cloister since 
the time of the Reformation, Radbruch was a “model youth,” more owing to his “sensitive 
conscience” than to any particular ambition.
18 He worked hard at his mathematical studies and 
did well despite having little natural interest in them—a good preparation, he as he reflected, for 
his later legal coursework—and gained the usual rigorous training in classical literature and basic 
philology as well as a sense of the importance of “a succinct [knappen] and exact style.”
19 His 
passion then, as it would be during his university days, was literature, and particularly poetry.  
Among his favorite writers were Theodor Storm, Gerhart Hauptmann, and the now largely 
forgotten poet Carl Busse, to whom Radbruch dared to write an unsolicited letter.  He received a 
reply from Busse telling him to visit someday when he was a little older, but Radbruch never did, 
because, as he said, “at that time I already had other Gods.”
20 
  This last formulation might bring to mind the notional “paganism” or “polytheism” of 
Goethe
21 or Weber, two of the more important influences on Radbruch, but it was not entirely a 
symbolic or ironic figure of speech, for he also had a lifelong fascination with Christianity.  
Despite the relative “coolness” with regard to religious practice in the family home, Radbruch 
found himself compelled to turn and return to reflections on God and religious devotion at 
various times.  In his schooldays, his overactive conscience and feelings of guilt induced a kind 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 18: “Mut, Entschlossenheit und Selbstständigkeit.” 
18 Ibid., 24. This self-description is accurate, as familiarity with his early correspondence amply demonstrates. 
19 Ibid., 22-23. 
20 Ibid., 27. 
21 The role played by Goethe in Radbruch’s thinking and writing has been exhaustively documented in Berthold 
Kastner, Goethe im Leben und Werk Gustav Radbruchs (Heidelberg: Müller, 1999). However, as Kastner shows (see 
25-26, 30), despite his affinities with Goethe’s worldview and the obligatory essays on the German classics in his 
schooldays, Radbruch did not begin to read the poet seriously as a thinker until 1916, and thus Goethe does not 
figure in our discussion here.  
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of ascetic practice of prayer (Gebetsaskese).
22 This did not last, and likely had little of properly 
religious substance to it, but a more mature reckoning was hinted at, during his first Heidelberg 
years, in a growing number of references to the need to take into account a religious perspective 
as one of several approaches to value-philosophy.
23 While serving at the front in 1916, he 
recorded in his journal his struggle to resolve the contradiction between the “dyed-in-the-wool” 
respect for military service that had been with him since childhood through the historical studies 
he had shared with his father, and his growing socialist convictions. “And I resolve this 
contradiction in the only way in which each contradiction, about which one has honestly but 
unavailingly agonized, resolves itself: religiously.”
24 
A few months later, he thought his friend Kantorowicz might be surprised at his new 
interest in the philosophy of religion, but wrote him that “for me, each thing has a double 
philosophy: value-philosophy…and a philosophy beyond value and disvalue [Unwert]: that is, 
philosophy of religion or metaphysics.”
25 This interest found expression not only in his later 
Rechtsphilosophie
26 but in a slim volume on the philosophy of religion written with the 
theologian Paul Tillich soon after the war.
27 In his last years, Radbruch not only (temporarily) 
expressed high hopes for the new Christian Democratic Party, but at least considered converting 
to Catholicism.  Ever since he had fallen in love with a Catholic girl as a young student in 
L￼beck, he had maintained his “lifelong reverence” for the “beauty of Catholic belief and liturgy 
[Kultus].”
28 Though never ultimately a believing Christian, according to his student Arthur 
                                                 
22 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 18. 
23 See, for instance, Gustav Radbruch, “ￜber den Begriff der Kultur,” GRGA Vol. 4, p. 11-17, here p.13. Originally 
appeared in Logos 2 (1911-12), 200-207. 
24 1916 Kriegstagebuch I [20 April-21 May 1916], p. 21, NL Radbruch I.C.1-17: “Und ich löse diesen Widerspruch 
so, wie sich allein jeder Widerspruch, an dem man sich redlich aber vergeblich gequält hat[,] sich löst: religiös.” 
25 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 9 July 1916, in Briefe I, 220. 
26 Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 3d. rev. and exp. ed. (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1932), Section 12. 
27 Radbruch and Tillich, Religionsphilosophie der Kultur: Zwei Entwürfe (Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1921). 
28 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 26.  
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Kaufmann, Radbruch even went so far as to have a Catholic priest perform the last rites at his 
death.
29 
  His literary and religious interests remained avocations, however, for when it came time 
for Radbruch to begin his university studies, he had little choice but to enroll in the legal faculty.  
It was understood that Radbruch was to be a jurist: his father thought it the best use of his talents, 
and he was not inclined to question his father’s judgment.
30 The opportunity to begin university 
studies was an exciting one, regardless of his ambivalence about the law, because it was a 
passport to the larger world.  Much affection as he had for Lübeck, its limitations were clear, and 
he later noted that “the oppressive [drückende] feeling of having to pursue a predetermined path 
within these narrow walls led me, like other young Lübeckers, to decide to seek a professional 
occupation outside of L￼beck.”
31 The city, with its oligarchy of merchants and lawyers, seemed 
at least in retrospect as though it “spoke to us not with the voice of the future, but with the voice 
of the past.”
32 And so Radbruch, just like Thomas Mann, left for Munich. 
  He remained for one term, during the summer of 1898, long enough to develop a robust 
appreciation for the Bavarian capital’s cultural and artistic life.  Living there strengthened his 
literary interests and helped him cultivate his taste in painting, sculpture, and theater.  As he 
wrote to a school friend, his legal studies bored him, but he was enthusiastic about Munich, its 
beer, and its art, and he planned to see the Secession’s exhibition.
33 The semester was not 
entirely without academic gain: the Romanist Bechmann gave him a solid introductory 
foundation in the study of law,
34 and he was enthralled by Lujo Brentano’s historical-
                                                 
29 Arthur Kaufmann, Gustav Radbruch: Rechtsdenker, Philosoph, Sozialdemokrat (Munich: Piper, 1987), 168-71. 
30 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 19. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Ibid., 9. 
33 Radbruch to Hermann Stolterfoht, 5 May 1898 , in Briefe I, 12. 
34 Radbruch’s dense notes on this course, “Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaft,” are preserved in NL Radbruch 
II.B1. Section 3 of the course treated the separation of law and morals.  
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methodological lectures on economics (Nationalökonomie). In retrospect, these lectures seemed 
to Radbruch to have planted the “first roots of my later socialistic convictions,” although at the 
time what impressed him most was the fact that “no science is so divided into parties as is 
economics [Volkswirtschaftslehre].”
35 
  Nevertheless, the book that made the greatest impression on him during this time was 
Rudolf Sohm’s Institutionen on the history and system of Roman private law, and so Radbruch 
transferred in the fall to Sohm’s university, Leipzig, in part to hear him lecture. Then at its 
height, Leipzig offered one of the best legal faculties in Germany, as well as a unique collection 
of social scientists oriented toward the “nomothetic” approach.
36 Aside from Sohm, who was the 
“greatest jurist, as teacher and thinker” that Radbruch encountered as a student, and whose 
lectures on canon law impressed him with their profound conception (Auffassung) of 
Christianity,
37 he also studied with the refined and eloquent professor of criminal law Carl 
Binding.  Binding awoke Radbruch’s interest in criminal law, although not in the way the 
professor would have wanted: in the course of warning his students against attempts to mix the 
results of sociological and criminological studies with legal doctrine in the interpretation of the 
positive law, he condemned as “dangerous” the work of his academic antagonist, Franz von 
Liszt, for this very reason.  Radbruch immediately sought out Liszt’s work and was persuaded of 
the importance of cross-disciplinary fertilization in the criminal law.
38 He remained three 
semesters in Leipzig, studying not only law but economics, history, and philosophy and 
psychology, with the eminent Karl Bücher, Karl Lamprecht, and Wilhelm Wundt respectively.  
                                                 
35 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 31; letter of 5 May 1898, to Stolterfoht, in Briefe I, 11. Radbruch was, however, so bored 
by the economist Lotz that he once began ostentatiously reading a newspaper during his lecture, gaining a “well-
deserved warning” for it. 
36 On the Leipzig tradition in social science, see Woodruff D. Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in 
Germany, 1840-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
37 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 35. Sohm’s work was, it may be noted in passing, also the source of the modern revival of 
the concept of charisma that became so influential through Max Weber. 
38 Ibid., 34.  
310 
 
His memoirs note the strong impression of devotion to truth and objectivity (Sachlichkeit) made 
by B￼cher and Wundt, but also the draw of Lamprecht’s fiery passion for a new method in the 
historical sciences: despite a L￼beck historian’s warning that Lamprecht was a “swindler,” 
Radbruch recalled that he and his fellow students had read each of Lamprecht’s polemics upon 
publication and quickly became convinced partisans of his approach.
39  
  Drawn to work with Liszt on criminal law and to return to a cultural capital once more, 
he spent his final year in Berlin in 1900-1901, passing his state legal exam in the spring of 1901 
after the statutory minimum of six semesters’ university study.  As was customary, Radbruch 
then undertook a year as Referendar, or attorney-in-training, in Lübeck, but disliked the practice 
of law and got Liszt’s support to end this practicum-year early and return to Berlin to do his 
doctoral dissertation.
40  This first work of Radbruch’s, a short contribution on the theory of 
“adequate causation” in the determination of legal liability, provoked by a recent book by the 
jurist Max Rümelin, was completed in May, 1902.  Despite his persisting anxieties, his 
dissertation was accepted and he passed his oral examinations; he reported to his parents that the 
Dean had commended him on an unusually impressive performance and remarked that he had a 
“calling for the lectern” if he was inclined toward an academic career.
41 
He was so inclined: anything to avoid a career in the practice of law.  Liszt advised him 
to forego the rest of his Referendar training and pursue habilitation with the distinguished 
Heidelberg criminal law professor Karl von Lilienthal, offering him the use of the Berlin 
Kriminalistisches Seminar and its resources while he worked.
42 Radbruch was disposed to 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 35-36. Radbruch’s notes from Wundt’s lectures on philosophy, logic, and psychology have survived and 
could possibly provide insight into his earliest thinking on philosophical themes; however, I was unable to read their 
handwriting.  
40 Kaufmann, Gustav Radbruch, 42. 
41 See letters of 14 and 28 May, 1902, in Briefe I, 15, 19. 
42 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 59. Liszt first suggested habilitation at Kiel, and then Heidelberg once a spot had opened 
up in the fall of 1902.  
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accept; however, apart from a final attempt at tolerating his Lübeck practicum, he spent the 
summer and early fall of 1902 traveling, particularly back to Munich where he had hoped to do 
his military service but was excused on health grounds.  He wrote his parents in September from 
Munich that he would prefer to take a break from “producing” scholarship and stay out of 
“society” in order “to perfect my philosophical training first through systematic familiarization.” 
Though he recognized this might not be the most “practical” course, he felt that “my scientific 
conscience requires it.”
43 
It would appear that this further philosophical training was initially in the “positivistic” 
tradition to which Radbruch had been exposed at Leipzig and by Liszt, leavened by 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism.
44 But his interests were eclectic.  While visiting Heidelberg for the 
first time in January of 1903, he planned to attend the lectures of the important but aging neo-
Kantian philosopher Kuno Fischer (although he would not seriously engage with neo-Kantian 
thinking until the fall of that year).
45 Thought-provoking, though unremarked in the literature on 
Radbruch, is the interest he took in the Austrian philosopher of language Fritz Mauthner in 
March of 1903, as interpreted by the socialist-anarchist writer Gustav Landauer.
46 During that 
month, Radbruch attended several talks by Landauer on Mauthner’s philosophy in Berlin, which 
he reported enthusiastically to his father in three notable but as yet unpublished letters, 
remarking that he had been quite impressed.
47 As Landauer published his short book on 
Mauthner at just that time, we have a good sense of what would have been said in the public 
lectures.  Emphasizing the inadequacy of language to convey the immediacy of experience, 
                                                 
43 Radbruch to parents, 20 September 1902, NL Radbruch III.A.2. [“meine philosophische Ausbildung zunächst 
durch systematisch Einarbeiten zu vervollkommnen.”] 
44 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 63. 
45 Radbruch to parents, 16 January 1903, in Briefe I, 23. 
46 See the three letters to his father of 12, 18, and 20 March 1903, NL Radbruch III.A.3; on Mauthner, who was also 
living in Berlin at the time, see Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, Ch.5. 
47 Radbruch to parents, 20 March 1903, NL Radbruch III.A.3.  
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Mauthner was famous for his injunction that a consistent philosopher will embrace silence.  
Landauer’s account laid out the skepticism and nominalism inherent in Mauthner’s position, 
writing for instance that “there is no connection that we could prove and use for daily life 
between the universe and human action, between God and morality; there exists only our will to 
shape a picture of the world as we can grasp and love it, and to form our lives and our 
institutions [Einrichtungen] in accord therewith.”
48 Our words, even highly evolved technical 
terms, could be seen only as engaged in a rough and blundering relation to reality. And we were 
learning to become accustomed to the inevitability of “an undertone of irony, of à peu près, of 
the provisory, of the metaphorical” and of the need for a “revaluation” (Umwertung) in all areas 
of specialized knowledge—not just, as Nietzsche said, in ethics, but in such areas as aesthetics 
and jurisprudence too.
49 Paring away the ways in which metaphor, anthropomorphism, and other 
language mistakes had clouded our understanding, Landauer concluded that the practical lesson 
of Mauthner’s work was the untenability of a religious worldview and the need in our modern 
situation for resignation, “epistemological passion, and… courageous pride”; indeed, he argued 
that Mauthner’s skepticism was “the trailblazer for new mysticism and new strong action.”
50 
  Radbruch was concerned philosophically at that time both with a specialized technical 
language and with the concept of action in his legal work.  He devoted most of 1903 to the 
completion of his Habilitationsschrift, Der Handlungsbegriff in seiner Bedeutung für das 
Strafrechtssystem (The Concept of Action in Its Significance for the System of Criminal Law).
51 
This work, the main portion of which was devoted to analyzing the legal concepts of action and 
                                                 
48 Gustav Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik: Versuche im Anschluss an Mauthners Sprachkritik (Berlin: Fleischel, 
1903), 81-82. 
49 Ibid., 134. 
50 Ibid., 154; 6. 
51 Radbruch, Der Handlungsbegriff in seiner Bedeutung für das Strafrechtssystem, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre 
von der rechtswissenschaftlichen Systematik. Berlin: Guttentag, 1903.  
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will, and the attribution of guilt or liability in criminal and tort law, was very troublesome for 
Radbruch.  He presented a talk on the subject at the seminar of the Berlin psychologist Carl 
Stumpf in May while it was still in gestation,
52 and it surely formed one of the topics of 
conversation in the legal philosophy discussion group Radbruch started at this time alongside his 
new friend Kantorowicz and several other Berlin students.
53 But when he submitted it to 
Lilienthal, it was too short to be accepted; Radbruch’s decision to lengthen it by adding a 
methodological section turned it into what he later called “a strange monster…, half criminal law 
doctrine, half general theory of law [allgemeine Rechtslehre].”
54 It became such a torture to write 
that his father invited Radbruch to stay with him at a hotel in the Harz mountains where he could 
provide his son with quiet surroundings and moral support.  And when finally finished in the 
early fall, the dissertation’s lengthy digression into general theory of law meant that it was 
necessary for Lilienthal to have Heidelberg’s resident legal theorist, Jellinek, vouch for it 
alongside him—evidence, Radbruch later remarked, of Jellinek’s “human and scientific 
tactfulness [Feingefühl].”
55 
  This was not, perhaps, the most auspicious entry into the academic world of the city on 
the Neckar, and Radbruch felt that he had taken too long in the writing. But that was not really 
the case—he was just about to turn twenty-five—and indeed the real problem was that he was 
not yet properly prepared to be a Privatdozent, and thus both a teacher and a member (with 
academic and social duties) of a law faculty.  His sense, at the time and in later recollection, of 
being immature, would lead to unnecessarily strained relations with some of the Heidelberg 
                                                 
52 See letter of 29 May 1903, NL Radbruch III.A.3. 
53 See letter of 3 June 1903, in Briefe I, 30. 
54 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 60. 
55 Ibid., 59-60.  
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faculty and contributed to the discomfort he felt during his first decade there, as well, most 
likely, as the slightly longer than average time he took to receive a call to a professorship.
56  
During his years as a Privatdozent from 1904 to 1914, Radbruch taught courses primarily 
in criminal law, criminal procedure, and philosophy of law.  He drew students only slowly: in his 
first two semesters in 1904, only two or three students showed up at the lectures he offered.
57  
The tally was only marginally better the following year, but he began to hone his teaching, 
resolving to lecture without a text or even notes, and gaining thereby some facility in public 
speaking.
58 He later remarked that his efforts during this decade lay primarily in the direction of 
improving his teaching as opposed to scholarship—Heidelberg was not, he claimed, an 
environment as conducive to diligent work as it was to the things of the spirit.
59 But it was in this 
period that he wrote his two most popular books, the Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft 
(Introduction to Legal Science, 1910) and the Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie (Outlines of 
Legal Philosophy, 1914), which were to go through many editions during his lifetime, as well as 
numerous articles and a steady stream of book reviews.
60 In 1907, the year Radbruch married his 
first wife, he and Kantorowicz attempted to start a journal that would be receptive to sociological 
and philosophical studies of law, but the plan fell through owing to lack of support from Jellinek 
and Windelband, who were needed to persuade the publisher.
61 That same year, as he began to 
feel increasingly alienated from the legal faculty, he received a joint appointment to teach at the 
nearby Mannheim commercial college with the help of Jellinek and the economist Eberhard 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 66. 
57 See letters of 29 and 30 April, 7 May, and 31 October 1904, in Briefe I, 51, 55. 
58 Letter of 4 March 1905, in Briefe I, 59; Innere Weg, 75. 
59 Employing that most German form of humor, the pun: “Heidelberg ist…mehr eine Pflanzstätte von Werken des 
Geistes als von Werken des Fleißes.” Innere Weg, 75. 
60 Radbruch, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1910), and Grundzüge der 
Rechtsphilosophie (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1914). 
61 Radbruch to his father, 8 and 21 July 1907, NL Radbruch III.A.7.  
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Gothein.
62 He was accorded a titular professorship at Heidelberg in 1910, but had to wait until 
the spring semester of 1914 for a meaningful promotion to associate professor, during which 
time his first marriage ended in separation and divorce and he struggled with depression.  The 
long-sought promotion came through a call to the university of Königsberg—“ultima Thule,” he 
lamented—which he accepted “with a heavy heart” and with much embitterment over the last 
years in Heidelberg.
63 He was to have only one semester’s teaching at Königsberg before the 
outbreak of the war, during which time he came to know the woman who would become his 
second wife in 1915. When the war came, he served honorably, first with the Red Cross and 
then, beginning in the spring of 1916, as an infantryman in the trenches of the Western Front.
64 
  What were Radbruch’s relations with his peers at the “seeding ground of works of the 
spirit,” Heidelberg? It is not possible to understand his thought apart from the contacts he made 
during the decade he spent there, above all among the members of Max Weber’s “counter-
circle.” Radbruch’s legal philosophy is generally taken to be an expression of the southwest-
German neo-Kantian value theory associated with Windelband, Rickert, Lask, and Weber, and 
his views are sometimes regarded as almost interchangeable with Weber’s.
65 It is not quite so 
simple, of course. We shall examine in the next section the degree to which Radbruch anticipated 
his later views in his first works of 1902-1903, independent of his Heidelberg contacts—as he 
later recalled, at the time of his habilitation he had still known “nothing of the southwest German 
school.”
66 And it has recently been argued that Radbruch’s Kantianism, and even his neo-
                                                 
62 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 5 May 1907, and to his father, 7 August 1907, in Briefe I, 114. 
63 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 3 April 1914, in Briefe I, 171. 
64 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 79; Radbruch, “Lebensbeschreibung,” (1945) in GRGA Vol. 16, p. 317;  see also letters of 
November and December 1915, in Briefe I, 204-207. 
65 See, for instance, Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value 
(London: Routledge, 1984) and, by the same authors, Max Weber: The Lawyer as Social Thinker (London: 
Routledge, 1994), where quotations from Radbruch are often used as compressed statements of what Weber also 
believed but expressed more diffusely. 
66 Radbruch to Karl Engisch, 21 September 1941, in Briefe II, GRGA Vol. 18, 179.  
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Kantianism, has been overstated.
67 According to this view, his philosophy tended toward an 
ontological division of reality into “realms” of experience, culture, and value that went well 
beyond the more modest claims of Kantian critical philosophy, whose “categories” shaped all 
possible experience but did not purport to possess a reality of the robustness implied by the 
notion of a “realm.” While this tendency away from the critical philosophy of Kant did not 
differentiate Radbruch from the later, more “Fichtean” neo-Kantians Rickert and Lask, it is said 
that his focus on justice as the “idea of law” involved him in a mode of thinking more 
characteristic of the Marburg-oriented Rudolf Stammler than of the southwest German school.
68 
Notwithstanding these claims, however, the importance of Baden neo-Kantian value theory to 
Radbruch’s thinking cannot be in doubt if we consider the intellectual influences he encountered 
during his first decade as a scholar, the terms of discussion within which his own work arose, 
and then the ways in which that work developed the theory. 
  When he moved to Heidelberg in October of 1903, Radbruch settled in a house owned by 
the Götz family.  This fortuitous fact would lead not only to his first marriage, to Lina Götz, but 
to his first encounter with the southwest German school.  Another new resident in the house, 
Heinrich Levy, was pursuing his graduate studies in philosophy with Windelband, and he and 
Radbruch quickly became friends.
69  Within a week of their acquaintance, Radbruch wrote his 
parents that Levy was “a quite excellent character and agreeable person, and is scientifically very 
stimulating for me”; the following day, Levy had persuaded him to join him in attending 
Windelband’s lectures on logic and on free will.
70 By early November, Radbruch was already 
                                                 
67 Dietmar von der Pfordten, “Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist: On the Question of What Ought to Be Preserved 
of His Philosophy,” Ratio Juris 21:3 (Sept. 2008), 387-403. 
68 Ibid., 391-94, 396-98. We will have more to say on the notion of the “idea of law” as justice below in Section II. 
69 Levy is best known for his later work on the “Hegel Renaissance,” though he also wrote on Kant and Heidegger. 
70 Radbruch to parents, 28 October 1903, in Briefe I, 36; letter of 29 October 1903 to parents, NL Radbruch III.A.3. 
It may be noted that Radbruch made here the rather anti-Semitic comment that Levy was “the first entirely  
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reporting that he had learned much from Levy.
71 “In debates, in which it was often do-or-die, he 
convinced me of the Kantian dualism between Is and Ought, reality and value, and of the 
theories [Lehren] of Windelband and Rickert founded on that dualism,” Radbruch recalled in his 
memoirs, crediting Levy with his first introduction to the “spirit of Heidelberg thinking.”
72 
Although both men were sensitive and nervous, and their friendship rather frequently disturbed 
by misunderstandings, Radbruch’s letters document that he spent much time in conversation with 
Levy, hiking in the hills around the city or even traveling together to Switzerland.  When Levy 
left for Strassburg in the spring of 1905, Radbruch regretted it, remarking that he had “in daily 
living together not only learned prodigiously much from him, but also found the opportunity for 
mutual discussion on everything that the day brought.”
73 
  Through Levy’s encouragement and the stimulus of Windelband’s lectures, Radbruch 
spent the end of 1903 familiarizing himself with Baden neo-Kantianism, and found much that 
appealed to his way of thinking.  He wrote to Kantorowicz already in late October, asking him, 
“Do you know Rickert’s Lehre von der Definition? I regret not having gotten to know it earlier. 
It contains in part similar lines of thought to my work [the just-completed second dissertation, 
Der Handlungsbegriff]. So I immediately sent Rickert a copy and am very anxious [gespannt] 
for his answer.” He even floated the idea of changing fields and getting a doctorate in philosophy 
with Windelband.
74 A few weeks later he added, “Before you review my work [Der 
Handlungsbegriff], do read Rickert’s Theory of the Definition and express that I’ve overlooked 
the book. Also, Windelband’s “Contributions to the Theory of the Negative Judgment” … should 
                                                                                                                                                             
sympathetic Jew whom I’ve met”; Radbruch was decisively to repudiate anti-Semitism within the first year or so of 
his stay in Heidelberg, a position from which he never deviated.  
71 Radbruch’s letter of 7 November 1903 refers to Levy, “der mir von Tag zu Tag lieber wird und von dem ich schon 
viel gelernt habe.” NL Radbruch III.A.3. 
72 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 63-64. 
73 Radbruch to parents, 6 April 1905, in Briefe I, 64. 
74 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 29 October 1903, in Briefe I, 37.  
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contain pertinent material. In his wonderful lectures on logic, which I’m talking through with a 
student of his (to my great gain), he’s said almost word-for-word the same thing about judgments 
and concepts as I have.”
75 It is clear that Radbruch was sympathetic to his first forays into neo-
Kantianism precisely because the Baden school doctrines were in line with his preexisting style 
of thought. 
But Radbruch’s connections with Rickert and particularly with Windelband deepened 
over the course of the decade following this initial reading.  He not only read Windelband’s 
technical essays and his histories of philosophy,
76 but made time during his busy teaching years 
to attend some of the philosopher’s lectures, for instance his 1906 course on Kant.
77 When 
Windelband died in the fall of 1915, Radbruch wrote to his parents, to whom he had no reason to 
exaggerate Windelband’s importance, that the death was a great loss to Heidelberg and that “I, 
too, lose in him a teacher who, next to Liszt, has influenced me the most.”
78 Naturally enough, he 
did not see as much of Rickert, who was based in Freiburg until he accepted Windelband’s 
former chair in 1915; but he visited Rickert several times, and he described the first two 
meetings as “endlessly interesting [pausenlos interessant].”
79 Even as his active duty service was 
about to begin in 1916, Radbruch was still mulling over a switch from law to philosophy through 
a habilitation with Rickert: he sounded out Max Weber and Karl Jaspers ahead of time to try and 
                                                 
75 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 19 November 1903, NL Radbruch III.E.20: “Ehe Sie meine Arbeit besprechen, lesen 
Sie ja Rickerts Lehre von der Definition und bringen [Sie] zum Ausdruck, dass ich das Buch übersehen habe. Auch 
Windelbands Beiträge z. L. v. negat. Urteil, Festgabe f. Zeller 1884, sollen Einschlägiger enthalten. In seinem 
wundervollen Colleg ueber Logik, das ich mit einem Schüler von ihm zu meinem grossen Gewinn durchspreche, hat 
er fast wörtlich das Gleiche über Urteil und Begriff gesagt, wie ich.” 
76 See, e.g., Radbruch to Karl Jaspers, 25 December 1911, NL Radbruch III.E.17a. 
77 Radbruch to parents, 11 January 1906, NL Radbruch III.A.6. 
78 Radbruch to parents, 27 October 1915, in Briefe I, 201. 
79 Radbruch to Lydia Radbruch (née Schenk), end of December 1915 or early January 1916, in Briefe I, 208. One of 
the two previous meetings with Rickert had been in 1910: Radbruch to parents, 7 April 1910, in NL Radbruch 
III.A.10.  
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make the case to Rickert.
80 And of course he was kept fully up-to-date with Rickert’s thought 
through the latter’s student, and Radbruch’s close friend, Emil Lask. 
  Radbruch and Lask knew each other during the entire decade they shared at Heidelberg. 
Shortly after his arrival, Radbruch wrote to Kantorowicz that “another person qualified for our 
circle [the Berlin legal philosophy group] is Dr. Lask…, who has gotten his degree with a first-
rate [vorzüglichen] dissertation on Fichte’s philosophy of history and is now studying law for the 
purpose of pursuing legal philosophy.”
81 Although Lask did indeed leave for Berlin to pursue his 
legal studies, he soon returned to Heidelberg to take up teaching.  Radbruch observed in late 
1904 that he and Lask were already very well acquainted and told Kantorowicz that “Lask will, I 
think, unlock a new world of legal-philosophical thinking for you too.”
82 By the following 
spring, they and a few others had begun to have lunch together daily in the old gothic-fronted 
Knight’s Inn in the cathedral square, a tradition they continued for years.
83 When Radbruch 
married Lina Götz in 1907, their “dear friend” Lask frequently visited their house, and in 1909-
1910 in particular he dined with them “almost daily.”
84 In fact, not only did Lask and Radbruch 
share their research in the evening discussions of the Weber circle, but they took an active 
cooperative role in each other’s scholarship. Lask read the entire manuscript of his Die Logik der 
Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre (The Logic of Philosophy and the Theory of Categories) 
aloud to Radbruch and Lina for their comments and criticisms, and she typed it up for him for 
the printers.
85 And Radbruch not only listed Lask alongside Windelband, Rickert, and Jellinek as 
                                                 
80 Radbruch to Jaspers, 27 January 1916, NL Radbruch III.E.17a. The plan came to nothing. 
81 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 29 October 1903, in Briefe I, 37. 
82 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 24 December 1904, in Briefe I, 57. 
83 See, e.g., Radbruch to parents, 20 May and 19 December 1905, and 17 May 1907, in NL Radbruch III.A.5 and 
III.A.7. The “Ritter” is still quite a good restaurant. 
84 Radbruch to parents, 22 November 1909, in NL Radbruch III.A.9. 
85 Radbruch to parents, 20 August 1910, in NL Radbruch III.A.10.  
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one of the main influences on his thought in the preface to his 1914 Grundzüge, but he remarked 
to Jaspers that the book itself “follows in his [Lask’s] tracks.”
86 
  We have seen that Radbruch met Max Weber in the spring of 1904, as Weber was 
beginning to enter Heidelberg social life once more.  Radbruch merits only a brief mention in 
Marianne Weber’s biography of her husband,
87 but she later wrote a heartfelt eulogy for him at 
the time of his death,
88 and we have the testimony of Weber’s friend Paul Honigsheim that “both 
Webers respected him very much; Max even called him an anima candida.”
89 Radbruch for his 
part quickly placed Weber among “the half dozen really significant scholars here,” a figure who 
in retrospect seemed “larger than life,” and Radbruch became a regular attendee at the monthly 
discussion evenings of the Weber circle.
90 He knew Weber’s methodological writings well soon 
after they appeared, cited them in his work, and recommended them to colleagues.
91 When his 
Grundzüge was published, Radbruch was more anxious to hear Weber’s response than that of 
any other scholar, and upon Jaspers’ report of Weber’s criticisms, Radbruch remarked rather 
resignedly that “Max Weber’s judgment has once again proved itself unerring; it is quite my own 
[judgment] too…,” the work being as Weber said both too “subtle” (scharfsinnig) and too 
“lightly-wrought” (leicht gearbeitet).
92 The two men saw much of each other until Weber’s 
death. 
                                                 
86 Radbruch, “Vorwort,” in Grundzüge, v; Radbruch to Jaspers, 7 June 1914, in Briefe I, 175-76: “in seinen Spuren 
wandelt.” See also the clear acknowledgment of Lask’s influence, especially that of his Rechtsphilosophie, in Innere 
Weg, 64. 
87 Marianne Weber, Max Weber: A Biography, trans. Harry Zohn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988), 452. 
88 Marianne Weber, Vortrag of 27 November 1949, in NL Radbruch I.E.46. Radbruch was, she said, a man of love 
and spirit, whose conduct after the tragic loss of his children in the Nazi period (one to a skiing accident, and one as 
a soldier at Stalingrad) helped her to realize that “a man who lives from the spirit [Geist] is not at all to be 
destroyed.” 
89 Paul Honigsheim, The Unknown Max Weber, ed. Alan Sica (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000), 200. 
90 Radbruch to parents, 14 June 1904 and 8 January 1909, in NL Radbruch III.A.4 and III.A.9; Innere Weg, 62. 
91 Radbruch cites several of Weber’s methodological essays with specific emphasis on their contribution to value 
theory and value-relativism in Grundzüge, 21, 24, 156, 180, 190; Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 22 January 1907, in 
Briefe I, 110, refers to “Max Weber’s critique of Stammler, which I find admirable [trefflich].” 
92 Radbruch to Jaspers, 28 June 1914, and to Kantorowicz, undated (early July 1914), in Briefe I, 177; 179.  
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  Karl Jaspers and Radbruch became friends under difficult circumstances, when 
Radbruch’s first marriage was in steep decline.  Because their correspondence often dealt with 
Radbruch’s personal troubles and the eventual dissolution of his marriage, some of it was 
probably destroyed by his second wife.  Nonetheless what remains testifies not only to close 
relations beginning in 1910—to the way in which Radbruch felt that he would “not only be 
bound to [Jaspers] through great thankfulness but through deep sympathy”—but also to a shared 
concern with personal authenticity and genuineness [Echtheit].
93 As his socialist convictions 
deepened during the war, Radbruch may have compared Jaspers “aristocratizing chatter” 
unfavorably with the attitudes of the working-class soldiers of his unit, but he remained in his 
debt and interested in his views.
94 In a 1949 draft for an afterword to his Rechtsphilosophie 
(which was the name given to the third and subsequent editions of the Grundzüge), he noted the 
recent philosophical popularity of existentialism, naming Heidegger and particularly Jaspers as 
the major figures in the movement, and remarked that his own legal philosophy was “drafted 
[konzipiert] long before the rise of Existenzphilosophie.”
95 He was perhaps thinking of the 
importance of the non-rational, personal decision with regard to value-choice as well as the 
emphasis on being “true” to oneself, proto-existential beliefs that he had arrived at before 
knowing Jaspers, but about which he and Jaspers were agreed. 
  For the most part, the other law professors whose thinking marked Radbruch’s own 
during his first decade in academic life were not Heidelberg faculty.  The exception was Jellinek.  
Radbruch had likely read some of Jellinek’s work before they became personally acquainted; an 
undated note on the stationery he used during the 1890s recorded his summary of Jellinek’s 1878 
                                                 
93 Radbruch to Jaspers, 29 December 1912 and 7 June 1914, in Briefe I, 159; 175-76; Innere Weg, 66. 
94 Radbruch to Lydia Radbruch, 19 June 1916, in Briefe I, 218. 
95 “Entwurf eines Nachworts zur ‘Rechtsphilosophie’,” in Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, Studienausgabe, ed. Ralf 
Dreier and Stanley L. Paulson (Heidelberg: Müller, 1999), 207.  
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Sozialethische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht und Strafe (Social-Ethical Significance of Law, 
Injustice, and Punishment), with its notion of law as the “ethical minimum.”
96 The two became 
acquainted through Radbruch’s habilitation advisor and Jellinek’s close friend, Lilienthal, and 
Radbruch reported that the older man’s judgment of his work was sympathetically critical. The 
results yielded by Radbruch’s Habilitationsschrift, said Jellinek, “don’t correspond to the effort 
expended.  There is nothing to be achieved in jurisprudence in intellectual terms alone; the main 
thing is evaluations; but [Radbruch’s] work strikes a sympathetic chord through the mark of 
honesty which it carries.”
97 Jellinek showed Radbruch “such warm sympathy” that the latter 
hoped “to find in him the best support and the example most to be striven for here.”
98 As we saw 
above, Radbruch listed Jellinek among the main influences on his thought in the foreword to the 
Grundzüge; he also cited his work first among those who had argued for the perspective of value 
relativism in social scientific and legal thought.
99 And though the two had less to do with one 
another after 1907,
100 when Radbruch had largely ostracized himself from the legal faculty 
owing to his marriage, he was genuinely saddened by the older man’s passing in 1911 and spoke 
at his funeral.
101  Jellinek was, he said, a man of “aesthetically-tempered nature,” whose 
scientific work reflected his deep belief in the rights of the individual personality, and Radbruch 
                                                 
96 NL Radbruch, II.E.72. Notes labeled “Rechtsphilosophie und strafrechtliche Anfänge,” on stationery printed with 
“L￼beck…den…189_” [year left blank]: “J[ellinek] fasst als ethisch auf, was den Bestand der Gesellschaft fördert, 
auch eine aus egoistischem Motiv vorgenommenen gesellschaftsfördernde Halt[un]g hat ethischen Wert, wenn auch 
nur geringen, deshalb ist auch das Recht Ethik, wenn auch nur Minimum.”  
97 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, undated (early December) 1903, in Briefe I, 42.  
98 Radbruch to parents, 26 November 1903, in NL Radbruch III.A.3. 
99 Radbruch, Grundzüge, v; 22. 
100 See Radbruch to his father, 16 November 1907, in NL Radbruch III.A.7: “Since my marriage, Jellinek has 
probably lost some interest for me.” 
101 Radbruch to his father, 18 January 1911, in Briefe I, 140.  
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emphasized his work on the use of comparative “types” in social science (see Chapter 5) and his 
contributions to liberalism: a man justly referred to as the Montesquieu of his day.
102 
We have seen in the previous chapter how closely connected Radbruch was with 
Kantorowicz and the Free Law School, and the impact that Stammler’s philosophy had on the 
legal theorists of their group.  We can, therefore, dispense with further consideration of these 
influences on Radbruch, apart from noting that Radbruch was willing to give Stammler a 
particularly important place in stoking his interest in legal philosophy, however little he 
interacted with Stammler in person.
103 In Section II below, we will consider specific instances in 
which Radbruch’s agreements with Baden neo-Kantianism or Weberian relativism had sources 
in contemporary German legal thought antedating his first Heidelberg period. 
Radbruch’s political views and his general temperament are also relevant to his ultimate 
stance on values and value-freedom.  Though Radbruch would later become justice minister 
under several SPD governments during the Weimar Republic, and officially joined the Socialist 
party after World War I, his politics were more nebulously left-of-center during the period under 
consideration here.  He was sympathetic to socialism from his university days at least, and read 
some Marx then
104; like many in Heidelberg, he was attracted to Friedrich Naumann’s National-
Social party, and glad that it supported cooperation with moderate socialist speakers, who 
seemed to him already in 1903 to hold amiable and sensible views.
105 He began to subscribe to 
the Sozialistisches Monatsheft at the same time.
106 During his Heidelberg decade, he was most 
                                                 
102 Radbruch, Untitled Obituary for Georg Jellinek, in Logos 2 (1911-12), 257-9; reprinted in GRGA Vol. 16, 21-24. 
This is not an exhaustive account of the Heidelberg scholars who were important to Radbruch (others would 
certainly include Eberhard Gothein, Edgar Jaffé, and Georg Lukács), limited as it is to those who had direct 
relevance to his thinking about values and value-judgments. 
103 See, e.g. “Entwurf eines Nachworts zur ‘Rechtsphilosophie’,” in Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 207-208; 
Radbruch to Kantorowicz 14 January 1905, NL Radbruch III.E.20. 
104 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 41. 
105 Radbruch to his father, 28 November 1903, in Briefe I, 40. 
106 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 19 November 1903, in NL Radbruch III.A.3.  
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inclined to discuss his political sympathies with Kantorowicz, who, as we have seen, became 
more of a liberal as Radbruch became more of a socialist; however, he largely remained an 
“unpolitical” professor until just before the war.  In 1912, he became a city assemblyman and 
greatly enjoyed the practical experience as a way of “turning outward” during the most trying 
year of his personal life.
107 Attending the funeral of August Bebel in Switzerland in 1913 seems 
to have been a turning point for him, at least in retrospect; he published an anonymous 
appreciation of the “great impression” it made on him in a local paper, which, he admitted to 
Jaspers, was “kitschy [and] sentimental,” but it also helped to “teach him finally where he must 
stand.”
108 Even after he had committed himself to a socialist viewpoint, however, Radbruch’s 
stance was notably individualistic, not collectivist, in matters of personal freedom.  In his 
Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft, for instance, he wrote that socialism as a political doctrine 
presupposed individualism just as much as its liberal rival in its commitment to its ultimate goal 
of developing the individual “personality”; and he claimed that the socialist worldview was 
opposed to the holistic notion of the social “totality” as a conservative rather than socialist 
idea.
109 Needless to say, as in the case of Tönnies and Sombart, Radbruch’s growing socialist 
sympathies could be seen as yet another factor leading him in the direction of the value-freedom 
criterion, since it could serve as a defensive posture against the prejudice he faced from the 
“orthodox” professors so influential in hiring decisions. 
  Equally hard to isolate as a causal factor, and to assign a relative weight, is Radbruch’s 
personality and character, which nevertheless almost certainly predisposed him to accept 
particular views on values and the nature of scholarship.  During the first half of his career, at 
                                                 
107 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 20 April 1912, in Briefe I, 150. 
108 Radbruch to Jaspers, 25 August 1913, in Briefe I, 165, where he also notes his positive impression of Karl 
Liebknecht; Innere Weg, 75. 
109 Radbruch, Einführung, 15-16; 42.  
325 
 
least, Radbruch was a shy and retiring person who preferred to remain in the realm of abstract 
thought,
110 but who nonetheless resolved to hold strong convictions and was willing to push 
himself to take public stands.  He was by nature highly self-conscious and unsure of himself, a 
fact manifested in almost all of his early correspondence; as late as 1914, he wrote Jaspers of 
“the danger of self-torturing, self-important preoccupation with one’s own person—of which 
I’ve just given an example again [in this letter].”
111 
Moreover he saw these tendencies as more than personal attributes: they were 
characteristic of his age.  In some unpublished notes “ￜber die Selbstbeobachtung” from his first 
Heidelberg decade, he considered a sort of ontogenetic-phylogenetic analogy between the self-
observation of youth and that associated with a self-conscious new stage in human culture such 
as his own time.  In each case, the person or culture too involved in analysis of self “cannot 
create a new character out of nothing; he [or it] declines for lack of freedom of the will and dies 
physically too—one thinks of Hermann’s Conradi or Hofmannsthal’s ‘Thor.’”
112 These 
references, particularly to the Austrian poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s play “Der T[h]or und der 
Tod,” which was a recurrent favorite of Radbruch’s, reflected his immersion in the literary 
culture of Munich and Berlin when his views were first beginning to form.
113 In his memoirs, he 
offered a striking depiction of the fin-de-si￨cle attitudes to which he had been “receptive”: a 
                                                 
110 For instance, he wrote his parents that “Ich bin so sehr gewohnt, nur über Abstrakta zu schreiben, dass es mit dem 
Erzählen nicht mehr recht gehen will,” (21 May 1904, in NL Radbruch III.A.4). See also Innere Weg, 53, for 
Radbruch’s preference for the abstract over the concrete, the concept over “life,” theory over practice during his 
youth. 
111 Radbruch to Jaspers, 28 June 1914, in Briefe I, 178. He also told Jaspers he thought he had been “excessively 
overestimated” (“maßlos ￼berschätzt”) by his family and in his schooling (letter to Jaspers, 8 May 1912, in NL 
Radbruch III.E.17a). 
112 “ￜber die Selbstbeobachtung,” in NL Radbruch II.E.72.6: “kann keinen neuen Charakter aus dem Nichts 
schaffen, er geht an dem Mangel der Willensfreiheit zugrunde und sterbt auch physisch ab; man denkt an Hermann’s 
Conradi, man denkt an Hofmannsthals ‘Thor.’”  
113 The melancholy and immobilized young aristocrat in Hofmannsthal’s play says at one point, “Was weiss denn 
ich vom Menschenleben? / Bin freilich scheinbar drin gestanden, / Aber ich hab es höchstens verstanden, / Konnte 
mich nie darein verweben. / Hab mich niemals daran verloren. / Wo andre nehmen, andre geben / Bleib ich beiseit, 
im Innern stummgeboren.” Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Kleine Dramen, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Im Insel, 1907), 59-60.  
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combination of the half-understood thoughts of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Max Stirner with a 
universal drive to unmask illusions and prejudices so vigorous as to extend to an attack on the 
validity of values of all sorts, leading in the direction of pessimism and nihilism. “All that 
remained after this work of destruction was the glorification of the drive or vitality of life [der 
Dynamik des Lebens überhaupt], an encomium to movement—indifferent to the goal, in service 
to anything…. [We] inwardly shied away from relinquishing too early the richness of unlimited 
possibilities for limited realities, from identifying [festlegen] firm convictions and forming our 
characters, which would also be to narrow ourselves.  We much rather held ourselves in 
suspension between the contradictions of this world full of contradictions.”
114 Particularly when 
combined with the drive to self-observation, he added, this attitude “threatens to empty out all 
feelings, to dissolve all values, to impede the emergence of any sort of conviction; and there 
remains only a harrowing emptiness and coldness.”
115 
His temperament, and the bohemian literary culture in which he felt most at home during 
his student days, inclined Radbruch to relativism and uncertainty about moral and cultural 
values, while simultaneously building in him an appreciation for the dangers of the self-
preoccupation and lack of direction such uncertainty could lead to.  As a result, he was attuned 
even from his pre-Heidelberg period to the need to put an end to it through a resolute decision.  
We have seen that his main complaint about his upbringing was a lack of emphasis on the 
building of an independent and decisive character,
116 and his willful, immature flouting of 
various academic conventions during his first Heidelberg years can be seen from one angle as an 
                                                 
114 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 39-40. 
115 Ibid., 40. 
116 See above, Section I.  
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attempt to gain this lacking independence.
117 He later noted that this tendency was present in 
strictly academic culture as well, and led to the same potential dangers: “The inclination to 
regard everything as debatable,” which was the attitude dominant in Liszt’s seminar if not in 
Liszt himself, Radbruch claimed, “could lead to a boundless [haltlosen] relativism, and the 
unavoidable attempt willfully to halt the discussion before any theory [was agreed upon] could 
lead to an obstinate partisanship [Parteigeist]. I confess that I was not entirely untouched by 
these opposing consequences.”
118 But whatever the dangers, he retained from this period a sort of 
personal code according to which he resolved not to allow his life to “drain away unlived into 
unconsciousness” or through inhibitions, but to act, something he first did properly to his 
satisfaction with his entry into politics in the 1920s.
119 
 
II.  Values and Elements of the Value-Freedom Doctrine in Radbruch’s Philosophy 
of Law, 1903-1914 
 
Radbruch believed that his personal life, preferences, and experiences helped him to 
achieve what clarity his philosophy could claim, and what influence it had for students and future 
lawyers through its aesthetic as well as its intellectual appeal.  For instance, he thought that his 
own initial lack of interest in the law made him a good candidate for introducing the law to 
ambivalent students.  His preface of December 1909 to the Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft 
remarked that it was an attempt “to write the book that [Radbruch] would have liked to read a 
                                                 
117 Cf. Kaufmann, Gustav Radbruch, 46-47, who puts Radbruch’s occasional forays into social faux-pas and 
rudeness down to what he sees as an admirable desire to reject “bourgeois” conventions. Radbruch himself later 
attributed these behaviors to immaturity, and his letters at the time often express regret for his conduct. See Innere 
Weg, 66; and e.g. Radbruch to Jaspers, 29 December 1912, in Briefe I, 158. 
118 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 55. 
119 Ibid., 33-34.  
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decade ago,” when he too was just beginning his legal studies and attempting to place law into 
relationship with other “cultural values,” doctrines of the state, and Weltanschauungen.
120 “Only 
through the experiences [Erfahrungen] of my own soul could I work out the antinomies and 
paradoxes of the law, as I have done in my Rechtsphilosophie.  Only because my genuine love 
belonged to the areas of intellectual life beyond the boundaries of law could my work range so 
often across the borders between jurisprudence and other sciences.”
121 Moreover, he 
acknowledged that many of his writings, even when seemingly impersonal and abstract, really 
reflected his own intimate views: as he remarked to Jaspers, his works could often be seen as 
“romans-à-clefs [Schlüsselromanen]” relating to his own life and thought.
122 It is therefore 
natural for us next to draw on our findings about Radbruch’s life and influences to help clarify 
and put in proper context the attitudes toward values, neo-Kantian value theory, and the elements 
of value-freedom in science that he expressed in the course of his first decade’s work.
123 
The definitive statement for this period is the 1914 Grundzüge, whose main themes and 
positions were developed in various articles and the Einführung in the period leading up to that 
year.  Does this mean that commentators are correct in seeing Radbruch’s legal philosophy as an 
expression of what he learned from Heidelberg neo-Kantianism and relativism? Section I has 
already given us good reason to believe that Radbruch’s attachment to the subjectivity of values, 
value-relativism, and to a theory of free individual value-choice pre-dated his first contacts with 
the Weber circle in Heidelberg.  His 1903 dissertation, Der Handlungsbegriff, completed before 
                                                 
120 Radbruch, Einführung, unpaginated preface. [GRGA Vol. 2, 93.] 
121 Radbruch, Innere Weg, 39. 
122 Radbruch to Jaspers, 28 June 1914, in Briefe I, 178. 
123 In one of his many intellectual-historical studies of previous jurists, Radbruch himself argued that a discussion of 
the “really lived life” of the biographical subject was underrated but provided essential insight into the subject’s 
thought. (Quoted from his essay on Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Spendel, Jurist in einer Zeitenwende, 8.)  
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his encounter with neo-Kantianism and Weber, provides a good indication of where he stood at 
that time. 
The second part of the dissertation was an attempt to gain a unified concept of action for 
use in criminal law (Strafrecht, also penal law) across the full spectrum of crimes and delicts, 
whether of active conduct or of culpable negligence (Fahrlässigkeit) or omission (Unterlassung).  
Radbruch’s student and biographer Kaufmann portrays it as being “wholly under the spell of 
Kantianism” in its preoccupation with purely formal analysis, without, however, noting that 
Radbruch was at this point familiar only with Rudolf Stammler’s Marburg-oriented neo-
Kantianism, and that his philosophical authorities in the text were in fact the three Logics of John 
Stuart Mill, Christoph Sigwart, and Wilhelm Wundt.
124 The argument was conducted at a high 
level of abstraction and generally without results, essentially conceding that the system of 
criminal law was split down the middle by division into the two categories of culpable action and 
omission,
125 and has not generally been very highly regarded.
126 Radbruch himself soon 
recognized his argument as flawed.
127 
Of much greater interest to us is the first, general, part.  Here Radbruch began with a 
defense of the legitimacy of writing on questions of methodology.  He acknowledged the 
criticisms of the Hegelian law professor Josef Kohler that no cleaning of surgical instruments 
could replace the skilled hand, nor could clearing the kitchen table make a roast, but insisted that 
after all someone must do the methodological preparation if the basis for legal scholarship was to 
be regarded as sound.
128 Various features of Radbruch’s argument in the first part showed 
                                                 
124 Kaufmann, Gustav Radbruch, 115. Kaufmann also misdates the published text to 1904, perhaps on the 
assumption that it reflects the impact of Heidelberg neo-Kantianism in its final, published form. 
125 Radbruch, Handlungsbegriff, 143. 
126 See, e.g., the critique of Radbruch’s confusion of contradictory concepts (doing vs. not-doing) and contrary 
concepts (doing vs. not-doing-something) in Spendel, Jurist in einer Zeitenwende, 33. 
127 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 25 June 1904, in Briefe I, 54. 
128 Radbruch, Handlungsbegriff, 8.  
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affinities with, or explicit statements in keeping with, the views expressed in his later essays and 
books.  For instance, though he did not make the distinction between “is” and “ought” an explicit 
principle, it was already part of his thinking. “The lawmaker [Gesetzgeber] does not say that 
such-and-such facts [or elements: Tatbestand] will have such-and-such a legal effect as a 
consequence; rather, he promises that he, the lawmaker, will see to it or commands that the 
subject [Untertan] shall see to it, that these facts shall have these legal consequences. The legal 
rule is not a declaratory sentence, but rather a constitutive rule, not an ascertaining 
[feststellender] sentence, but rather an establishing [festsetzender] rule: not natural law 
[Naturgesetz], but rather norm.”
129 Confusing the two is a logical mistake, one that has been 
common in the law at least since the early nineteenth-century historical school and the method of 
dialectics, both of which try to find normative content in historical development.
130 Perhaps 
recalling Landauer’s presentation of Fritz Mauthner’s ideas from earlier in the year, Radbruch 
adopted a nominalistic posture and warned against any mistaken hypostatization of concepts or 
mixing of logical terminology and real objects, whether in Plato’s doctrine of Ideas, scholastic 
realism, or Hegel’s philosophy, alongside reification of the soul, the will, and the idea of causal 
power.
131 
Perhaps, following Kaufmann, we can see this separation of “is” and “ought” as indebted 
to the one neo-Kantian author Radbruch had read by 1903, Rudolf Stammler.
132 Radbruch’s own 
later statements on who persuaded him to adopt this element of the fact-value distinction are 
contradictory: as we have seen, in his memoirs he credited Heinrich Levy, whereas in the 1949 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 40. 
130 Ibid., 41. 
131 Ibid., 39-40. 
132 Radbruch was in fact preparing to write a review of Stammler’s magnum opus, Die Lehre von dem richtigen 
Rechte, while he was working on his habilitation dissertation, as he remarked to Kantorowicz alongside favorable 
comments about Stammler’s Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung: Radbruch to 
Kantorowicz, 12 September 1903, in Briefe I, 33.  
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draft preface to his Rechtsphilosophie he credited Stammler.
133 Both may have had an impact, 
but what is clear from his dissertation is that Radbruch was not willing to follow Stammler in the 
latter’s attempt to construct a new version of normative natural law.  Here Radbruch showed that 
unlike any of the neo-Kantians (Marburg or Baden), and independent of Weber, he had 
connected the “is”/“ought” distinction with the non-rationality and subjectivity of values or 
“oughts.” And he did so in the context of a specifically juristic problem.
134 
In the production of legal principles of any degree of generality, observed Radbruch, the 
standard method is to look to the collection of legally valid past judgments and to distill from 
them by “induction” a set of principles or rules that serves as the common feature uniting them.  
These rules may then be applied according to the method of “construction” (Konstruktion) used 
in “conceptual jurisprudence” that we examined in the previous chapter, namely by extending 
them beyond the specific holdings reached by judges on past cases to new and unforeseen 
circumstances in present cases.  Sometimes the derived principles may logically compel a 
judgment that does not, as a matter of fact, seem acceptable as an outcome to the judicial 
process—it is not accorded legal validity.  Such an outcome may prompt the judge to view the 
principle it was based upon as falsely induced in the first place.  But how is one to know which 
option to select: whether the outcome is to be accepted or the principles it was based upon are to 
be rejected? Radbruch’s answer is: Rechtsgefühl, the “feeling” for, or sense of, law or justice. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, this concept was used by the Free Law 
movement.  It did not necessarily have to mean a non-rational, emotive response, but could 
signify a general sense of what the just judgment would be like, taking existing law and the clear 
intentions of the parties in a novel contract or dispute situation into account.  For instance, 
                                                 
133 Radbruch, “Entwurf eines Nachworts zur ‘Rechtsphilosophie” in Rechtsphilosophie: Studienausgabe, ed. Dreier 
and Paulson, 206-207. 
134 For the following argument, see Handlungsbegriff, 16-17.  
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Radbruch noted, explicitly crediting an oral communication by Kantorowicz for the insight, one 
way to show that a legal principle has been wrongly induced is to use a procedure of reductio ad 
absurdum, showing by the impossibility of implementing the conclusion that the reasoning had 
gone wrong somewhere before the final step.  But however useful this procedure is in practice, it 
begs the question.  For what is to count as our criterion for determining what is absurd and what 
is not? Legal scholarship has typically answered using the concepts of the “nature of the 
case/thing” (Natur der Sache) or the “spirit of the law” (Geist des Gesetzes), grasping at the will-
o’-the-wisp of a factual reality with normative implications.  In fact, Radbruch points out, people 
(Persönlichkeiten) who doubt the weight of their own personal judgment often try to clothe 
themselves in the garments of some such abstract and seemingly authoritative “good thing.”  
That this is a common event does mean there are such objective sources. As the final court of 
opinion, he concludes, 
There remains then only the individual Rechtsgefühl, individual “value-judgments and willed decisions,” 
[Werturteile und Willensentscheidungen], individual conviction of “right law” [richtigen Recht], whose significance 
Stammler recognized in a manner just as brilliant as his attempt to elevate it to a scientific, objective-truth-delivering 
method was futile. Such conviction will always remain, much rather, “immediate knowledge” or intuition—like all 
insight into that which should be [sein soll].
135 
Here Radbruch simultaneously repudiates Stammler’s attempt at a new normative legal 
science on Kantian critical foundations, sets out his view of the nature of “value judgments and 
willed decisions” as matters of intuition and conviction, and suggests the vainness of hopes for 
reason and scientific method to deliver such value judgments.  We considered in Section  I some 
of the sources of Radbruch’s early opinions that might have led him to such a conclusion; 
another is suggested by the reference he gives to readers at the conclusion of this passage: to the 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 17.  
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1891 Freiburg prorectoral address of the jurist Gustav Rümelin.
136 Rümelin, whom Radbruch 
often mentioned along with his brother Max as among the most important predecessors of the 
Free Law movement’s way of thinking,
137 had much earlier been among the first to introduce the 
terminology of value judgments as well as the view that such judgments were inherently 
subjective and could not achieve the sort of consensus that empirical or logical statements could 
claim, while still noting their importance for the judicial process.
138 This speech was one of the 
most cited sources in the general part of Radbruch’s dissertation.  And he had similar responses 
to other juristic sources, such as the dissertation of his former fellow student at Berlin, the Swiss 
Ernst Delaqui.  In early January, 1904, again months before any acquaintance with Weber, he 
wrote to Kantorowicz of his satisfaction with Delaqui’s tendency to lay out various partisan 
positions on a particular question by “clarify[ing] the inner relationship of those views to the 
dispute” dispassionately without himself taking sides. But what really impressed Radbruch was 
“the honest acknowledgment” that one couldn’t “get away” with making claims about principles, 
“that the value judgments which hold [gelten] are irrational, not to be led back to any principle. 
This honest and renunciatory [entsagungsvolle] realism is very impressive to me, as I’m always 
wanting to bash my head against the wall with my logicism [Logizismus].
139 
 The usual picture, then, that Radbruch’s value relativism was owing to the example of 
Max Weber, is entirely mistaken; and, indeed, there are also indications in this text of why 
Radbruch was later of the same opinion as Weber about what reason is like and what it can be 
expected to do in relation to values.  For instance, reflecting the logic of Sigwart and Mill, 
                                                 
136 Gustav Rümelin, Werturteile und Willensentscheidungen im Civilrecht (Freiburg i.B.: Lehmann, 1891). 
137 See e.g. Radbruch, “Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschöpfung: Ein Beitrag zum juristischen Methodenstreit,” 
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20:2 (March 1906), 355-70, here p. 369. The brothers were in fact 
most closely associated with the related “Jurisprudence of Interests” movement. 
138 Rümelin, Werturteile und Willensentscheidungen, 29-31 and passim. 
139 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 5 January 1904, in Briefe I, 46.  
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Radbruch pictured reasoning largely as the application of deductive logic to the data provided by 
induction and experience—the latter being the real source of any new knowledge (as opposed to 
psychological realizations about already existing knowledge).  Deductive conclusions “contain 
within them nothing that had not already been contained in the axioms” from which they began; 
but reason, following Mill and in line with one of Weber’s principal claims, could still help to 
secure knowledge by checking the consistency of inductions with one another and of the 
generalizations based on them.
140 The dissertation evinced a strong tendency, as well, to attempt 
to lead any and all systems of concepts or systems of judgments (propositions) back to ultimate 
axioms that were themselves basic, a pattern integral to both Weber’s and Radbruch’s 
antinomianism, as we will see.
141 
Turning to the writings of Radbruch’s Heidelberg period proper, most fundamental to his 
thought, conceptually speaking, was the attempt to determine the task of legal philosophy in the 
first place.  One traditional and easy way of doing this, of course, was that of legal positivism, 
which saw little place for philosophy at all.  Like the jurists we have considered in the previous 
chapter, Radbruch was heavily influenced by positivism while rejecting certain aspects of 
standard positivist thinking.  He insisted, like them, on the need to take philosophical and 
sociological factors into account, rather than seeing the law as a self-contained and pristine 
system, but he was still generally respectful of the achievements of the “Allgemeine Rechtslehre” 
tradition and he had some trouble deciding which factor was most important to him.  Torben 
Spaak is right that there are still positivist elements in Radbruch’s thinking and that he was not 
an advocate of natural law all along but only in his last years.
142 As Radbruch wrote to the 
                                                 
140 Radbruch, Handlungsbegriff, 10-11. 
141 See, e.g., Ibid., 54-55 on the notion of an “Oberbegriff” as the ultimate end of any classificatory system of 
concepts and an original judgment as the end of any deductive system of legal rules. 
142 Spaak, “Meta-Ethics and Legal Theory,” 261-63, 270-71.  
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Karlsruhe lawyer Ernst Fuchs, a friend and a militant advocate of the Free Law movement, he 
was no “born” jurist of the new (sociological) style, but had affinities with the older positivist 
approach; it was just that he had seen some of its problems, and in some ways he preferred 
writing legal philosophy because he was unable to decide the question of his allegiance in 
matters of proper legal practice between the two approaches.
143 This is worth keeping in mind 
when we observe that his legal philosophy begins with the task of establishing the necessary 
features of any legal order and has distinct affinities with Stammler’s notion of a formal “natural 
law with changing content.” 
  Radbruch resisted the notion that the concept of law itself could be arrived at inductively 
through comparison of existing positive laws and whole legal orders with one another, or with 
non-legal customs and morals.
144  Rather, he argued in classic Kantian fashion, the concept of 
law must necessarily precede the ability to identify given empirical phenomena as legal.  This 
was not the absurd claim that a sound legal philosophy must temporally precede the 
identification of existing law; only that it must logically precede it, with the goal of philosophy 
being not the provision of new knowledge of the law but only the clarification and reformulation 
of the concept of law already known implicitly through the work of legal science itself.
145 Nor 
was this merely the sort of logical priority necessary to recognize a ‘token’ of a particular ‘type’ 
(that is, e.g., that some given particular human behavior is an instance of the type ‘contract 
agreement’), as critics might suggest.  That was a mere “nominal definition,” a classificatory 
concept imposed for the purpose of useful ordering of legal phenomena.  Instead, he suggested, 
legal philosophy’s task lay in showing through transcendental argument the necessary conditions 
                                                 
143 Radbruch to Ernst Fuchs, 14 January 1913, in Briefe I, 160. 
144 He associated this view (which is not, of course, inherently limited to positivism alone) with the arch-positivist 
legal theorist Carl Bergbohm, whose Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie (1892) was a classic statement for the 
dominant camp in Imperial legal academia. See the pages in the following note. 
145 Radbruch, Grundzüge, 30-31.  
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for the existence of any legal phenomena whatsoever.  With his usual flair for vivid metaphor, he 
suggested that this was the difference between a concept that legal phenomena as it were 
“democratically elect” to order them, and a concept that makes them possible in the first place 
“‘by the grace of God,’” and thereby belonging to the “small aristocracy of forming concepts.”
146  
  The question, of course, was whether such a universally necessary grounding for law was 
a revival of natural law thinking.  Like many Kantians and neo-Kantians, Radbruch aimed for a 
“middle ground”—in his case, between the errors of natural law and the errors of positivism.  If 
positivism erred in thinking a concept of law could be derived from mere induction, natural law 
erred as well.  Natural law was not to be proven faulty by pointing out the various conflicting 
customs of the world, he acknowledged, since that might simply indicate a failure to find the 
right law.  But Radbruch thought that Kantian criticism had shown that no knowledge of the real 
world of experience was possible on the basis of reason alone, and that the necessity of 
combining the categories of pure reason with the evidence of the senses in order to have any 
possible experience meant that reason alone could provide form but no content to natural law.  At 
most, natural law was “richtiges Recht” or “right law,” generally or universally valid but without 
the ability to compel specific actions or offer specific remedies in all cases, as its demands on 
human agents would vary across times and social conditions.  That is to say, it was, with 
Stammler, a “natural law with changing content.”
147 
  Radbruch sought to be more consistent than Stammler, however, since the latter had no 
sooner established the formal nature of the demands of “right law” than he proceeded to derive 
some specific legal rules (content) from them through the “social ideal” of a community of free-
willed people.  Just as Kant’s theory of knowledge has not shown “how one is to produce one’s 
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world-picture [Weltbild], but is much rather an analysis of already produced world-pictures,” 
wrote Radbruch in his notes in the middle of the decade, so also Stammler’s “right law” can only 
claim to be an analysis of the “already established [ermittelten] right law” gained through one’s 
“Rechtsgefühl.”
148 Not only Stammler but Kant too, in his practical philosophy, had attempted 
unsuccessfully to derive rules with specific content from formal, generalizable maxims.
149 
“There is indeed (ostensibly) a method for drawing out the eternal form from the given material 
and sorting it out from the incidental matter—namely, the critical method.  There is, however, by 
no means a method of wedding the empty form synthetically with new matter.”
150 Attempts to do 
so methodically were simply returns to old-style natural law. 
  The problem with Stammler, then, was his insufficient commitment to his own dualism 
of form and content and the injunction not to confuse them.  In Radbruch’s own theory, he 
attempted to remain a consistent dualist as to form and content—not just as to facts and norms, 
“is” and “ought,” where Stammler like other Kantians did remain consistent.  Here the Marburg 
approach and the Baden approach were at one: norms or values could not be derived from facts, 
and the study of the effects of empirically existing laws on people’s actions had to be kept 
separate from the study of laws as systems of norms.  Radbruch made his acceptance of this key 
element of the value-freedom complex clear throughout his early writings.
151  As he wrote in the 
Grundzüge, “Philosophy takes as its object not being [das Seiende], but what should be [das 
                                                 
148 NL Radbruch, II.E.72.13, third sheet. 
149 Radbruch, Grundzüge, 23. Radbruch also made the charge of inconsistency against Kant and the claim that no 
“unambiguously ascertainable [eindeutig feststellbaren] categorical imperative” was possible in an unpublished 
lecture, “Die Wiedergeburt der deutschen Philosophie,” which he gave on 30 June 1916 in the officers’ mess of his 
army unit: NL Radbruch II.H.6, p. 5. 
150 NL Radbruch, II.E.72.13, fourth sheet, “Zu M.E. Mayers Kritik Stammlers”: “Es gibt zwar (angeblich) eine 
Methode dafür aus dem gegebenen Material die ewige Form herauszuarbeiten und sie von dem zufälligen Stoffe zu 
sondern, nämlich die kritische Methode. Keineswegs aber gibt es eine Methode die leere Form nun synthetisch mit 
neuem Stoffe zu vermählen.” My italics. Note Radbruch’s fairly metaphysical interpretation of Kantian 
epistemology. 
151 See, e.g. “Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschöpfung,” 365: “aus dem Sein kann man nach Kants Lehre ein Sollen 
nimmermehr herausklauben.”  
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Seinsollende], not reality but value, not the causes but the purpose [Zweck], not the being [Sein] 
but the meaning [Sinn] of all things.  And legal philosophy in particular deals not with the law 
which holds [gilt] but rather with that which should hold, not with the positive but with the right 
law [richtigen Rechte], not with law but with the value, the meaning, the purpose of law—with 
justice.”
152 
  The task of legal philosophy was, then, to deal with the value or values universally 
presupposed as the grounds of possibility for any phenomenon to “show up” as a legal 
phenomenon for human observers, without thereby falling into prescriptive natural law.  Legal 
science, on the other hand—Rechtswissenschaft—had to deal not just with the “ought,” the 
“value” or the “purpose” of law, but with the human reality of law as well: what the law is or 
was in a given agreement or dispute.  Knowing what we do about Radbruch’s background, it will 
not be surprising to learn at this juncture that his conviction answer was that legal science is 
neither a “value-blind” procedure, ignoring the world of values and oughts entirely, nor an 
evaluative, normative science, but a “value-relating” cultural science. Sounding a note that 
would harmonize with the Southwest neo-Kantians, Radbruch argued this as follows. 
  In order to examine the a priori conditions for the possibility of law, he suggested, we 
must consider two a priori ways of thinking.  These two divide everything cognizable into “two 
worlds, two realms, or better … the duality of approach [Betrachtungsweise], which forms two 
world-pictures from one-and-the-same given [Gegebenheit].” They are, as the reader will by now 
expect, the value-blind natural scientific approach which opens the realm of “is” (Sein), reality, 
and nature; and the evaluating approach, which opens the realm of “ought” (Sollen), values, and 
purposes (Zwecke), and which distinguishes between positive and negative evaluations.
153 But 
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law does not seem to fit into either of these categories.  Not the first, as “every attempt to make 
out the law as a discrete unity from the continuum of the given through a purpose-free and value-
free approach teaches that the concept of law does not belong to the realm (Reiche) of nature”: 
nothing would appear to the observer to set law apart from other regular human behavior and 
institutional actions.  Law, then, is not value-free in the sense of the mid-nineteenth-century 
“positivist” or scientistic perspective.  Nor yet does it fit the second category: it was the mistake 
of natural law to see law as belonging solely to the realm of ends and values, to deny any legal 
rule or statement that stands contrary to the highest legal ends or values, not merely its justice but 
its validity and even its character as law at all.
154 A third possible approach, following 
Windelband and Lask, is the religious-philosophy of values, awkwardly termed the “value-
overcoming” (wertüberwindende) approach. This view refuses to distinguish between positive 
values and negative disvalues (Unwerte) by considering them all in the light of divine 
redemption: that is, it assumes that in the final analysis, all human distinctions between good and 
evil will be overcome by God’s universal love and the distinction will cease to have meaning.  
“Value-overcoming,” however, has no more purchase on identifying that area of reality 
characterized as law than did the second because it, too, is inherently evaluative—in effect, it 
evaluates all things positively.
155 
Law fits, instead, into the fourth, the “strange between-realm” of culture, where 
phenomena are picked out from the continuum of reality by their relation to values.  It is not 
evaluative, refusing as it does to sit in judgment on what constitutes a virtue or vice, a true 
statement or an error, taste or tastelessness, but only to present each instance in its relatedness to 
moral, scientific, and aesthetic values.  Nor, obviously, is it value-blind: “It culls [auslesen] from 
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the given only those elements which stand in some sort of relation to values, which let 
themselves be subsumed under value-concepts—be it directly, because they represent a 
realization of a value or a disvalue, or be it indirectly, because in the course of serving as a 
means or obstruction for the realization of a value, they are illuminated [bestrahlt] by the 
reflection of that promoted value or disvalue.”
156 It is an odd cultural science, to be sure: unlike 
history or economics, for instance, its subject matter is a set of imperatives.  Radbruch 
distinguished imperatives from norms—a norm holds absolutely and timelessly; an imperative is 
an actual, empirically existent command to take or avoid a particular action.  But these 
imperatives may be studied in just the same way as any other cultural fact or result of willed 
human action.  
Against the views of Jellinek, Kantorowicz, and Kelsen, therefore, and along with Rickert 
and Lask, Radbruch maintained that it is “not a normative ought [Sollen] [that] forms the object 
of legal science, but rather an imperative will [Wollen]. It is no Normwissenschaft, but rather an 
empirical cultural science.”
157 What, then, of the objection that the science of law is supposed to 
provide the judge with the knowledge and the means to decide a case—would that not mean that, 
in some sense, the science itself must impose a normative judgment? We will return to this 
question at the end of this chapter.  
  To sum up, Radbruch has set the task of legal philosophy as expounding the nature of the 
value-presuppositions for the possible existence of law, and the task of legal science as showing 
the way in which legal phenomena relate to those ultimate value presuppositions.  So what are 
the values necessarily grounding any possible legal order? Radbruch’s reply was that the highest 
legal value is justice, conceived as “like treatment of like cases.”  As various commentators have 
                                                 
156 Ibid., 38-39. 
157 Ibid., 73; for his explicit disagreement with Jellinek and Kantorowicz (Kelsen is not mentioned here, though 
Radbruch was quite familiar with his major 1911 work), and for his endorsement of Rickert and Lask, see 185.  
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noted, Radbruch drew here on earlier notions of the concept of law than those popular among 
positivist legal theorists or the Baden neo-Kantians, particularly on Aristotelian and early 
modern notions of justice prior to the focus on freedom and contract that gained ground in the 
seventeenth century, though also on Stammler and on Max Weber’s “Rechtsgüterlehre.”
158 
Radbruch often referred to this highest value, justice, as the “Idea of Law” (Rechtsidee); law, 
then, is that area of cultural reality which can be made the object of a judgment of justice or 
injustice; it is that which just law should be, whether it really is just law or not; it is that entity 
(Seinsgebilde) which “serves” the legal value (the “Idea of Law”) as a “substrate” and “stage” 
(Schauplatz).  He offered several other formulations as well.  The purport of all of them is to 
show that the concept of factually existing law is to be distinguished from the value-concept of 
“right law” (richtiges Recht) “but is only producible [gewinnbar] through or out of it” by 
reference to justice.
159 Reference to the value of justice, then, direct or indirect, is necessarily 
presupposed by any possible legal action or idea, and the latter are not conceivable without it. 
But the value itself is purely formal, Radbruch observed: after all, there are many 
different ways of agreeing on what constitutes the like treatment of like cases.
160 Consequently, 
in any possible case of the experience of legal phenomena, we must also presuppose another 
legal value: Zweck or Zweckmässigkeit, that is, purpose or expediency, which gives content to 
the formal value of justice.  Strictly speaking, this is really an aspect of, or sub-value to, that of 
justice—since expediency, insofar as it is a universal value, must also be formal; it is really just a 
clarification of a feature we already know must pertain to justice, namely that it must answer the 
                                                 
158 Von der Pfordten, “Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist,” 397; Dreier and Paulson, “Einf￼hrung in die 
Rechtsphilosophie Radbruchs,” 239; Anton-Hermann Chroust, “The Philosophy of Law of Gustav Radbruch,” 
Philosophical Review 53:1 (1944), 23-45, here p. 31. It should be noted that Lask, too, made reference to the idea of 
justice. 
159 Radbruch, Grundzüge, 39. 
160 For instance, to clarify through a modern example, the arguments for and against affirmative action both argue 
for equal treatment, but disagree about what constitutes equal treatment.  
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question of how to treat like cases alike.  The specific answers provided by different theories of 
the purpose of law cannot claim universality and necessity, and so are not part of the a priori 
concept of law.  But because this is so, a third value, or again properly speaking a third aspect of 
the value of justice, Rechtssicherheit or legal certainty, must also come into play.  If the 
“content” provided to justice through legal expediency cannot be universal, there will be 
disagreement about it, but this is intolerable to the concept of law because a law that changes at 
will cannot be law in the first place.  And so positivity, legal certainty, must be seen as a part of 
justice and therefore of any possible law.  This aspect of Radbruch’s philosophy—the threefold 
nature of the Idea of Law—did not change between 1914 and the 1932 edition of his 
Rechtsphilosophie, and the various articles on the latter edition available in English already 
provide access to the ideas in question, so we need not belabor these points.
161 
  For our purposes, what is most relevant here is the problem raised by expediency.  This 
concept contains the always knotty and troublesome point of intersection between fact and value, 
between the world of universal, formal validity and the real world of actual laws.  Radbruch’s 
solution is to cut this Gordian knot.  He simply acknowledges that rational agreement about the 
“content” for the idea of the law’s purpose will not obtain, and embraces value relativism.  He 
does so on two grounds having to do with the subjectivity of values, both of which we have 
already encountered in previous chapters: emotivism and antinomianism.  Because value choice 
cannot occur in a rationally determined way, science, including legal science, cannot make 
ultimate or axiomatic value choices for the human agent, although it still has a role to play in the 
sphere of value-judgments. 
                                                 
161 See the articles listed in Note 158, as well as Spaak, “Meta-Ethics and Legal Theory,” 268. An excellent recent 
German account of Radbruch’s philosophy in its 1932 form (which again is the same on these points) is Friederike 
Wapler, Werte und das Recht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 192-202.  
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   We have seen that Radbruch was tending toward an emotivist or at the very least a non-
rationalist picture of value-choice even before his Heidelberg years.  This tendency continued 
throughout his early and middle career.  In his important 1906 essay “Die Rechtswissenschaft als 
Rechtsschöpfung” (Legal Science as Law-Creation), his picture of the judge’s decision on a 
“hard case,” where there was no agreement about expediency—about which concrete set of 
values should guide the decision—clearly showed that he regarded the choice as one owing 
ultimately to personal character, sentiment, and will.  We could all agree to strive toward the 
formal value of “right law,” but “which law is right is [a question] determined solely according 
to the norms which the judge carries in his breast… The scientific development [Bearbeitung] 
like the practical application of the law consists, that is, in the clarification, rectification, and 
completion of the positive legal rules in the sense of one’s own value judgments, which make the 
choice between several possible interpretations and between several mutually contradicting legal 
rules and [thus] step into the gaps in [existing] legislation.  And as in each new creation, so in 
this one, the judge and legal theorist is engaged with his whole personality, not just with his 
thinking, but also with his feeling and will.”
162 
This was not just the case for judges, of course.  Later that same year, he wrote to his 
future first wife that different people needed different ethical norms according to their differing 
characters and personality types; the strong personality needed the Christian virtues of goodness 
and humility the way the fearful needed the Nietzschean virtues of “fearless, heedless power.” 
For, he said, “that’s the way it is with ethical norms: they are different for every person,” and 
alike only in that they instruct one to become something other and better than one’s current 
self.
163 The fact that this view was not too far afield from Simmel’s “individual law” is 
                                                 
162 Radbruch, “Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschöpfung,” 365-66. 
163 Radbruch to Linda Götz, 8 December 1906, in Briefe I, 108.  
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emphasized by another letter of the same month to Kantorowicz, where Radbruch remarked that 
he had been reading Simmel’s book Schopenhauer und Nietzsche and was “pleased about our 
methodological kinship with him: how he leads metaphysical questions back, in the end, to the 
difference between typical characters. And [how he] doesn’t see the task of science as being to 
judge between two points of view [Ansichten], but rather to think them all through in all their 
consequences [or consistency]: that’s just what we do with the juristic controversies.”
164 
And this was, indeed, the perspective he carried through into his own interventions in 
legal theory.
165  He enshrined the viewpoint in the opening pages of the Grundzüge, writing: 
“Now, it is a basic idea, to be confirmed in the course of these considerations, that value 
judgments are not capable of being [matters of] knowledge, but only of commitment 
[Bekenntnis]. And so this book—since facing the decisive questions it will again and again have 
to admit the unknowability [Unerkennbarkeit], the mere avowability [Bekennbarkeit] of its 
answers—must begin at once with an unprovable commitment.”
166 This was true even of the 
dualism of fact and value and the doctrine of the impossibility of deriving values from matters of 
fact with which the book began—“one of those opinions [Stellungnahmen] which can’t be 
further substantiated [begründet] but rather may only be more clearly illustrated.”
167 
This is not to say that Radbruch’s conviction of the rightness of value relativism was an 
arbitrary stab-in-the-dark.  If it could not be shown decisively, it could certainly be more clearly 
illustrated, and here Radbruch pointed—like Weber—to signs that the realm of values was an 
antinomian world of conflict and struggle between equally plausible claims.  What was one to 
do, he asked, in cases where different systems of norms or values came into conflict? Should 
                                                 
164 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 29 December 1906, in Briefe I, 109. 
165 See, as he mentions in the letter, his essay on obstetrics and criminal law, which appeared shortly thereafter: 
Geburtshülfe und Strafrecht (Jena: Fischer, 1907), 1-34 passim. 
166 Radbruch, Grundzüge, 2. 
167 Ibid., 3.  
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legal norms win out over customary norms, for instance—should duels, demanded by custom in 
some cases but prohibited by law, be permitted or prohibited? Should a journalist protect his 
sources as demanded by custom or break their silence in giving evidence as demanded by the law 
in criminal cases? “Here several groups of norms of conflicting contents confront one another,” 
Radbruch answered, “neither willing to retire behind the other, each unconditional, ‘categorical,’ 
mandatory.  In such a conflict of groups of norms about their rank-ordering we can only be 
parties to the dispute and never the judge…,” a situation that holds for us just as it did in ancient 
times for Sophocles’ Antigone.
168 
Nor was this true only of individual cases of moral quandary, but of whole systems of 
values.  Radbruch’s remark about Simmel’s procedure in “leading back” to a difference between 
people’s characters was indicative of his position.  Worldviews, which were in effect systems of 
values, could be perfectly internally consistent and yet in utter contrast to other worldviews, as 
they were composed of chains of value judgments that were founded in the last instance on 
competing but axiomatic value choices.  Radbruch, like Weber, loved to contrast religious and 
worldly ethical systems as the prime if certainly not the only instance of such inevitable 
antinomian conflict.  “We are, each, a stage for the apparently unconquerable contradiction 
between two ethical systems: a system of duty and love, of peace and humility, and a system of 
law and honor, of struggle and pride.”
169  
Naturally enough, this problem obtained for Weltanschauungen that took political and 
legal questions into their purview as well as ethical ones.  To provide the law with a specific 
content, with purpose or expediency, was the goal of various ethical and political worldviews 
that faced off in the same way.  He wrote in 1907 that which side one adopted in a disputed legal 
                                                 
168 Radbruch, Einführung, 13. 
169 Radbruch, “ￜber das Rechtsgef￼hl,” Die Tat 6 (1914-15), 337-45, here p. 341. Reprinted in GRGA Vol. 1, 423-
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question “is dependent on ultimate standpoints of worldview, which are the last roots of the 
views struggling against one another in so many legal-scientific controversies: whether one 
assigns the higher value to the interest or the will of the individual, to reason or to freedom, to 
the community or the individual.”
170 Long before he wrote the Grundzüge, Radbruch had 
adopted Lask’s division of goods into the “personal” and the “transpersonal.”  On the matter of 
which value to place first—the development of the individual human personality through culture; 
or the progress and refinement of culture, including the great “causes” and tasks of world history, 
through individuals’ efforts—people could only disagree.
171 These two perspectives, plus the 
addition of a third perspective prioritizing social or communal values, seemed to him to help 
explain the division of the partisan political ideologies that also influenced the question of which 
purpose the law would adopt.
172  Much of the middle section of the Grundzüge is taken up with 
the specific political worldviews of conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and political Catholicism 
and the reflections of the personal or transpersonal ethical systems within them.  We need not 
explore these questions in detail; Radbruch’s position is clear.  Each of the worldviews is 
internally consistent, each claims to stand higher than the others,
173 and their opposition requires 
us to take a position: “reason and science must fall silent before [this opposition]; there is no 
general truth here.” Paraphrasing the Fichte quotation we have encountered several times in 
previous chapters, “what kind of philosophy one picks depends on what kind of a person one is, 
goes a famous saying.”
174 
                                                 
170 Radbruch, Geburtshülfe und Strafrecht, 34. Interestingly, in this case, Radbruch follows this sentence with the 
decision that he will himself abstain from making a judgment in the matter of his topic because of this situation. 
171 See his discussion of these two approaches in Einführung, 13-14 and 120-21; “ￜber den Begriff der Kultur,” 13-
14 [sic]; and Grundzüge, 89-90. 
172 Radbruch, Grundzüge, 95; 125-158 on the political ideologies and the purpose (Zweck) of law. 
173 Ibid., 91. 
174 Radbruch, Einführung, 16.  
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This was pure value relativism, and Radbruch was not shy about saying so.
175 He did 
acknowledge that antinomian conflict might not be the last word about values.  In a long letter to 
Kantorowicz during the stress of wartime service he went so far as to say that in the last analysis, 
the ability to derive all values, without any mutual contradictions, from a single ultimate “value-
axiom” was “an a priori cognitive necessity of any philosophizing.”
176 However, he quickly 
added that it was difficult to see how to prove this, criticized attempts to come prematurely to a 
standpoint of “harmony,” and remarked that one might hope for ultimate reconciliation of values 
but that this was at the very least a non-demonstrable “metaphysical conviction.”
177 Religion and 
metaphysics were legitimate spheres of belief, and might indeed offer a rank-ordering of values, 
but they were not science.
178 
In the absence of such far-off hopes, there were also some risks associated with accepting 
relativism. It could lead to paralyzing uncertainty or indifference, about which Radbruch 
worried, as we saw above.
179 Just as in the individual case, where his solution was to propose a 
courageous and definitive personal decision, so in the legal case, the question of competing 
Rechtszwecke had to be resolved through a willed decision: 
Now, it has proven to be impossible to answer the question as to the purpose of law other than through the 
enumeration of the various party-opinions about it—and the validity of the positive law is founded precisely on this 
impossibility of natural law.  Relativism, until now only the method of our considerations [in the Grundzüge], enters 
at this point as an element [Bauglied] into our system.  The ordering of our communal life [Zusammenlebens] cannot 
be left to the opinions on law of the individuals living together, since these different people may give contradictory 
directives; it must much rather be regulated by a supra-individual authority [Instanz]. As, however, reason and 
                                                 
175 Radbruch, Grundzüge, 24ff. 
176 Radbruch to Kantorowicz, 17 May 1917, in Briefe I, 242. 
177 Ibid., 242-43. 
178 Radbruch, “ￜber den Begriff der Kultur,” 14. 
179 See, e.g., Radbruch, Innere Weg, 65; Radbruch to Lydia Radbruch, 2 April 1917, in Briefe I, 235.  
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science cannot execute this task, will and power must take it over: if no one is able to ascertain what is just, then 
someone must determine [festsetzen] what shall be right.
180 
  This was the role of the third element of the tripartite “Idea of Law”: the value of legal 
certainty.  Because of the “conflict of individual views of justice,” that is, regarding purpose or 
“content,” legal certainty represented the most immediate, pressing task of any legal order, which 
was to end this conflict “through an authentic decision [authentische Entscheidung].”
181 No legal 
order, no pursuit of the value of justice, was possible in the absence of a way of establishing the 
law beyond the whims or worldviews of given individual citizens.  For Radbruch, the authority 
imposed by legal certainty should not just be the arbitrary imposition of power, despite the 
affinities of this line of argument with those or Hobbes or later Schmitt.  Even if legal philosophy 
as theoretical reason cannot answer questions of the validity of values, it still “lays all possible 
objects of evaluation out for choice before the practical reason of the individual—that is, not so 
much for his arbitrary will [Belieben], but rather for his conscience.”
182 Rather than the 
despairing genuflection before power, as in Pilate’s “what is truth?”, Radbruch insists, relativism 
leads one to adopt the mentality of Lessing’s Nathan the Wise, wherein the silence of theoretical 
reason is a strong call to practical reason.
183  But the philosophical substance of this insistence is 
limited as we have seen by the fact that for Radbruch, matters of conscience and character, while 
they may carry ultimate conviction for one person in the manner of Simmel’s “individual law,” 
are without necessary and rigorous persuasive power for those other than the deciding individual 
or authority. 
  This analysis completed the architecture of Radbruch’s legal philosophy, with its fact-
value dualism, its antinomianism and value relativism, and its insistence that reason and legal 
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182 Ibid., 28. 
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science cannot answer normative questions but must delegate the task to the individual will and 
its non-rational if not irrational decision.  Yet Radbruch is left with some problems.  For 
instance, the three values or three aspects of justice that make up the Idea of Law can come into 
conflict with one another like any other values with claims to be categorical, and this conflict 
cannot be resolved for good and all.  How does Radbruch’s philosophy equip the jurist to judge 
between the needs of justice, purpose, and certainty when they do not coincide? What, for 
instance of a situation in which a positive, legally certain law with a specific purpose 
nevertheless appears unjust—a Schandgesetz? There can be no universally valid answer to this 
question, Radbruch thought, for the reasons he had already given.  “That it cannot be answered 
generally was shown; it can only be decided from case to case, now in one, now in the other 
direction [Sinne]; this decision is, however, to be obtained through the goal [Zweck] common to 
justice and legal certainty, through investigating whether greater harm accrues to this goal in the 
given case from disregard of the positivity or through disregard of the injustice [sic] of the legal 
rule.”
184 This answer—solving the problem of conflict differently at different times, in different 
cases—is no doubt inevitable given Radbruch’s assumptions, and it is certainly accurately 
descriptive of legal practice.  It is not really philosophically satisfying, however, not least 
because it begs the question of which value-standard to apply to determine what constitutes the 
“greater harm” in a given case.  Relativism was supposed to be confined to the question of what 
content to give to the purpose of law, and not to spread to the question of whether justice is in 
fact a priori the highest, necessary value for any legal order. 
Perhaps an even larger problem is raised by the task of keeping legal science scientific 
(going by Radbruch’s assumptions).  Does he not reduce Rechtswissenschaft to mere personal 
decision and opinion? 
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  Radbruch was quite clear that he intended legal science to provide knowledge 
(Erkenntnis), not just commitment (Bekenntnis).
185 In other words, he had to deal with the 
problem of scientific objectivity.  There were certain things that science could clearly do in 
addressing value questions even if values were ultimately only subjective, and we have 
encountered these things before.  “The scientific ascertainment of ultimate ends [Zwecke] is 
indeed impossible, but the scientific identification of the appropriate means to the achievement 
of an end once selected is most definitely conceivable. Thus two soluble assignments remain for 
a scientific consideration of legal values [Rechtswertbetrachtung].” The first was, of course, to 
investigate the right means to the goals given by a particular doctrine of expediency or purpose; 
in this capacity, science was policy science, “the science of the possible,” finding ways of 
creating the conditions for compromise between parties so as to move forward toward the 
purpose set for it.
186 
The second assignment was to check on the internal consistency of one’s value system, 
and thereby at least “scientifically [to] prepare the personal decision” about legal purpose that 
was necessary.  Scientific consideration could do this “by bringing to mind the general maxims 
through which each political declaration [Aussage], action, or institution is put into use and so 
tacitly affirmed; that is, by clarifying their political consequences, their presuppositions derived 
from worldviews, and finally their systematic relationship to other political convictions.  It will 
think the legal purpose [Rechtszweck] at hand through to the end, in the sense of immanent 
internal consistency [Widerspruchslosigkeit]…”
187 In keeping with this goal, it could observe 
whether the necessary means were aligned with or in contrast with the values presupposed by the 
ultimate goal, and could ask the “Kantian-formulated question” of how this legal goal or purpose 
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was possible: “which presuppositions must one recognize in order to recognize this legal purpose 
in a consistent way?” Indeed, legal philosophy could do this systematically for all possible legal-
political (rechtspolitische) perspectives.  Even from a value-relativist standpoint, the scholar 
could achieve a considerable amount of scientific objectivity, provided he “emphasized 
conscientiously and everywhere the boundary between knowledge and commitment,” and that he 
“presented the relationship of his commitment on all sides to other possible commitments.”
188 If, 
in sum, legal science could permit scholars of all different moral or political views to agree on 
judgments of means and judgments of internal consistency of value systems, it could not be 
dismissed as mere opinion or commitment.  To take an example from Radbruch’s criminal law 
interests, a jurist might disagree with his colleagues that the purpose of criminal punishment 
should be the deterrence of crime instead of the reformation of the criminal, but all jurists ought 
to be able to agree on how to formulate a statute so that it was in fact maximally suited to deter 
crime in a given social setting. 
  This answer to the question about what made legal knowledge more substantive than 
personal opinion put to rest, as it had done for Weber, and to a lesser extent Tönnies, some of the 
nagging worries about objectivity in the human sciences given the assumption of the subjectivity 
and omnipresence of value judgments.  But another question still loomed.  For Weber the 
problem at this point had been that scholars (let us say, historians) might not agree on the value-
criterion for what makes an individual, event, or other cultural object historically significant (see 
Chapter 1 above) unless values were indeed universally valid, and that this threatened objectivity 
for value-relativists at a level beyond the determination of means to ends.  It threatened the very 
conception of universally agreed-upon facts in the cultural or historical sciences.  Such a 
problem might well also arise for Radbruch—it is closely related to the first problem we 
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considered, regarding the possible conflict between the highest legal values of justice, purpose, 
and positivity.  If some of these phenomena were present without others in a given case, perhaps 
legal scholars would disagree about what constitutes a legal fact in that case.  But let us say that 
we accept Radbruch’s solution that these three values are in fact aspects of one purely formal 
value, justice, to which any possible legal phenomenon must refer, and that therefore no scholar 
will be in doubt about the phenomenon’s legal character if it makes reference to any notion of 
justice whatsoever.  The question is not, then, one of gaining universal scholarly acceptance of 
the specifically legal significance of a phenomenon.  Even if we grant all this, however, there is 
still a problem with the objectivity of legal science for Radbruch. 
This problem is that the task of legal science seems to be not just to mark out the domain 
of significant legal facts, but to remain objective or impartial in the application of justice, to 
make objective judgments according to legal rules rather than to personal opinions.  How can a 
judge’s judgment be the deployment of objective knowledge if value judgments must enter into 
it? 
  The theory of “conceptual jurisprudence” we have encountered in the previous chapter 
provided a theory of how objective application of legal knowledge in judging cases might be 
possible, provided that one simply accepted the legitimacy of the entire legal order.  (It could not 
address “Jellinek’s paradox” or answer the question of the Grundnorm, to use Kelsen’s 
terminology.) It was simply that any new exigencies could be faced by using the tools of legal 
science to deduce rules covering these situations from the preexisting concepts provided by the 
far-seeing original legislator—no matter how novel the situation.  This led to the idea of a 
“gapless” law.  The judge, then, needed merely to be an “automaton,” in the picture preferred by 
Radbruch, Kantorowicz, and the Free Law movement: a “subsumption-apparatus, a judgment- 
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machine, a legal vending machine.”
189 Less amusingly stated, the judge could simply be a legal 
scholar who was empowered to render judgment, using the standard value-relating cultural 
scientific approach to find the “facts” (in this case, those legal rules which were applicable in the 
given situation), and acting in the precise way that any other judge would act in that situation.  
Thus, the law could be applied objectively. 
Had Radbruch accepted this model, it would have fit with the possibility of an objective 
cultural science of the facts of the law, relating aspects of reality to the formal legal values in 
such a way as to pick them out as significant legal phenomena, and there would be no concern 
about a loss of scientific status for legal science.  But he did not find this picture plausible. “In 
formulating a statute, just who could avoid all contradiction with any of the impossibly many 
earlier-issued legal norms?” he asked, and provided as well some examples showing the 
implausibility of the idea of having a given statute in effect decide all cases in advance.
190 The 
judge could not simply engage in what Radbruch termed “philological interpretation”—namely, 
the attempt to find out what the past meaning of a law had been, whether it was sensible or not, 
contradictory or not.  He also had the obligation to deal with the case before him no matter what: 
even if the results of legal science showed that the existing law was flawed, conflicted, or did not 
extend to cover the present case.
191 If the law was not “gapless,” then, the judge had to fill it 
somehow, and as we have seen, for Radbruch in the end he could not use “reason” or “science” 
but only his own conviction as to what was right.  There was, in short, no way to avoid seeing 
the judge as a lawmaker rather than a technician, a result that violated the separation of powers 
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doctrine.
192  And it also seemed to cast doubt on the possibility of separating law from politics, 
and factual judgments (about what the law in a given case in fact was) from value judgments. 
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Chapter 6. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The five scholars considered at length in the preceding chapters have emerged as 
sophisticated theorists of “value-free” social science, including the social science of law.  Many 
of them knew each other and saw each other as allies.  But they came from very different 
backgrounds and faced discipline-specific problems, the common elements of which might not 
be readily apparent.  They were often drawn to different elements of the value-freedom 
“complex” itself, whether to the distinctions between theory and practice, fact and value, Is and 
Ought, or to the means-ends thinking of a positive (non-normative) social science.  However 
important neo-Kantianism is for understanding several of these thinkers, it cannot be regarded as 
the singular conceptual foundation that underlies value-freedom.  The latter is, and was, too 
readily reached by other intellectual means.  Nor can the influence of Max Weber explain the 
spread of the value-freedom idea, as it often developed independently of and well before his own 
formulations.  Further, can one cannot dismiss the notion of value-freedom as a political doctrine 
appropriate only to those who support a given social or political order: the political and 
intellectual variety of the thinkers considered here shows this subsequent twentieth-century 
assertion to be curiously off the mark.  True, it is not a doctrine likely to appeal to those who 
believe that they have found the one and only answer, and the absence of members of the 
extreme left or right from our group is not coincidental; however, neither is it accurate to portray 
value-freedom as, necessarily, liberal politics by other means. 
But despite their intellectual differences, our group of five all shared two major beliefs: 
that social science should accept the domain of human intentions, meanings, goals, and values 
into its kingdom, and that in that domain value subjectivism was lord.  
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  Subjectivism of this sort, the commitment to the non-rational nature of evaluative 
judgments, brought with it two main problems.  First, there was the problem—simultaneously 
theoretical and, for several of these thinkers, personal—that in the absence of rational claims of 
any kind for evaluative judgments about ends or goals, programmatic principles, or concepts of 
the good, it was an open question how such goals or principles should be determined.  These 
thinkers were not attracted by alternative answers such as that goals and “true” (valid) values 
were set by God or by the authority of tradition, but they could not avoid the question of how the 
inevitable normative element of human actions was to be grounded.  Values must “come” from 
somewhere, as they are presupposed in any goal-directed activity, even the most basic (mere 
physiological needs-satisfaction, for instance, implies its own very basic value set).  That is, this 
was a “forced option,” in the terminology of William James, where even passivity implied a 
choice.  The path taken by these thinkers, more or less explicitly in individual cases, was to see 
valuation as a matter first of the individually willed, basically emotive selection of a fundamental 
or axiomatic value set, and subsequently of the internal consistency of all other valuations within 
a coherent worldview deriving from that set.  Attempts, such as Tönnies’, to view such choices 
as commonly or intersubjectively understandable nonetheless presupposed a justificatory final 
grounding in the inner life of the individual.  None of these thinkers relied upon any really 
existing extra-individual authority, whether church or party. 
  Second, when coupled with the rejection of simplistic positivist claims about the 
exclusion of all values from social science, their subjectivism led them to confront the problem 
of explaining how objective statements could be made by social scientists at all.  Most of them in 
fact failed to reconcile their explicit commitments to objectivity, their value subjectivism, and 
their acknowledgement of the role of values in social scientific explanation.  In the course of  
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trying to do so, they quite commonly developed the arguments, traditionally seen as Weberian, 
about what practical actions a “value-free” science could yet take (means-ends selection, the 
internal consistency of ideals, and so forth), but they did not secure the “factual” or “theoretical” 
side of the distinction from the threat of subjectivity.  Their virtue, as it were, in taking human 
mental states and intentions seriously and thereby rejecting positivism, would appear to have cost 
them a solid grounding for the objectivity of their disciplines.  Whether the distinction took the 
form of the normative and factual sides of the state; the duty of the judge and the factual, cultural 
science of law; or the contrast between theoretical economics and economic policymaking, their 
distinctions ultimately relied upon a secure grounding in the “facts.”  It is precisely such secure 
facts, and secure theories based upon them, that the philosophers we discussed in Chapter 1 
called into question.  The failure of the value-freedom advocates lay not in their analytical 
distinctions, nor in their analysis of values, but in the assumption that universal rationality or 
some secure “fact” lay at the end of their chains of justification, in the same way that an 
ungrounded value lay at the other. 
What of the answer to the objectivity problem raised by those who did not fall back upon 
an “ascetic” version of objectivity for the inquiring scholar? There was, as we saw, a suggestion 
in Jellinek that objectivity might be better conceived as a process than as a state, or as a virtue. 
He shared this view with his Heidelberg colleague, Weber, although neither man elaborated an 
extensive theory on the basis of his position.  For Jellinek, the competition of free minds, 
thriving in an environment of academic freedom, seemed to provide a kind of selective 
mechanism – not unlike evolution in the biological world – that would drive science to adapt to 
reality despite the unavoidability of subjective value judgments.  
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  It is not entirely clear why the notion of value-freedom arose just when it did, but what is 
clear is that the distinctions normally identified with it—Is/Ought, theory/practice, fact/value—
did not by themselves lead to the notion of a value-free science.  These doctrines were perfectly 
compatible with a commitment to one of the older moral sciences, as in the case of a historical 
economist like Roscher; or to a theory of objective values as in Windelband and Rickert.  Our 
conception of value-freedom must, thus, be widened to include value subjectivism as a core 
component.  And as this dissertation has suggested, it also ought to include a commitment to an 
“interpretive” social science or cultural science.  In the German-speaking intellectual world 
between 1880 and 1914, value-freedom set its adherents apart not only from historicists but from 
positivists. 
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